Jealousy Revisited: Recent Philosophical Work on a Maligned Emotion

Taking as its starting point a previous work by the author which reviewed early philosophical sources on jealousy and proposed both a conceptual and moral account of this much-maligned emotion, the present article reviews the relevant philosophical literature from the last decade or so. Most noticeable is how scarce those sources still are. Special attention is given, however, to a new conceptual model proposed by Purshouse and Fredericks which rejects the standard architectonic of jealousy as a three-party compound emotion. While the essential contours of the new model are rejected, Fredericks is shown to offer some powerful misgivings about putative instrumentalist defences of jealousy. In addition to this new model, a number of other recent writings about jealousy – historical, conceptual and moral – are subjected to critical scrutiny in this overview article.     

Are Envy,Anger, and Resentment Moral Emotions?

Abstract

The moral status of emotions has recently become the focus of various philosophical investigations. Certain emotions that have traditionally been considered as negative, such as envy, jealousy, pleasure-in-others'-misfortune, and pride, have been defended. Some traditionally “negative” emotions have even been declared to be moral emotions.

In this brief paper, I suggest two basic criteria according to which an emotion might be considered moral, and I then examine whether envy, anger, and resentment are moral emotions.     

Ekman's basic emotions: Why not love and jealousy?

Paul Ekman's view of the emotions is, we argue, pervasive in psychology and is explicitly shaped to be compatible with evolutionary thinking. Yet, strangely, jealousy and parental love, two emotions that figure prominently in evolutionary psychology, are absent from Ekman's list of the emotions. In this paper we examine why Ekman believes this exclusion is necessary, and what this implies about the limits of his conception of emotion. We propose an alternative way of thinking about emotion that does not exclude jealousy and parental love.     

Historical analysis in the study of emotion

Historical research on emotion has burgeoned in recent years. While some historians examine continuities in emotion despite changes in context—as in 19th- and 20th-century grief reactions—most attention has been directed toward charting major changes in emotional standards and explaining their causation. In Western civilization, the century and a half following about 1680 stands as a major period of emotional change, since emotions are linked to other facets of the social experience in a time of major ideological and economic transition. New emphasis on romantic love, restraint of anger, and the salience of guilt instead of shame develop in this transitional period, as well as improved ability to articulate emotional experience generally. Recent work also points to subsequent emotional shifts, even in recent decades, as in the targeting of anger and jealousy. Historical research and the overall emphasis on change as a factor in emotions study suggest new facets for other disciplines, including further work on the relationship between emotional standards and emotional experience.This article is based on an invited address, delivered to the Inaugural Plenary Meeting of the International Society for Research on Emotions at Harvard University, June 1985. The author is Heinz Professor of History, Carnegie-Mellon University, Schenley Park, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15213.     

Jealousy,Infidelity, and the Difficulty of Diagnosing Pathology: A CBT Approach to Coping with Sexual Betrayal and the Green-Eyed Monster

Humans have evolved adaptations for infidelity, as well defenses against a partner’s betrayal—centrally the emotion of jealousy. Both create problems that bring couples to therapy. Diagnosing jealousy as pathological versus normal turns out to be difficult, in part because infidelity has evolved to be concealed from the betrayed mate, which creates a signal detection problem. Because missing an infidelity committed by a mate has been more costly in evolutionary currencies than falsely suspecting a partner of cheating, selection has created an error management cognitive bias to over-infer a partner’s betrayal. Moreover, adaptations for jealousy become activated by predictors of infidelity, such as mate value discrepancies, when no actual infidelities have occurred. Cognitive-behavior therapy (CBT) offers several ways to deal with these complexities. One way is to highlight potential mismatches, distinguishing between jealous emotions that were functional in ancestral environments but are less so in modern environments. A second is to distinguish between the goal of personal well-being and reproductive outcomes. Understanding the evolutionary logic of jealousy, in short, provides patients with conceptual tools for cognitively reframing jealousy and infidelity.     

James’s theory of emotion and affective turn in psychology / La teoría de las emociones de James y el giro afectivo en psicología

Using William James’s classical theory of the emotions, this article discusses the way the relationship between cognition and emotion are predominantly explained and operationalized in contemporary psychology and neuroscience research. Specific aspects of James’s theory are reconstructed, connecting his more general philosophical framework with arguments about the relationship between subjective experience and the process of corporal change. A review published in the journal Cognition & Emotion (C&E) (2001–11) concludes that almost all its literature is based on the idea of interaction between two different processes, while James suggests that the process of experience is one and the same. Dialogue between these two scenarios facilitates the identification of current research potentialities in terms of mixed-method studies and with emphasis on the temporality of action, overall physiological change, and uniqueness of experience.     

Jealousy in Relation to Envy

The conceptions of jealousy used by philosophical writers are various, and, this paper suggests, largely inadequate. In particular, the difference between jealousy and envy has not yet been plausibly specified. This paper surveys some past analyses of this distinction and addresses problems with them, before proposing its own positive account of jealousy, developed from an idea of Leila Tov-Ruach(a.k.a. A. O. Rorty). Three conditions for being jealous are proposed and it is shownhow each of them helps to tell the emotion apart from some distinct species of envy.It is acknowledged that the referents of the two terms are, to some extent, overlapping,but shown how this overlap is justified by the psychologies of the respective emotions.     

THE ROLE OF COGNITION AND FEELING IN RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE

Abstract Inquiry into religious experience is informed by conceptualizations of emotion. Although a long history of theoretical and empirical work has provided considerable insight into the philosophical, psychological, and (more recently) neurobiological structure of emotion, the role of cognition and feeling in religious emotional states remains poorly conceived, and, hence, so does the concept of religious experience. The lack of a clear understanding of the role of emotion in religious experience is a consequence of a lack of an adequate interdisciplinary account of emotions. Our primary aim here is to examine the consequences of a properly interdisciplinary understanding of emotions for the analysis of religious experience. To this end, we note points of convergence between psychological, philosophical, and neuroscientific accounts of emotion and between such accounts and reports on the neurobiology of religious experience, in particular two recent human brain imaging studies. We conclude that emotions are richer phenomena than either pure feeling or pure thought and that, rightly understood, emotion affords religious experience its distinctive content and quality. Accordingly, we argue that religious experience cannot be reduced to pure feeling or pure thought. Rather, on our analysis, religious experience emerges as “thinking that feels like something.”     

Beliefs about power and its relation to emotional experience: a comparison of Japan, France, Germany, and the United States

This research examined the concept of power in Japan, France, Germany, and the United States, as well as beliefs about the emotions persons in power tend to elicit in others and about powerful people's regulation (specifically, inhibition) of certain emotions. Definitions of power were assessed by examining the importance of two main components: control over self versus other and freedom of action vis-à-vis social norms. Beliefs about both positive (pride, admiration) and negative (jealousy, contempt) emotions were measured. Analyses revealed that the concept of power differed across countries and that the definitions of power as well as country of origin significantly predicted beliefs about the emotions that are elicited in others by powerful people and also the regulation of expression of emotion by powerful people.     

Emotion in inter-group relations

The study of inter-group relations has seen a renewed emphasis on emotion. Various frameworks converge on the general conceptualisation of group-level emotions, with respect to their antecedent appraisals and implications for inter-group relations. However, specific points of divergence remain unresolved regarding terminology and operationalisation, as well as the role of self-relevance (e.g., self-categorisation, in-group identification) in moderating the strength of emotion that individuals feel about groups and their inter-relations. In this chapter we first present a typology of group-level emotions in order to classify current conceptual and empirical approaches, differentiating them along the dimensions of the (individual or group) subject and object of emotion. The second section reviews evidence for the claim that individuals feel stronger group-level emotions about things that are relevant to their self-concept, with emphasis on three indicators of self-relevance: domain relevance, self-categorisation as an in-group member, and in-group identification. Implications for, and future directions in, the study of emotion in inter-group relations are discussed.     

Jealousy: Compound emotion or label for a particular situation?

Individuals generally experience several emotions when confronted with an unfaithful mate. Such observations have led some scholars to propose that jealousy is a compound emotion. The purpose of this study was to investigate whether the concept of jealousy as a combination of primary emotions is an artifact of the failure to control for the focus of concern. The subjects were 149 undergraduates who read jealousy and nonjealousy scenarios and indicated the emotions they believed the partner of a relationship experienced in response to the actions of the mate. The results indicated that manipulation of the focus of concern was a more parsimonious explanation of the results than the assumption that the subjects were basing their responses upon a subjective experience of a compound emotion.This paper was presented at the meeting of the American Psychological Association, Anaheim, California, August 1983.     

Infants and Emotions: How the Ancients' Theories Inform Modern Issues

Although cognitively oriented theories of emotion are now dominant in the psychological study of emotion, there remain issues upon which these theories do not agree. Central among these are questions regarding the minimal cognitive processes necessary to have an emotion. A potentially productive approach to such questions is the study of the relation of cognitive development and the development of emotions in infants. Such an approach was featured in ancient philosophical and psychological treatises, some of which formed the very foundations of later cognitive theories. However, the recent literature has been nearly indifferent to just these foundations. Ancient commentators, especially Aristotle and the Stoic and Epicurean philosophers, understood emotions as fundamentally sociomoral constructs. Owing to a lack of socialisation and moral understanding, infants are not fully capable of experiencing emotions as they are typically understood. Contemporary work in the area of emotion, including that of Michael Lewis, as well as work in other emotion-related areas, is shown to address only inadequately the sociomoral components of emotion and thus to address only inadequately the emotion-cognition relationship.     

Emotion and Religion Revisited: A Response to O'Connor and Averill

O'Connor is critical of Watts' suggestion that emotion can serve as a model for religion. The proposal arises from recent developments in the psychology of emotion that emphasize that it is socially embedded and dependent on processes of interpretation. Similar points have been made about religion: Neither religion nor emotion are purely private matters. More generally, it is urged that there be stronger links between general psychology and the psychology of religion, and also that the psychology of religion be broadened to include a two-way dialogue between theology and psychology. Averill's point is accepted that emotional experience is too much shaped by religion to be allowed to validate it. As a contribution to Averill's question about emotions in the afterlife, points are made about the bodily aspect of the afterlife, the emotions of God, and redeemed emotions.     

恋爱关系中触摸和依恋对嫉妒的影响

选取恋爱中的青年,探讨触摸类型、依恋和嫉妒的关系。实验1选取50名大学生,采用想象情境范式,探究触摸类型（分为“无触摸、脸部触摸和腰部触摸”三种条件）对嫉妒的影响。选择害怕、生气、尴尬、性唤起、悲伤和妒忌作为测量指标。结果显示,三种条件下嫉妒情绪无显著差异。实验2选取113名青年,将无触摸条件分为远距离和近距离两种,进一步探讨触摸类型、依恋和嫉妒的关系。依恋的测量选用亲密关系经验问卷,分为焦虑、回避两个维度。结果发现：（1）在远距离无触摸条件下,依恋焦虑和悲伤、害怕、妒忌、生气正相关;（2）近距离无触摸条件下,依恋回避和悲伤、妒忌、生气负相关;（3）脸部触摸条件下,依恋焦虑和害怕、性唤起正相关。总的来看,爱情依恋对嫉妒情绪的影响受到触摸类型的调节。     

Healthy and unhealthy emotion regulation: personality processes, individual differences, and life span development

Abstract Individuals regulate their emotions in a wide variety of ways. Are some forms of emotion regulation healthier than others? We focus on two commonly used emotion regulation strategies: reappraisal (changing the way one thinks about a potentially emotion‐eliciting event) and suppression (changing the way one responds behaviorally to an emotion‐eliciting event). In the first section, we review experimental findings showing that reappraisal has a healthier profile of short‐term affective, cognitive, and social consequences than suppression. In the second section, we review individual‐difference findings, which show that using reappraisal to regulate emotions is associated with healthier patterns of affect, social functioning, and well‐being than is using suppression. In the third section, we consider issues in the development of reappraisal and suppression and provide new evidence for a normative shift toward an increasingly healthy emotion regulation profile during adulthood (i.e., increases in the use of reappraisal and decreases in the use of suppression).     

Are epistemic emotions metacognitive?

This article addresses the question whether epistemic emotions (such as surprise, curiosity, uncertainty, and feelings of knowing) are in any sense inherently metacognitive. The paper begins with some critical discussion of a recent suggestion made by Joelle Proust, that these emotions might be implicitly or procedurally metacognitive. It then explores the theoretical resources that are needed to explain how such emotions arise and do their work. While there is a perennial temptation to think that epistemic emotions are somehow about the cognitive states of the person undergoing the emotion, we will see that such views can and should be resisted.     

Appraisal,computational models,and scherer's expert system

Abstract

This paper discusses computational models of the mechanism of emotion elicitation according to appraisal theories of emotion. Following a brief review of earlier models, the general affordances of computational models are discussed. Scherer's (1993) recent “expert system” for predicting emotions is then examined in some detail, followed by an exploration of several alternative algorithms for computing an elicited emotion based on an appraisal specification.     

Toward a consensual taxonomy of emotions

ABSTRACT

In this article, I chart certain origins of the science of emotion back to the cognitive revolution. I then highlight new developments in the field – the influences of emotion upon cognition, the focus on over 20 emotions, the expanding emphasis on positive emotion, and an abiding interest in the functions emotions serve. I close by arguing for the need for the field to move toward a conceptual taxonomy of emotions, to move beyond decades of terminological debates about what emotions are to a convergent effort to understand what emotions do for people.