Response interference between functional and structural object‐related actions is increased in patients with ideomotor apraxia

We report data from two left hemisphere stroke patients with moderate‐to‐severe ideomotor apraxia who exhibited deficits in positioning their hands to use ‘conflict’ objects (objects grasped and used with different hand postures) relative to controls and patients with mild apraxia. These novel data support the claim that actions to common objects are subject to interference between multiple responses, and suggest that errors in apraxia may be attributed to deficient resolution of competition between appropriate and inappropriate actions.     

The relationship between children's drawings and preferences for alternative depictions of a familiar object

Little attention has been paid to children's evaluations of their own drawings and those of others. This study aimed to determine whether young children are satisfied with their own method of portraying a familiar object, or whether they would ideally like to draw in a more advanced way, but are hampered by production deficiencies from achieving this aim. Children aged 4 to 9 years produced drawings of a house and expressed preferences concerning an experimental series of house drawings, in which features typically found in drawings by children of different ages were systematically varied. It was found that children of all ages preferred those drawings which had most features in common with their own productions, suggesting that they are satisfied with their own drawings and may actually choose to draw in the way that they do. The conclusions of other studies using this paradigm are questioned on the grounds that they contain methodological weaknesses, particularly with respect to design of their preference stimuli.     

Expertise increases the functional overlap between face and object perception

Recent studies indicate that expertise with objects can interfere with face processing. Although competition occurs between faces and objects of expertise, it remains unclear whether this reflects an expertise-specific bottleneck or the fact that objects of expertise grab attention and thereby consume more central resources. We investigated the perceptual costs of expertise by measuring visual thresholds for identifying targets embedded within RSVP sequences presented at varying temporal rates. Car experts and novices searched for face targets among face and car distractors, or watch targets among watch and car distractors. Remarkably, car experts were slower than novices at identifying faces among task-irrelevant cars, yet faster than novices at identifying watches among cars. This suggests that car expertise leads to greater functional overlap between cars and faces while reducing the functional overlap between cars and objects, a result incompatible with the notion of an encapsulated module for exclusive processing of faces.     

Three-year-olds understand appearance and reality--just not about the same object at the same time

Young children struggle in the classic tests of appearance versus reality. In the current Study 1, 3-year-olds had to determine which of 2 objects (a deceptive or a nondeceptive one) an adult requested when asking for the "real X" versus "the one that looks like X." In Study 2, children of the same age had to indicate what a single deceptive object (e.g., a chocolate-eraser) looked like and what it really was by selecting one of two items that represented this object's appearance (a chocolate bar) or identity (a regular eraser). Children were mainly successful in Study 1 but not in Study 2. The findings are discussed with a focus on young children's difficulty with "confronting" perspectives, which may be involved in their struggles with a number of classic theory of mind tasks.     

Retrieval-induced forgetting of performed and observed bizarre and familiar actions

To investigate whether people show retrieval-induced forgetting (RIF) for bizarre and familiar actions that they performed or observed, three experiments were conducted. In Experiment 1, participants performed bizarre and familiar actions with different objects during learning (e.g., pencil: balance the pencil across the cup, sharpen the pencil). They repeatedly performed a set of the bizarre or familiar actions during retrieval practice. After a distracter task, participants' cued recall was tested. Participants showed RIF for both bizarre and familiar actions. In Experiment 2, half of the participants performed the bizarre and familiar actions themselves; the other half observed the experimenter performing the actions. Replicating the results of Experiment 1, participants who performed the actions showed RIF for bizarre and familiar actions. In contrast, participants who observed the actions did not show RIF for either action type. Experiment 3 examined whether this lack of RIF for observed actions occurred due to a lack of active recall during retrieval practice; it did. Overall, the three experiments demonstrated RIF for both bizarre and familiar performed and observed actions. A distinctiveness account of the results is provided.     

Object-based eye movements: The eyes prefer to stay within the same object

The present study addressed the question of whether we prefer to make eye movements within or between objects. More specifically, when fixating one end of an object, are we more likely to make the next saccade within that same object or to another object? Observers had to discriminate small letters placed on rectangles similar to those used by Egly, Driver, and Rafal (1994). Following an exogenous cue, observers made a saccade to one end of one of the rectangles. The small target letter, which could be discriminated only after it had been fixated, could appear either within the same or at a different object. Consistent with object-based attention, we show that observers prefer to make an eye movement to the other end of the fixated same object, rather than to the equidistant end of a different object. It is concluded that there is a preference to make eye shifts within the same object, rather than between objects.     

On the relations between action planning, object identification, and motor representations of observed actions and objects

Recent evidence suggests that viewing a static prime object (a hand grasp), can activate action representations that affect the subsequent identification of graspable target objects. The present study explored whether stronger effects on target object identification would occur when the prime object (a hand grasp) was made more action-rich and dynamic. Of additional interest was whether this type of action prime would affect the generation of motor activity normally elicited by the target object. Three experiments demonstrated that grasp observation improved the identification of grasp-congruent target objects relative to grasp-incongruent target objects. We argue from this data that identifying a graspable object includes the processing of its action-related attributes. In addition, grasp observation was shown to influence the motor activity elicited by the target object, demonstrating interplay between action-based and object-based motor coding.     

Forgetting to remember: the functional relationship of decay and interference

Functional decay theory proposes that decay and interference, historically viewed as competing accounts of forgetting, are instead functionally related. The theory posits that (a) when an attribute must be updated frequently in memory, its current value decays to prevent interference with later values, and (b) the decay rate adapts to the rate of memory updates. Behavioral predictions of the theory were tested in a task-switching paradigm in which memory for the current task had to be updated every few seconds, hundreds of times. Reaction times and error rates both increased gradually between updates, reflecting decay of memory for the current task. This performance decline was slower when updates were less frequent, reflecting a decrease in the decay rate following a decrease in the update rate. A candidate mechanism for controlled decay is proposed, the data are reconciled with practice effects, and implications for models of executive control are discussed.     

Phenomenological differences between familiar and unfamiliar odours

Unfamiliar odours are harder to discriminate than familiar odours. We explored the phenomenal basis of this difference. In experiments la and 1b, participants profiled odour quality for two sets of familiar and unfamiliar odours. In both cases unfamiliar odours were redolent of more odour qualities than familiar stimuli. In experiment 2, participants received (i) a set of familiar and unfamiliar odours and learnt their names, and (ii) a further set of familiar and unfamiliar odours to which they were exposed. Participants then profiled these stimuli as well as a further unexposed set of familiar and unfamiliar odours. Exposure, but not naming, led to a significantly smaller difference between the familiar and unfamiliar stimuli, in terms of their redolence to other odours, when compared to unexposed control stimuli. Unfamiliar exposed odours were also judged as less redolent than unexposed unfamiliar odours. These observations are consistent with a mnemonic basis for odour-quality perception.     

Dividing attention between color and shape revisited: redundant targets coactivate only when parts of the same perceptual object

When a single perceptual object provides two different reasons for a particular decision (by containing two qualitatively different targets), detailed analyses of the response-time distributions have shown that the two different reasons are jointly responsible for the final decision. The question is whether this coactivation occurs because the two targets contained by the object were from separate dimensions (e.g., color and shape) or were parts of the same perceptual object. Early work argued in favor of dimensions, implying that the types of information being processed is critical, as opposed to their sources; more recent work has argued in favor of objects. Experiment 1 in the present paper corrected for a potential bias in the design of some recent studies and found additional evidence in favor of objects. Two additional experiments directly manipulated whether redundant targets would be perceived as parts of one or two perceptual objects (while holding all else constant) and produced the strongest evidence to date that coactivation requires that the redundant targets be parts of one object. This reverses the original conclusion and suggests that the sources of information are critical, as opposed to the types. Two specific versions of the object-based model are discussed.     

On the relationship between flanker interference and localized attentional interference

The flanker interference (FI) effect suggests that visual attention operates like a mental spotlight, enhancing all stimuli within a selected region. In contrast, other data suggest difficulty dividing attention between objects near one another in the visual field, an effect termed localized attentional interference (LAI). The present experiment examined the relationship between these phenomena. Observers made speeded identity judgments of a colored target letter embedded among gray fillers. A response-compatible or -incompatible flanker of a non-target color appeared at varying distances from the target. Data gave evidence of LAI and spatially-graded FI, with mean RTs and flanker effects both decreasing with target–flanker separation. Both effects were reduced when target location was pre-cued and when the target was of higher salience than the flanker. Results suggest that the distribution of spatial attention modulates the strength of objects competing for selection, with this competition underlying both the FI and LAI effects.     

A dissociation between the sense of familiarity and access to semantic information concerning familiar people

In the current study we examined the relationship between working memory capacity, inhibition/susceptibility to interference and fluid intelligence, measured by the Raven's Progressive Matrices (PM38), comparing groups of young (aged 18–35), young-old (aged 65–74), and old-old (aged 75–86) participants. Groups were administered two working memory tasks tapping into different mechanisms involved in working memory. The ability to control for irrelevant information was measured both considering memory errors (intrusion errors) in a working memory task and an index of susceptibility to interference obtained with a variant of the Brown-Peterson task. Regression analyses showed that the classical working memory measure was the most potent predictors of the Raven's score. Susceptibility to interference and intrusions errors contributed, but to a lower extent, to the Raven explained variance. These results confirm that working memory shares cognitive aspects with the fluid intelligence measure considered, whereas the role of inhibition to Raven scores is still in need of better evidence.     

More on parts in object concepts: Response to Tversky and Hemenway

This articleresponds to the comments ofTversky and Hemenway (1991), who criticized the logic, stimuli, and data analysis of Murphy (1991). It is argued here that their objections do not mitigate the conclusions drawn by Murphy. In particular, the objection that the stimuli were not natural enough to reveal differences between category levels seems to presuppose an answer to the question under investigation. However, further experimentation with other stimuli might resolve this issue empirically.     

Recognizing a plane-misoriented view of a familiar object is not influenced by the ease of specifying the main axis of elongation of that object

Participants saw three versions of pictures of familiar objects: the original unaltered (axis-normal) pictures, axis-extended pictures in which the main axes of the axis-normal pictures were elongated, and axis-switched pictures in which objects that were originally horizontally elongated were depicted as vertically elongated and vice versa. Relative to axis-normal pictures, axis extension aided decisions about whether the picture of the object was wide or tall, and axis switching hindered these decisions for both upright and plane-misoriented views. Nevertheless, although these axis manipulations clearly influenced decisions about the location of the object's main axis of elongation, axis-switched pictures were no harder to name than axis-extended pictures. Changing the depicted main axis of elongation by axis switching and axis extension did not influence object recognition in itself, whether for upright or for plane-misoriented views. This suggests that specifying the main axis of elongation of an object does not play an important role in the orientation-sensitive processes involved in identifying plane-misoriented views of that object.     

The very same thing: Extending the object token concept to incorporate causal constraints on individual identity

The contributions of feature recognition, object categorization, and recollection of episodic memories to the re-identification of a perceived object as the very same thing encountered in a previous perceptual episode are well understood in terms of both cognitive-behavioral phenomenology and neurofunctional implementation. Human beings do not, however, rely solely on features and context to re-identify individuals; in the presence of featural change and similarly-featured distractors, people routinely employ causal constraints to establish object identities. Based on available cognitive and neurofunctional data, the standard object-token based model of individual re-identification is extended to incorporate the construction of unobserved and hence fictive causal histories (FCHs) of observed objects by the pre-motor action planning system. It is suggested that functional deficits in the construction of FCHs are associated with clinical outcomes in both autism spectrum disorders and later-stage stage Alzheimer's disease.