Participants' perceptions of smartphone travel surveys

Smartphone travel surveys are becoming of central importance in collecting detailed, accurate data of people’s travel activities. As with their conventional survey counterparts, the quality of data collected through these surveys is adversely affected by participants’ non-response and resulting biases. However, little is known about the factors affecting people’s perceptions and intentions to continue participating in such surveys. Although literature has investigated the associations between individuals’ socio-demographic attributes and their likelihood of survey participation, the impact of their subjective perceptions and attitudes on their survey participation intentions and behaviour is underexplored. Hence, through a model of participants’ perceptions of smartphone travel survey applications (survey apps), this study aims to reveal such impacts and how they affect the participants’ intentions to continue participating in these surveys. In this study, a survey is designed and used to collect data in a smartphone travel survey before the participants are asked about their personal perceptions and attitudes. Partial least squares path modelling (PLS-PM) is applied to analyse the data, as it allows simultaneous estimation of the relationships between multiple latent constructs as well as the indicators of each construct. The results showed a significant, positive impact of the perceived “ease of use” and “usefulness” of the survey app as the technological medium of data collection on the participants’ “satisfaction” and “intention” to continue participating in the corresponding survey. The study also found that participants’ perceived “risk” associated with privacy concerns did not have any significant impact on their intention to continue participating in the survey.     

Conflictual Moralities,Ethical Torture: Revisiting the Problem of “Dirty Hands”

The problem of “dirty hands” has become an important term, indeed one of the most important terms of reference, in contemporary academic scholarship on the issue of torture. The aim of this essay is to offer a better understanding of this problem. Firstly, it is argued that the problem of “dirty hands” can play neither within rule-utilitarianism nor within absolutism. Still, however, the problem of “dirty hands” represents an acute, seemingly irresolvable, conflict within morality, with the moral agent understood, following Nagel, as necessarily holding mixed, absolutist-consequentialist moral intuitions, pulling in opposite directions. Secondly, a distinction is drawn between real situations of “dirty hands,” and other conflictual scenarios, which are commonly, but unjustifiably placed under the metaphorical title of “dirty hands.” Finally, it is suggested - utilizing Nagel’s own ideas, as developed in his later work, and Sen’s notion of evaluator relativity—that the moral “blind alley” manifested in the problem of “dirty hands” may not be totally blind after all, at least from the situated agent’s own internal point of view (as opposed to that of an external observer trying to put herself in the agent’s position by way of moral simulation). Thus, contrary to Walzer’s approach, it is possible for a person (politician) acting in a situation of “dirty hands,” not to believe herself to be guilty, but still be a moral person.     

Why Husserl’s Universal Empiricism is a Moderate Rationalism

Husserl claims that his phenomenological–epistemological system amounts to a “universal” form of empiricism. The present paper shows that this universal moment of Husserl’s empiricism is why his empiricism qualifies as a rationalism. What is empiricist about Husserl’s phenomenological–epistemological system is that he takes experiences to be an autonomous source of immediate justification. On top of that, Husserl takes experiences to be the ultimate source of justification. For Husserl, every justified belief ultimately depends epistemically on the subject’s experiences. These are paradigms of empiricist claims and thus Husserl seems to subscribe to empiricism. However, what is universal about Husserl’s “empiricism” is that he does not limit the concept of (justification-conferring) experiences to sensory experiences or sensory experiences plus introspective intuitions but broadens the concept of experience such that also a priori intuitions are included. Husserl insists that logical, mathematical, and phenomenological intuitions such as?~?(p ∧ ?~?p), 2?+?2?=?4, and “Experiences necessarily bear the mark of intentionality” provide non-inferential justification analogous to how sensory experiences can non-inferentially justify beliefs such as “There is a table in front of me.” Importantly, Husserl makes clear that such a priori intuitions are not about our concepts but about reality. This is why Husserl’s universal empiricism is a rationalism. Husserl differs from traditional rationalism as he allows that a priori intuitions can be fallible and empirically underminable. This distinguishes Husserl’s rationalism from Descartes’ and makes him a proponent of moderate rationalism as currently championed by Laurence BonJour.     

The folk conception of knowledge

How do people decide which claims should be considered mere beliefs and which count as knowledge? Although little is known about how people attribute knowledge to others, philosophical debate about the nature of knowledge may provide a starting point. Traditionally, a belief that is both true and justified was thought to constitute knowledge. However, philosophers now agree that this account is inadequate, due largely to a class of counterexamples (termed “Gettier cases”) in which a person’s justified belief is true, but only due to luck. We report four experiments examining the effect of truth, justification, and “Gettiering” on people’s knowledge attributions. These experiments show that: (1) people attribute knowledge to others only when their beliefs are both true and justified; (2) in contrast to contemporary philosophers, people also attribute knowledge to others in Gettier situations; and (3) knowledge is not attributed in one class of Gettier cases, but only because the agent’s belief is based on “apparent” evidence. These findings suggest that the lay concept of knowledge is roughly consistent with the traditional account of knowledge as justified true belief, and also point to a major difference between the epistemic intuitions of laypeople and those of philosophers.     

Temperament and intuition: A commentary on Feltz and Cokely

In this paper, we examine Adam Feltz and Edward Cokely’s recent claim that “the personality trait extraversion predicts people’s intuitions about the relationship of determinism to free will and moral responsibility” (INSERT REFERENCE). We will first present some criticisms of their work before briefly examining the results of a recent study of our own. We argue that while Feltz and Cokely have their finger on the pulse of an interesting and important issue, they have not established a robust and stable connection between extraversion and compatibilist-friendly intuitions.     

Predicting premeditation: future behavior is seen as more intentional than past behavior

People's intuitions about the underlying causes of past and future actions might not be the same. In 3 studies, we demonstrate that people judge the same behavior as more intentional when it will be performed in the future than when it has been performed in the past. We found this temporal asymmetry in perceptions of both the strength of an individual's intention and the overall prevalence of intentional behavior in a population. Because of its heightened intentionality, people thought the same transgression deserved more severe punishment when it would occur in the future than when it did occur in the past. The difference in judgments of both intentionality and punishment was partly explained by the stronger emotional reactions that were elicited in response to future actions than in response to past actions. We consider the implications of this temporal asymmetry for legal decision making and theories of attribution more generally.     

On non-pragmatic Millianism

Speakers often judge the sentence “Lois Lane believes that Superman flies” to be true and the sentence “Lois Lane believes that Clark Kent flies” to be false. If Millianism is true, however, these sentences express the very same proposition and must therefore have same truth value. “Pragmatic” Millians like Salmon and Soames have tried to explain speakers’ “anti-substitution intuitions” by claiming that the two sentences are routinely used to pragmatically convey different propositions which do have different truth values. “Non-Pragmatic” Millians like Braun, on the other hand, have argued that the Millian should not appeal to pragmatics and opt instead for a purely psychological explanation. I will present two objections against Non-Pragmatic Millianism. The first one is that the view cannot account for the intuitions of speakers who accept the identity sentence “Superman is Clark Kent”: applying a psychological account in this case, I will argue, would yield wrong predictions about speakers who resist substitution with simple sentences. I will then consider a possible response from the non-pragmatic Millian and show that the response would in fact require an appeal to pragmatics. My conclusion will be that Braun’s psychological explanation of anti-substitution intuitions is untenable, and that the Millian is therefore forced to adopt a pragmatic account. My second objection is that Non-Pragmatic Millianism cannot account for the role that certain commonsense intentional generalizations play in the explanation of behavior. I will consider a reply offered by Braun and argue that it still leaves out a large class of important generalizations. My conclusion will be that Braun’s non-pragmatic strategy fails, and that the Millian will again be forced to adopt a pragmatic account of intentional generalizations if he wants to respond to the objection. In light of my two objections, my general conclusion will be that non-pragmatic versions of Millianism should be rejected. This has an important consequence: if Millianism is true, then some pragmatic Millian account must be correct. It follows that, if standard objections against pragmatic accounts succeed, then Millianism must be rejected altogether.     

Sexual Intent Perceptions: The Role of Perceiver Experience and the Real‐Person Reduction1

What factors influence the amount of sexual intention accorded to a person's behavior? A perceiver's gender and personal experiences, and the nature of the relationship with the perceived were investigated. Two findings emerged. First, perceiver sexual and dating experiences predicted perceptions in addition to and independent of perceiver gender, but only for a “self” target. Second, hypothetical targets were perceived more sexually relative to targets that represented real people. These findings extended previous research suggesting that features of targets and perceivers in addition to gender are predictive of sexual perceptions. These target features (e.g., “self” vs. other, “real” vs. hypothetical) have distinct influences on sexual perceptions, suggesting that the choice of a target in research studies should be considered carefully.     

The hand of God or the hand of Maradona? Believing in free will increases perceived intentionality of others’ behavior

The question of whether free will actually exists has been debated in philosophy for centuries. However, how belief in free will shapes the perception of our social environment still remains open. Here we investigate whether belief in free will affects how much intentionality we attribute to other people. Study 1a and 1b demonstrate a weak positive relation between the strength of belief in free will and the perceived intentionality of soccer players committing handball. This pattern even holds for behavior that is objectively not intentional (i.e., when the player touches the ball accidentally). Going one step further, in Study 2 we find a weak correlation between belief in free will and perceiving intentions in very abstract geometrical shapes. These findings suggest that whether individuals believe in free will or not changes the way they interpret others’ behavior, which may have important societal consequences.     

Small Unit Leader Perceptions of Managing Soldier Behavioral Health and Associated Factors

This investigation explored squad leaders’ perceptions of their roles managing subordinate soldiers’ behavioral health (BH) needs. The data were obtained through an anonymous survey of 458 squad leaders (i.e., small unit leaders who oversee 4–10 soldiers). More than 80% of squad leaders perceived management of soldier BH needs before, during, and after treatment as their responsibility, and felt comfortable and capable of executing these roles. Latent class analysis was used to determine groups of “most active,” “moderately active,” and “least active” leaders. Multinomial logistic regression was used to compare the least and most active classes. The most active leaders were more likely to report high BH knowledge, dedication to a common purpose, and low levels of “associative” stigma. These results should inform leader management of soldier BH. Future research should examine active leader characteristics and whether evidence-based training can increase support for preventing and managing BH issues.     

On intuitional stability: The clear,the strong,and the paradigmatic

Skepticism about the epistemic value of intuition in theoretical and philosophical inquiry has recently been bolstered by empirical research suggesting that people’s concrete-case intuitions are vulnerable to irrational biases (e.g., the order effect). What is more, skeptics argue that we have no way to “calibrate” our intuitions against these biases and no way of anticipating intuitional instability. This paper challenges the skeptical position, introducing data from two studies that suggest not only that people’s concrete-case intuitions are often stable, but also that people have introspective awareness of this stability, providing a promising means by which to assess the epistemic value of our intuitions.     

Got Pain? Racial Bias in Perceptions of Pain

In the days of slavery, White people assumed that Black people felt less pain than did White people. This belief was used to justify slavery; it was also used to justify the inhumane treatment of Black men and women in medical research. Today, White Americans continue to believe that Black people feel less pain than do White people although this belief has changed from its historical, explicitly racist form. Racial attitudes do not moderate the bias, suggesting that racial bias in perceptions of others' pain is not rooted (solely) in racial prejudice. Moreover, Black Americans too believe that Black people feel less pain than do White people, suggesting that the bias is no longer grounded in intergroup dynamics. Rather, contemporary forms of this bias stem from assumptions that Black people face more hardship and “thus” can withstand more pain and assumptions that Black people's bodies are not only different but also superhuman. Although this new instantiation of the pain perception bias is decidedly more “benevolent”, it can nonetheless lead to negative outcomes. Here, we consider how racial bias in perceptions of others' pain may affect racial disparities in health care and intergroup relations more generally. We also discuss potential avenues for interventions aimed at preventing this bias among children and reducing this bias among adults.     

Free Will,Determinism, and the Possibility of Doing Otherwise

I argue that free will and determinism are compatible, even when we take free will to require the ability to do otherwise and even when we interpret that ability modally, as the possibility of doing otherwise, and not just conditionally or dispositionally. My argument draws on a distinction between physical and agential possibility. Although in a deterministic world only one future sequence of events is physically possible for each state of the world, the more coarsely defined state of an agent and his or her environment can be consistent with more than one such sequence, and thus different actions can be “agentially possible”. The agential perspective is supported by our best theories of human behaviour, and so we should take it at face value when we refer to what an agent can and cannot do. On the picture I defend, free will is not a physical phenomenon, but a higher‐level one on a par with other higher‐level phenomena such as agency and intentionality.     

What Makes a Manipulated Agent Unfree?

Incompatibilists and compatibilists (mostly) agree that there is a strong intuition that a manipulated agent, i.e., an agent who is the victim of methods such as indoctrination or brainwashing, is unfree. They differ however on why exactly this intuition arises. Incompatibilists claim our intuitions in these cases are sensitive to the manipulated agent’s lack of ultimate control over her actions, while many compatibilists argue that our intuitions respond to damage inflicted by manipulation on the agent’s psychological and volitional capacities. Much hangs on this issue because manipulation‐based arguments are among the most important for defending incompatibilist views of free will. In this paper, I investigate this issue from a experimental perspective, using a set of statistical methods well suited for identifying the features of hypothetical cases people’s intuitions are responding to. Results strongly support the compatibilist view—subjects’ tendency to judge that a manipulated agent is unfree was found to depend on their judgments that the agent suffers impairments to certain psychological/volitional capacities that compatibilists say are the basis for free will. I discuss the significance of these results for the use of manipulation cases in the philosophical debate about free will.     

Kant and Kantians on “the Normative Question”

After decades of vigorous debate, many contemporary philosophers in the Kantian tradition continue to believe, or at least hope, that morality can be given a firm grounding by showing that rational agents cannot consistently reject moral requirements. In the present paper, I do not take a stand on the possibility of bringing out the alleged inconsistency. Instead I argue that, even if a successful argument could be given for this inconsistency, this would not provide an adequate answer to “the normative question” (i.e., “why should I be moral?”). My defense of this claim emerges from a defense of a claim about Kant, namely, that he did not attempt to answer the normative question in this way. After carefully articulating Kant’s answer to the normative question, I argue that his answer to this question contains a lesson about why we should not embrace the approach that is popular among many contemporary Kantians.     

What emotional reactions can tell us about the nature of others: An appraisal perspective on person perception

The present research aimed to assess how people use knowledge about the emotional reactions of others to make inferences about their character. Specifically, we postulate that people can reconstruct or “reverse engineer” the appraisals underlying an emotional reaction and use this appraisal information to draw person perception inferences. As predicted, a person who reacted with anger to blame was perceived as more aggressive, and self-confident, but also as less warm and gentle than a person who reacted with sadness (Study 1). A person who reacted with a smile (Study 1) or remained neutral (Study 2) was perceived as self-confident but also as unemotional. These perceptions were mediated by perceived appraisals.     

Perception of randomness: On the time of streaks

People tend to think that streaks in random sequential events are rare and remarkable. When they actually encounter streaks, they tend to consider the underlying process as non-random. The present paper examines the time of pattern occurrences in sequences of Bernoulli trials, and shows that among all patterns of the same length, a streak is the most delayed pattern for its first occurrence. It is argued that when time is of essence, how often a pattern is to occur (mean time, or, frequency) and when a pattern is to first occur (waiting time) are different questions and bear different psychological relevance. The waiting time statistics may provide a quantitative measure to the psychological distance when people are expecting a probabilistic event, and such measure is consistent with both of the representativeness and availability heuristics in people’s perception of randomness. We discuss some of the recent empirical findings and suggest that people’s judgment and generation of random sequences may be guided by their actual experiences of the waiting time statistics.     

Perception of randomness: On the time of streaks

People tend to think that streaks in random sequential events are rare and remarkable. When they actually encounter streaks, they tend to consider the underlying process as non-random. The present paper examines the time of pattern occurrences in sequences of Bernoulli trials, and shows that among all patterns of the same length, a streak is the most delayed pattern for its first occurrence. It is argued that when time is of essence, how often a pattern is to occur (mean time, or, frequency) and when a pattern is to first occur (waiting time) are different questions and bear different psychological relevance. The waiting time statistics may provide a quantitative measure to the psychological distance when people are expecting a probabilistic event, and such measure is consistent with both of the representativeness and availability heuristics in people’s perception of randomness. We discuss some of the recent empirical findings and suggest that people’s judgment and generation of random sequences may be guided by their actual experiences of the waiting time statistics.     

Are Intuitions Quasi‐Perceptual “Presentations”?

John Bengson has offered a detailed theory of the nature and epistemology of intuition according to which intuitions are quasi‐perceptual conscious experiences that “present” their contents as true. The paper offered here argues that Bengson’s terminology of “presentations” is difficult to interpret. Bengson does not provide a clear meaning for “presentation” or “presentational state,” and this makes it impossible to evaluate his proposal that intuitions are presentations. This paper argues, furthermore, that intuitions are not phenomenal mental states and therefore have no perception‐like phenomenology or epistemology. It concludes that Bengson’s theory fails to metaphysically, epistemologically, or methodologically legitimize intuitions.