Realism,instrumentalism, and the intentional stance

One of Dennett's principal arguments for an instrumentalistic construal of intentional attributions (e.g., attributions of belief, etc.) is that such attributions are environment relative. I argue that one can and should adopt a realist perspective toward such attributions, but accommodate their environmental relativity by treating intentional properties as relational properties. By doing so one acquires a useful perspective on experimental cognitive psychology; in particular, one can overcome the temptation to treat ecological accounts and information processing accounts as incompatible alternatives and come to see them as mutually supportive. Treating intentional properties as relational may be counter-intuitive, but I provide examples of how other sciences have had to treat what seem to be intrinsic properties as relational.     

Using information theory to assess the diversity,complexity, and development of communicative repertoires

The application of quantitative and comparative measures from information theory on animal communication can provide novel insights into the ecological, environmental, social, and contextual properties that shape the structure, organization, and function of signal repertoires. Using 2 phylogenetically different mammalian species that share similar ecological and social constraints as examples, the authors quantitatively examined the internal structure and development of a subsystem of these species' vocal repertoires in comparison with that of human language and illustrated that these species exhibit convergent developmental processes. The authors also discussed how predictions on the structure and organization of animal communication systems can be made from this new application of information theoretic measures with respect to behavioral ecology.     

动允直接知觉的共鸣原理

传统认知理论认为我们只能间接知觉动允,而生态认知心理学则认为对动允的知觉是个体与环境信息直接共鸣的过程。生态认知心理学首先判定动允并不是存在于我们头脑中的认识,而是实际存在于个体-环境系统中的事实,对动允的直接知觉就是对动允的检测而非推测,是对动允信息的拾取而非对记忆内容的提取。这种直接知觉表现为身体的相关动作机制（动作神经元、肌肉组织等）与环境中动允信息的共鸣。进化与学习在共鸣的形成与发展中具有重要作用。     

The role of representative design in an ecological approach to cognition

Egon Brunswik argued that psychological processes are adapted to environmental properties. He proposed the method of representative design to capture these processes and advocated that psychology be a science of organism-environment relations. Representative design involves randomly sampling stimuli from the environment or creating stimuli in which environmental properties are preserved. This departs from systematic design. The authors review the development of representative design, examine its use in judgment and decision-making research, and demonstrate the effect of design on research findings. They suggest that some of the practical difficulties associated with representative design may be overcome with modern technologies. The importance of representative design in psychology and the implications of this method for ecological approaches to cognition are discussed.     

Radical Embodied Cognitive Neuroscience

Abstract

A radical embodied cognitive neuroscience (RECN) based on ecological psychology requires the understanding of the brain, its structure, and its functions to be compatible with the main tenets of the Gibsonian theory. In this paper, we propose neural reuse as a promising candidate to achieve such understanding. We base our proposal on two fundamental ideas. In section two, we review what we take to be the two central requirements for a RECN based on ecological psychology: compatibility with the explanation of perception and action at the ecological scale and the rejection of computation as a paradigm for the explanation of the activity of the brain. In section three, we show how neural reuse meets the two requirements and, furthermore, we evaluate its theoretical parallelism with ecological psychology. Finally, after developing these ideas, in the conclusion we put forward further aspects and research possibilities that follow from the coalition of neural reuse and ecological psychology for a Gibsonian neuroscience.     

Ecological Psychology and Social Psychology: It is Holt,or Nothing!

What is the greatest contribution that ecological psychologists can offer social psychology? Ideally, ecological psychologists could explain how people directly perceive the unique properties of their social partners. But social partners are distinguished from mundane objects because they possess mental traits, and tradition tells us that minds cannot be seen. When considering the ideal possibility, we reject that doctrine and posit minds as perceivable. For ecological psychology, this entails asserting that minds are the types of things able to structure ambient energy. Contemporary research and theory suggests distinctly ecological ways of attacking this problem, but the problem is not new. Almost 100 years ago, Holt argued for the visibility of minds. Thus when considering these ideas, ecological psychologists face a choice that is at once about their future and their past. Extending ecological psychology’s first principles into the social realm, we come to the point where we must either accept or reject Holt’s arguments, and the wider context they bring. In doing so, we accept or reject our ability to study the uniquely social.     

Selection: The Two Subcultures

Abstract

The concept of culture is proposed as an explanatory tool for analysing the profession of work and organizational psychology. It is argued that two professional subcultures may be distinguished in the area of selection—labelled psychometric and social negotiation respectively. These are distinguished by their differing assumptions, values and artefacts. Changes in the environment of work and organizational psychologists are described, and it is argued that these have profound implications for the ways in which selection procedures are conducted. The psychometric subculture is considered to be less adaptive in the longer term to these environmental changes.     

Learning to recognize talkers from natural,sinewave, and reversed speech samples

In 5 experiments, the authors investigated how listeners learn to recognize unfamiliar talkers and how experience with specific utterances generalizes to novel instances. Listeners were trained over several days to identify 10 talkers from natural, sinewave, or reversed speech sentences. The sinewave signals preserved phonetic and some suprasegmental properties while eliminating natural vocal quality. In contrast, the reversed speech signals preserved vocal quality while distorting temporally based phonetic properties. The training results indicate that listeners learned to identify talkers even from acoustic signals lacking natural vocal quality. Generalization performance varied across the different signals and depended on the salience of phonetic information. The results suggest similarities in the phonetic attributes underlying talker recognition and phonetic perception.     

Finding common ground: Alternatives to code models for language use

The papers in this special issue offer valuable perspectives on public language activities as they are embedded in cultural and social contexts. The perspectives are diverse in their theoretical perspectives, the issues on which they focus, and the methodologies they use and promote using. They represent language studies from the perspective of ecological psychology, dynamical systems approaches, the Distributed Language Approach, and others. The contributions are, in some cases, revolutionary and dis-equilibrating. Different contributions to the special issue offer critiques of conventional scientific studies of decontextualized language and language processing, and offer new perspectives on such diverse domains as the understanding of agency, the study of reading, educational practice, and understanding how articulatory speech actions can have significance beyond that of the physical actions themselves.     

Integrating Human and Natural Systems in Community Psychology: An Ecological Model of Stewardship Behavior

Community psychology (CP) research on the natural environment lacks a theoretical framework for analyzing the complex relationship between human systems and the natural world. We introduce other academic fields concerned with the interactions between humans and the natural environment, including environmental sociology and coupled human and natural systems. To demonstrate how the natural environment can be included within CP’s ecological framework, we propose an ecological model of urban forest stewardship action. Although ecological models of behavior in CP have previously modeled health behaviors, we argue that these frameworks are also applicable to actions that positively influence the natural environment. We chose the environmental action of urban forest stewardship because cities across the United States are planting millions of trees and increased citizen participation in urban tree planting and stewardship will be needed to sustain the benefits provided by urban trees. We used the framework of an ecological model of behavior to illustrate multiple levels of factors that may promote or hinder involvement in urban forest stewardship actions. The implications of our model for the development of multi-level ecological interventions to foster stewardship actions are discussed, as well as directions for future research to further test and refine the model.     

Pragmatism,enactivism, and ecological psychology: towards a unified approach to post-cognitivism

This paper argues that it is possible to combine enactivism and ecological psychology in a single post-cognitivist research framework if we highlight the common pragmatist assumptions of both approaches. These pragmatist assumptions or starting points are shared by ecological psychology and the enactive approach independently of being historically related to pragmatism, and they are based on the idea of organic coordination, which states that the evolution and development of the cognitive abilities of an organism are explained by appealing to the history of interactions of that organism with its environment. It is argued that the idea of behavioral or organic coordination within the enactive approach gives rise to the sensorimotor abilities of the organism, while the ecological approach emphasizes the coordination at a higher-level between organism and environment through the agent’s exploratory behavior for perceiving affordances. As such, these two different processes of organic coordination can be integrated in a post-cognitivist research framework, which will be based on two levels of analysis: the subpersonal one (the neural dynamics of the sensorimotor contingencies and the emergence of enactive agency) and the personal one (the dynamics that emerges from the organism-environment interaction in ecological terms). If this proposal is on the right track, this may be a promising first step for offering a systematized and consistent post-cognitivist approach to cognition that retain the full potential of both enactivism and ecological psychology.

     

An Ecological Approach to Modeling Vision: Quantifying Form Perception Using the Circle Map Equation

Abstract

Object perception occurs within a dynamic world, where the environment and the observer (both body and eyes) are continually moving, shifting and changing. We seek to characterize and quantify this process from a perspective accounting for the interconnected system of motion in the environment, the perceiver and the eye, unfolding through time. Specifically, we build a mathematical representation for object perception based off the circle map equation. We describe an interaction between the eyes’ movement and the movement in the world, in order to better understand how those work together to result in perception. Across three experiments, we show that the stability of the relationship between object perception and complex eye movements can be perturbed and will have a predictable response to said perturbations. In so doing, we provide a different context – a dynamical systems framework – under which we can begin to consider the ecological validity of visual perception models, while recognizing the degree to which the visuo-spatial world is continuously being perturbed and disrupted. In fact, we postulate that such perturbations are capitalized on by the perceptual system, contributing to accurate object and motion identification.     

Meaning-creation,selfhood, and religion: From religious metanarratives to spiritual self-narratives

Abstract

This paper attempts to support the idea that the psychology of religion might be developed as an applied branch of cultural psychology. The scope of the argument is both theoretical and empirical. On the one hand, it is argued that religion functions as the most powerful semiotic system which provides subjects with metaphors, narrative frameworks, rituals and other cultural resources for personalised meaning-construction and life-designing. On the other hand, it is illustrated with an exploratory qualitative study how a specific type of community, a Catholic Seminary, produces a particular set of religious symbols and how their members write their narrative identities in multiple and unstable ways through dialectical tensions and creative self-invention. Thus, the psychology of religion becomes a fruitful laboratory to further investigate the mutually generative interplay between culture and self in order to better understand the plastic process of continuous self-identity formation and transformation.     

What’s Inside Your Head Once You’ve Figured Out What Your Head’s Inside Of

Abstract

In this article, we investigate the foundations for a Gibsonian neuroscience. There is an increasingly influential current in neuroscience based on pragmatic and selectionist principles, which we think can contribute to ecological psychology. Starting from ecological psychology, we identify three basic constraints any Gibsonian neuroscience needs to adhere to: nonreconstructive perception, vicarious functioning, and selectionist self-organization. We discuss two previous attempts to integrate affordances with neuroscience: Reed’s ecological rendering of Edelman’s selectionism as well as Dreyfus’ phenomenological interpretation of Freeman’s neurodynamics. Reed and Dreyfus face the problem of how to account for “value.” We then show how the free-energy principle, an increasingly dominant framework in theoretical neuroscience, is rooted in both Freeman’s neurodynamics and Edelman’s selectionism. The free-energy principle accounts for value in terms of selective anticipation. The selection pressures at work on the agent shape its selective sensitivity to the relevant affordances in the environment. By being responsive to the relevant affordances in the environment, an agent comes to have grip on its interactions with the environment and can thrive in its ecological niche.     

The spatial intersection of minds

Spatial formats of information are ubiquitous in the cognitive and neural sciences. There are neural uses of space in the topographic maps found throughout cortex. There are metaphorical uses of space in cognitive linguistics, physical uses of space in ecological psychology, and mathematical uses of space in dynamical systems theory. These varied informational uses of space each provide a single contiguous medium through which cognitive processes can be shared across subsystems. As we further develop our understanding of how the human mind processes information in real time, the continuous sharing and cascading of information patterns between brain areas can be extended to a sharing and cascading of information between multiple brains and bodies to produce coordinated behavior. Essentially, the way you and the people around you negotiate your shared space affects the way you think, because space is a fundamental part of how you think. It is via space that the mental processes of one mind can form an intersection with the mental processes of another mind.     

Emotion: Sensory Representation,Reinforcement, and the Temporal Lobe

Abstract

In this article emphasis is placed on the reciprocal relationships between reinforcers and the central representations of extrinsic stimuli. It is argued that an understanding of these processes will prove crucial in an understanding of how adaptive stimulus representations can be formed and how such representations can come to elicit emotions. It is proposed that the evolutionary origin of emotions, which are primarily Seen as energising signals of survival value, arose from the need to Sensitise an animal in the absence of appropriate signals of reinforcement. Evidence is provided that many of these functions take place in the primate temporal lobe.     

The ecology of physical activity and sport: Merging science and practice

Abstract

A focus on the ecology of physical activity and sport will merge science and practice within the field of sport psychology. To support this contention, this paper identifies shortcomings of prominent theories within sport psychology by grouping them into meta-theoretical categories labeled dispositional-biological, cognitive behavioral, cognitive-phenomenological, and social-comtructionist. The solution to these shortcomings is an ecological meta-theory that definer the field of sport psychology as the study of how individuals encounter their physical activity and sport environments. Analysis and intervention of this targeted subject matter can be at the physiological, interpersonal, interpersonal, community, and/or institutional and public policy level. A meta-theory that defines ecological information within physical activity in sport as the primary subject matter of study and intervention will develop an autonomous field of study and practice.     

Why the brain needs language in order to be self-conscious

It has been argued that natural language, in the form of inner speech, plays a central role in self-consciousness. However, it is not quite clear why. In this paper, we present a novel answer to the why question. According to the thesis presented in this paper, the brain as a physical system is limited in observing itself and relies on the mediation of natural language for the reconstruction of its phase space trajectory. Drawing on knowledge gathered on the measurement of dynamical systems, we detail the unique properties of natural language that may support this reconstruction.     

Direct Perception Requires an Animal-Dependent Concept of Specificity and of Information

Specificity and information are at center stage in ecological psychology. Nevertheless, the usual theorizing on these concepts may have made the problem of accounting for perception and action more difficult by so far underestimating the role of animals as both meaning-detectors and meaning-determiners. The usual understanding of information and specificity in ecological psychology seems neither necessary nor even compatible with ecological premises and empirical findings. I argue that a reframing of these concepts to fully take animals into account is necessary to explain perception of action-specific meanings. The reframing proposed converges on ideas from developmental systems theory and in no way concedes to inputs-followed-by-processing-followed-by-representation models. Fully acknowledging the animal for properly defining information over the animal-environment system poses no threat lawfulness, realism, or direct perception. It also invites serious consideration of self-organization and interactivism as sources for further development of ecological science.