Experiments: Why and How?

An experiment, in the standard scientific sense of the term, is a procedure in which some object of study is subjected to interventions (manipulations) that aim at obtaining a predictable outcome or at least predictable aspects of the outcome. The distinction between an experiment and a non-experimental observation is important since they are tailored to different epistemic needs. Experimentation has its origin in pre-scientific technological experiments that were undertaken in order to find the best technological means to achieve chosen ends. Important parts of the methodological arsenal of modern experimental science can be traced back to this pre-scientific, technological tradition. It is claimed that experimentation involves a unique combination of acting and observing, a combination whose unique epistemological properties have not yet been fully clarified.     

What is learned from experience in a probabilistic environment?

Three experiments explored what is learned from experience in a probabilistic environment. The task was a simulated medical decision‐making task with each patient having one of two test results and one of two diseases. The test result was highly predictive of the disease for all participants. The base rate of the test result was varied between participants to produce different inverse conditional probabilities of the test result given the disease across conditions. Participants trained using feedback to predict a patient's disease from a test result showed the classic confusion of the inverse error, substituting the forward conditional probability for the inverse conditional probability when tested on it. Additional training on the base rate of the test result did little to improve performance. Training on the joint probabilities, however, produced good performance on either conditional probability. The pattern of results demonstrated that experience with the environment is not always sufficient for good performance. That natural sampling leads to good performance was not supported. Further, because participants not trained on joint probabilities did, however, know them but still committed the confusion of the inverse error, the hypothesis that having joint probabilities would facilitate performance was not supported. The pattern of results supported the conclusion that people learn all the necessary information from experience in a probabilistic environment, but depending upon what the experience was, it may interfere with their ability to recall to memory the appropriate sample set necessary for estimating or using the inverse conditional probability. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Dying: A universal human experience?

This paper explores the question, “Is there a universal psychological experience suffered by all dying persons?” a question to which the popular theory of Kübler-Ross presupposes an affirmative answer. Our answer takes three steps: first, a comparison between the Kübler-Ross model of dying and that of the late medievalBook of the Craft of Dying centered upon the five Kübler-Ross “stages”; second, a philosophical critique of the terms of this comparison; and third, a revised look at the alleged similarities between the two models, providing a deeper look at the moral and spiritual assumptions behind each.     

Why do people show minimal knowledge updating with task experience: Inferential deficit or experimental artifact?

Students generally do not have highly accurate knowledge about strategy effectiveness for learning, such as that imagery is superior to rote repetition. During multiple study–test trials using both strategies, participants' predictions about performance on List 2 do not markedly differ for the two strategies, even though List 1 recall is substantially greater for imagery. Two experiments evaluated whether such deficits in knowledge updating about the strategy effects were due to an experimental artifact or to inaccurate inferences about the effects the strategies had on recall. Participants studied paired associates on two study–test trials—they were instructed to study half using imagery and half using rote repetition. Metacognitive judgements tapped the quality of inferential processes about the strategy effects during the List 1 test and tapped gains in knowledge about the strategies across lists. One artifactual explanation—noncompliance with strategy instructions—was ruled out, whereas manipulations aimed at supporting the data available to inferential processes improved but did not fully repair knowledge updating.     

Why do people show minimal knowledge updating with task experience: inferential deficit or experimental artifact?

Students generally do not have highly accurate knowledge about strategy effectiveness for learning, such as that imagery is superior to rote repetition. During multiple study-test trials using both strategies, participants' predictions about performance on List 2 do not markedly differ for the two strategies, even though List 1 recall is substantially greater for imagery. Two experiments evaluated whether such deficits in knowledge updating about the strategy effects were due to an experimental artifact or to inaccurate inferences about the effects the strategies had on recall. Participants studied paired associates on two study-test trials--they were instructed to study half using imagery and half using rote repetition. Metacognitive judgements tapped the quality of inferential processes about the strategy effects during the List 1 test and tapped gains in knowledge about the strategies across lists. One artifactual explanation--noncompliance with strategy instructions--was ruled out, whereas manipulations aimed at supporting the data available to inferential processes improved but did not fully repair knowledge updating.     

Discriminating utopian from dystopian literature: Why is walden two considered a dystopia?

Skinner thought of Walden Two as a utopia, but many literary critics consider it a dystopia. The present paper examines works by several authors of utopian literature in an effort to determine what elements lead critics to classify works as "dystopian." Common elements seem to include (a) suspicion of scientific social planning, (b) the unhappiness of the characters portrayed, (c) suspicion of sources of control of behavior outside the individual, (d) violation of a presumed inherent need to struggle, and (e) suspicion of behavioral methods of governance. The elements Walden Two shares with other utopias and dystopias are examined, and the conclusion is offered that Walden Two could not be considered a dystopia for any of the traditional reasons. Instead, the negative view of Walden Two seems to be an outgrowth of literary devices and general negative reactions to behavioral determinism.     

Why Me? Why Not Me?

The decision to undergo BRCA testing is very complex and emotionally laden. This decision can be further complicated by the loss of a mother at an early age. The following personal account by a genetic counselor discusses the testing process and the struggle to accept the results and reframe one’s self-identity. The sensitive nature of this testing and the implications for other family members is explored.     

Why Teach Literature and Medicine? Answers from Three Decades

In this essay, I look back at some of the earliest attempts by the first generation of literature-and-medicine scholars to answer the question: Why teach literature and medicine? Reviewing the development of the field in its early years, I examine statements by practitioners to see whether their answers have held up over time and to consider how the rationales they articulated have expanded or changed in the following years and why. Greater emphasis on literary criticism, narrative ethics, narrative theory, and reflective writing has influenced current work in the field in ways that could not have been foreseen in the 1970s. The extraordinary growth of interest and work in the field nationally and, especially since 1996, internationally has included practitioners in many additional areas such as disability studies, film studies, therapeutic writing, and trauma studies. Along with the emergence of narrative medicine, this diverse community of scholars and practitioners—affiliated more through their use of narrative methodologies than the teaching of literature—makes the perennial challenge of evaluation and assessment even more complicated.     

Why reread? Evidence from garden-path and local coherence structures

Two eye-tracking experiments were conducted to compare the online reading and offline comprehension of main verb/reduced relative garden-path sentences and local coherence sentences. Rereading of early material in garden-path reduced relatives should be revisionary, aimed at reanalysing an earlier misparse; however, rereading of early material in a local coherence reduced relative need only be confirmatory, as the original parse of the earlier portion of these sentences is ultimately correct. Results of online and offline measures showed that local coherence structures elicited signals of reading disruption that arose earlier and lasted longer, and local coherence comprehension was also better than garden path comprehension. Few rereading measures in either sentence type were predicted by structural features of these sentences, nor was rereading related to comprehension accuracy, which was extremely low overall. Results are discussed with respect to selective reanalysis and good-enough processing.     

The near-death experience: Private or public?

This editorial contrasts the private, personal near-death experience with the public concept of the experience, and finds important messages for humanity that are common to both.     

Creativity from Constraints: What can we learn from Motherwell? from Modrian? from Klee?

This article presents a problem‐solving model of variability and creativity built on the classic Reitman and Simon analyses of musical composition and architectural design. The model focuses on paired constraints: one precluding (or limiting search among) reliable, existing solutions, the other promoting (or directing search to) novel, often opposite, ones. The primary constraint pair precludes an existing goal criterion and promotes a novel one. Other constraints — source (elements for recombination), task (how materials are used) and subject (motif, theme) — are then strategically selected to realize the goal. A brief discussion of Abstract Expressionism introduces the model, which is then applied to the painting careers of Piet Modrian and Paul Klee.     

Why? Versus Why Not?: Potentialities of Aging in Shaw's Back to Methuselah

Bernard Shaw's critique of society's sacred cows, as well as his participation in the social, cultural and political marketplace in which he lived, resemble the new historical/cultural materialism of contemporary theory. In Back to Methuselah, Shaw examines the notions of aging and illuminates the degree to which our chronological standards of old age are sociological not biological constructs. This tour de force on aging both dramatizes age as a function of societal and/or individual choice, not as a biological given, and juxtaposes opinions toward aging in such a way that flexible attitudes toward the subject emerge.     

Why are some problems hard? Evidence from Tower of Hanoi

This paper analyzes the causes for large differences in difficulty of various isomorphic versions of the Tower of Hanoi problem. Some forms of the problem take 16 times as long to solve, on average, as other versions. Since isomorphism rules out size of task domain as a determinant of relative difficulty, these experiments seek and find causes for the differences in features of the problem representation. Analysis of verbal protocols and the temporal patterning of moves allows the problem-solving behavior to be divided into exploratory and final-path phases. Entry into the final-path phase depends on acquisition of the ability to plan pairs of moves, an achievement made difficult by the working memory load it entails. This memory load can be reduced by automating the rules governing moves, either through problem exploration or training. Once automation has occurred, the solution is obtained very rapidly. Memory load is also proposed as the locus of other differences in difficulty found between various problem representations.