The end of theoretical orientations?

Theoretical orientation is the most pervasive organizing device in psychology. Ideas, books, people, therapies, and other salient matters are frequently classified into psychodynamic, behavioral, humanistic, cognitive, or other orientation categories. The continued prominence of theoretical-orientation classification belies a breakdown in its applicability to contemporary psychology. Psychotherapy remains a stronghold. However, with internal and external forces endorsing particular approaches, theoretically-based practices will be forced to yield to evidence-based ones. The final dismantling of traditional theoretical categories by evidence-based practice standards paradoxically provides a hopeful impetus to otherwise arrested theoretical development. Manifest avowed theoretical orientation is distinguished from a latent theoretical-orientation construct, and the ways a new kind of meta-theory of therapy will reduce the naivete and increase the applicability of clinical research is discussed.     

The end of mental illness thinking?

Mental health theory and practice are in a state of significant flux. This theoretical article places the position taken by the British Psychological Society Division of Clinical Psychology (DCP) in the context of current practice and seeks to critically examine some of the key factors that are driving these transformations. The impetus for a complete overhaul of existing thinking comes from the manifestly poor performance of mental health services in which those with serious mental health problems have reduced life expectancy. It advocates using the advances in our understanding of the psychological, social and physical mechanisms that underpin psychological wellbeing and mental distress, and rejecting the disease model of mental distress as part of an outdated paradigm. Innovative research in genetics, neuroscience, psychological and social theory provide the platform for changing the way we conceptualise, formulate and respond to psychological distress at both community and individual levels.     

Analytic Phenomenology (or “What It Is Like”) vs. Husserlian Phenomenology

I begin this paper by outlining two senses of “phenomenology.” First, the “what it is like” or “analytic tradition” sense: the verbalization of qualitative states of consciousness of which we are aware. Second, the “Continental” sense: the rigorous study of the structures of consciousness. I outline the ways in which these two senses diverge. First, Continental phenomenology involves a diversified account of consciousness, states of awareness, and the human person. The phenomenologist articulates this account not by introspection but via acts of phenomenological reflection concerning eidetic intuitions about essential structural features. Second, via the method of “sense explication,” the phenomenologist can articulate an account of passive and subconscious states which we are not strictly “aware” of. The conclusion shows these divergences of senses are sometimes overlooked, leading to equivocation. Zahavi and Gallagher must be employing the “what it is like” sense when they make certain “phenomenological” arguments concerning social cognition, yet Spaulding’s ensuing critique of phenomenology is directed at Continental phenomenology. Also, it is only phenomenology in the “what it is like” sense which cannot contribute to subpersonal psychology. Genetic Continental phenomenology describes the lawful relations amongst the precursors and preconditions which give rise to conscious experience, constituting a type of (non-causal) subpersonal explanation.     

Decomposition: to what extent? The case of Turkish.

It has been proposed that in agglutinative languages, lexical access of morphologically complex words must involve decomposition rather than full listing (Frauenfelder & Schreuder, 1992; Hankamer, 1989). We tested this proposal in Turkish using a simple lexical decision task. Results show that multimorphemic words that consist of frequent affixes are processed as fast as monomorphemic words. This finding suggests that in languages with rich morphology, not all multimorphemic words are accessed in a decomposed form. To the extent that morphemes are in frequent use, they may induce whole-word rather than decompositional lexical access.     

The beginning of the end for chimpanzee experiments?

The advanced sensory, psychological and social abilities of chimpanzees confer upon them a profound ability to suffer when born into unnatural captive environments, or captured from the wild – as many older research chimpanzees once were – and when subsequently subjected to confinement, social disruption, and involuntary participation in potentially harmful biomedical research. Justifications for such research depend primarily on the important contributions advocates claim it has made toward medical advancements. However, a recent large-scale systematic review indicates that invasive chimpanzee experiments rarely provide benefits in excess of their profound animal welfare, bioethical and financial costs. The approval of large numbers of these experiments – particularly within the US – therefore indicates a failure of the ethics committee system. By 2008, legislative or policy bans or restrictions on invasive great ape experimentation existed in seven European countries, Japan, Australia and New Zealand. In continuing to conduct such experiments on chimpanzees and other great apes, the US was almost completely isolated internationally. In 2007, however, the US National Institutes of Health National Center for Research Resources implemented a permanent funding moratorium on chimpanzee breeding, which is expected to result in a major decline in laboratory chimpanzee numbers over the next 30 years, as most are retired or die. Additionally, in 2008, The Great Ape Protection Act was introduced to Congress. The bill proposed to end invasive research and testing on an estimated 1,200 chimpanzees confined within US laboratories, and, for approximately 600 federally-owned, to ensure their permanent retirement to sanctuaries. These events have created an unprecedented opportunity for US legislators, researchers, and others, to consider a global ban on invasive chimpanzee research. Such a ban would not only uphold the best interests of chimpanzees, and other research fields presently deprived of funding, but would also increase the compliance of US animal researchers with internationally-accepted animal welfare and bioethical standards. It could even result in the first global moratorium on invasive research, for any non-human species, unless conducted in the best interests of the individual or species.     

Back to The Phenomena (of Sport) – or Back to The Phenomenologists? Towards a Phenomenology of (Sports) Phenomenology

Is phenomenology a method or a philosophy (of ‘ontological’ character)? This question is discussed here with a recent philosophical collection of articles about the phenomenology of sport at hand. However, one finds very few concrete phenomena in this volume, but much abstract talk about the authoritative philosophers of ontology and existentialism. This gives the ‘phenomenological school’ a somewhat sectarian character, which is not typical in recent contributions of phenomenology. This review essay broadens out from the current volume under consideration towards a history of phenomenology and a differential phenomenology of phenomenology. It is not clear how much value the volume itself, however, has for the understanding of sport as well as for the understanding of phenomenology. Nevertheless, it documents how phenomenological scholastics approach sport, which may serve as a warning at a time when positivist reductionism seems to have also become mainstream in human and social sciences.     

The Role of Marriage in Hegel’s Phenomenology

In the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel discusses marriage in his analysis of the first shape of Spirit, Ethical Life. Since it is analyzed in terms of a particular shape of spirit and set in Ancient Greece, it is difficult to understand both its use in the Phenomenology as well as what claims, if any, he is making about the institution of marriage as such. I aim to show that in this text, marriage functions as a fundamental context in which self-knowing occurs.     

What kind of evaluative states are emotions? The attitudinal theory vs. the perceptual theory of emotions

This paper argues that Deonna and Teroni's attitudinal theory of emotions faces two serious problems. The first is that their master argument fails to establish the central tenet of the theory, namely, that the formal objects of emotions do not feature in the content of emotions. The second is that the attitudinal theory itself is vulnerable to a dilemma. By pointing out these problems, our paper provides indirect support to the main competitor of the attitudinal theory, namely, the perceptual theory of emotions.     

The end of History or the end of Democracy? National identity and the future of the nation‐state

Two alternative scenarios on the future of the nation state are presented in order to discuss the concepts of national identity as well as of political system legitimacy. At the core is the question to what extent the nation state will become obsolescent if not obsolete as a function of international interdependence. Fukuyama considers national identity a cultural phenomenon alien to democracy as the ultimate form of government. Guéhenno, in contrast, believes that the erosion of the nation state and of national identity will bring about the end of democracy. The disagreement rests on the assumption whether the political systems will be able to retain their autonomy allowing them to maintain or expand individual liberty and collective freedom.     

The counselor: who? what?

The author examines the criticisms of counselors which center on such factors as age, sex, race, and elitism. Areas of confusion regarding the functions of the counselor are related to the teacher-counselor issue, the professional functions of the counselor, and the basic purpose of counseling. The counselor is seen primarily as doing psychological counseling with individuals and groups, rather than teaching or advising.     

The Trio of Time: On Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Time

Human Studies - The transition from “natural” sensation to “phenomenological” perception is revealed since the dynamic temporality within perception is elaborated by...     

The Phenomenon of Ego-Splitting in Husserl’s Phenomenology of Pure Phantasy

Husserl’s phenomenology of imagination embraces a cluster of different theories and approaches regarding the multi-faced phenomenon of imaginative experience. In this paper I consider one aspect that seems to be crucial to the understanding of a particular form of imagination that Husserl names pure phantasy. I argue that the phenomenon of Ego-splitting discloses the best way to elucidate the peculiarity of pure phantasy with respect to other forms of representative acts (such as remembering) and to any simple form of act modification (such as neutrality modification). First, I unravel the phenomenological distinctions which, respectively, oppose phantasy to perception, on the one hand, and phantasy to other forms of the so-called “intuitive re-presentations”. Second, I introduce the difference between presentative and representative acts, arguing that this cannot help us to single out the defining feature of phantasy experiences. The third section draws again an important distinction between pure phantasy and neutrality modification, which allows me to finally determine an internal trait of phantasy experiences, which Husserl refers to as the “Ego-splitting” (Ichspaltung). In this way, I hope to contribute to a refined characterization of Husserl’s phenomenology of imagination.     

Does mood influence the realism of confidence judgments?

Previous research has shown that mood affects cognition, but the extent to which mood affects meta-cognitive judgments is a relatively over-looked issue. In the current study we investigated how mood influences the degree of realism in participants' confidence judgments (based on an episodic memory task). Using music and film in combination, we successfully induced an elated mood in half of the participants, but failed to induce a sad mood in the other half. In line with previous research, the participants in both conditions were overconfident in their judgments. However, and contrary to our prediction, our data indicated that there was no difference in the realism of the confidence between the conditions. When relating this result to previous research, our conclusion is that there is no, or very little, influence of mood of moderate intensity on the realism of confidence judgments.     

J. J. Katz' logic of questions: New departure or dead end?

Philosophical Studies -