Attitude importance as a moderator of the relationship between implicit and explicit attitude measures

The authors examined attitude importance as a moderator of the relationship between the Implicit Association Test (IAT) and explicit attitude measures. In Study 1 (N = 194), as ratings of attitude importance regarding the 2000 presidential election increased, the strength of the relationship between a Bush-Gore IAT and explicit attitude measures also increased. Study 2 provided a conceptual replication of these results using attitudes toward Coke and Pepsi (N = 112). In addition, across both studies, explicit attitude measures were better predictors of deliberative behaviors than IAT scores. In Study 3 (N = 77), the authors examined the role of elaboration as a mechanism by which attitude importance may moderate IAT-explicit attitude correlations. As predicted, increased elaboration resulted in stronger IAT-explicit attitude correlations. Other possible mechanisms by which attitude importance may moderate the IAT-explicit attitude relationship also are discussed.     

Discrepancies between explicit and implicit self-concepts: Consequences for information processing

Individuals with discrepancies among their explicit beliefs often engage in greater elaboration of discrepancy-related information in a presumed attempt to reduce the discrepancy. The authors predicted that individuals with discrepancies between explicit and implicit self-conceptions might similarly be motivated to engage in processing of discrepancy-related information, even though they might not be aware of the discrepancy. Four studies were conducted in which various self-dimensions were assessed with explicit and implicit measures. Across several different self-dimensions (e.g., need to evaluate, self-esteem), the authors found that as the discrepancy between the explicit and implicit measure increased (regardless of direction), people engaged in more thinking about information framed as related to the self-dimension on which the discrepancy existed. This research suggests that individuals might be motivated to examine relevant information as a strategy to minimize the implicit doubt that accompanies an inconsistency between explicit and implicit self-conceptions.     

Discrepancies between implicit and explicit self-esteem: implications for narcissism and self-esteem instability

ABSTRACT There appear to be two forms of high self-esteem: secure high self-esteem (which is often linked with psychological health) and fragile high self-esteem (which is generally associated with poor psychological adjustment and impaired interpersonal relationships). Discrepant high self-esteem is a form of fragile self-esteem characterized by high explicit self-esteem and low implicit self-esteem. The present study examined whether discrepant high self-esteem was associated with narcissism and self-esteem instability in an undergraduate sample. Using multiple measures of implicit self-esteem, two basic findings emerged from the present study. First, participants with discrepant high self-esteem possessed the highest levels of narcissism. Second, participants with high explicit self-esteem and high implicit self-esteem displayed the most stable self-esteem. Findings are discussed in terms of secure and fragile high self-esteem.     

Reporting tendencies underlie discrepancies between implicit and explicit measures of self-esteem

The assumption that implicit measures assess associations that are not accessible to consciousness abounds in current social cognition research. In the present report, we question this assumption, focusing on the construct of implicit self-esteem as a case in point. Although researchers often argue that implicitly measured self-esteem is unconscious, we provide evidence that it is not, and that discrepancies between implicit and explicit measures of self-esteem are the result of reporting tendencies. Study 1 demonstrated that individuals for whom explicitly measured self-esteem is relatively high and implicitly measured self-esteem is relatively low admit to overpresenting themselves. In Study 2, implicit and explicit measures of self-esteem were related when subjects were urged to avoid over- or underpresenting themselves when responding to the explicit measures. We discuss the critical distinction between awareness of one's attitudes and awareness of their influence.     

Understanding patterns of attitude change: When implicit measures show change, but explicit measures do not

A common assumption in research on attitudes is that indirect measures assess relatively stable implicit attitudes, whereas traditional self-report measures assess more recently acquired explicit attitudes that coexist with old, presumably stable implicit attitudes. This assumption seems difficult to reconcile with research showing experimentally induced changes on implicit but not explicit measures. The present research tested a process-account of such asymmetrical patterns. Specifically, we argue that implicit measures show experimental effects that do not emerge on explicit measures when (a) the pairing of an attitude object with positive or negative valence creates new automatic associations in memory, and, at the same time, (b) the consideration of additional information about the attitude object eliminates the impact of automatic associations on self-reported evaluative judgments. Results from three studies support these predictions. Implications for research on attitude change are discussed.     

The effect of expertise on the relation between implicit and explicit attitude measures: An information availability/accessibility perspective

Three experiments investigate expertise as a moderator of the relationship between implicit and explicit attitude measures. Prior research suggests that greater expertise leads to stronger implicit–explicit relations; however, a cognitive view of expertise can also predict a weaker implicit–explicit relation. Our framework helps to resolve that seeming contradiction on the basis of the availability/accessibility of attributes versus attitudes in explicit attitude measures. We show that object specificity and contextual factors (e.g., instructions and prior evaluations in a survey) differentially affect the availability/accessibility of global attitudes and attribute information for novices versus experts, thus determining how expertise moderates the implicit–explicit relation.     

Associations between visual attention,implicit and explicit attitude and behaviour for physical activity

The current study explored associations between previous physical activity and both implicit and explicit attitudes, as well as visual attention and activity motivation (intention). Analyses were performed on participants initially unaware of the physical activity focus of the study (N = 98). Higher levels of physical activity were associated with positive implicit attitudes and an attentional bias towards exercise cues. There was a quadratic (‘U’ shaped) relationship between implicit attitude and attention: the more extreme individuals’ implicit attitudes towards exercise (positive or negative) the greater their attentional bias to exercise cues. Furthermore, explicit attitude moderated the relationship between attentional bias and physical activity: attentional bias to exercise cues was associated with higher levels of physical activity only for those who had a strong positive explicit attitude. Findings suggested that implicit cognitions are linked with previous physical activity. Future research should consider strategies for strengthening positive implicit and explicit attitudes and directing attention to cues signalling healthy behaviour.     

Obtaining separate measures for implicit and explicit memory

In this paper a new model, the Implicit/Explicit Separation (IES) model, is developed and applied. The model is designed to obtain separate probability measures for explicit memory storage, implicit memory storage, fractional storage, and non-storage. The model is needed because memory research has shown the importance of the distinction between a conscious memory of a target event and a memory residue that is unable to support conscious recall or confident recognition, but it is still able to support guessing at rates above chance. Maximum likelihood and population-parameter mapping estimates for the parameters of the IES model are provided. The accuracy of parameter estimates is studied as a function of sample size. Three experiments are reported to demonstrate how the IES model is used to achieve a more fine grained assessment of the quality of information storage. These experiments also provide strong validation support for the IES model itself. Across the three experiments, each of the four components for representing target information (explicit, implicit, fractional, and non-storage) demonstrates a different pattern. The IES model is discussed in terms of alternative models such as the dual-process model and the process-dissociation model.     

On the reliability of implicit and explicit memory measures

Functional dissociations between implicit and explicit memory tests often take the form of large differences between groups or experimental conditions (e.g., amnesics and controls, elderly and younger persons, or persons learning with and without a distracting secondary task) when performance is assessed using explicit memory tests, whereas no difference is observed with implicit memory tests. We argue that the interpretation of such dissociations in terms of the memory processes or systems involved in performance is problematic because the same data pattern would emerge as a result of a mere methodological artifact, that is, the situation that implicit memory tests have low reliability whereas explicit memory tests are fairly reliable measurement instruments. We present reasons for such a reliability difference, and we demonstrate it empirically in Experiments 1a, 1b, and 2. However, our analysis also shows, and Experiment 3 confirms empirically, that implicit memory tests need not necessarily be less reliable measurement instruments than explicit memory tests.     

Associative and propositional processes in evaluation: an integrative review of implicit and explicit attitude change

A central theme in recent research on attitudes is the distinction between deliberate, "explicit" attitudes and automatic, "implicit" attitudes. The present article provides an integrative review of the available evidence on implicit and explicit attitude change that is guided by a distinction between associative and propositional processes. Whereas associative processes are characterized by mere activation independent of subjective truth or falsity, propositional reasoning is concerned with the validation of evaluations and beliefs. The proposed associative-propositional evaluation (APE) model makes specific assumptions about the mutual interplay of the 2 processes, implying several mechanisms that lead to symmetric or asymmetric changes in implicit and explicit attitudes. The model integrates a broad range of empirical evidence and implies several new predictions for implicit and explicit attitude change.     

A meta-analysis on the correlation between the implicit association test and explicit self-report measures

Theoretically, low correlations between implicit and explicit measures can be due to (a) motivational biases in explicit self reports, (b) lack of introspective access to implicitly assessed representations, (c) factors influencing the retrieval of information from memory, (d) method-related characteristics of the two measures, or (e) complete independence of the underlying constructs. The present study addressed these questions from a meta-analytic perspective, investigating the correlation between the Implicit Association Test (IAT) and explicit self-report measures. Based on a sample of 126 studies, the mean effect size was .24, with approximately half of the variability across correlations attributable to moderator variables. Correlations systematically increased as a function of (a) increasing spontaneity of self-reports and (b) increasing conceptual correspondence between measures. These results suggest that implicit and explicit measures are generally related but that higher order inferences and lack of conceptual correspondence can reduce the influence of automatic associations on explicit self-reports.     

Understanding implicit and explicit attitude change: a systems of reasoning analysis

There is considerable controversy about how to conceptualize implicit and explicit attitudes, reflecting substantial speculation about the mechanisms involved in implicit and explicit attitude formation and change. To investigate this issue, the current work examines the processes by which new attitudes are formed and changed and how these attitudes predict behavior. Five experiments support a systems of reasoning approach to implicit and explicit attitude change. Specifically, explicit attitudes were shaped in a manner consistent with fast-changing processes, were affected by explicit processing goals, and uniquely predicted more deliberate behavioral intentions. Conversely, implicit attitudes reflected an associative system characterized by a slower process of repeated pairings between an attitude object and related evaluations, were unaffected by explicit processing goals, uniquely predicted spontaneous behaviors, and were exclusively affected by associative information about the attitude object that was not available for higher order cognition.     

Independence between implicit and explicit processing as revealed by the Simon effect

Studies showing human behavior influenced by subliminal stimuli mainly focus on implicit processing per se, and little is known about its interaction with explicit processing. We examined this by using the Simon effect, wherein a task-irrelevant spatial distracter interferes with lateralized response. Lo and Yeh (2008) found that the visual Simon effect, although it occurred when participants were aware of the visual distracters, did not occur with subliminal visual distracters. We used the same paradigm and examined whether subliminal and supra-threshold stimuli are processed independently by adding a supra-threshold auditory distracter to ascertain whether it would interact with the subliminal visual distracter. Results showed auditory Simon effect, but there was still no visual Simon effect, indicating that supra-threshold and subliminal stimuli are processed separately in independent streams. In contrast to the traditional view that implicit processing precedes explicit processing, our results suggest that they operate independently in a parallel fashion.     

Relations between implicit and explicit measures of attitudes and measures of behavior: evidence of moderation by individual difference variables

The moderating role of individual difference variables (Self-Reported Habit Index [SRHI], Need for Cognition [NFC]) on relationships between implicit (Implicit Association Test [IAT], Extrinsic Affective Simon Test [EAST]) or explicit measures of attitude and behavior is assessed in two studies. A dissociation pattern is found on self-report diary measures of behavior. In Study 1, the EAST-behavior relationship is moderated by SRHI; explicit measures of the attitude-behavior relationship are moderated by NFC. In Study 2, the IAT-behavior relationship is moderated by SRHI; explicit measures of the attitude-behavior relationship are moderated by NFC. Higher levels of SRHI and NFC are associated with stronger relationships between the implicit or explicit measures of attitude and the measure of behavior. In Study 2, the SRHI x IAT interaction is replicated for an objective behavior measure. Implications for understanding the relationship between implicit and explicit measures of attitudes and measures of behavior are discussed.     

Qualitative differences between implicit and explicit sequence learning

Four experiments investigate the differences between implicit and explicit sequence learning concerning their resilience to structural and superficial task changes. A superficial change that embedded the SRT task in the context of a selection task, while maintaining the sequence, did selectively hinder the expression of implicit learning. In contrast, a manipulation that maintained the task surface, but decreased the sequence validity, affected the expression of learning specifically when it was explicit. These results are discussed in the context of a dynamic framework (Cleeremans & Jiménez, 2002), which assumes that implicit knowledge is specially affected by contextual factors and that, as knowledge becomes explicit, it allows for the development of relevant metaknowledge that modulates the expression of explicit knowledge.     

Social anxiety and evaluation of social crowds: explicit and implicit measures

To investigate whether social anxiety disorder is indeed characterized by a biased negative evaluation of facial expressions, 25 highly socially anxious (SA) participants and 30 non-anxious controls (NACs) were asked to respond to different ratios of neutral-angry or happy-angry face combinations (crowds). In an indirect Approach-Avoidance Task (AAT), participants used a joystick to pull the crowds towards themselves (approach) or push them away (avoidance). SAs showed faster avoidance of neutral-angry crowds when the number of angry faces in the crowd increased. The happy-angry crowds were generally avoided, independent of the ratio of the two emotions. NACs did not show any specific response tendency. When directly rating the friendliness of the crowds, the two groups did not differ.     

Moderators of the relationship between implicit and explicit evaluation

Automatic and controlled modes of evaluation sometimes provide conflicting reports of the quality of social objects. This article presents evidence for 4 moderators of the relationship between automatic (implicit) and controlled (explicit) evaluations. Implicit and explicit preferences were measured for a variety of object pairs using a large sample. The average correlation was r=.36, and 52 of the 57 object pairs showed a significant positive correlation. Results of multilevel modeling analyses suggested that (a) implicit and explicit preferences are related, (b) the relationship varies as a function of the objects assessed, and (c) at least 4 variables moderate the relationship: self-presentation, evaluative strength, dimensionality, and distinctiveness. The variables moderated implicit-explicit correspondence across individuals and accounted for much of the observed variation across content domains. The resulting model of the relationship between automatic and controlled evaluative processes is grounded in personal experience with the targets of evaluation.