Metacognition of agency and theory of mind in adults with high functioning autism

We investigated metacognition of agency in adults with high functioning autism or Asperger Syndrome (HFA/AS) using a computer task in which participants moved the mouse to get the cursor to touch the downward moving X’s and avoid the O’s. They were then asked to make judgments of performance and judgments of agency. Objective control was either undistorted, or distorted by adding turbulence (i.e., random noise) or a time Lag between the mouse and cursor movements. Participants with HFA/AS used sensorimotor cues available in the turbulence and lag conditions to a lesser extent than control participants in making their judgments of agency. Furthermore, the failure to use these internal diagnostic cues to their own agency was correlated with decrements in a theory of mind task. These findings suggest that a reduced sensitivity to veridical internal cues about the sense of agency is related to mentalizing impairments in autism.     

Metacognition of agency

The feeling that we are agents, intentionally making things happen by our own actions, is foundational to our understanding of ourselves as humans. People's metacognitions of agency were investigated in 4 experiments. Participants played a game in which they tried to touch downward scrolling Xs and avoid touching Os. Variables that affected accuracy included speed of the scroll, density of the targets, and feedback. Of central interest were variables directed not only at accuracy but also at people's control: the turbulence of the cursor and how close the cursor had to come to the target for a hit (i.e., "magic"). After each trial, people made judgments of agency or judgments of performance. People were selectively sensitive to the variables to which they should be responsive in agency monitoring--whether the cursor moved in close synchrony to their movements and whether targets disappeared by magic. People knew, separably from their objective or judged performance, when they were in control and when they were not. These results indicate that people can sensitively monitor their own agency.     

The influence of performance on action-effect integration in sense of agency

Sense of agency refers to the subjective feeling of being able to control an outcome through one’s own actions or will. Prior studies have shown that both sensory processing (e.g., comparisons between sensory feedbacks and predictions basing on one’s motor intentions) and high-level cognitive/constructive processes (e.g., inferences based on one’s performance or the consequences of one’s actions) contribute to judgments of sense of agency. However, it remains unclear how these two types of processes interact, which is important for clarifying the mechanisms underlying sense of agency. Thus, we examined whether performance-based inferences influence action-effect integration in sense of agency using a delay detection paradigm in two experiments. In both experiments, participants pressed left and right arrow keys to control the direction in which a moving dot was travelling. The dot’s response delay was manipulated randomly on 7 levels (0–480 ms) between the trials; for each trial, participants were asked to judge whether the dot response was delayed and to rate their level of agency over the dot. In Experiment 1, participants tried to direct the dot to reach a destination on the screen as quickly as possible. Furthermore, the computer assisted participants by ignoring erroneous commands for half of the trials (assisted condition), while in the other half, all of the participants’ commands were executed (self-control condition). In Experiment 2, participants directed the dot as they pleased (without a specific goal), but, in half of the trials, the computer randomly ignored 32% of their commands (disturbed condition) rather than assisted them. The results from the two experiments showed that performance enhanced action-effect integration. Specifically, when task performance was improved through the computer’s assistance in Experiment 1, delay detection was reduced in the 480-ms delay condition, despite the fact that 32% of participants’ commands were ignored. Conversely, when no feedback on task performance was given (as in Experiment 2), the participants reported greater delay when some of their commands were randomly ignored. Furthermore, the results of a logistic regression analysis showed that the threshold of delay detection was greater in the assisted condition than in the self-control condition in Experiment 1, which suggests a wider time window for action-effect integration. A multivariate analysis also revealed that assistance was related to reduced delay detection via task performance, while reduced delay detection was directly correlated with a better sense of agency. These results indicate an association between the implicit and explicit aspects of sense of agency.     

Time perception and the experience of agency

In the current study, we investigate whether sense of agency over an effect coincides with the perceived time of the effect that occurs either at its usual time or earlier or later than usual. One group of participants usually perceived an action effect immediately after the action, another group delayed by 250 ms. In test blocks the effect stimulus was sometimes presented earlier or later than usual. Participants judged either the degree of experienced agency over the effect or whether the effect had appeared at its usual time, or earlier or later than usual. In both groups experienced agency and the perception of the effect’s time ‘as usual’ were highly correlated. To rule out that time judgments influenced sense of agency, we replicated the pattern of agency judgments in Experiment 2 in which participants only judged agency. Taken together, we demonstrated that agency and time judgments vary similarly across temporal deviations of effects irrespective of to which delay participants were adapted to. The high correlation of judgment types indicates that perceiving an effect at its usual time and sensing to have caused the effect are closely related. In contrast, physical temporal proximity of actions and effects has only a minor impact on experienced agency.     

The enduring effect of availability

The present study addressed whether experienced ease of retrieval of autobiographical events affects trait judgments made immediately and after a delay (Experiment 1) and whether this influence is modulated by either of two discounting instructions (Experiment 2). In Experiment 1, participants first attempted to retrieve 6 or 12 personal memories for different traits and then made ease of retrieval and self-trait judgments immediately or 1 week later. In Experiment 2, participants made immediate ratings and then delayed ratings under 3 instructional manipulations: a generic instruction to repeat these judgments, to make these ratings after they were reminded of their original recall total, or to make these ratings after they had their retrieval ease discounted or augmented. In each experiment, an enduring effect of availability was obtained in that the relationship between ease of retrieval and self-trait rating was only slightly affected by the delay. Being reminded of the original number of recalled memories nullified the relationship between ease of retrieval and trait rating. However, discounting or augmenting ease of retrieval, which altered ease of retrieval ratings, did not. Potential explanations for an enduring effect of availability are discussed.     

The effect of feedback on children’s metacognitive judgments: a heuristic account

In three experiments, we investigated whether the feedback effect on the accuracy of children’s metacognitive judgments results from an improvement in monitoring processes or the use of the Anchoring-and-Adjustment heuristic. Experiment 1 revealed that adding feedback increased the accuracy of young children’s (aged 4, 6, and 8 years) memory prediction. In Experiment 2, the influence of an external anchor on children’s metacognitive judgment was established. Finally, in Experiment 3, two memory tasks that differed in terms of difficulty were administered. Participants were randomly assigned to an anchoring (high/low/no anchor) and a feedback (feedback/no feedback) condition. Results demonstrated that children in the feedback condition adjusted their predictions toward the feedback, regardless of the task’s difficulty. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that external information provided by feedback is used as an anchor for judgment. This interpretation is strengthened by the correlation found between the two scores computed to assess participants’ susceptibility to anchoring and feedback effects, which indicates that children who are more sensitive to the anchoring effect are also more sensitive to the feedback effect.     

The effect of speed limit credibility on drivers' speed choice

Credibility of speed limits is a key factor affecting drivers’ compliance with speed limits. Two experiments were conducted to investigate how credibility of speed limits affects judgments of appropriate speed. The first experiment aimed to establish speeds deemed appropriate by investigating Malaysians drivers’ judgments of the appropriate speed to drive based on photographs of roads with the speed limit sign erased. Drivers chose speeds which correlated with but were higher than the actual speed limits of the roads. Analysis of road characteristics suggested they based their decisions mainly on features of the road itself rather than of the roadside. The second experiment tested the impact of credibility of speed limit information on the speed drivers judged appropriate. Drivers judged the appropriate speed to drive for the same photographs as in Experiment 1 with speed limit information provided. Four conditions were included: two conditions where the speed limit posted was 10% higher or 10% lower than the appropriate speed established in Experiment 1 (credible speed limits), and two conditions where the posted speed limit was 50% higher or 50% lower than the appropriate speed (non-credible speed limits). Posted speed limits did affect drivers’ judgments about the appropriate speed to drive. Credibility also influenced judgments whereby drivers selected appropriate speeds consistent with the speed limits for the 10% lower condition, but not for speed limits that deviated highly from the appropriate speed judged in Experiment 1.     

At first glance: Accessibility of the physical attractiveness stereotype

This research investigated two related questions. First, do stereotyped attribute judgments emerge based on attractiveness information presented under severely restricted viewing conditions? Second, will similar biased judgments be obtained for the same targets when subjects are permitted unrestricted viewing time? Experiment 1 found that male and female Caucasian college students were able to differentiate between levels of attractiveness of both males and females on the basis of cue information contained in a single brief glance (100 ms) at a target. Subjects made stereotyped attribute judgments of targets' femininity/masculinity, job suitability, and cooperativeness based on this information under restricted and unrestricted (Experiment 2) conditions. Subjects' eye fixation patterns, recorded during the second experiment, revealed that men and women differed in the way they explored targets, but their differing search strategies had no significant effect on physical attractiveness stereotyping. Results suggest that perception of differential attractiveness occurs automatically with the initial encoding of sensory data.     

Typicality in logically defined categories: Exemplar-similarity versus rule instantiation

A rule-instantiation model and a similarity-to-exemplars model were contrasted in terms of their predictions of typicality judgments and speeded classifications for members of logically defined categories. In Experiment 1, subjects learned a unidimensional rule based on the size of objects. It was assumed that items that maximally instantiated the rule were those farthest from the category boundary that separated small and large stimuli. In Experiment 2, subjects learned a disjunctive rule of the form "x or y or both". It was assumed that items that maximally instantiated the rule were those with both positive values (x and y). In both experiments, the frequency with which different exemplars were presented during classification learning was manipulated across conditions. These frequency manipulations exerted a major impact on subjects' postacquisition goodness-of-example judgments, and they also influenced reaction times in a speeded classification task. The results could not be predicted solely on the basis of the degree to which the rules were instantiated. The goodness judgments were predicted fairly well by a mixed exemplar model involving both relative-similarity and absolute-similarity components. It was concluded that even for logically defined concepts, stored exemplars may form a major component of the category representation.     

Subjective probabilities and moral judgments

The two experiments reported here examined the relationship between subjective probability estimates and moral judgments (credit and blame assignment, trait attributions, and behavior evaluations). Subjects read about situations that varied in outcome valence (moral or immoral); in addition, the nature of situational demands (Experiment 1) or behavior frequency (Experiment 2) was varied. In the first experiment, subjective probabilities were related to judgments of immoral behaviors (but not moral behaviors), whereas the situational demands only had an impact on judgments of moral behaviors. Experiment 2 included a wider range of behavioral situations, and the probability estimates and moral judgments were assessed independently. In contrast to the first experiment, subjective probabilities were related to trait and behavior ratings of both moral and immoral acts. Consistent with the first experiment, however, subjective probabilities predicted blame but not credit. Across both studies, the prior expectancies were more strongly related to evaluations of immoral acts than moral acts. Implications for understanding the determinants of judgments of moral and immoral acts are discussed.     

Judging response-outcome relations: The role of response-outcome contingency,outcome probability,and method of information presentation

A series of four experiments investigated college students’ judgments of interevent contingency. Subjects were asked to judge the effect of a discrete response Itapping a wire) on the occurrence of a brief outcome (a radio’s buzzing). Pairings of the possible event-state combinations (response-outcome, response-no outcome, no response-outcome, no response-no outcome) were presented in a summary-table (Experiments 2 and 4), in an unbroken-time-line (Experimente 1, 2, and 4), or in a broken-time-line format (Experiment 3). Subjects judged the extent to which the response caused the outcome or prevented it from occurring. Across all methods of information presentation, judgments were a positive function of response-outcome contingency and outcome probability. In the unbroken-time-line condition, judgments of negative response-outcome contingencies were less extreme than judgments of equivalent positive contingencies. This asymmetry was smaller in the broken-time-line condition and in those conditions in which subjects were encouraged to segment an unbroken time line into discrete response outcome units. Finally, judgments of positive and negative relationships were generally symmetrical in the summary-table condition. Relative to the two time-line portrayals, summary table judgments were also less influenced by the overall probability of outcome occurrence. These judgment differences among format conditions suggest that, depending on the method of information presentation, subjects differently partition event sequences into discrete event pairings.     

Are Causal Structure and Intervention Judgments Inextricably Linked? A Developmental Study

The application of the formal framework of causal Bayesian Networks to children’s causal learning provides the motivation to examine the link between judgments about the causal structure of a system, and the ability to make inferences about interventions on components of the system. Three experiments examined whether children are able to make correct inferences about interventions on different causal structures. The first two experiments examined whether children’s causal structure and intervention judgments were consistent with one another. In Experiment 1, children aged between 4 and 8 years made causal structure judgments on a three‐component causal system followed by counterfactual intervention judgments. In Experiment 2, children’s causal structure judgments were followed by intervention judgments phrased as future hypotheticals. In Experiment 3, we explicitly told children what the correct causal structure was and asked them to make intervention judgments. The results of the three experiments suggest that the representations that support causal structure judgments do not easily support simple judgments about interventions in children. We discuss our findings in light of strong interventionist claims that the two types of judgments should be closely linked.     

Imitation in shadowing words

Imitation of shadowed words was evaluated using Goldinger’s (1998) AXB paradigm. The first experiment was a replication of Goldinger’s experiments with different tokens. Experiment 1’s AXB tests showed that shadowed words were judged to be better imitations of target words than were baseline (read) counterparts more often than chance (.50). Order of presentation of baseline and shadowed words in the AXB test also significantly influenced judgments. Degree of prior exposure to token words did not significantly influence judgments of imitation. Experiment 2 employed modified target tokens with extended voice onset times (VOTs). In addition to AXB tests, VOTs of response tokens were compared across baseline and shadowing conditions. The AXB tests revealed shadowed words to be better imitations of target tokens than baseline, without an influence of AXB presentation order. Differences between baseline and shadowing VOTs were greater when VOTs were extended. The implications of spontaneous imitation in nonsocial settings are considered.     

Knowing what to remember and forget: A developmental study of cue memory in intentional forgetting

These experiments are the first to investigate children’s encoding and use of information about a memory cue in Bjork’s (1972) intentional forgetting task. In Experiment 1, children in Grades 2, 4, and 6 and college students were given cues to either remember or forget after the presentation of each picture. Recall and recognition tests of pictures and cues followed. The procedure in Experiment 2 was identical to that in Experiment 1 except that the list of presentation pictures was altered for some children (Grades 3 and 4) and adolescents (Grades 8 and 9) so that remember and forget cues were associated with particular taxonomic categories. In Experiment 3, the testing component was modified so that children (Grades 2, 3, and 4) and college students were asked to recall only the cue associated with each picture. The results indicated that (1) children as young as second graders encode the cue associated with each picture, although to a lesser extent than do college students, (2) much improvement in intentional forgetting is still occurring during adolescence, (3) only adults adequately cluster their recall by cue, (4) associating remember and forget cues with items from different categories does not increase the differentiation between cues, and (5) eliminating picture recall and recognition has minimal effects on the magnitude of cue judgments. These results suggest that children’s difficulties on intentional forgetting tasks stem, at least in part, from their poorer encoding of information about whether an item should be remembered or forgotten.     

Effects of real gender and labeled gender on adults' perceptions of infants.

Three experiments were conducted to discover factors mediating adults' perceptions of male and female infants. In the first experiment, college students were shown 30-s videotapes of four male and four female babies, each of whom was randomly labeled with a male or a female name. Infants labeled as male were perceived as significantly more masculine and stronger than those labeled as female. Discriminant analyses revealed that both rated masculinity and the combination of ratings on male stereotyped traits differentiated infants labeled as male or female. Analyses of real gender revealed that boys were rated as less sensitive and stronger than girls. Discriminant analyses suggested that the combination of less sensitive, more of a problem, more mature, and more playful best differentiated real males from real females. In Experiment 2, the findings of Experiment 1 were confirmed with a sample of mothers of young infants. In Experiment 3 college students' judgments of the sex of the eight babies were correctly predicted from the sensitivity ratings of these babies in Experiment 1. It appears that there is a complex of cues from which adults make judgments of infants' gender and inferences about their characteristics: Boys may appear stronger, more playful, and more of a problem, and girls seem to look more sensitive. Implications for further studies of gender labeling and for sex typing are discussed.     

Dirty work, clean hands: The moral psychology of indirect agency

When powerful people cause harm, they often do so indirectly through other people. Are harmful actions carried out through others evaluated less negatively than harmful actions carried out directly? Four experiments examine the moral psychology of indirect agency. Experiments 1A, 1B, and 1C reveal effects of indirect agency under conditions favoring intuitive judgment, but not reflective judgment, using a joint/separate evaluation paradigm. Experiment 2A demonstrates that effects of indirect agency cannot be fully explained by perceived lack of foreknowledge or control on the part of the primary agent. Experiment 2B indicates that reflective moral judgment is sensitive to indirect agency, but only to the extent that indirectness signals reduced foreknowledge and/or control. Experiment 3 indicates that effects of indirect agency result from a failure to automatically consider the potentially dubious motives of agents who cause harm indirectly. Experiment 4 demonstrates an effect of indirect agency on purchase intentions.     

Processing fluency affects subjective claims of recollection

Previous studies that have used the remember-know paradigm to investigate subjective awareness in memory have shown that fluency manipulations have an impact on "know" responses but not on "remember" responses (e.g., Rajaram, 1993), a finding typically accounted for by invoking inferential processing in judgments of familiarity but not of recollection. However, in light of several researchers' criticisms of this procedure, as well as findings documenting the influence of processing fluency on various subjective judgments, the present study was conducted in order to investigate whether judgments of recollection might also be subject to inferential processes and not solely the product of conscious retrieval. When the standard remember-know procedure was used (Experiment 1), manipulations of perceptual fluency increased "know" responses but had no effect on "remember" responses, replicating previous findings. However, when an independent ratings method was employed (Higham & Vokey, 2004), manipulations of perceptual fluency (Experiment 2) and conceptual fluency (Experiment 3) reliably increased claims of both familiarity and recollection, suggesting that the conclusion that fluency affects only "know" responses may be an artifact of the standard remember-know procedure.     

Heading backward: Perceived direction of movement in contracting and expanding optical flow fields

Two goals were pursued in an investigation of possible visual sources for directionality judgments of ego-motion. First, J. J. Gibson’s (1950) global radial outflow hypothesis was contrasted with a simple extrapolation strategy. Second, backing-direction judgments capitalizing on the informational equivalence of global radial outflow created during forward ego-motion and global radial inflow during backward ego-motion were explored. In comparing the accuracy of heading and backing judgments, new insights about global flow and extrapolation strategies were found. Consistent with the hypothesis of an extrapolation strategy, Experiment 1 demonstrated that backing judgments were more accurate than heading judgments when linear observer motion was simulated by means of a point-light flow field. In this case, accuracy was higher with two-point-light displays (extrapolation) than with more complex displays (global flow). Experiment 2 showed that in cases where extrapolation was not possible, such as circular motion, no advantage of backing judgments could be found and judgments were generally less accurate. We conclude that, whenever possible, observers use extrapolation to determine their heading/backing. Only when global flow is the only good source of information do they rely on it.