The role of robotic modelling in cognitive science

From the perspective of cognitive robotics, this paper presents a modern interpretation of Newell’s (1973) reasoning and suggestions for why and how cognitive psychologists should develop models of cognitive phenomena. We argue that the shortcomings of current cognitive modelling approaches are due in significant part to a lack of exactly the kind of integration required for the development of embodied autonomous robotics. Moreover we suggest that considerations of embodiment, situatedness, and autonomy, intrinsic to cognitive robotics, provide an appropriate basis for the integration and theoretic cumulation that Newell argued was necessary for psychology to mature. From this perspective we analyse the role of embodiment and modes of situatedness in terms of integration, cognition, emotion, and autonomy. Four complementary perspectives on embodied and situated cognitive science are considered in terms of their potential to contribute to cognitive robotics, cognitive science, and psychological theorizing: minimal cognition and organization, enactive perception and sensorimotor contingency, homeostasis and emotion, and social embedding. In combination these perspectives provide a framework for cognitive robotics, not only wholly compatible with the original aims of cognitive modelling, but as a more appropriate methodology than those currently in common use within psychology.     

The extended body: a case study in the neurophenomenology of social interaction

There is a growing realization in cognitive science that a theory of embodied intersubjectivity is needed to better account for social cognition. We highlight some challenges that must be addressed by attempts to interpret ‘simulation theory’ in terms of embodiment, and argue for an alternative approach that integrates phenomenology and dynamical systems theory in a mutually informing manner. Instead of ‘simulation’ we put forward the concept of the ‘extended body’, an enactive and phenomenological notion that emphasizes the socially mediated nature of embodiment. To illustrate the explanatory potential of this approach, we replicate an agent-based model of embodied social interaction. An analysis of the model demonstrates that the extended body can be explained in terms of mutual dynamical entanglement: inter-bodily resonance between individuals can give rise to self-sustaining interaction patterns that go beyond the behavioral capacities of isolated individuals by modulating their intra-bodily conditions of behavior generation.     

The soft embodiment of culture: camera angles and motion through time and space

Cultural assumptions about one's relation to others and one's place in the world can be literally embodied in the way one cognitively maps out one's position and motion in time and space. In three experiments, we examined the psychological perspective that Asian American and Euro-American participants embodied as they both comprehended and produced narratives and mapped out metaphors of time and space. In social situations, Euro-American participants were more likely to embody their own perspective and a sense of their own motion (rather than those of a friend), whereas Asian American participants were more likely to embody a friend's perspective and sense of motion (rather than their own). We discuss how these psychological perspectives represent the soft embodiment of culture by implicitly instantiating cultural injunctions (a) to think about how you look to others and to harmonize with them or (b) to know yourself, trust yourself, and act with confidence.     

具身双加工观点：解析具身效应的边界条件

为了找出具身效应在认知加工上的边界条件,在综合分析具身理论中的双加工内涵和具身实验研究中的双加工证据基础上,提出了具身双加工观点：具身效应与直觉性的一型加工更为契合,会被反思性的二型加工所抑制。具体而言,抽象思维的发展程度、认知加工的无意识状态、认知负荷和心理冲突性均可能会导致两种加工类型之间的转换,从而调节具身效应。该观点对提高具身实验操控的有效性,解决具身效应的可重复性危机具有指导意义。     

Minding gaps on the skin: Opposite bisection biases on forehead and back of one’s head

Humans perceive the world from an egocentric perspective, while being able to mentally take a third person’s perspective. Graphesthesia tasks revealed that letters written on the back of one’s own head are consistently perceived from an embodied perspective, while the perspective on one’s front is less consistent and often disembodied. We developed a cutaneous gap bisection task as a more discrete measure of the perspective on the body. In analogy to a visual pseudoneglect, we expected bisections to deviate toward the left ear when perceived from an embodied perspective. While this hypothesis was confirmed for gap bisections on the back, the results on the front suggest overall a disembodied perspective. Contrary to our expectation, this pattern was not predicted by the spontaneous perspective participants took in a graphesthesia task, indicating different cognitive mechanisms. We discuss these findings in the frame of the current literature on spatial attention and perspective taking.     

The emotive neuroscience of embodiment

Embodiment in psychological research and theory often refers to the idea that the body plays a crucial role in emotive, motivational, and cognitive processes. We review past and recent embodiment research, focusing on neuroscientific work. In particular, we review a growing body of evidence supporting the notion that manipulated facial expressions, hand contractions, and changes in physical posture influence physiological activity related to approach motivation or the inclination to move toward a stimulus. Several other perspectives are also considered, such as work related to facial-feedback theories of emotion, theories of grounded or embodied cognition, and mirror neuron research. Ultimately, we conclude that bi-directionality may exist between certain bodily movements and other components of approach- or avoidance-related emotions. Avenues for new research are considered given these implications.     

Embodied Cultural Cognition: Situating the Study of Embodied Cognition in Socio‐Cultural Contexts

Embodiment research has demonstrated that cognition is grounded in bodily interactions with the environment and that abstract concepts are tied to the body’s sensory and motor systems. Building upon this embodiment perspective and advancing our understanding, we discuss the extension of embodied cultural cognition. We propose that some associations between bodily experiences and abstract concepts are not randomly formed; rather, the development of such associations is situated in a socio‐cultural context, informed by cultural imperatives, values, and habits. We draw evidence supporting this view of embodied cultural cognition in body–mind linkages manifested in construal of emotions, time perception, person perception, social power, and moral reasoning. To further extend this research avenue that synthesizes the studies of embodied cognition and culture, we also suggest potential future research directions inspired by this view. This embodied cultural cognition account is useful in understanding and organizing accumulating discoveries of cultural variations in embodiments; it also highlights the social situatedness of embodied cognition and is, therefore, highly compatible with theorizing and research in social and cultural psychology.     

语言理解中的动作知觉：基于具身认知的视角

具身认知理论是目前认知科学领域中最新的研究范式和取向, 它认为人的认知过程依赖于感知和动作系统, 强调身体在认知中发挥重要作用。具身语言理解则认为, 身体、动作和知觉系统在语言认知中也起着不可或缺的作用。文章在简要回顾具身语言理解的相关理论如索引假设、浸入式经历者框架、语言神经理论的基础上, 重点从语言理解的四个层面的实证研究, 即音位、单词、句子、语篇, 证实具身语言理解的观点。未来的研究应该着眼于用具身认知观点来解释更高级的抽象语言表征, 具身单词、句子、语篇的具体表征形式, 并利用具身语言认知的观点进行认知的本土化研究。     

My body until proven otherwise: Exploring the time course of the full body illusion

Evidence from the Full Body Illusion (FBI) has shown that adults can embody full bodies which are not their own when they move synchronously with their own body or are viewed from a first-person perspective. However, there is currently no consensus regarding the time course of the illusion. Here, for the first time, we examined the effect of visuomotor synchrony (synchronous/asynchronous/no movement) on the FBI over time. Surprisingly, we found evidence of embodiment over a virtual body after five seconds in all conditions. Embodiment decreased with increased exposure to asynchronous movement, but remained high in synchronous and no movement conditions. We suggest that embodiment of a body seen from a first-person perspective is felt by default, and that embodiment can then be lost in the face of contradictory cues. These results have significant implications for our understanding of how multisensory cues contribute to embodiment.     

具身视角下的社会认知

摘 要：由于第一代认知科学存在着身心剥离的缺憾,具身化作为第二代认知科学的主要特征得到研究者的广泛关注,并且得到了来自神经科学领域的支持。随着研究的深入,具身学派提出,社会认知是否也应是具身的。现有研究发现具身性对个体评价、反应速度、言语理解、人际交往等方面都有不小的作用。但上述以身体模拟为主的证据仍不足以证明社会认知是具身的,具身学派还需解决诸如明确具身的定义、实验论证、明显区别于传统认知观等问题。     

EMBODIED COGNITION AND RELIGION

It is argued that there are good scientific grounds for accepting that cognition functions in a way that reflects embodiment. This represents a more holistic, systemic way of thinking about human beings, and contributes to the coordination of scientific assumptions about mind and body with those of the faith traditions, moving us beyond sterile debates about reductionism. It has been claimed by Francisco Varela and others that there is an affinity between Buddhism and embodied cognition, though it is argued here that they are less closely aligned than is sometimes assumed. Embodied cognition also accords well with the holistic strand of thinking about human nature in Judeo‐Christian thinking. While accepting the persuasiveness of the general case for cognition being embodied it is suggested here that some forms of cognition are more embodied than others, and that it may be one of the distinctive features of humans that they have developed a capacity for relatively nonembodied forms of cognition.     

Body Awareness: a phenomenological inquiry into the common ground of mind-body therapies

Enhancing body awareness has been described as a key element or a mechanism of action for therapeutic approaches often categorized as mind-body approaches, such as yoga, TaiChi, Body-Oriented Psychotherapy, Body Awareness Therapy, mindfulness based therapies/meditation, Feldenkrais, Alexander Method, Breath Therapy and others with reported benefits for a variety of health conditions. To better understand the conceptualization of body awareness in mind-body therapies, leading practitioners and teaching faculty of these approaches were invited as well as their patients to participate in focus groups. The qualitative analysis of these focus groups with representative practitioners of body awareness practices, and the perspectives of their patients, elucidated the common ground of their understanding of body awareness. For them body awareness is an inseparable aspect of embodied self awareness realized in action and interaction with the environment and world. It is the awareness of embodiment as an innate tendency of our organism for emergent self-organization and wholeness. The process that patients undergo in these therapies was seen as a progression towards greater unity between body and self, very similar to the conceptualization of embodiment as dialectic of body and self described by some philosophers as being experienced in distinct developmental levels.     

从具身视角看道德判断

道德判断是个体对于某类行为的善恶好坏和是非对错所进行的评价及判断。随着具身认知理论的兴起, 道德判断的具身研究随之展开。道德判断具身性的研究主要围绕身体清洁、厌恶, 身体温度及身体动作这3个维度展开。从皮亚杰及维果茨基的心理发展观, 概念隐喻理论和进化心理学3个角度对道德判断具身效应进行了理论解释和探讨。考虑到身体变量会通过情绪、认知因素进而影响道德判断, 今后具身认知视角下的道德判断应与道德判断中已有的理论进行整合, 同时对其与道德直觉的关系需要深入探讨, 并需进一步考察具身效应发生的时效性和动态性问题, 探讨道德判断具身效应的调节变量及个体差异, 同时要对道德判断具身效应进行跨文化比较。     

Normative Embodiment. The Role of the Body in Foucault's Genealogy. A Phenomenological Re-Reading

In Foucault's later works, experience and embodiment become important for explaining the normative constitution of the subject: for norms to be effective, discourses are insufficient – they must be experienced and embodied. Practices of “discipline” inscribe power constellations and discourses into subjective experience and bodies. In his lectures on the Hermeneutics of the Subject, he turns this “violent” form of normative embodiment into an ethical perspective by referring to the Stoic tradition. Even though Foucault never developed a notion of experience and embodiment himself, his ideas can be re-read and complemented from a phenomenological perspective.

The article tries to investigate the role of bodily experience and practice in Foucault's Genealogy and to bring it into dialogue with Husserl and Merleau-Ponty's conceptions of the lived body. It will attempt to show that concepts like sedimentation and habituality can help to explain how cultural norms not only influence the way we think about, but also how we perceive and are affected by the world. This operation of norms happens already at the lowest stages of experience, where embodied experience leaves its traces, in sedimentation and habitualization. These passive layers of experience are permeable to historical discourses, so that norms are literally inscribed in the body. These are the foundations for what I seek to define as normative embodiment.     

Unstable Embodiments: A Phenomenological Interpretation of Patient Satisfaction with Treatment Outcome

Many patients experience aspects of treatment and care as dehumanizing because the body is considered separate from the self and its life context. An attempt to transcend viewing persons in dualistic terms is posed by phenomenologists who focus not on "the body" as such but on what it means to be "embodied." In this paper, we review the relevance of the phenomenology of the body for health care and report the results of comparing Sally Gadow's phenomenological insights about body-self unity with a qualitative analysis of patients' accounts of satisfaction with the outcome of hand surgery. We illustrate the ways in which our findings were and were not congruent with Gadow's conceptualization of embodiment and highlight aspects that are ambiguous. We conclude that the body-self dialectical relationship should be recast as a body-self-society trialectic and discuss the implications of this new conceptualization for clinical practices.     

Moral Imagination, Disability and Embodiment

abstract    In this paper we question the basis on which judgements are made about the 'quality' of the lives of people whose embodied experience is anomalous, specifically in cases of impairments. In moral and political philosophy it is often assumed that, suitably informed, we can overcome epistemic gaps through the exercise of moral imagination: 'putting ourselves in the place of others', we can share their points of view. Drawing on phenomenology and theories of embodied cognition, and on empirical studies, we suggest that there are barriers to imagining oneself differently situated, or imagining being another person, arising in part from the way imagination is constrained by embodied experience. We argue that the role of imagination in moral engagement with others is to expand the scope of our sympathies rather than to enable us to put ourselves in the other's place. We argue for explicit acknowledgement that our assessments of others' QOL are likely to be shaped by the specifics of our own embodiment, and by the assumptions we make as a consequence about what is necessary for a good quality of life.     

An ecological approach to embodiment and cognition

The purpose of this article is to explore the relation between embodiment and cognition from an ecological point of view, which has been given little attention in current studies on embodiment. To begin with, two basic meanings of embodiment are distinguished: the state of being embodied and the act of embodying. This article gives more attention to embodying than to being embodied. Next, the ecological framework to investigate embodiment are presented, with focusing on affordances, tool use, and the body. On this view, it is argued that tools extend action and perception capabilities, which implies that the boundary of the body can be extended beyond the surface of the skin. Then, the empirical studies on perception of affordances, on limb proprioception, and on tool use are outlined. These studies support the idea that the boundary of the body can shift. Finally, the boundary of the body is discussed in reference to perception–action systems, suggesting that research on embodiment should pay more attention to the dynamic nature of the body.     

Embodied simulation: From neurons to phenomenal experience

The same neural structures involved in the unconscious modeling of our acting body in space also contribute to our awareness of the lived body and of the objects that the world contains. Neuroscientific research also shows that there are neural mechanisms mediating between the multi-level personal experience we entertain of our lived body, and the implicit certainties we simultaneously hold about others. Such personal and body-related experiential knowledge enables us to understand the actions performed by others, and to directly decode the emotions and sensations they experience. A common functional mechanism is at the basis of both body awareness and basic forms of social understanding: embodied simulation. It will be shown that the present proposal is consistent with some of the perspectives offered by phenomenology.     

The second me: Seeing the real body during humanoid robot embodiment produces an illusion of bi-location

Whole-body embodiment studies have shown that synchronized multi-sensory cues can trick a healthy human mind to perceive self-location outside the bodily borders, producing an illusion that resembles an out-of-body experience (OBE). But can a healthy mind also perceive the sense of self in more than one body at the same time? To answer this question, we created a novel artificial reduplication of one’s body using a humanoid robot embodiment system. We first enabled individuals to embody the humanoid robot by providing them with audio-visual feedback and control of the robot head movements and walk, and then explored the self-location and self-identification perceived by them when they observed themselves through the embodied robot. Our results reveal that, when individuals are exposed to the humanoid body reduplication, they experience an illusion that strongly resembles heautoscopy, suggesting that a healthy human mind is able to bi-locate in two different bodies simultaneously.     

Adoption, ART, and a re-conception of the maternal body: toward embodied maternity

We criticize a view of maternity that equates the natural with the genetic and biological and show how such a practice overdetermines the maternal body and the maternal experience for women who are mothers through adoption and ART (Assisted Reproductive Technologies). As an alternative, we propose a new framework designed to rethink maternal bodies through the lens of feminist embodiment. Feminist embodied maternity, as we call it, stresses the particularity of experience through subjective embodiment. A feminist embodied maternity emphasizes the physical relations of the subjective lived-body rather than the genetic or biological connections. Instead of universalizing claims about the maternal body, embodied maternity looks to communicable experiences and empathetic understanding.