共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 31 毫秒
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Panu Raatikainen 《Synthese》2003,135(1):37-47
Hilary Putnam's famous arguments criticizing Tarski's theory oftruth are evaluated. It is argued that they do not succeed to undermine Tarski's approach. One of the arguments is based on the problematic idea of a false instance of T-schema. The otherignores various issues essential for Tarski's setting such as language-relativity of truth definition. 相似文献
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Luca Bellotti 《Erkenntnis》2005,62(3):395-409
I discuss and try to evaluate the argument about constructible sets made by Putnam in ‘
”Models and Reality”, and some of the counterarguments directed against it in the literature. I shall conclude that Putnam’s argument, while correct in substance, nevertheless has no direct bearing on the philosophical question of unintended models of set theory. 相似文献
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Philosophical Studies - Universal reductionism—the sort of project pursued by Carnap in the Aufbau, Lewis in his campaign on behalf of Humean supervenience, Jackson in From Metaphysics to... 相似文献
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Robert Kirk 《Synthese》1996,108(2):157-170
Kim maintains that a physicalist has only two genuine options, eliminativism and reductionism. But physicalists can reject both by using the Strict Implication thesis (SI). Discussing his arguments will help to show what useful work SI can do.(1) His discussion of anomalous monism depends on an unexamined assumption to the effect that SI is false.(2) His conclusion on multiple realizability is much stronger than his reasoning warrants.(3) In discussing supervenience, he is wrong to assume that the only approach to explaining why physical truths determine all the truths must be via psychophysical laws.(4) His general argument rests on a mistaken assumption that the only alternative to psychophysical identity theses is to accept supervenient causal relations. 相似文献
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Philosophy and Neuroscienceis an unabashed apologetic for reductionism in the philosophy of mind. Although we have learnt much from Bickle's work, we
find his central claims unconvincing. Our comments have two central foci:Bickle's account of mental causation, and his single-cell
account of consciousness. We argue that Bickle's attempt to solve the problem of mental causation is marred by his refusal
to take multiple realizability seriously, and we suggest that his faith in single cell accounts of consciousness is misplaced.
We remain unconvinced that the solutions to the problems of mental causation and consciousness are to be found in neuroscience. 相似文献
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Damian Cox 《Erkenntnis》2003,58(1):33-46
Hilary Putnam and Nelson Goodman are two of the twentieth century's most persuasive critics of metaphysical realism, however they disagree about the consequences of rejecting metaphysical realism. Goodman defended a view he called irrealism in which minds literally make worlds, and Putnam has sought to find a middle path between metaphysical realism and irrealism. I argue that Putnam's middle path turns out to be very elusive and defend a dichotomy between metaphysical realism and irrealism. 相似文献