Language Signaling High Proportions and Generics Lead to Generalizing,but Not Essentializing,for Novel Social Kinds

Generics (e.g., “Dogs bark”) are thought by many to lead to essentializing: to assuming that members of the same category share an internal property that causally grounds shared behaviors and traits, even without evidence of such a shared property. Similarly, generics are thought to increase generalizing, that is, attributing properties to other members of the same group given evidence that some members of the group have the property. However, it is not clear from past research what underlies the capacity of generic language to increase essentializing and generalizing. Is it specific to generics, or are there broader mechanisms at work, such as the fact that generics are terms that signal high proportions? Study 1 (100 5–6 year-olds, 140 adults) found that neither generics, nor high-proportion quantifiers (“most,” “many”) elicited essentializing about a novel social kind (Zarpies). However, both generics and high-proportion quantifiers led adults and, to a lesser extent, children, to generalize, with high-proportion quantifiers doing so more than generics for adults. Specifics (“this”) did not protect against either essentializing or generalizing when compared to the quantifier “some.” Study 2 (100 5–6 year-olds, 112 adults) found that neither generics nor visual imagery signaling high proportions led to essentializing. While generics increased generalizing compared to specifics and visual imagery signaling both low and high proportions for adults, there was no difference in generalizing for children. Our findings suggest high-proportion quantifiers, including generics, lead adults, and to some extent children, to generalize, but not essentialize, about novel social kinds.     

Normative Social Role Concepts in Early Childhood

The current studies (N = 255, children ages 4–5 and adults) explore patterns of age‐related continuity and change in conceptual representations of social role categories (e.g., “scientist”). In Study 1, young children's judgments of category membership were shaped by both category labels and category‐normative traits, and the two were dissociable, indicating that even young children's conceptual representations for some social categories have a “dual character.” In Study 2, when labels and traits were contrasted, adults and children based their category‐based induction decisions on category‐normative traits rather than labels. Study 3 confirmed that children reason based on category‐normative traits because they view them as an obligatory part of category membership. In contrast, adults in this study viewed the category‐normative traits as informative on their own (not only as a cue to obligations). Implications for continuity and change in representations of social role categories will be discussed.     

Children's (and Adults') Production Adjustments to Generic and Particular Listener Needs

Adults design utterances to match listeners' informational needs by making both “generic” adjustments (e.g., mentioning atypical more often than typical information) and “particular” adjustments tailored to their specific interlocutor (e.g., including things that their addressee cannot see). For children, however, relevant evidence is mixed. Three experiments investigated how generic and particular factors affect children's production. In Experiment 1, 4‐ to 5‐year‐old children and adults described typical and atypical instrument events to a silent listener who could either see or not see the events. In later extensions, participants described the same events to either a silent (Experiment 2) or an interactive (Experiment 3) addressee with a specific goal. Both adults and 4‐ to 5‐year‐olds performed generic adjustments but, unlike adults, children made listener‐particular adjustments inconsistently. These and prior findings can be explained by assuming that particular adjustments can be costlier for children to implement compared to generic adjustments.     

Essentialist Beliefs About Bodily Transplants in the United States and India

Psychological essentialism is the belief that some internal, unseen essence or force determines the common outward appearances and behaviors of category members. We investigated whether reasoning about transplants of bodily elements showed evidence of essentialist thinking. Both Americans and Indians endorsed the possibility of transplants conferring donors' personality, behavior, and luck on recipients, consistent with essentialism. Respondents also endorsed essentialist effects even when denying that transplants would change a recipient's category membership (e.g., predicting that a recipient of a pig's heart would act more pig‐like but denying that the recipient would become a pig). This finding runs counter to predictions from the strongest version of the “minimalist” position (Strevens,2000), an alternative to essentialism. Finally, studies asking about a broader range of donor‐to‐recipient transfers indicated that Indians essentialized more types of transfers than Americans, but neither sample essentialized monetary transfer. This suggests that results from bodily transplant conditions reflect genuine essentialism rather than broader magical thinking.     

Why are dunkels sticky? Preschoolers infer functionality and intentional creation for artifact properties learned from generic language

Artifacts pose a potential learning problem for children because the mapping between their features and their functions is often not transparent. In solving this problem, children are likely to rely on a number of information sources (e.g., others’ actions, affordances). We argue that children’s sensitivity to nuances in the language used to describe artifacts is an important, but so far unacknowledged, piece of this puzzle. Specifically, we hypothesize that children are sensitive to whether an unfamiliar artifact’s features are highlighted using generic (e.g., “Dunkels are sticky”) or non-generic (e.g., “This dunkel is sticky”) language. Across two studies, older—but not younger—preschoolers who heard such features introduced via generic statements inferred that they are a functional part of the artifact’s design more often than children who heard the same features introduced via non-generic statements. The ability to pick up on this linguistic cue may expand considerably the amount of conceptual information about artifacts that children derive from conversations with adults.     

You'll change more than I will: Adults’ predictions about their own and others’ future preferences

It has been argued that adults underestimate the extent to which their preferences will change over time. We sought to determine whether such mispredictions are the result of a difficulty imagining that one's own current and future preferences may differ or whether it also characterizes our predictions about the future preferences of others. We used a perspective-taking task in which we asked young people how much they liked stereotypically young-person items (e.g., Top 40 music, adventure vacations) and stereotypically old-person items (e.g., jazz, playing bridge) now, and how much they would like them in the distant future (i.e., when they are 70 years old). Participants also made these same predictions for a generic same-age, same-sex peer. In a third condition, participants predicted how much a generic older (i.e., age 70) same-sex adult would like items from both categories today. Participants predicted less change between their own current and future preferences than between the current and future preferences of a peer. However, participants estimated that, compared to a current older adult today, their peer would like stereotypically young items more in the future and stereotypically old items less. The fact that peers’ distant-future estimated preferences were different from the ones they made for “current” older adults suggests that even though underestimation of change of preferences over time is attenuated when thinking about others, a bias still exists.     

The organization of words and environmental sounds in the second year: Behavioral and electrophysiological evidence

The majority of research examining early auditory‐semantic processing and organization is based on studies of meaningful relations between words and referents. However, a thorough investigation into the fundamental relation between acoustic signals and meaning requires an understanding of how meaning is associated with both lexical and non‐lexical sounds. Indeed, it is unknown how meaningful auditory information that is not lexical (e.g., environmental sounds) is processed and organized in the young brain. To capture the structure of semantic organization for words and environmental sounds, we record event‐related potentials as 20‐month‐olds view images of common nouns (e.g., dog) while hearing words or environmental sounds that match the picture (e.g., “dog” or barking), that are within‐category violations (e.g., “cat” or meowing), or that are between‐category violations (e.g., “pen” or scribbling). Results show both words and environmental sounds exhibit larger negative amplitudes to between‐category violations relative to matches. Unlike words, which show a greater negative response early and consistently to within‐category violations, such an effect for environmental sounds occurs late in semantic processing. Thus, as in adults, the young brain represents semantic relations between words and between environmental sounds, though it more readily differentiates semantically similar words compared to environmental sounds.     

This cat has nine lives? Children's memory for genericity in language

Generic noun phrases ("Birds lay eggs") are important for expressing knowledge about abstract kinds. The authors hypothesized that genericity would be part of gist memory, such that young children would appropriately recall whether sentences were presented as generic or specific. In 4 experiments, preschoolers and college students (N = 280) heard a series of sentences in either generic form (e.g., "Bears climb trees") or specific form (e.g., "This bear climbs trees") and were asked to recall the sentences following a 4-min distractor task. Participants in all age groups correctly distinguished between generic and specific noun phrases (NPs) in their recall, even when forgetting the details of the NP form. Memory for predicate content (e.g., "climb trees") was largely unaffected by genericity, although memory for category labels (e.g., "bear") was at times better for those who heard sentences with generic wording. Overall, these results suggest that generic form is maintained in long-term memory even for young children and thus may serve as the foundation for constructing knowledge about kinds.     

Reasoning about knowledge: Children’s evaluations of generality and verifiability

In a series of experiments, we examined 3- to 8-year-old children’s (N = 223) and adults’ (N = 32) use of two properties of testimony to estimate a speaker’s knowledge: generality and verifiability. Participants were presented with a “Generic speaker” who made a series of 4 general claims about “pangolins” (a novel animal kind), and a “Specific speaker” who made a series of 4 specific claims about “this pangolin” as an individual. To investigate the role of verifiability, we systematically varied whether the claim referred to a perceptually-obvious feature visible in a picture (e.g., “has a pointy nose”) or a non-evident feature that was not visible (e.g., “sleeps in a hollow tree”). Three main findings emerged: (1) young children showed a pronounced reliance on verifiability that decreased with age. Three-year-old children were especially prone to credit knowledge to speakers who made verifiable claims, whereas 7- to 8-year-olds and adults credited knowledge to generic speakers regardless of whether the claims were verifiable; (2) children’s attributions of knowledge to generic speakers was not detectable until age 5, and only when those claims were also verifiable; (3) children often generalized speakers’ knowledge outside of the pangolin domain, indicating a belief that a person’s knowledge about pangolins likely extends to new facts. Findings indicate that young children may be inclined to doubt speakers who make claims they cannot verify themselves, as well as a developmentally increasing appreciation for speakers who make general claims.     

The Role of Executive Function and Theory of Mind in Pragmatic Computations

In sentences such as “Some dogs are mammals,” the literal semantic meaning (“Some and possibly all dogs are mammals”) conflicts with the pragmatic meaning (“Not all dogs are mammals,” known as a scalar implicature). Prior work has shown that adults vary widely in the extent to which they adopt the semantic or pragmatic meaning of such utterances, yet the underlying reason for this variation is unknown. Drawing on theoretical models of scalar implicature derivation, we explore the hypothesis that the cognitive abilities of executive function (EF) and theory of mind (ToM) contribute to this observed variation. In Experiment 1, we show that individuals with better ToM are more likely to compute a scalar implicature and adopt the pragmatic meaning of an utterance; however, EF makes no unique contribution to scalar implicature comprehension after accounting for ToM. In Experiment 2, we replicate this finding and assess whether it generalizes to the comprehension of other pragmatic phenomena such as indirect requests (e.g., “It's hot in here” uttered to ask for something to be done) and metaphor (e.g., “to harvest courage”). This is the first evidence that differences in ToM are associated with pragmatic competence in neurotypical adults across distinct pragmatic phenomena.     

Naming solids and nonsolids: Children's default construals

Four experiments used a free-naming task to examine children's and adults' default construals of solids and nonsolids. In Experiment 1,4-year-old children viewed entities presented in familiar geometric shapes (e.g., square, triangle), without touching them. One half saw solids (e.g., a square made of wood); the other half saw nonsol ids matched carefully in shape (e.g., a square with the same dimensions but made of peanut butter). To tap their default construals, children were simply asked, “What is that?” Answers varied sharply with the type of stimulus. If the entity was solid, children tended to provide an individual-related word (e.g., “a square”), even if they also knew a substance-related word (e.g., “wood”). But if the stimulus was nonsolid, children tended to give a substance-related word (e.g., “peanut butter”), even if they also knew an individual-related word (e.g., “a square”). These words were usually common nouns produced in appropriate sentential contexts, suggesting that 4-year-olds represented the words as naming kinds. The same pattern of results obtained in Experiments 2 and 3, which were modified replications of Experiment 1. The results of Experiment 4 replicated the main findings of Experiment 1 using adults as participants. The studies suggest that, as a default, 4-year-olds conceptualize solids and nonsolids in (a) fundamentally distinct, (b) kind-based (rather than perceptual property-based), and (c) adult-like ways.     

The privileging of ‘Support-From-Below’ in early spatial language acquisition

Spatial terms that encode support (e.g., “on”, in English) are among the first to be understood by children across languages (e.g., Bloom, 1973; Johnston & Slobin, 1979). Such terms apply to a wide variety of support configurations, including Support-From-Below (SFB; cup on table) and Mechanical Support, such as stamps on envelopes, coats on hooks, etc. Research has yet to delineate infants’ semantic space for the term “on” when considering its full range of usage. Do infants initially map “on” to a very broad, highly abstract category – one including cups on tables, stamps on envelopes, etc.? Or do infants begin with a much more restricted interpretation - mapping “on” to certain configurations over others? Much infant cognition research suggests that SFB is an event category that infants learn about early - by five months of age (Baillargeon & DeJong, 2017) - raising the possibility that they may also begin by interpreting the word “on” as referring to configurations like cups on tables, rather than stamps on envelopes. Further, studies examining language production suggests that children and adults map the basic locative expression (BE on, in English) to SFB over Mechanical Support (Landau et al., 2016). We tested the hypothesis that this ‘privileging’ of SFB in early infant cognition and child and adult language also characterizes infants’ language comprehension. Using the Intermodal-Preferential-Looking-Paradigm in combination with infant eye-tracking, 20-month-olds were presented with two support configurations: SFB and Mechanical, Support-Via-Adhesion (henceforth, SVA). Infants preferentially mapped “is on” to SFB (rather than SVA) suggesting that infants differentiate between two quite different kinds of support configurations when mapping spatial language to these two configurations and more so, that SFB is privileged in early language understanding of the English spatial term “on”.     

Object specificity and personal relevance in long-term visual remembering

The personal relevance of an object is multi-faceted, each facet being capable of contributing to the effects on object memory attributed to personal relevance. An object's status as an individual object (object specificity), rather than just a category of object, is one such facet and its impact on the long-term visual remembering of everyday objects is assessed in two experiments. Images and drawings were produced under generic (e.g., “Please draw a bed”) and personal exemplar (e.g., “Please draw your bed”) instructions, and participants indicated the degree to which the image on which their drawing was based was of a specific object or a generic object. Object specificity induced a sense of time and place for a remembered object, the most recent encounter with the object being most salient. Other aspects of personal relevance collectively facilitated the retrieval of an object's category-irrelevant features (thereby increasing the vividness of the object image), the other objects with which it was seen, and a more general episodic sense of place. Against a broader theoretical perspective, it is proposed that visual episodic memory and visual knowledge are primary sources of information for specific personally relevant objects and generic objects, respectively.     

Even frequent and expected words are not identified without spatial attention

Previous studies have disagreed about the extent to which people extract meaning from words presented outside the focus of spatial attention. The present study examined a possible explanation for such discrepancies inspired by attenuation theory: Unattended words can be read more automatically when they are expected within a given context (e.g., due to frequent repetition). We presented a brief prime word in lowercase, followed by a target word in uppercase. Participants indicated whether the target word belonged to a particular category (e.g., “sports”). When we used a visual cue to draw attention to the location of the prime word, it produced substantial priming effects on target responses (i.e., especially fast responses when the prime and target words were identical or from the same category). When prime words were not attended, however, they produced no priming effects. This finding replicated even when there were only four words, each repeated 160 times during the experiment. It appears that very little word processing is possible without spatial attention, even for words that are expected and frequently presented.     

Spendthrifts and Tightwads in Childhood: Feelings about Spending Predict Children's Financial Decision Making

Adults differ in the extent to which they find spending money to be distressing; “tightwads” find spending money painful, and “spendthrifts” do not find spending painful enough. This affective dimension has been reliably measured in adults and predicts a variety of important financial behaviors and outcomes (e.g., saving behavior and credit scores). Although children's financial behavior has also received attention, feelings about spending have not been studied in children, as they have in adults. We measured the spendthrift–tightwad (ST–TW) construct in children for the first time, with a sample of 5‐ to 10‐year‐old children (N = 225). Children across the entire age range were able to reliably report on their affective responses to spending and saving, and children's ST–TW scores were related to parent reports of children's temperament and financial behavior. Further, children's ST–TW scores were predictive of whether they chose to save or spend money in the lab, even after controlling for age and how much they liked the offered items. Our novel findings—that children's feelings about spending and saving can be measured from an early age and relate to their behavior with money—are discussed with regard to theoretical and practical implications. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Human and Global Identities: Different Prototypical Meanings of All-Inclusive Identities

The impact of identities encompassing all human beings (e.g., human and/or global identities) on intergroup relations is complex, with studies showing mostly positive (e.g., less dehumanization), but also negative (e.g., deflected responsibility for harm behavior), effects. However, different labels and measures have been used to examine the effects of these all-inclusive superordinate identities, without a systematic empirical examination of the extent to which they overlap or differ in their sociopsychological prototypical content. This study examined whether different labels activate the same contents in laypeople's conceptualization. Two hundred and forty-eight participants openly described one of six labels: “All humans everywhere”; “People all over the world”; “People from different countries around the world”; “Global citizens”; “Citizens of the world”; and “Members of world community.” Results from quantitative content analyses showed that the different labels activated different thematic attributes, representing differences in their core prototypical meaning. We propose that a general distinction should be made between labels that define membership based on human attributes (e.g., biological attributes) and those that evoke attributes characteristic of membership in a global political community (e.g., attitudinal attributes), as their effect on intergroup relations may vary accordingly.     

Establishing equivalence–equivalence analogical relations via tact and listener training

We investigated the role of verbal behavior on the emergence of analogy-type responding as measured via equivalence–equivalence relations. In Experiment 1, 8 college students learned to label arbitrary stimuli as, “vek,” “zog,” and “paf”, and in Experiment 2, 8 additional participants learned to select these stimuli when hearing their names in an auditory–visual matching-to-sample (MTS) task. Experimenters tested for the emergence of relational tacts (i.e., “same” and “different”) and equivalence–equivalence relations (analogy tests) via visual–visual MTS. Half of the participants were exposed to a think-aloud procedure. Even though they all passed analogy tests while tacting stimuli relationally, only participants exposed to tact training (Experiment 1) did so without the need for remediation. The results of these experiments confirm that individual discriminative and relational control of stimuli established through verbal behavior training is sufficient to produce equivalence–equivalence analogical responding, advancing the analysis of complex cognitive (problem-solving) phenomena.     

材料呈现方式对不同音乐训练经验的汉语儿童英语言语记忆的影响

选取受过音乐训练和未受过音乐训练的汉语儿童为被试,在同一呈现速率条件下以歌曲、韵律和朗读三种方式呈现一段英文材料,从单词、句子和篇章三个层面探讨音乐训练经验和材料呈现方式对第二语言言语记忆的影响。结果发现：1）音乐组的记忆成绩高于非音乐组;2）相比于朗读材料,儿童对于歌曲和韵律材料的记忆效果更好;3）在单词和句子层面,音乐组和非音乐组的差异主要体现在歌曲材料上,而篇章层面没有类似发现。该结果表明音乐训练和材料呈现方式均能影响儿童的第二语言言语记忆,并且音乐训练效应对材料呈现方式表现出选择性     

The Formal Structure of Kind Representations

Kind representations, concepts like table, triangle, dog, and planet, underlie generic language. Here, we investigate the formal structure of kind representations—the structure that distinguishes kind representations from other types of representations. The present studies confirm that participants distinguish generic-supporting properties of individuals (e.g., this watch is made of steel) and accidental properties (e.g., this watch is on the nightstand). Furthermore, work dating back to Aristotle establishes that only some generic-supporting properties bear a principled connection to the kind, that is, are true of an individual by virtue of its being a member of a specific kind (e.g., telling time for a watch). The present studies tested the hypothesis that principled connections are part of the formal structure of kind representations. Specifically, they tested whether they structure a newly learned kind representation. Experiment 1 found that introducing a property of a newly encountered novel kind in any one of four linguistic frames that provide evidence that a property has a principled connection to a kind (e.g., “It has fur because it is a blick”) led participants to infer a different conceptual consequence of principled connections (i.e., “There is something wrong with this blick, which does not have fur”) for which they had no direct evidence. Two introduction frames that provided no evidence for principled connections (e.g., “Almost all blicks have fur”) did not generate the same consequence. Experiment 2 found that all of the targeted properties were generic licensing, irrespective of the introduction frame. That the distinction between properties that bear principled connections to their kinds, and merely generic-supporting properties structures novel kind representations, provides strong evidence that this distinction is part of the formal structure of kind representations.