Stereotypes as justifications for prior intergroup discrimination: Studies of Scottish national stereotyping

Two studies provide support for the group‐justification approach to stereotyping (Tajfel, 1981 ; Huici, 1984 ). This approach contends that stereotypes not only serve cognitive functions for individuals but also provide a means of justifying prior intergroup discrimination. Study 1 investigated whether the content of the Scottish ingroup stereotype changes due to the prior expression of intergroup discrimination. Scottish students were primed with either a ‘differentiation’ or a ‘fairness’ ingroup norm and completed two intergroup judgement tasks. Other Scottish students were primed only with a ‘differentiation’ ingroup norm, while a control group received no prime or judgement tasks. Only participants who experienced the ‘differentiation’ ingroup norm prime and the intergroup judgement tasks changed the content of their ingroup stereotype as an attempt to justify their discriminatory behaviour. Study 2 examined whether Scottish students would use both positive ingroup and negative outgroup stereotypes to rationalize intergroup discrimination. Students who experienced a ‘differentiation’ ingroup norm prime and intergroup judgement tasks showed the highest level of superior recall for positive ingroup and negative outgroup stereotype‐consistent words compared to stereotype‐neutral words. This finding suggests that the expression of intergroup discrimination activates the use of both positive ingroup and negative outgroup stereotypes. Together the findings of these two studies provide empirical support for the notion that stereotypes serve social as well as cognitive functions. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A Moral‐Existential Account of the Psychological Factors Fostering Intergroup Conflict

We combine ideas from terror management and moral foundations theories to analyze the role of existential and moral concerns in the creation and escalation of intergroup conflict. We argue that moral values, as important components of cultural worldviews, serve to buffer existential anxiety. Perceived threats to one’s moral values thus are capable of inducing existential anxiety and unleashing strong moral emotions, creating the psychological impetus for intergroup conflict and violence. We review evidence that threats to the five core moral intuitions posited by moral foundations theory (harm/care, fairness/reciprocity, ingroup/loyalty, authority/respect, and purity/ sanctity) are associated with existential anxiety and that this contributes to intergroup strife and violence. Moral and existential concerns combine to create a vicious feedback loop that leads to self‐perpetuating spirals of violence, which helps explain the intractability of many real‐life conflicts.     

Moral duty or moral defence? The effects of perceiving shared humanity with the victims of ingroup perpetrated harm

Previous theory and research suggests that perceiving shared humanity with others should be a positive force for intergroup relations. The present research considers the alternative possibility, that notions of shared humanity might protect people from feelings of guilt over ingroup perpetrated harm by obscuring the ingroup's unique role in these events. Consistent with this idea, Study 1 (N = 58) found that perceiving shared humanity with a harmed outgroup was associated with less guilt and stronger expectations of forgiveness among members of the perpetrator group. Study 2 (N = 52) demonstrated that these effects only occurred when the moral integrity of the ingroup was open to question. When ingroup morality was instead secure, defensive use of humanity was not apparent. Together, these studies suggest that perceiving harmful ingroup actions as ‘only human’ can sometimes be a moral defence that absolves group members of feelings of responsibility for wrongdoing. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The threat of moral transgression: The impact of group membership and moral opportunity

When other ingroup members behave immorally, people's motivation to maintain a moral group image may cause them to experience increased threat and act defensively in response. In the current research, we investigated people's reactions to others' misconduct and examined the effect of group membership and the possible threat‐reducing function of moral opportunity—the prospect of being able to re‐establish the group's moral image. In Study 1, students who were confronted with fellow students' plagiarism and who received an opportunity to improve their group's morality reported feeling less threatened than students who did not receive such opportunity. In Study 2, students reacted to a recent academic fraud case, which either implicated an ingroup (scholar in their own discipline) or an outgroup member (scholar in another discipline). Results indicated that participants experienced more threat when an ingroup (versus an outgroup) member had committed the moral transgression. However, as hypothesized, this was not the case when moral opportunity was provided. Hence, the threat‐reducing effect of moral opportunity was replicated. Additionally, participants generally were more defensive in response to ingroup (versus outgroup) moral failure and less defensive when moral opportunity was present (versus absent). Together, these findings suggest that the reduction of threat due to moral opportunity may generally help individuals take constructive action when the behavior of fellow group members discredits the group's moral image.     

United we win,divided we fail? Effects of cognitive merger representations and performance feedback on merging groups

Research has shown that cognitive representations of mergers influence intergroup evaluations. This paper extends this research by studying how cognitive representations of mergers (one group, dual identity, and two groups) interact with performance feedback (success and failure) to affect intergroup evaluations. Two competing hypotheses were tested, which made different predictions in case of superordinate group salience combined with subgroup salience after merger failure: The subgroup‐salience‐hypothesis predicts that subgroup salience during a merger generally results in pre‐merger ingroup bias toward the pre‐merger outgroup (i.e., two groups and dual identity). The superordinate‐ salience‐hypothesis predicts that subgroup salience only results in pre‐merger ingroup bias if superordinate group salience is low (i.e., two groups). Both hypotheses predict low levels of ingroup bias after merger success. Study 1 confirmed the second hypothesis using a 3 (merger representation: one group, dual identity, and two groups) × 2 (merger feedback: failure and success) design with interacting groups. Study 2 replicated the results in an adapted minimal group paradigm. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Young children perceive less humanness in outgroup faces

We investigated when young children first dehumanize outgroups. Across two studies, 5‐ and 6‐year‐olds were asked to rate how human they thought a set of ambiguous doll‐human face morphs were. We manipulated whether these faces belonged to their gender in‐ or gender outgroup (Study 1) and to a geographically based in‐ or outgroup (Study 2). In both studies, the tendency to perceive outgroup faces as less human relative to ingroup faces increased with age. Explicit ingroup preference, in contrast, was present even in the youngest children and remained stable across age. These results demonstrate that children dehumanize outgroup members from relatively early in development and suggest that the tendency to do so may be partially distinguishable from intergroup preference. This research has important implications for our understanding of children's perception of humanness and the origins of intergroup bias.     

Spitefulness and moral values

The relationship between spitefulness and an individual’s sense of morality or lack thereof has been neglected in studies of personality. It seems probable that individuals with higher levels of spitefulness exhibit fewer moral concerns relative to those with lower levels of spite. To examine associations between spitefulness and moral concerns, 436 community participants completed self-report measures concerning their spitefulness, basic personality dimensions, and moral concerns. Spitefulness was negatively associated with individualizing values (i.e., sensitivity to harm and fairness) such that spiteful individuals were less concerned about issues related to avoiding harm or injustice to others when making moral judgments. However, spitefulness was not simply associated with a general reduction in moral concerns as it was not significantly associated with binding values (i.e., concerns about ingroup loyalty, authority, and purity).     

Group morality and intergroup relations: cross-cultural and experimental evidence

An observational, cross-cultural study and an experimental study assessed behaviors indicative of a moral code that condones, and even values, hostility toward outgroups. The cross-cultural study, which used data from the Standard Cross-Cultural Sample (Murdock & White, 1969), found that for preindustrial societies, as loyalty to the ingroup increased the tendency to value outgroup violence more than ingroup violence increased, as did the tendencies to engage in more external than internal warfare, and enjoy war. The experimental study found that relative to guilt-prone group members who were instructed to remain objective, guilt-prone group members who were instructed to be empathic with their ingroup were more competitive in an intergroup interaction. The findings from these studies suggest that group morality is associated with intergroup conflict.     

Reaction in action: intergroup contrast in automatic behavior

Whereas previous research has shown automatic behavior conforming to outgroup stereotypes, the authors demonstrate automatic behavioral contrast away from a stereotype/trait associated with an outgroup (Study 1 and 2) and point to the importance of an "us-them" intergroup comparison in this process. In Study 1, participants colored pictures more messily when neatness was associated with an outgroup rather than the ingroup. In Study 2, using a different behavior, participants primed with busy business people reacted faster than controls (assimilation) but became slower when their student ingroup identity was activated (contrast). Subliminally priming an "us-them" intergroup comparison set undermined the accessibility of outgroup stereotypic words (Study 3), especially for those higher in prejudice (Study 4). This suggests that people automatically distance themselves from outgroup attributes when intergroup antagonism is cued or chronic. Implications for the role of self and comparison processes in automatic behavior are discussed.     

Evaluations of moral and conventional intergroup transgressions

To investigate children's understanding of intergroup transgressions, children (3–8 years, N = 84) evaluated moral and conventional transgressions that occurred among members of the same gender group (ingroup) or members of different gender groups (outgroup). All participants judged moral transgressions to be more wrong than conventional transgressions. However, when asked to make a judgment after being told an authority figure did not see the transgression, younger participants still judged that moral violations were less acceptable than conventional transgressions, but judged both moral and conventional transgressions with an outgroup victim as more acceptable than the corresponding transgressions with an ingroup victim. Older children did not demonstrate the same ingroup bias; rather they focused only on the domain of the transgressions. The results demonstrate the impact intergroup information has on children's evaluations about both moral and conventional transgressions.     

The Effects of Moral and Pragmatic Arguments Against Torture on Demands for Judicial Reform

Torture can be opposed on the basis of pragmatic (e.g., torture does not work) or moral arguments (e.g., torture violates human rights). Three studies investigated how these arguments affect U.S. citizens' attitudes toward U.S.‐committed torture. In Study 1, participants expressed stronger demands for redressing the injustice of torture when presented with moral rather than pragmatic or no arguments against torture. Study 2 replicated this finding with an extended justice measure and also showed the moderating role of ingroup glorification and attachment. Moral arguments increased justice demands among those who typically react most defensively to ingroup‐committed wrongdoings: the highly attached and glorifying. Study 3 showed that the effect of moral arguments against torture on justice demands and support for torture among high glorifiers is mediated by moral outrage and empathy but not guilt.     

The other side of we: when outgroup members express common identity

Previous research on the common ingroup identity model has focused on how one's representations of members of the ingroup and outgroup influence intergroup attitudes. Two studies reported here investigated how learning how others, ingroup or outgroup members, conceive of the groups within a superordinate category affects intergroup bias and willingness to engage in intergroup contact. Across both studies, high school students who learned that other ingroup members categorized students at both schools within the common identity of "students" showed less intergroup bias in evaluations and greater willingness for contact. However, consistent with the hypothesized effects of identity threat, when participants read that outgroup members saw the groups within the superordinate category, they exhibited a relatively negative orientation, except when ingroup members also endorsed a superordinate identity (Study 1). This result occurred even when the relative status of the groups was manipulated (Study 2).     

The effects of intergroup context of evaluation on ambivalence toward the ingroup and the outgroup

A study is reported which examines the relations between ambivalence toward the ingroup and the outgroup. The basic assumption was that ambivalent attitudes in intergroup contexts contribute to satisfying two competing motivations of group members, i.e. establishment of positive distinctiveness for the ingroup and conformity to the fairness norm. Participants were asked to evaluate the ingroup and one other group by using unipolar (positively and negatively valenced) affect‐ and cognition‐based items. We predicted an interaction effect of target group (ingroup versus outgroup) and attitude domain (affect‐based versus cognition‐based) on ambivalence. Additional hypotheses were formulated taking separately into account the positive and the negative unipolar items. We expected that on positively valenced items the ingroup would be favoured over the outgroup on both affect‐ and cognition‐based evaluations. Besides, we predicted that on negatively valenced items, the ingroup would be favoured over the outgroup on affect‐based evaluation but not on cognition‐based evaluation. Results indicated support for the predictions and shed light on the moderating role played by attitude domains on both ambivalence and ingroup favouritism. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Competitive victimhood as a response to accusations of ingroup harm doing

Accusations of unjust harm doing by the ingroup threaten the group's moral identity. One strategy for restoring ingroup moral identity after such a threat is competitive victimhood: claiming the ingroup has suffered compared with the harmed outgroup. Men accused of harming women were more likely to claim that men are discriminated against compared with women (Study 1), and women showed the same effect when accused of discriminating against men (Study 3). Undergraduates engaged in competitive victimhood with university staff after their group was accused of harming staff (Study 2). Study 4 showed that the effect of accusations on competitive victimhood among high-status group members is mediated by perceived stigma reversal: the expectation that one should feel guilty for being in a high-status group. Exposure to a competitive victimhood claim on behalf of one's ingroup reduced stigma reversal and collective guilt after an accusation of ingroup harm doing (Study 5).     

Constructing intergroup relationships in social communication

Abstract:  People communicate with each other about their ingroup and outgroup in a social context. These social communications may have profound effects in constructing intergroup relationships. In this paper, we outline how different combinations of the social identities of the sender, receiver, and target of the social communication may give rise to differing face concerns of the ingroup and outgroup, and may result in different patterns of communications about them. People may enhance or protect their ingroup social identity, and derogate the outgroup social identity to their ingroup audiences; however, they are more likely to enhance and protect their outgroup's social identity when communicating with outgroup audiences. Two studies tested these predictions. Study 1 used real groups of Australian and Asian students communicating about an Asian student in an Australian university context. In Study 2, participants assigned to two fictitious groups communicated about their ingroup and outgroup. In both studies, the findings were interpreted within the framework of intergroup communication, although there were some notable deviations from the predictions. Future directions of the research were also discussed.     

Retributive justice and social categorizations: the perceived fairness of punishment depends on intergroup status

In the current research, the authors investigate the influence of intergroup status and social categorizations on retributive justice judgments, that is, the extent to which observers perceive punishment as fair. Building on social identity theory and the model of subjective group dynamics, it is predicted that when the ingroup has higher status than the outgroup, people are relatively less concerned about punishment of an outgroup offender than when the ingroup has lower status than the outgroup. Two experiments revealed that participants are more punitive towards an ingroup than an outgroup offender when ingroup status is high but not when ingroup status is low. Furthermore, in correspondence with our line of reasoning, this finding emerged because participants were less punitive towards outgroup offenders when ingroup status is high than when ingroup status was low. It is concluded that the perceived fairness of punishment depends on the offender's social categorization and intergroup status. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Ingroup bias,self-enhancement and group identification

These two studies integrate self-enhancement and ingroup bias and analyse the phenomena from the social identity theory and self-categorization theory. In Study 1, the subjects (N=181) evaluated supporters of two presidential candidates on a rating scale. In Study 2, the subjects (N=302) evaluated either Finnish women's and men's positive characteristics (success condition) or negative characteristics (failure condition) which might play a role in achieving equality between the sexes in Finland. Self-evaluations were conducted on the same scale as those of ingroup and outgroup evaluations. The results showed that ingroup was evaluated more positively than outgroup (hypothesis 1) and that self was evaluated more positively than ingroup (in Study 2, however, this main effect was qualified by gender). As expected, group identification did not dilute self-enhancement (hypothesis 2) in either of the studies but strengthened self-enhancement in Study 1. Hypothesis 3 stated that self-enhancement is inversely related to ingroup favouritism but the hypothesis was only partially confirmed in that the correlation was predictably negative in Study 1 but near zero in both conditions of Study 2. Finally, contrary to hypothesis 4, it turned out that high identified group members evaluated self and ingroup more independently than lows which contradicts the idea of depersonalization. Together the results would be plausible if we rejected the unidimensional conception of interpersonal–intergroup behaviour and assumed instead that interpersonal and intergroup behaviour constitute two bipolar continua. © 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Do liberals and conservatives use different moral languages? Two replications and six extensions of Graham,Haidt, and Nosek’s (2009) moral text analysis

Do liberals and conservatives tend to use different moral languages? The Moral Foundations Hypothesis states that liberals rely more on foundations of care/harm and fairness/cheating whereas conservatives rely more on loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion, and purity/degradation in their moral functioning. In support, Graham, Haidt, and Nosek (2009; Study 4) showed that sermons delivered by liberal and conservative pastors differed as predicted in their moral word usage, except for the loyalty foundation. I present two high-powered replication studies in religious contexts and six extension studies in politics, the media, and organizations to test ideological differences in moral language usage. On average, replication success rate was 30% and effect sizes were 38 times smaller than those in the original study. A meta-analysis (N = 303,680) found that compared to liberals, conservatives used more authority r = 0.05, 95% confidence interval = [0.02, 0.09] and purity words, r = 0.14 [0.09, 0.19], fewer loyalty words, r = −0.08 [−0.10, −0.05], and no more or less harm, r = 0.00 [−0.02, 0.02], or fairness words, r = −0.03 [−0.06, 0.01].