Critical Psychology: What It Is and What It Is Not

Critical psychology alerts us to the limitations of mainstream research in the discipline, and it promises to put 'social' issues on the agenda in the whole of psychology. A starting point of the stance of critical psychological research is that the claims that psychologists make about human beings often seem to vanish almost as quickly as they are discovered. People, a group or culture do not behave or think like the model would predict, and, more importantly, we find that our awareness, our reflection on a process described by a psychologist changes that process. It is in the nature of human nature to change, to change as different linguistic resources, social practices, and representations of the self become available, and for human nature to change itself as people reflect on who they are and who they may become. That means that any attempt to fix us in place must fail. But it will only fail in such a way that something productive emerges from it if we do something different, and one place to do something different is in psychology. We need to step back and look at the images of the self, mind and behaviour that psychologists have produced, the types of practices they engage in, and the power those practices, those 'technologies of the self' have to set limits on change. When we appreciate this, we can start to look at what psychologists might do instead as part of a genuinely critical approach.     

Racism: What It Is and What It Isn't

The words `racist' and `racism' have become so overused that they nowconstitute obstacles to understanding and interracial dialogue aboutracial matters. Instead of the current practice of referring tovirtually anything that goes wrong or amiss with respect to race as`racism,' we should recognize a much broader moral vocabulary forcharacterizing racial ills – racial insensitivity, racial ignorance,racial injustice, racial discomfort, racial exclusion. At the sametime, we should fix on a definition of `racism' that is continuouswith its historical usage, and avoids conceptual inflation. Isuggest two basic, and distinct, forms of racism that meet thiscondition – antipathy racism and inferiorizing racism. We should alsorecognize that not all racially objectionable actions are done froma racist motive, and that not all racial stereotypes are racist.     

What It Is to Pretend

Pretense is a topic of keen interest to philosophers and psychologists. But what is it, really, to pretend? What features qualify an act as pretense? Surprisingly little has been said on this foundational question. Here I defend an account of what it is to pretend, distinguishing pretense from a variety of related but distinct phenomena, such as (mere) copying and practicing. I show how we can distinguish pretense from sincerity by sole appeal to a person's beliefs, desires, and intentions – and without circular recourse to an ‘intention to pretend’ or to a sui generis mental state of ‘imagining.’     

Feminist Epistemology: Rethinking the Dualisms of Atomic Knowledge

Feminist epistemologists who attempt to refigure epistemology must wrestle with a number of dualisms. This essay examines the ways Lorraine Code, Sandra Harding, and Susan Hekman reconceptualize the relationship between self/other, nature/culture, and subject/object as they struggle to reformulate objectivity and knowledge.     

Demystifying Intuition: What It Is,What It Does,and How It Does It

Definitions of intuition are discussed and two working definitions are proposed. This is followed by a list of eight unresolved problems concerning intuition. It is suggested that all of these problems can be resolved by cognitive-experiential self-theory (CEST), a dual-process theory of personality according to which people process information with two systems, an experiential/intuitive system that is an associative learning system that humans share with other animals and a uniquely human verbal reasoning system. Intuition is considered to be a subsystem of the experiential/ intuitive system that operates by exactly the same principles and attributes but has narrower boundary conditions. The next section includes a presentation of the most relevant aspects of CEST with an emphasis on the operating rules and attributes of the experiential/intuitive system. This is followed by demonstrating how the operation of the experiential/intuitive system can resolve each of the unresolved problems concerning intuition. The article closes with a comparison of the advantages and disadvantages of the experiential/intuitive and rational/analytic systems. It is concluded that neither system is generally superior to the other, as each has important advantages and disadvantages.     

实践推理:从信念和愿望应该形成什么目标

这篇文章探讨实践推理中目标推理的问题,试图发现一个理性主体从信念和愿望形成目标的基本逻辑标准。文中的分析以循序渐进的方式展开,从只包含信念和愿望的基础模型开始,到增加了数值和排序方式表示愿望偏好的混合拓展模型结束,都给出了相应的目标形成标准,并构造出了形式化的目标形成理论。最后,我们探讨了不同模型形成的目标之间的关系,并证明了混合拓展模型中目标的存在性等基本定理。     

Advances in Behaviorism: It's Not What It Used to Be

Behaviorism has changed over the past half century and its modern form is not familiar to many educators and other applied professionals. Put briefly, behaviorism has changed from the molecular and absolutist form of years past, when basic researchers, therapists and educators sought to modify isolated target behaviors. Modern behaviorism is relativistic and molar and the articles included in this issue are meant to illustrate this changed emphasis. The first article shows how the matching law has redefined the old law of effect and how that affects application. The second shows how relational frames provide a behavioral treatment of cognitive variables that dispels the stereotyped view of behavior modification. The third treats molar classes of behaviors as traits, and individual behaviors as states, applying that distinction to aspects of the relative frequencies of behaviors of children at home and at school. Finally, the last article shows specifically how behavioral methods have been (and are) applied to the behavior of autistic children, in a program that has been extremely successful over the past few years.     

Calling a Thing What It Is: A Lutheran Approach to Whiteness

The July 2013 acquittal of George Zimmerman in killing of African American teenager Trayvon Martin and the aftermath demonstrated that America is not yet cured from “the cancer of whiteness” that infects the heart of American Christianity. This article interrogates “whiteness” as a pressing American and religious issue. It looks to Martin Luther's theology of the cross as a way to both expose the sinfulness of whiteness and to offer a framework for dislodging it.     

Two Critical Issues in Primary Prevention: What It Is and How To Do It

Definition of primary prevention and of end-state and stressful life variable models are presented to guide the design and conduct of primary prevention activities.     

Worker Well-Being: What it Is,and how it Should Be Measured

Applied Research in Quality of Life - Worker well-being is a hot topic in organizations, consultancy and academia. However, too often, the buzz about worker well-being, enthusiasm for new programs...     

What It Means to Be a Man: Aging and Anxiety in Beckett's Krapp's Last Tape and That Time

One of the great writers of Twentieth-century doubt, Samuel Beckett is perhaps best known for endowing his protagonists with some of the more classic symptoms of anxiety and depression. The result is an extraordinary corpus that unfolds how the intricacies and excesses of anxiety affect the behavior of men and women involved in intimate relationships, and how that behavior is exhibited in their aging years. While this discussion of Krapp's Last Tape (1960) and That Time (1976) will explore anxiety from a specifically male point of view, the works themselves compel various responses from readers of both sexes. Both pieces also may be of interest to those concerned with the rethinking of sexual roles in intimate relationships in light of an individual's response to the physical and emotional aspects of aging.     

Animal Morality: What It Means and Why It Matters

It has been argued that some animals are moral subjects, that is, beings who are capable of behaving on the basis of moral motivations (Rowlands 2011, 2012, 2017). In this paper, we do not challenge this claim. Instead, we presuppose its plausibility in order to explore what ethical consequences follow from it. Using the capabilities approach (Nussbaum 2004, 2007), we argue that beings who are moral subjects are entitled to enjoy positive opportunities for the flourishing of their moral capabilities, and that the thwarting of these capabilities entails a harm that cannot be fully explained in terms of hedonistic welfare. We explore the implications of this idea for the assessment of current practices involving animals.