The correlation of EPQ psychoticism with two behavioural measures of impulsivity

The Psychoticism (P) scale of the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire (EPQ) was correlated with performance on two behavioural measures of impulsivity: total number of Errors in a choice reaction-time (RT) task, and number of Taboo Responses in an open-ended creativity test. Experiment 1 employed 20 Ss in an auditory RT situation and using an untimed creativity test. P correlated strongly and positively with a logged Taboo Responses measure but not with a logged Errors score. The correlation of P with Errors reached statistical significance when the biserial correlation of P with Errors/No Errors was calculated. Experiment 2 employed 35 Ss in a visual choice RT situation and using a timed creativity test. Questionnaire scales of Venturesomeness, Impulsiveness and Empathy were also used. Both behavioural indices were significantly correlated with P, but not with Venturesomeness or Impulsiveness. The results constitute further support for the view that the P scale of the EPQ contains a strong impulsivity component.     

The Influence of Positive Affect on the Decision Rule in Risk Situations: Focus on Outcome (and Especially Avoidance of Loss) Rather Than Probability

Two experiments examined the influence of positive affect on probability estimation and choice. Participants in whom positive affect had been induced, as well as no-manipulation controls, were asked to make both numerical evaluations of verbal probabilities in three-outcome gambles and actual betting decisions about similar gambles. Results from Experiment 1 showed the phenomenon labeledcautious optimism:Positive affect participants significantly overestimated the probabilities associated with phrases for winning relative to their estimates of probability of losing for the same phrases (optimism), while participants in a control condition did not; yet, in actual gambling situations, affect condition participants were much less likely to gamble than were controls when a real loss was possible (caution). Results of the betting task from Experiment 2 further indicated that affect participants used a betting-decision rule that was different from that of controls: They bet less than controls in gambles where potential losses were large, even though probability of loss was small, and they bet more than controls in gambles where the amount of the potential loss was small, even though the probability of loss was moderate or large. These findings suggest that positive affect can promote an overt shift from a decision rule focusing primarily on probabilities to one focusing on utilities or outcome values, especially for losses. Taken together, the results are compatible with an interpretation of the influence of positive affect in terms of an elaboration of positive cognitive material, and purposive behavior in decisions, rather than in terms of mere response bias.     

Masked prime stimuli can bias “free” choices between response alternatives

Stimuli presented below the threshold of awareness can systematically influence choice responses determined by the instructed stimulus-response (S-R) mapping (task set). In this study, we investigated whether such stimuli will also bias a free choice between two response alternatives under conditions in which this choice subjectively appears to be internally generated and free. Participants had to respond to targets preceded by masked arrow primes. Left-pointing and right-pointing arrow targets required left or right responses, whereas randomly interspersed “free-choice” targets indicated that the participants were free to choose either response. Although masked primes could not be consciously discriminated, they systematically affected not only performance to arrow targets, but also the free choice between response alternatives. This demonstrates that apparently “free” choices are not immune to nonconsciously triggered biases. However, in blocks in which no specific S-R mapping was imposed, masked primes did not affect free-choice performance, indicating that these effects are not automatic but are determined by currently active task sets.     

Scarcity,engagement, and value

Scarcity has been found to intensify value, positive or negative, rather than simply enhancing it. Some researchers have proposed that scarcity affects value by increasing how much attention is paid to a stimulus. We conceptualized sustained attention as stronger engagement and operationalized a situation of scarcity by telling participants who were choosing between two objects that the object that was chosen would then be replaced (Replenish) or not replaced (Scarce). To distinguish sustained attention-stronger engagement in a situation of scarcity from grabbing attention (salience from distinctiveness), the choice was between one option with a single instance (solitary-high salience) and a second option with several duplicates (abundant-low salience). We predicted that stronger engagement from a situation of scarcity would, first, intensify the value of the chosen item regardless of whether it was solitary or abundant, with positive items becoming more positive and negative items becoming more negative, and second, the stronger engagement from the situation of scarcity would transfer intensification to another separate object in the same setting. The results of Studies 1 and 2 supported both of these predictions. Study 3 tested a boundary condition for these scarcity–engagement effects in terms of how real participants experienced the choice items to be, where ‘realness’ is another source of engagement strength. As expected, the scarcity–engagement effect on intensifying value was replicated for participants who experienced the activity as real but was eliminated for those who did not.     

Expectation theories of decision making for duplex gambles

Complete tests of subjectively expected utility (SEU), subjectively expected value (SEV), expected utility (EU) and expected value (EV) theories were made for duplex gambles without measuring subjective probability or subjective utility. All gambles were hypothetical and offered on booklets. The duplex gambles consisted of winning gambles, which offered a chance to win a certain amount of money or to break even; and losing gambles, which offered a chance to lose a certain amount of money or break even.The results indicated that SEU, SEV and EU theories could not account for the strategies of 33%, 53% and 86% of the Ss respectively in the losing form of gambles, while EV theory accounted for 78% of the behavior of Ss.In the winning form of gambles, SEU, SEV and EU theory held for 77%, 65%, and 54% of the Ss respectively, while EV theory held for only 40% of the Ss. Suggestions for further research were made.     

Dimensionality and construct validity of a video-based, objective personality test for the assessment of willingness to take risks in road traffic

The study at hand reports first results about the dimensionality and construct validity of a newly developed objective, video-based personality test, which assesses the willingness to take risks in traffic situations. On the basis of the theory of risk homeostasis developed by Wilde, different traffic situations with varying amounts of objective danger were filmed. These situations mainly consisted of situations with passing maneuvers and speed choice or traffic situations at intersections. Each of these traffic situations describes an action which should be carried out. The videos of the traffic situations are presented twice. Before the first presentation, a short written explanation of the preceding traffic situation and a situation-contingent reaction is provided. The respondents are allowed to obtain an overview of the given situations during the first presentation of each traffic situation. During the second presentation the respondents are asked to indicate at which point the action that is contingent on the described situation will become too dangerous to carry out. Latencies for items were recorded as a measure for the magnitude of the person's subjectively accepted willingness to take risks in the sense of the risk homeostasis theory by Wilde. In a study with 243 people with different education and sex, the one-dimensionality of the test corresponding to the latency model by Scheiblechner was investigated. Analysis indicated that the new measure assesses a one-dimensional latent personality trait which can be interpreted as subjectively accepted amount of risk (target risk value). First indicators for the construct validity of the test are given by a significant correlation with the construct-related secondary scale, adventurousness of the Eysenck Personality Profiler with, at the same time, nonsignificant correlations to the two secondary scales, extroversion and emotional stability, that are not linked to the construct.     

Discrete dynamic choice: An extension of the choice models of thurstone and luce

The present paper deals with the extension of two well-known static discrete choice theories to the dynamic situation in which individuals make choices at several points in (continuous) time. A dynamic version of Luce's Axiom, “independence from irrelevant alternatives”, is proposed and some of its implications are derived. In the static case Yellott (J. Math. Psych. 1977, 15, 109–146) and others have demonstrated that an independent random utility model generated from the extreme value distribution exp(?e^?ax?b) becomes equivalent to Luce's Axiom. Yellott also introduced an axiom called “invariance under uniform expansions of the choice set”, and he proved that within the class of random utility models with independent identically distributed utilities (apart from a location shift) this axiom is equivalent to Luce's Axiom. These results are extended to the dynamic situation and it is shown that if the utility processes are expressed by so-called extremal processes the corresponding choice model is Markovian. A nonstationary generalization is proposed which is a substantial interest in applications where the parameters of the choice process are influenced by previous choice experience or by time-varying exogenous variables. In particular, it is demonstrated that the nonstationary model is Markovian if and only if the joint choice probabilities at two points in time have a particular form. Thus, the paper provides a rationale for applying a specific class of Markov models as the point of departure when modelling mobility processes that involve individual discrete decisions over time.     

Does Practical Deliberation Crowd Out Self-Prediction?

It is a popular view thatpractical deliberation excludes foreknowledge of one's choice. Wolfgang Spohn and Isaac Levi have argued that not even a purely probabilistic self-predictionis available to thedeliberator, if one takes subjective probabilities to be conceptually linked to betting rates. It makes no sense to have a betting rate for an option, for one's willingness to bet on the option depends on the net gain from the bet, in combination with the option's antecedent utility, rather than on the offered odds. And even apart from this consideration, assigning probabilities to the options among which one is choosing is futile since such probabilities could be of no possible use in choice. The paper subjects these arguments to critical examination and suggests that, appearances notwithstanding, practical deliberation need not crowd outself-prediction.     

Well-being in major depression and social phobia with and without comorbidity

Background/Objective: Lower levels in well-being have been observed in individuals with Major Depression (MDD) and Social Phobia (SP), but well-planned direct comparisons with control individuals, not suffering from a mental disorder, are lacking. Furthermore, MDD is highly comorbid with anxiety disorders, and SP with depressive disorders. This study is among the first to examine differences in well-being in individuals with a clinical diagnosis of MDD or SP compared to individuals with no such diagnosis and to test differences in well-being within the combined diagnostic categories respective with and without anxiety-depressive comorbidity. Method: Participants were 119 individuals with a diagnosis of MDD, 47 SP and 118 controls. Results: Results revealed that overall well-being as well as emotional, psychological, and social well-being were lower in the MDD and SP group compared to the control group. Individuals with comorbidity reported lower well-being than individuals without comorbidity. Conclusions: These findings have clinical implications as presence of comorbidity may require a different therapeutic approach than with no comorbidity.     

Place your bets: psychophysiological correlates of decision-making under risk

Emotions and their psychophysiological correlates are thought to play an important role in decision-making under risk. We used a novel gambling task to measure psychophysiological responses during selection of explicitly presented risky options and feedback processing. Active-choice trials, in which the participant had to select the size of bet, were compared to fixed-bet, no-choice trials. We further tested how the chances of winning and bet size affected choice behavior and psychophysiological arousal. Individual differences in impulsive and risk-taking traits were assessed. The behavioral results showed sensitivity to the choice requirement and to the chances of winning: Participants were faster to make a response on no-choice trials and when the chances of winning were high. In active-choice trials, electrodermal activity (EDA) increased with bet size during both selection and processing of losses. Cardiac responses were sensitive to choice uncertainty: Stronger selection-related heart rate (HR) decelerations were observed in trials with lower chances of winning, particularly on active-choice trials. Finally, betting behavior and psychophysiological responsiveness were moderately correlated with self-reported impulsivity-related traits. In conclusion, we demonstrate that psychophysiological arousal covaries with risk-sensitive decision-making outside of a learning context. Our results further highlight the differential sensitivities of EDA and HR to psychological features of the decision scenario.     

Sex and situational influences on the use of power: A follow-up study

This study, which is patterned after an earlier study of male students by Goodstadt and Kipnis [1970], investigated the influence of sex and self-confidence of the subject and kind of worker problem encountered (motivation vs. ability) on the use of supervisory powers by male and female students in a simulated production situation. Contrary to previous research and sex-role stereotypes, males and females were not found to differ in power use or in self-ratings of self-confidence. Neither sex of the subject nor level of self-confidence was found to influence choice of power. Rather, type of worker problem influenced the use of power, with ability problems evoking the use of expert and coercive powers and motivation problems evoking the use of reward powers.     

Social Skills Deficits and Vocal Characteristics of Children with Social Phobia or Asperger’s Disorder: A Comparative Study

Social skills deficits are commonly reported among children with social phobia (SP) and children with Asperger’s Disorder (AD); however, a lack of direct comparison makes it unclear whether these groups, both of which endorse the presence of social anxiety, have similar or unique skills deficits. In this investigation, the social behaviors of children with SP (n = 30) or AD (n = 30) were compared to a typically developing (TD) peer group (n = 30) during structured role play interactions. Data were analyzed using blinded observers’ ratings of overt behaviors and digital vocal analysis of verbal communication. Compared to children with AD and TD children, children with SP exhibited less overall social skill, an ineffective ability to manage the conversational topic (pragmatic social behavior), and deficient speech production (speech and prosodic social behavior). There were no differences in observer ratings between children with AD and TD children. However, using digital analysis of vocal characteristics (i.e., intensity, pitch), distinct vocal patterns emerged. Specifically, children with AD spoke more softly than TD children, and had lower vocal pitch and less vocal pitch variability than children with SP. This pattern may be subjectively heard as monotonic speech. Consistent with a vocal pattern associated with heightened anxiety, children with SP spoke more softly and had less voice volume variation than TD children, and had higher vocal pitch and more vocal pitch variability (jitteriness) than children with AD. Clinical implications of these findings are discussed.     

Connections between caring climate,self-compassion,self-pity,and reactions to an emotionally difficult sport situation

Multiple variables influence athletes’ ability to cope with the challenges of sport participation including self-compassion, self-pity, and emotional regulation. Yet, the role of coach and teammates in nurturing self-compassion (SC), reducing self-pity (SP), and helping to regulate emotions (RESE) has not been fully investigated. Therefore, this study explored the interrelationships between perceptions of the caring climate (CC), SC, SP, RESE, and reactions to an emotionally difficult sport scenario (REs) and specific ways coaches and teammates helped or hindered SC. 224 predominately White (79%), female (69%), male (30%), and non-binary (1%) undergraduate students (M_age = 18.44, SD = 0.66) involved in a high school sport the previous year, participated in an online survey. The survey included measures of CC, SC, SP, RESE, and REs along with four open-ended questions asking participants to reflect on how coaches and teammates helped or hindered development of SC. Correlations revealed CC was positively related to RESE and SC and negatively related to SP. Further, CC was positively associated with constructive REs and negatively associated with deconstructive REs. To test whether RESE, SC, and SP mediated the relationship between the CC and REs, a path analysis was conducted. A partially mediated model emerged, ꭓ²(11) = 22.10, p = .02, CFI = 0.99, TLI = 0.93, RMSEA = 0.07 (CI = 0.02–0.11), SRMR = 0.04, with CC positively predicting positive and negative RESE, positive RESE positively predicting SC, and negative RESE positively predicting SC and negatively predicting SP. Additionally, SC, SP, and RESE differentially predicted REs. Thematic analysis of the open-ended questions revealed higher order themes of emotional, esteem, informational, and conditional support with a variety of supports being used by coaches and teammates. These findings provide insight into how coaches may be able to support athletes’ SC and RESE to navigate challenges within sport.     

Motivational Factors in the Perception of Psychological Situation Characteristics

This article seeks to formulate how motivational factors underlie and contribute to situation perceptions. Specifically, it is proposed that situation perceptions, to a large extent, capture subjectively perceived “motivational presses”, consisting of motivational processes (What happens to one's needs and goals in the situation?) and motivational content (Which needs or goals does the situation concern?). Additionally, such a motivational perspective can be fruitfully equipped with evolutionary psychological theories on human (social) motives. Thus, it is argued that situation perception contains evolutionarily important information on motivational processes and content. An evolutionarily informed motivational perspective on situation perception is applied to the recently proposed Situational Eight DIAMONDS situation characteristics to provide them with a theoretical underpinning. Ultimately, such a framework can be used to better understand situations and person–situation transactions (i.e., how people experience and shape situations in daily life) that can impact well‐being, health, and personality development.     

The demonstration of capacity limitation

The study of divided attention has produced many apparent demonstrations of “capacity limitation.” Possible ambiguities in such demonstrations are considered for three major types of experimental situation: simultaneous inputs with separate responses; choice; and classification. Two issues emerge. First, demonstrations always rest on assumptions about process set, i.e., the set of internal processes by which the task actually is performed. Alternative process sets are considered for situations of each type. Second, a demonstration of capacity limitation is made either by increasing the number of simultaneous processes, or by changing the bias between them. In either case effects unrelated to capacity limitation may influence the results. If several processes contribute to a single response, some performance decrement must accompany an increase in their number, simply through the increased overall chance for error. If the subject is biased toward one alternative in a choice or classification situation, the benefits enjoyed by this alternative may reflect not a preferential allocation of attentional capacity, but simply a willingness to decide in favor of this alternative with relatively little evidence.     

Reversal of the preference reversal phenomenon

The widely replicated preference reversal phenomenon (PRP) violates most theories of decision under risk. People exhibiting PRP choose a safe bet (with a large chance of a small gain) over a long shot (with a small chance of a larger gain). But, when bidding to buy or sell each bet, they bid more for the long shot. Surprisingly, in Experiment 1, a new opposite reversal pattern (NPRP) was found: Safe bets typically received larger bids than long shots and reversals were far more frequent when the long shot was chosen. In Experiment 2, NPRP was found for $100 expected value bets, but PRP occurred for bets with $3 expected values. The task characteristics apparently necessary to produce NPRP are (1) bids in the form of maximum buying prices, (2) possibility of loss in bidding, but not in choice, and (3) large payoffs. It is argued that wealth effects predicted by expected utility theory are too small to explain NPRP. Instead, it is hypothesized that a contingent decision process underlies the shift in reveral patterns and that aspiration levels exert increased influence in bidding to buy when payoffs are large.     

Use of absolute and comparative performance feedback in absolute and comparative judgments and decisions

Which matters more—beliefs about absolute ability or ability relative to others? This study set out to compare the effects of such beliefs on satisfaction with performance, self-evaluations, and bets on future performance. In Experiment 1, undergraduate participants were told they had answered 20% correct, 80% correct, or were not given their scores on a practice test. Orthogonal to this manipulation, participants learned that their performance placed them in the 23rd percentile or 77th percentile, or they did not receive comparative feedback. Participants were then given a chance to place bets on two games—one in which they needed to get more than 50% right to double their money (absolute bet), and one in which they needed to beat more than 50% of other test-takers (comparative bet). Absolute feedback influenced comparative betting, particularly when no comparative feedback was available. Comparative feedback exerted weaker and inconsistent effects on absolute bets. Absolute feedback also had stronger (and more consistent) effects on satisfaction with performance and state self-esteem. Experiment 2 replicated these effects in a different university sample, and demonstrated that the effects emerge even when bets are placed after participants rate their satisfaction with their performance (although these ratings do not mediate the effect of feedback on bets). These findings suggest that information about one’s absolute standing on a dimension may be more influential than information about comparative standing, partially supporting a key tenet of Festinger’s [Festinger, L. (1954). A theory of social comparison processes. Human Relations, 7, 117–140.] theory of social comparison.     

Speech perception as categorization

Speech perception (SP) most commonly refers to the perceptual mapping from the highly variable acoustic speech signal to a linguistic representation, whether it be phonemes, diphones, syllables, or words. This is an example of categorization, in that potentially discriminable speech sounds are assigned to functionally equivalent classes. In this tutorial, we present some of the main challenges to our understanding of the categorization of speech sounds and the conceptualization of SP that has resulted from these challenges. We focus here on issues and experiments that define open research questions relevant to phoneme categorization, arguing that SP is best understood as perceptual categorization, a position that places SP in direct contact with research from other areas of perception and cognition.     

Distinguishing choice and subjective probability estimation processes: Implications for theories of judgment and for cross-cultural comparisons

Research on subjective probability (SP) often focuses on the difference between the fraction of correct binary choices and the SP that they are correct or on the deviation of the calibration curve from the diagonal. On the assumption that choice and SP judgments reflect different, albeit closely related, processes, it is important to analyze the two sources of data separately. This article uses data collected by Yates, Lee, Shinotsuka, Patalano, and Sieck (1998) from Chinese, Japanese, and Americans to demonstrate the advantages of doing so and to yield new conclusions regarding cross-cultural comparisons of judgment. One new result is that a discrete threshold model with an error term best described the choice data of all groups. From their analyses, Yates et al. (1998) had concluded that the Chinese were more overconfident than the American or Japanese. According to the present results, the Chinese appeared either more overconfident or more underconfident, depending on how the data are analyzed. The dual outcome is a consequence of the greater variability both in their SP judgments and in their binary choices. Additionally, the Chinese participants’ choices and SPs were more responsive to the base rate than were those of the other groups.