Perceptual Analysis and Sensory Integration in Brain-Damaged Persons

(Ames, L. B., Learned, J., Metraux, R. W., &; Walker, R. N. Child Rorschach Responses: Developmental Trends from Two to Ten Years. New York: Hoeber, 1952. Pp. 310.): Reviewed by Bettye M. Caldwell     

Practical Tools and Guidelines for Exploring and Fitting Linear and Nonlinear Dynamical Systems Models

A dynamical system is a system of variables that show some regularity in how they evolve over time. Change concepts described in most dynamical systems models are by no means novel to social and behavioral scientists, but most applications of dynamic modeling techniques in these disciplines are grounded on a narrow subset of—typically linear—theories of change. I provide practical guidelines, recommendations, and software code for exploring and fitting dynamical systems models with linear and nonlinear change functions in the context of four illustrative examples. Cautionary notes, challenges, and unresolved issues in utilizing these techniques are discussed.     

An Unscented Kalman Filter Approach to the Estimation of Nonlinear Dynamical Systems Models

In the past several decades, methodologies used to estimate nonlinear relationships among latent variables have been developed almost exclusively to fit cross-sectional models. We present a relatively new estimation approach, the unscented Kalman filter (UKF), and illustrate its potential as a tool for fitting nonlinear dynamic models in two ways: (1) as a building block for approximating the log–likelihood of nonlinear state–space models and (2) to fit time-varying dynamic models wherein parameters are represented and estimated online as other latent variables. Furthermore, the substantive utility of the UKF is demonstrated using simulated examples of (1) the classical predator-prey model with time series and multiple–subject data, (2) the chaotic Lorenz system and (3) an empirical example of dyadic interaction.     

Dynamical Models of Sentence Processing

We suggest that the theory of dynamical systems provides a revealing general framework for modeling the representations and mechanism underlying syntactic processing. We show how a particular dynamical model, the Visitation Set Gravitation model of Tabor, Juliano, and Tanenhaus (1997), develops syntactic representations and models a set of contingent frequency effects in parsing that are problematic for other models. We also present new simulations showing how the model accounts for semantic effects in parsing, and propose a new account of the distinction between syntactic and semantic incongruity. The results show how symbolic structures useful in parsing arise as emergent properties of connectionist dynamical systems.     

知觉符号理论及其研究范式

知觉符号理论是第二代认知科学的核心理论之一, 研究者采用多种实验范式、在各个领域对该理论进行了探讨。分析以往的研究发现, 大量的研究主要探讨语言表征、概念获得、具身情绪、推理过程、社会认知和知觉符号发展等科学问题。本文对此领域的发展进行了简要梳理, 特别是以实验范式发展为主线详细介绍了知觉符号理论的发展, 并在此基础上提出了多元表征的思考。最后, 对知觉符号理论的发展提出了展望。     

Evolutionary Psychology, Cognitive Science, and Dynamical Systems: Building an Integrative Paradigm

Cognitive science, evolutionary psychology, and dynamical systems theory have all been proposed as frameworks for linking the diverse subdisciplines of psychology with one another, and with other scientific disciplines. Traditional cognitive science focused on content-free general processing and deemphasized motivation. An evolutionary perspective emphasizes the centrality of motivational systems and the specificity of mechanisms designed to solve particular recurrent problems. The evolutionary perspective provides a set of broad general principles linking diverse behaviors in humans as well as other species. The dynamic approach seeks even broader principles, searching for emergent patterns in all complex systems, whether animate or inanimate. Natural selection is itself one such broad principle, as is the broader principle of self-organization, which helps explain dynamic equilibria found in groups of humans and in diverse species linked together within ecosystems. Proponents of the major contending interdisciplines will need to build more bridges if the dream of a unifying paradigm is to be realized. This review samples some of the reasons why evolutionary psychologists, dynamical systems theorists, and traditional cognitive scientists need one another.     

The Senses Considered as Perceptual Systems,by J. J. Gibson

This paper examines the relationship of Jean-François Lyotard’s aesthetics to phenomenology, especially the works of Mikel Dufrenne and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. It argues that this comparison allows a greater understanding of Lyotard’s late aesthetic writings, which can appear gnomic and which have received relatively little critical attention. Lyotard credits Merleau-Ponty with opening the theme of difference in the aesthetic field, yet believes that the phenomenological approach can never adequately account for it. After outlining Lyotard’s early critiques of Dufrenne and Merleau-Ponty, the paper will demonstrate how his late aesthetics can be understood as returning to phenomenological themes but in the form of a reversal. Lyotard’s “lesson of darkness” is that the secret power of art can never be brought into the light of phenomenal appearance, and that artworks do not testify to the birth of perception, but to its death and resurrection.     

Models,Models, and Models

Michael Dummett famously maintained that analytic philosophy was simply philosophy that followed Frege in treating the philosophy of language as the basis for all other philosophy (1978, 441). But one important insight to emerge from computer science is how difficult it is to animate the linguistic artifacts that the analysis of thought produces. Yet, modeling the effects of thought requires a new skill that goes beyond analysis: procedural literacy. Some of the most promising research in philosophy makes use of a variety of modeling techniques that go beyond basic logic and elementary probability theory. What unifies this approach is a focus on what Alan Perlis called procedural literacy. This essay argues that the future spoils in philosophical research will disproportionally go to those who are procedurally literate.     

Vahid,Burge, and Perceptual Entitlement

Hamid Vahid criticizes Tyler Burge's account of perceptual entitlement. Vahid argues that Burge's account fails to satisfy a criterion of adequacy that any correct account of perceptual warrant must satisfy. According to Vahid, a correct account of perceptual warrant must allow for perceptual beliefs which are produced by a properly functioning perceptual system yet which lack warrant. The present article argues that Vahid's critique of Burge fails. It presents numerous examples of such beliefs that are consistent with Burge's account of perceptual entitlement.     

Experiences,Seemings, and Perceptual Justification

Several philosophers have distinguished between three distinct mental states that play a role in visual recognition: experiences, propositional seemings, and beliefs. I clarify and offer some reasons for drawing this three-fold distinction, and I consider its epistemological implications. Some philosophers have held that propositional seemings always confer prima facie justification, regardless of a particular seeming's relation to experience. I add to criticisms of this view in the literature by arguing that it fails to solve a version of the ‘problem of the speckled hen’. A more promising view holds that propositional seemings confer justification only when appropriately related to experiences. I offer advice for developing such an account.     

Documentaries,Docudramas, and Perceptual Beliefs

The main accounts of the documentary in contemporary analytic aesthetics have difficulties in dealing with the distinction between documentaries and docudramas. On the one hand, the assertion-based accounts proposed by Noël Carroll, Trevor Ponech, and Carl Plantinga cannot properly differentiate documentaries from docudramas. On the other hand, Gregory Currie's account can do so by relying on the notion of trace, but this involves an undesirable side effect, namely, the exclusion, from the documentary, of those documentaries that do not include traces of their subjects, as, for instance, documentaries that resort to reenactment. Is there a way to exclude docudramas from the documentary without also excluding other films that we usually treat as documentaries? This article affirmatively answers by relying on the notion of perceptual belief, that is, a belief that one can form by endorsing the demonstrative content of one's perception. While documentaries primarily involve the formation of perceptual beliefs, docudramas invite us to form nonperceptual beliefs by primarily involving the formation of perceptual imaginings. That is why docudramas are not documentaries. By contrast, a documentary that resorts to reenactment primarily involves the formation of perceptual beliefs, namely, perceptual beliefs about the reenactment itself.     

Perceptual Error,Conjunctivism, and Husserl

Claude Romano (2012) and Andrea Staiti (2015) have recently discussed Husserl’s account of perception in relation to debates in current analytic philosophy between so-called “conjunctivists” and “disjunctivists”. Romano and Staiti offer strikingly different accounts of the nature of illusion and hallucination, and opposing readings of Husserl. Romano thinks hallucinations and illusions are fleeting, fragile phenomena, while Staiti claims they are inherently retrospective phenomena. Romano reads Husserl as being committed to a form of conjunctivism that Romano rejects in favour of a version of disjunctivism. Staiti, by contrast, claims that, from a Husserlian viewpoint, conjunctivism and disjunctivism are equally untenable. I suggest that both Romano and Staiti offer implausible accounts of illusions and hallucinations, and deliver premature verdicts on Husserl in relation to the analytic debates on perception.     

Preparing for the 21st Century: Some Goals and Challenges for Studies of Infant Sensory and Perceptual Development

While acknowledging that there has been enormous progress in our understanding of sensory and perceptual development in human infancy over the past three decades, this paper looks toward future directions in preparation for the 21st century. It is argued that investigators should move away from the categorical thinking that dominates the field and focus more on developmental process in studying the acquisition of perceptual skills. Also, more attention should be paid to the functional role of perceptual skills and less to demonstrations of discrimination. In addition, researchers should attempt to bring their work and conceptualizations more in line with that on adults and older children. Future work on sensory and perceptual development in infancy will be heavily influenced by our understanding of how the brain works, especially with refinements in brain imaging and neurophysiology and with developments in computational modeling of perceptual processes. Finally, it is likely that there will be increased application of research findings to such problems as identification of infants at risk.