虚无主义:尼采与施蒂纳

"施蒂纳—尼采"问题包括两个层面:一是二者的事实性关系,即尼采究竟有没有阅读过施蒂纳并接受其影响;二是思想性关系,即尼采和施蒂纳在虚无主义这个大背景下必然产生思想交汇和交锋。本文将对第一个问题做出综述,并对第二个问题进行分析。结论乃是:在思想的客观性上,尼采对虚无主义的克服必然包括对施蒂纳的克服。尼采不满足于施蒂纳取消人道主义之后所导致的价值真空,并以生命为基础建立起新的价值;但在施蒂纳的理论视野里,这些新价值乃是危险的。     

Heidegger's Nietzsche interpretation

Continental Philosophy Review -     

Nietzsche for beginners

Writers and Readers Publishing, USA, 1990     

克尔凯郭尔与尼采

当代哲学中两个富有特征的基本概念,“生存”和“存在”,最初是由尼采和克尔凯郭尔创造的。尼采的哲学思考始终围绕着“生存”的现象,克尔凯郭尔的思考活动不断深入“存在”的问题。因此,他们二人的兴趣都首先而且几乎只是指向人,指向人的生存和人的存在的。所以,他们的哲学不是一个以封闭方式包括人类学的形而上学体系,相反,其哲学活动的内在系统的基础完全在于将一切问题都概括为这样一个基本问题：“人是什么?”和人成为了什么。这样,二者的哲学都是在一种实验“心理学”的名义下的哲学人类学。     

Attitudes to suffering: Parfit and Nietzsche

Abstract

In On What Matters, Derek Parfit argues that Nietzsche does not disagree with central normative beliefs that ‘we’ hold. Such disagreement would threaten Parfit’s claim that normative beliefs are known by intuition. However, Nietzsche defends a conception of well-being that challenges Parfit’s normative claim that suffering is bad in itself for the sufferer. Nietzsche recognizes the phenomenon of ‘growth through suffering’ as essential to well-being. Hence, removal of all suffering would lead to diminished well-being. Parfit claims that if Nietzsche understood normative concepts in Parfit’s objectivist sense, he would not disagree with the claim that suffering is bad in itself – that intrinsic facts about suffering count in favour of our not wanting it. I argue that Nietzsche would disagree. Suffering for Nietzsche is not merely instrumentally necessary for psychological growth, nor is it easy to construe it as something bad in itself that contributes value as part of a good whole. Suffering that can be given meaning through growth is something we have reason to want. Suffering that remains brute and uninterpreted is something we have reason not to want. But for Nietzsche, suffering as such has no invariant value across all contexts.