Representational momentum in memory for pitch

When a visual pattern is displayed at successively different orientations such that a rotation or translation is implied, an observer's memory for the final position is displaced forward. This phenomenon of representational momentum shares some similarities with physical momentum. For instance, the amount of memory shift is proportional to the implied velocity of the inducing display; representational momentum is specifically proportional to the final, not the average, velocity; representational momentum follows a continuous stopping function for the first 250 ms or so of the retention interval. In a previous paper (Kelly & Freyd, 1987) we demonstrated a forward memory asymmetry using implied changes in pitch, for subjects without formal musical training. In the current paper we replicate our earlier finding and show that the forward memory asymmetry occurs for subjects with formal musical training as well (Experiment 1). We then show the structural similarity between representational momentum in memory for pitch with previous reports of parametric effects using visual stimuli. We report a velocity effect for auditory momentum (Experiment 2), we demonstrate specifically that the velocity effect depends on the implied acceleration (Experiment 3), and we show that the stopping function for auditory momentum is qualitatively the same as that for visual momentum (Experiment 4). We consider the implications of these results for theories of mental representation.     

Representational momentum,internalized dynamics,and perceptual adaptation

In this paper I look at dynamic mental representations, motion detection under conditions of certainty or uncertainty, perceptual adaptation, and priming of motion direction. The goal is to bridge the boundaries created in part by the use of different terminology within different literatures. The most fruitful parallel may be between the phenomenon of dynamic mental representation and representational momentum on the one hand, and perceptual adaptation as revealed by motion priming on the other. I suggest an overlap between the two phenomena.     

Representational momentum,spatial layout,and viewpoint dependency

Completing a representational momentum (RM) task, participants viewed one of three camera motions through a scene and indicated whether test probes were in the same position as they were in the final view of the animation. All camera motions led to RM anticipations in the direction of motion, with larger distortions resulting from rotations than a compound motion of a rotation and a translation. A surprise test of spatial layout, using an aerial map, revealed that the correct map was identified only following aerial views during the RM task. When the RM task displayed field views, including repeated views of multiple object groups, participants were unable to identify the overall spatial layout of the scene. These results suggest that the object–location binding thought to support certain change detection and visual search tasks might be viewpoint dependent.     

Representational momentum in scenes: Learning spatial layout

In four experiments, we examined whether watching a scene from the perspective of a camera rotating across it allowed participants to recognize or identify the scene's spatial layout. Completing a representational momentum (RM) task, participants viewed a smoothly animated display and then indicated whether test probes were in the same position as they were in the final view of the animation. We found RM anticipations for the camera's movement across the scene, with larger distortions resulting from camera rotations that brought objects into the viewing frame compared with camera rotations that took objects out of the viewing frame. However, the RM task alone did not lead to successful recognition of the scene's map or identification of spatial relations between objects. Watching a scene from a rotating camera's perspective and making position judgments is not sufficient for learning spatial layout.     

Forms of momentum across space: Representational,operational, and attentional

Cognition can exhibit biases consistent with future expectations, and some of these biases result in momentum-like effects and have been linked with the idea of an internalization of the effects of momentum. These momentum-like effects include representational momentum, operational momentum, and attentional momentum. Similarities and differences between these different momentum-like effects are considered. Hubbard’s (2005) review of representational momentum is updated to include studies published since that review appeared, and the first full reviews of operational momentum and attentional momentum are provided. It is suggested that (1) many variables that influence one of these momentum-like effects have a similar influence on another momentum-like effect, (2) representational momentum, operational momentum, and attentional momentum reflect similar or overlapping mechanisms, and operational momentum and attentional momentum are special cases of representational momentum, and (3) representational momentum, operational momentum, and attentional momentum reflect properties of a more general spatial representation in which change or transformation of a stimulus is mapped onto motion in a spatial coordinate system.     

Displacement in depth: Representational momentum and boundary extension

Memory for targets moving in depth and for stationary targets was examined in five experiments. Memory for targets moving in depth was displaced behind the target with slower target velocities (longer ISIS and retention intervals) and beyond the target with faster target velocities (shorter ISIS and retention intervals), and the overall magnitude of forward displacement for motion in depth was less than the overall magnitude of forward displacement for motion in the picture plane. Memory for stationary targets was initially displaced away from the observer, but memory for smaller stationary targets was subsequently displaced toward the observer and memory for larger stationary targets was subsequently displaced away from the observer; memory for the top or bottom edge of a stationary target was displaced inside the target perimeter. The data are consistent with Freyd and Johnson's (1987) two-component model of the time course of representational momentum and with Intraub et al.'s (1992) two-component model of boundary extension.     

Representational momentum for rotations in depth: effects of shadings and axis

Representational momentum is a positive memory distortion for an object's final position following the presentation of an implied event (J.J. Freyd, 1987). Positive memory distortions occur when observers accept test positions beyond the final presented position, or forward along the implied trajectory, as the same more readily than positions behind the final position. Four experiments explored implied events depicting rotations about various depth axes in shaded and silhouette conditions. Positive memory distortions were observed for all depth rotations under certain shading conditions, with some differences in the size of the distortion between axes. No directional effects (e.g., right vs. left) were observed. The overall positive memory distortions observed for depth rotations contrasted with the negative distortions previously observed for translation motion in depth (T.L. Hubbard, 1995 ).     

Attentional momentum does not underlie the inhibition of return effect.

J. Pratt, T. M. Spalek, and F. Bradshaw (1999) recently proposed that attentional momentum is the mechanism underlying the inhibition of return (IOR) effect. They suggested that momentum associated with an attentional movement away from a peripherally cued location and toward an uncued opposite location is essential and fundamental to the finding of an IOR effect. Although it is clear from the present study and from a reanalysis of data from Pratt et al. that response time can be facilitated at an uncued opposite location, this putative effect of attentional momentum is neither robust nor reliable. First, it occurs for only a minority of participants. Second, it occurs in only a subset of the cued display positions. And finally, it is uncorrelated with the occurrence of IOR. Together the data indicate that the attentional momentum hypothesis is an overgeneralization and that it does not underlie the robust and reliable IOR effect.     

Representational momentum and related displacements in spatial memory: A review of the findings

Memory for the final location of a moving target is often displaced in the direction of target motion, and this has been referred to asrepresentational momentum. Characteristics of the target (e.g., velocity, size, direction, and identity), display (e.g., target format, retention interval, and response method), context (landmarks, expectations, and attribution of motion source), and observer (e.g., allocation of attention, eye movements, and psychopathology) that influence the direction and magnitude of displacement are reviewed. Specific conclusions regarding numerous variables that influence displacement (e.g., presence of landmarks or surrounding context), as well as broad-based conclusions regarding displacement in general (e.g., displacement does not reflect objective physical principles, may reflect aspects of naive physics, does not solely reflect eye movements, may involve some modular processing, and reflects high-level processes) are drawn. A possible computational theory of displacement is suggested in which displacement (1) helps bridge the gap between perception and action and (2) plays a critical part in localizing stimuli in the environment.     

Representational momentum and the brain: An investigation into the functional necessity of V5/MT

The mental representation of objects can imply motion and momentum. This can be explored by investigating a distortion in recognition memory for pictures that depict objects “frozen” in mid-air, implying motion. This distortion is called representational momentum (RM). Recent functional neuroimaging studies have suggested that the V5/MT system (the area of the brain thought to be responsible for perceptual processing of motion) is involved in the mediation of RM. The results of these studies are reviewed here. However the presence of functional activity revealed in brain imaging studies does not mean that this part of the brain is necessary for a particular cognitive task. A greater degree of functional necessity can be inferred by disrupting function in that part of the brain. One way in which this can be done is with Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS, a method of temporarily suspending cortical activity). We extended the findings of the previous fMRI experiments by using TMS in conjunction with an RM paradigm. Repetitive magnetic stimulation to V5/MT during the so-called freeze-frame RM task resulted in an absence of the stereotypical distortion in recognition memory (compared to stimulation at the vertex) for approximately 60% of     

Representational momentum and event course anticipation in the perception of implied periodical motions.

After viewing an object in an implied rotation, subjects' short-term visual memory for the object's position is distorted in the direction of rotation. Previous accounts of this representational momentum effect have emphasized the analogy to physical momentum. This study provides a more general perspective: Position memory is influenced by anticipatory processes related to the future event course. In Experiment 1, subjects are presented with an implied periodical event in which a rectangle rotates back and forth. When a direction change in the implied rotation can be anticipated, memory distortion size drops back to zero. Experiment 2 rejects an alternative explanation for the findings of Experiment 1 in terms of enhanced position memory caused by repeated presentations of the memory pattern orientation within the same trial. In Experiment 3, the periods of the implied event are marked by changes in velocity rather than direction. The anticipation of a sudden velocity increase leads to a larger memory shift. We conclude that the perceptual system anticipates the event course on the basis of a representation of the higher order event structure rather than the local motion characteristics.     

Representational blending in human conditional learning: Implications for associative theory.

In two experiments, participants were presented with pictures of different foods (A, B, C, D, X,) and learned which combinations resulted in an allergic reaction in a fictitious patient, Mr X. In Problem 1, when A or B (but not C or D) was combined with food X an allergic reaction occurred, and when C or D (but not A or B) was combined with Y an allergic reaction occurred. In Experiment 1, participants also received Problem 2 in which A, B, C, and D interacted with foods V and W either in the same way as X and Y, respectively, or in a different way. Participants performed more proficiently in the former than in the latter condition. In Experiment 2, after training on Problem 1, participants judged whether or not novel combinations of foods (e.g., AB, CD, AD, CB) would cause an allergic reaction in Mr X. They were no more likely to indicate that AB or CD would cause an allergic reaction than AD or CB, but made their judgements more rapidly and with greater confidence on AB and CD trials than on AD and CB trials. These results (1) indicate that shared representations come to be addressed by the components of similar compounds (e.g., AX and BX) that have predicted the same outcome (an allergic reaction), and (2) are inconsistent with standard, associative theories of learning, but (3) are consistent with findings from nonhuman animals and with a connectionist interpretation of these findings.     

Representational insight in pigeons: comparing subjects with and without real-life experience

Understanding the relation between objects and their pictures at a level beyond mere feature discrimination is by no means a trivial cognitive ability, and support of this is still weak in nonhuman species. Here, we report evidence of representational insight in pigeons. Responding to pictures of human body parts was compared in birds that had extensive pre-experience with live humans and in birds that had never seen any human heads. In a two-alternative forced-choice procedure the pigeons were trained to discriminate between pictures of either handless or headless humans and nonhumans. On test, the birds had to choose (i) between body parts they had already seen in training and the parts that had been missing, (ii) between previously seen parts and arbitrary skin patches, and (iii) between previously missing parts and skin patches. Only the pigeons that lacked experience with real heads and were trained with pictures of headless humans failed to show a significant preference for pictures of missing parts (i.e., heads) over arbitrary skin patches. This demonstrates the importance of individual experience with the real 3D-referents of pictures for classification of the latter and is thereby evidence of representational insight.     

Extensive practice does not eliminate human switch costs

Numerous human task-switching studies have shown that decision making that follows a task switch is slower and less accurate than that which follows a task repetition. Stoet and Snyder (2003a) tested humans and rhesus monkeys on a task-switching paradigm, but found, surprisingly, no switch costs in the monkeys. We hypothesized that the exceptional monkey behavior may have been due to the more extensive practice the monkeys received in comparison with human subjects. In the present study, we tested the hypothesis that extensive practice can abolish switch costs in humans. Four human subjects each performed 23,000 trials in a task-switching paradigm. We found that this amount of practice does not abolish switch costs.     

Representational economy, not processing speed, determines preferred processing strategy of visual patterns

According to Garner, visual patterns are mentally represented as categories rather than by their physical identity. On the other hand, physical and categorical identification tasks engender their own specific processing strategies. Nevertheless, categorical strategies should be more generic than physical ones. We tested this prediction using Garner patterns in a same-different task: one version involved categorical, the other physical identification. Both tasks showed effects of categorical representation but also contrasting categorical and physical processing strategies in their response time profiles. When trials from categorical and physical identification tasks were randomly intermixed, mixing costs were additive for categorical trials but not for physical trials, indicating a shift in processing strategy for the latter. For these trials, the physical response time profile was found to be displaced by a categorical profile. We concluded that the more generic processing strategy is the one that maximizes the role of categorical representation.     

Representational momentum in dynamic facial expressions is modulated by the level of expressed pain: Amplitude and direction effects

Humans have developed a specific capacity to rapidly perceive and anticipate other people’s facial expressions so as to get an immediate impression of their emotional state of mind. We carried out two experiments to examine the perceptual and memory dynamics of facial expressions of pain. In the first experiment, we investigated how people estimate other people’s levels of pain based on the perception of various dynamic facial expressions; these differ both in terms of the amount and intensity of activated action units. A second experiment used a representational momentum (RM) paradigm to study the emotional anticipation (memory bias) elicited by the same facial expressions of pain studied in Experiment 1. Our results highlighted the relationship between the level of perceived pain (in Experiment 1) and the direction and magnitude of memory bias (in Experiment 2): When perceived pain increases, the memory bias tends to be reduced (if positive) and ultimately becomes negative. Dynamic facial expressions of pain may reenact an “immediate perceptual history” in the perceiver before leading to an emotional anticipation of the agent’s upcoming state. Thus, a subtle facial expression of pain (i.e., a low contraction around the eyes) that leads to a significant positive anticipation can be considered an adaptive process—one through which we can swiftly and involuntarily detect other people’s pain.     

On matters of mind and body: regarding Descartes

In this paper the author considers Descartes’ place in current thinking about the mind‐body dilemma. The premise here is that in the history of ideas, the questions posed can be as significant as the answers acquired. Descartes’ paramount question was ‘How do we determine certainty?’ and his pursuit of an answer led to cogito ergo sum. His discovery simultaneously raised the question whether mind is separate from or unified with the body. Some who currently hold that brain and subjectivity are unified contend that the philosopher ‘split’ mind from body and refer to ‘Descartes’ error’. This paper puts forward that Descartes’ detractors fail to recognise Descartes’ contribution to Western thought, which was to introduce the Enlightenment and to give a place to human subjectivity. Added to this, evidence from Descartes’ correspondence with Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia supports the conclusion that Descartes did in fact believe in the unity of mind and body although he could not reconcile this rationally with the certainty from personal experience that they were separate substances. In this Descartes was engaged in just the same dilemma as that of current thinkers and researchers, a conflict which still is yet to be resolved.     

Representational coexistence in the God concept: Core knowledge intuitions of God as a person are not revised by Christian theology despite lifelong experience

Psychonomic Bulletin & Review - Previous research has shown that in the minds of young adult religious adherents, acquired theology about the extraordinary characteristics of God (e.g.,...     

Haste makes waste,but not for all: The speed-accuracy trade-off does not apply to neurotics

ObjectivesTo examine if neurotics are the exception to the speed-accuracy rule and in fact are more accurate when making faster decisions.DesignThe study employed a laboratory-based, cross-sectional design.MethodOne hundred and ninety-six elite young cricketers completed measures of neuroticism before performing a cricket-specific computer-based decision-making task.ResultsNeuroticism significantly moderated the relationship between decision-making time and decision-making accuracy such that decreases in response time were associated with improvements in decision-making accuracy for individuals with high levels of neuroticism. Conversely, decreases in response time were associated with decrements in accuracy for individuals with low levels of neuroticism.ConclusionsThe study presents the first data that confirm that speed accuracy trade-offs do not occur across all individuals; individuals with high levels of neuroticism benefit from making faster decisions.     

Representational content and computation in the human visual system

Summary Information-processing systems can be characterized by their ability to transform systematically certain internal representational states (symbols) into one another. The presence of such an information-processing capacity calls for an explanation. How could such an explanation in principle be formulated? How is it possible to specify internal representational states and to ascribe to them certain representational contents? What has to be demonstrated by such explanations is how an information-processing capacity is actually instantiated in a system. In this paper, the outlines of an explanation by instantiation are sketched for a specific human visual capacity. In addition, some fundamental problems facing the development of this explanation will be discussed.