共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 31 毫秒
1.
Steve Clarke 《Sophia》2007,46(3):277-285
Both intention-based and causation-based definitions of the miraculous make reference to the term ‘supernatural’. Philosophers
who define the miraculous appear to use this term in a loose way, perhaps meaning the nonnatural, perhaps meaning a subcategory
of the nonnatural. Here I examine the aetiology of the term ‘supernatural’. I consider three outstanding issues regarding
the meaning of the term and conclude that the supernatural is best understood as a subcategory of the nonnatural. In light
of this clarification, I argue that a prominent causation-based definition of the miraculous should be revised so as not refer
to the supernatural. I further argue that authors of intention-based definitions of the miraculous need to consider whether
or not they should continue to refer to the supernatural, in their definitions of the miraculous, in light of the conclusions
discerned here.
相似文献
Steve ClarkeEmail: |
2.
Luca Moretti 《Philosophical Studies》2008,141(1):97-114
Minimal entities are, roughly, those that fall under notions defined by only deflationary principles. In this paper I provide
an accurate characterization of two types of minimal entities: minimal properties and minimal facts. This characterization
is inspired by both Schiffer’s notion of a pleonastic entity and Horwich’s notion of minimal truth. I argue that we are committed
to the existence of minimal properties and minimal facts according to a deflationary notion of existence, and that the appeal
to the inferential role reading of the quantifiers does not dismiss this commitment. I also argue that deflationary existence
is language-dependent existence—this clarifies why minimalists about properties and facts are not realists about these entities
though their language may appear indistinguishable from the language of realists.
相似文献
Luca MorettiEmail: |
3.
Supernatural Miracles and Religious Inclusiveness 总被引:1,自引:1,他引:0
Morgan Luck 《Sophia》2007,46(3):287-293
In this paper I shall assess Clarke’s assertion that all definitions of miracles that purport to satisfy the criterion of
religious inclusiveness should substitute the term ‘supernatural’ for ‘non-natural’. In addition, I shall attempt to strengthen
Clarke’s conception of the supernatural by offering an analysis of what it means for something to be ‘above’ nature. Lastly,
I shall offer a new argument as to why Clarke’s intention-based definition of miracles is necessarily less religiously inclusive
than Mumford’s causation-based definition.
相似文献
Morgan LuckEmail: |
4.
Uriah Kriegel 《Philosophical Studies》2008,141(1):79-95
The ontology of (merely) intentional objects is a can of worms. If we can avoid ontological commitment to such entities, we
should. In this paper, I offer a strategy for accomplishing that. This is to reject the traditional act-object account of
intentionality in favor of an adverbial account. According to adverbialism about intentionality, having a dragon thought is
not a matter of bearing the thinking-about relation to dragons, but of engaging in the activity of thinking dragon-wise.
相似文献
Uriah KriegelEmail: |
5.
Michael Rubin 《Philosophical Studies》2008,139(3):307-327
A number of philosophers defend naturalistic moral realism by appeal to an externalist semantics for moral predicates. The
application of semantic externalism to moral predicates has been attacked by Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons in a series of
papers that make use of their “Moral Twin Earth” thought experiment. In response, several defenders of naturalistic moral
realism have claimed that the Moral Twin Earth thought experiment is misleading and yields distorted and inaccurate semantic
intuitions. If they are right, the intuitions generated by Moral Twin Earth cannot be appealed to in arguments against externalist
moral semantics. The most developed case against the Moral Twin Earth argument that follows this strategy is found in a paper
by Stephen Laurence, Eric Margolis and Angus Dawson. Here I argue that their attack on the Moral Twin Earth thought experiment
fails. Laurence, Margolis and Dawson have not shown that we have reason to distrust the semantic intuitions it generates
相似文献
Michael RubinEmail: |
6.
Andrea Viggiano 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2008,11(2):213-224
In order to rebut G. E. Moore’s open question argument, ethical naturalists adopt a theory of direct reference for our moral
terms. T. Horgan and M. Timmons have argued that this theory cannot be applied to moral terms, on the ground that it clashes
with competent speakers’ linguistic intuitions. While Putnam’s Twin Earth thought experiment shows that our linguistic intuitions
confirm the theory of direct reference, as applied to ‘water’, Horgan and Timmons devise a parallel thought experiment about
moral terms, in order to show that this theory runs against our linguistic intuitions about such terms. My claim is that the
Horgan–Timmons argument does not work. I concede that their thought experiment is a good way to test the applicability of
the theory of direct reference to moral terms, and argue that the upshot of their experiment is not what they claim it is:
our linguistic intuitions about Moral Twin Earth are parallel to, not different from, our intuitions about Twin Earth.
相似文献
Andrea ViggianoEmail: |
7.
Stephen Finlay 《Philosophical Studies》2009,143(3):315-340
This paper advances a reductive semantics for ‘ought’ and a naturalistic theory of normativity. It gives a unified analysis
of predictive, instrumental, and categorical uses of ‘ought’: the predictive ‘ought’ is basic, and is interpreted in terms
of probability. Instrumental ‘oughts’ are analyzed as predictive ‘oughts’ occurring under an ‘in order that’ modifer (the
end-relational theory). The theory is then extended to categorical uses of ‘ought’: it is argued that they are special rhetorical
uses of the instrumental ‘ought’. Plausible conversational principles explain how this end-relational ‘ought’ can perform
the expressive functions of the moral ‘ought’. The notion of an ‘ought-simpliciter’ is also discussed.
相似文献
Stephen FinlayEmail: |
8.
Karen Bennett has recently argued that the views articulated by Linsky and Zalta (Philos Perspect 8:431–458, 1994) and (Philos
Stud 84:283–294, 1996) and Plantinga (The nature of necessity, 1974) are not consistent with the thesis of actualism, according
to which everything is actual. We present and critique her arguments. We first investigate the conceptual framework she develops
to interpret the target theories. As part of this effort, we question her definition of ‘proxy actualism’. We then discuss
her main arguments that the theories carry a commitment to actual entities that do not exist. We end by considering and addressing
a worry that might have been the driving force behind Bennett’s claim that Linsky and Zalta’s view is not fully actualistic.
相似文献
Edward N. ZaltaEmail: |
9.
Andrew Mason 《Res Publica》2009,15(2):179-194
Some moral theorists defend a holistic account of practical reasons and deny that the possibility of moral thought depends
upon the existence of moral principles. This article explores the implications of this position for theorising about justice,
which has often aspired to provide us with an ordered list of principles to govern our institutions and practices.
相似文献
Andrew MasonEmail: |
10.
Nathan Stemmer 《Journal for General Philosophy of Science》2007,38(2):315-327
Quine’s eliminativist theory has largely been ignored by the philosophical community. This is highly regrettable because Quine’s
theory is probably close to correct. Now, the probable correctness of Quine’s theory has an important consequence since, according
to the theory, there are no mental entities (events, states, phenomena, properties, etc.) nor do such entities play any role
in a scientific account of the relevant phenomena. But the hundreds or probably thousands of publications that deal with issues
such as mental causation, the nature of qualia, supervenience of the mental, or multiple realizability, presume the existence
of, or at least attribute a positive role to, mental entities. The probable correctness of Quine’s theory therefore suggests
that all these publications are worthless and reading them is a waste of time just as reading studies about how crystal spheres
can move planets is considered nowadays a waste of time.
相似文献
Nathan StemmerEmail: |
11.
12.
Experimental philosophy and philosophical intuition 总被引:4,自引:3,他引:1
Ernest Sosa 《Philosophical Studies》2007,132(1):99-107
The topic is experimental philosophy as a naturalistic movement, and its bearing on the value of intuitions in philosophy.
This paper explores first how the movement might bear on philosophy more generally, and how it might amount to something novel
and promising. Then it turns to one accomplishment repeatedly claimed for it already: namely, the discrediting of armchair
intuitions as used in philosophy.
相似文献
Ernest SosaEmail: |
13.
14.
Jonathan Schaffer 《Philosophical Studies》2008,141(1):7-19
On the truthmaker view of ontological commitment [Heil (From an ontological point of view, 2003); Armstrong (Truth and truthmakers, 2004); Cameron (Philosophical Studies, 2008)], a theory is committed to the entities needed in the world for the theory to be made true. I argue that this view
puts truthmaking to the wrong task. None of the leading accounts of truthmaking—via necessitation, supervenience, or grounding—can
provide a viable measure of ontological commitment. But the grounding account does provide a needed constraint on what is
fundamental. So I conclude that truthmaker commitments are not a rival to quantifier commitments, but a needed complement.
The quantifier commitments are what a theory says exists, while the truthmaker commitments are what a theory says is fundamental.
相似文献
Jonathan SchafferEmail: |
15.
Nathan Salmon 《Philosophical Studies》2008,141(2):263-280
Jeffrey King’s principal objection to the direct-reference theory of demonstratives is analyzed and criticized. King has responded
with a modified version of his original argument aimed at establishing the weaker conclusion that the direct-reference theory
of demonstratives is either incomplete or incorrect. It is argued that this fallback argument also fails.
相似文献
Nathan SalmonEmail: |
16.
Shannon Vallor 《Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences》2009,8(1):1-15
Dennett’s recent defense in this journal of the heterophenomenological method and its supposed advantages over Husserlian
phenomenology is premised on his problematic account of the epistemological and ontological status of phenomenological states.
By employing Husserl’s philosophy of science to clarify the relationship between phenomenology and evidence and the implications
of this relationship for the empirical identification of ‘real’ conscious states, I argue that the naturalistic account of
consciousness Dennett hopes for could be authoritative as a science only by virtue of the very phenomenological evidences
Dennett’s method consigns to the realm of fiction. Thus heterophenomenology, qua scientific method, is incoherent.
相似文献
Shannon VallorEmail: |
17.
The relationships of voluntary retirement and organizational turnover intentions to various commitment constructs in work
and non-work settings were examined using a sample of 345 employees near retirement age (mean age = 53.71). The results demonstrated
that work centrality and commitment to leisure activities were unique predictors of retirement intentions, while affective
organizational commitment predicted turnover intentions but not retirement. Occupational commitment was a significant predictor
of both retirement and turnover. The implications for revising the definition of work-role attachment theory and further developing
a theoretical model to explain retirement decisions are also discussed.
相似文献
Joseph A. SchmidtEmail: |
18.
It is generally agreed upon that Grice’s causal theory of perception describes a necessary condition for perception. It does
not describe sufficient conditions, however, since there are entities in causal chains that we do not perceive and not all
causal chains yield perceptions. One strategy for overcoming these problems is that of strengthening the notion of causality
(as done by David Lewis). Another is that of specifying the criteria according to which perceptual experiences should match
the way the world is (Frank Jackson and Michael Tye). Finally, one can also try to provide sufficient conditions by elaborating
on the content of perceptual experiences (Alva N?e). These different strategies are considered in this paper, with the conclusion
that none of them is successful. However, a careful examination of their problems points towards the general solution that
we outline at the end.
相似文献
Valtteri Arstila (Corresponding author)Email: |
Kalle PihlainenEmail: |
19.
Evan Selinger 《Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences》2008,7(2):301-308
Harry Collins interprets Hubert Dreyfus’s philosophy of embodiment as a criticism of all possible forms of artificial intelligence.
I argue that this characterization is inaccurate and predicated upon a misunderstanding of the relevance of phenomenology
for empirical scientific research.
相似文献
Evan SelingerEmail: |
20.
Daniel A. Weiskopf 《Philosophical Studies》2008,140(3):359-384
Certain of our concepts are innate, but many others are learned. Despite the plausibility of this claim, some have argued
that the very idea of concept learning is incoherent. I present a conception of learning that sidesteps the arguments against
the possibility of concept learning, and sketch several mechanisms that result in the generation of new primitive concepts.
Given the rational considerations that motivate their deployment, I argue that these deserve to be called learning mechanisms.
I conclude by replying to the objections that these mechanisms cannot produce genuinely new content and cannot be part of
genuinely cognitive explanations.
相似文献
Daniel A. WeiskopfEmail: |