Can there be a Uniform Application of Direct Reference?

There are two interpretations of what it means for a singular term to be referentially direct, one truth-conditional and the other cognitive. It has been argued that on the former interpretation, both proper names and indexicals refer directly, whereas on the latter only proper names are directly referential. However, these interpretations in fact apply to the same singular terms. This paper argues that, if conceived in purely normative terms, the linguistic meaning of indexicals can no longer be held to make these terms referentially indirect under the second interpretation. This result is then generalized to proper names, by ascribing them a normative meaning as well.     

Why Propositions Might be Sets of Truth-supporting Circumstances

Soames (Philos Top 15:44–87, 1987, J Philos Logic 37:267–276, 2008) has argued that propositions cannot be sets of truth-supporting circumstances. This argument is criticized for assuming that various singular terms are directly referential when in fact there are good grounds to doubt this.     

The Semantics of Rigid Designation

Frege's thesis that each singular term has a sense that determines its reference and serves as its cognitive value has come to be widely doubted. Saul Kripke argued that since names are rigid designators, their referents are not determined by senses. David Kaplan has argued that the rigid designation of indexical terms entails that they also lack referent–determining senses. Kripke's argument about names and Kaplan's argument about indexical terms differ, but each contains a false premise. The referents of both names and indexical terms are determined by reflexive senses. It is reflexive sense that makes these terms rigid designators.     

Intention-sensitive semantics

A number of authors have argued that the fact that certain indexicals depend for their reference-determination on the speaker’s referential intentions demonstrates the inadequacy of associating such expressions with functions from contexts to referents (characters). By distinguishing between different uses to which the notion of context is put in these argument, I show that this line of argument fails. In the course of doing so, I develop a way of incorporating the role played by intentions into a character-based semantics for indexicals and I argue that the framework I prefer is superior to an alternative which has been proposed by others.     

On the unification argument for the predicate view on proper names

The predicate view on proper names opts for a uniform semantic representation of proper nouns like ‘Alfred’ as predicates on the level of logical form. Early defences of this view can be found in Sloat (Language, vol. 45, pp. 26–30, 1969) and Burge (J. Philos. 70: 425–439, 1973), but there is an increasing more recent interest in this view on proper names. My paper aims to provide a reconstruction and critique of Burge’s main argument for the predicate view on proper names, which is still used by several current philosophers in defence of this view. I have called this argument the unification argument. I will present a stepwise interpretation and reconstruction of this argument, consider several possible responses to it and defend a specific response to it in detail.     

Propositions, semantic values, and rigidity

Jeffrey King has recently argued: (i) that the semantic value of a sentence at a context is (or determines) a function from possible worlds to truth values, and (ii) that this undermines Jason Stanley's argument against the rigidity thesis, the claim that no rigid term has the same content as a non-rigid term. I show that King's main argument for (i) fails, and that Stanley's argument is consistent with the claim that the semantic value of a sentence at a context is (or determines) a function from worlds to truth values.     

A set of 254 Snodgrass-Vanderwart pictures standardized for Spanish: Norms for name agreement,image agreement,familiarity, and visual complexity

The Snodgrass and Vanderwart (1980) picture set was standardized for a Spanish sample (N = 261). The present article shows the main results, but more explicitly, it shows the differences between English and Spanish data. This evidence justifies the statement that normative data of cognitive stimuli cannot be taken into another language directly, because object names that are very common in one language may not be so in another, or objects that have a specific name in one language may have a generic name in another, and so on. Finally, because of the potential usefulness of the data for bilingualism studies, the Spanish data are presented jointly with the English data.     

Proper Name Hypermnesia in an Autistic Subject

The case study of an autistic “savant” subject with person names hypermnesia is presented. NM's performance in memorizing person names is compared to that of normal controls, IQ-matched controls, and one overtrained control. The data show a selective hypermnesia for both the free recall of person names and the recognition of faces. Recall of common names and of biographical informations linked to faces is unremarkable. NM's hypermnesia is restricted to list learning as low performance is observed in face-name learning tasks. A comparison of the data with that of the overtrained control indicates that training is not responsible for NM's pattern of results. These findings, when combined with previous results involving proper names, demonstrate a double dissociation between proper names and other types of semantic and referential information. However, aspects of NM's performance pattern are more compatible with a network model of proper names than with a sequential model. We propose that the contextual regularity of proper names in ecological situations can be responsible for their high memorization by NM.     

Proportionality, Just War Theory and Weapons Innovation

Just wars are supposed to be proportional responses to aggression: the costs of war must not greatly exceed the benefits. This proportionality principle raises a corresponding ‘interpretation problem’: what are the costs and benefits of war, how are they to be determined, and a ‘measurement problem’: how are costs and benefits to be balanced? And it raises a problem about scope: how far into the future do the states of affairs to be measured stretch? It is argued here that weapons innovation always introduces costs, and that these costs cannot be determined in advance of going to war. Three examples, the atomic bomb, the AK-47 and the ancient Greek catapult, are given as examples. It is therefore argued that the proportionality principle is inapplicable prospectively. Some replies to the argument are discussed and rejected. Some more general defences of the proportionality principle are considered and also rejected. Finally, the significance of the argument for Just War Theory as a whole is discussed.     

On Reichenbach’s argument for scientific realism

The aim of this paper is to articulate, discuss in detail and criticise Reichenbach’s sophisticated and complex argument for scientific realism. Reichenbach’s argument has two parts. The first part aims to show how there can be reasonable belief in unobservable entities, though the truth of claims about them is not given directly in experience. The second part aims to extent the argument of the first part to the case of realism about the external world, conceived of as a world of independently existing entities distinct from sensations. It is argued that the success of the first part depends on a change of perspective, where unobservable entities are viewed as projective complexes vis-à-vis their observable symptoms, or effects. It is also argued that there is an essential difference between the two parts of the argument, which Reichenbach comes (somewhat reluctantly) to accept.     

Parts, classes and Parts of Classes: an anti-realist reading of Lewisian mereology

This study is in two parts. In the first part, various important principles of classical extensional mereology are derived on the basis of a nice axiomatization involving ‘part of’ and fusion. All results are proved here with full Fregean (and Gentzenian) rigor. They are chosen because they are needed for the second part. In the second part, this natural-deduction framework is used in order to regiment David Lewis’s justification of his Division Thesis, which features prominently in his combination of mereology with class theory. The Division Thesis plays a crucial role in Lewis’s informal argument for his Second Thesis in his book Parts of Classes. In order to present Lewis’s argument in rigorous detail, an elegant new principle is offered for the theory that combines class theory and mereology. The new principle is called the Canonical Decomposition Thesis. It secures Lewis’s Division Thesis on the strong construal required in order for his argument to go through. The exercise illustrates how careful one has to be when setting up the details of an adequate foundational theory of parts and classes. The main aim behind this investigation is to determine whether an anti-realist, inferentialist theorist of meaning has the resources to exhibit Lewis’s argument for his Second Thesis—which is central to his marriage of class theory with mereology—as a purely conceptual one. The formal analysis shows that Lewis’s argument, despite its striking appearance to the contrary, can be given in the constructive, relevant logic IR. This is the logic that the author has argued, elsewhere, to be the correct logic from an anti-realist point of view. The anti-realist is therefore in a position to regard Lewis’s argument as purely conceptual.     

AI &; Law,Logic and Argument Schemes

This paper reviews the history of AI & Law research from the perspective of argument schemes. It starts with the observation that logic, although very well applicable to legal reasoning when there is uncertainty, vagueness and disagreement, is too abstract to give a fully satisfactory classification of legal argument types. It therefore needs to be supplemented with an argument-scheme approach, which classifies arguments not according to their logical form but according to their content, in particular, according to the roles that the various elements of an argument can play. This approach is then applied to legal reasoning, to identify some of the main legal argument schemes. It is also argued that much AI & Law research in fact employs the argument-scheme approach, although it usually is not presented as such. Finally, it is argued that the argument-scheme approach and the way it has been employed in AI & Law respects some of the main lessons to be learnt from Toulmin’s The Uses of Argument.     

Assessing the validity of implicit egotism: a reply to Gallucci (2003)

B. W. Pelham, M. C. Mirenberg, and J. T. Jones (2002) argued that most people prefer stimuli that are associated with the self, a preference they called implicit egotism. In support of implicit egotism, Pelham et al presented evidence from 10 archival studies showing that people gravitate toward careers and places of residence that resemble their names or birthday numbers. M. Gallucci (2003) argued that alternate analyses of the same data provide strong evidence against implicit egotism. Whereas Gallucci was correct that Pelham et al's original analyses were flawed, their results remain significant even when more conservative tests are used. The authors also present new data in support of implicit egotism, including exhaustive studies of (a) common surnames and US city names and (b) common surnames and street names. The new studies also revealed that as sample sizes grow larger, studies are more likely to produce evidence of implicit egotism.     

WARRANTED ASSERTIBILITY AND THE NORMS OF ASSERTORIC PRACTICE: WHY TRUTH AND WARRANTED ASSERTIBILITY ARE NOT COINCIDENT NORMS

Crispin Wright has argued that truth and warranted assertibility are coincident but non‐co‐extensive norms of assertoric practice and that this fact inflates deflationary theories of truth. Wright's inflationary argument has generated much discussion in the literature. By contrast, relatively little has been said about the coincidence claim that is the focus of this paper. Wright's argument for the claim that truth and warranted assertibility are coincident norms is first presented. It is then suggested that the argument trades on an ambiguity in ‘justified’ and ‘warrantedly assertible’. Finally, it is argued that, once the ambiguity is removed, there is reason to reject the claim that truth and epistemic warrant are coincident norms of assertoric practice. One important result is that no epistemic theory of truth can satisfy what Wright takes to be a key platitude about assertion.     

Skepticism and justification

Synthese - This paper discusses the skeptical argument presented by Keith Lehrer in his paper ‘Why Not Scepticism?’. It is argued that Lehrer's argument depends on unacceptable...     

Trust,Respect, and the Psychology of Political Engagement1

Local community involvement has long been regarded as central to citizens’ participation in the political process because it is believed to create attitudes of generalized trust that encourage citizens to become involved in governance. Recently Putnam (1995a) has argued that declining opportunities for community involvement have led to decreased trust in others, and this contributes to declining rates of voting in elections. This paper directly tests the validity of Putnam's argument. It shows that civic participation is related to political participation, but only through the mediating mechanism of generalized trust. The paper further examines why citizens participate in their communities. It finds that people participate more in their communities when they feel that they are respected members of those communities. Implications for psychological theory and political mobilization are discussed.     

Intersecting Constraints on Label Learning: Effects of Age,Label Properties,and Referential Context

ABSTRACT

This research investigates the development of constraints in word learning. Previous experiments have shown that as infants gain more knowledge of native language structure, they become more selective about the forms that they accept as labels. However, the developmental pattern exhibited depends greatly on the way that infants are introduced to the labels and tested. In a series of experiments, we examined how providing referential context in the form of familiar objects and familiar object names affects how infants learn labels that they would otherwise reject, nonspeech sounds. We found evidence of the development of intersecting constraints: Younger infants (14-month-olds) were more open to learning nonspeech tone labels than older infants (19-month-olds), and younger infants were more open to the influence of referential context. These findings suggest that infants form expectations about labels and labeling contexts as they become more sophisticated learners.