Sellars and Nonconceptual Content

In this paper I take up the question of whether Wilfrid Sellars has a notion of non‐conceptual perceptual content. The question is controversial, being one of the fault lines along which so‐called left and right Sellarsians diverge. In the paper I try to make clear what it is in Sellars' thought that leads interpreters to such disparate conclusions. My account depends on highlighting the importance of Sellars' little discussed thesis that perception involves a systematic form of mis‐categorization, one where perceivers mistake their sensory states to be properties of physical objects. I argue that the counterpart color and shape attributes of these states, which become ‘point of viewish’ when organized by the productive imagination, provides perceptual experience with its non‐conceptual representational content. I then argue that this content is not a form of the mythical Given because one can only have a non‐conceptual point of view on an object when an object is introduced into one's perceptual experience through the conceptual mis‐taking of one's sensory states. So, while Sellars has a notion of non‐conceptual representational content, it can only be salient in the context of a perceptual act that is conceptual overall.     

Obsessional beliefs and the implicit and explicit morality of intrusive thoughts

Cognitive models of obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) suggest that misinterpreting intrusive thoughts exacerbates obsessional thinking. To evaluate this hypothesis, healthy participants (N=91) were prompted to recollect their unwanted thoughts, and then beliefs about the immorality of these thoughts were manipulated. Next, participants completed implicit and explicit measures of self-evaluation and appraisals of unwanted thoughts. Results from structural regression analyses indicated that explicit responses to unwanted thoughts, such as evaluations of the significance of intrusive thoughts and state self-esteem, were predicted by pre-existing obsessional beliefs, but not by the morality instruction manipulation. In contrast, implicit responses, such as appraisals of unwanted thoughts as relatively important and evaluations of the self as relatively immoral and dangerous, were predicted by the interaction between specific obsessional beliefs (e.g., intolerance of uncertainty) and the morality instructions. Findings largely support cognitive models of OCD and suggest unique predictors of implicit and explicit responses to unwanted thoughts.     

Hegel and Sellars on the Unity of Things

ABSTRACT

I have claimed previously that Hegel and Sellars are both, in the end, monistic visionaries, though with radically different visions of the grand unity of things. In this paper I explain and defend that claim. Section one differentiates several kinds of monism; section two discusses Hegel’s vision of the underlying unity of thing, while section three does the same for Sellars. The compare-and-contrast assignment is brought to completion in section four.     

Sellars and Quine on empiricism and conceptual truth1

I compare Sellars’s criticism of the ‘myth of the given’ with Quine’s criticism of the ‘two dogmas’ of empiricism, that is, the analytic–synthetic distinction and reductionism. In Sections I to III, I present Quine’s and Sellars’s views. In IV to X, I discuss similarities and differences in their views. In XI to XII, I show that Sellars’s arguments against the ‘myth of the given’ are incompatible with Quine’s rejection of the analytic–synthetic distinction.     

Sellars,concepts and conceptual change

Much discussion in recent philosophy of science assumes an holistic view of conceptual systems without providing any analysis of the nature of such systems. For several decades, however, Sellars has been attempting to develop and defend such a view. In this paper I examine Sellars' version of an holistic theory of concepts, discuss some of the objections to this view, and consider what insight Sellars' analysis can provide for problems concerning the introduction of new scientific concepts, and the nature of conceptual change in science.I want to thank Peter Barker, Gary Gutting, Paul Teller, Michael Tye, and especially Richard Burian, for comments on earlier versions of this paper.