In the Name of Culture and Religion: The Political Function of Blasphemy in Islamic States

ABSTRACT

This article argues that blasphemy laws and a cultural relativist approach to human rights have a political function in authoritarian states. Islamic states use a strong cultural relativist approach to justify their dismal human rights record. The main aim of this approach, however, is survival. The article shows how Islamic countries use religion for their own political survival purposes and how blasphemy laws are often used to silence critique of political, social and religious orders that infringe on basic human rights. From this perspective, blasphemy laws are tools of oppression, not a symbol of cultural and religious difference. By highlighting how blasphemy laws and a cultural relativist approach to religion have been used as tools of oppression by authoritarian regimes, the article underscores the importance of freedom of expression for any functioning democracy.     

Blasphemy and Protection of the Faith: Legal Perspectives from the Middle Ages

ABSTRACT

Jewish, Christian, and Muslim legal traditions have all attempted to define and prohibit blasphemy: insult or verbal attack against their religion, against its rites and symbols, against God and his human representatives. Such laws could be internal (prohibiting blasphemy by members of the faith group) or external (prohibiting insult by those outside the faith). This article will first briefly trace the former, looking at how Jewish, Christian, and Muslim legal traditions from Antiquity and the Middle Ages define and prohibit blasphemy. The second part of the article will then focus on the second issue, looking at how Christian and Muslim legal traditions attempted to prohibit insults to the faith by adherents of other religions. We shall look, for example, at various Christian laws dealing with what was perceived as Jewish mockery of Christian ritual and sacred objects: from mock crucifixions allegedly practiced by Jews as part of Purim celebrations in the fifth-century Roman Empire to Jews who supposedly derided the Eucharist during thirteenth-century Corpus Christi processions. We shall in parallel examine prohibitions in Muslim legal texts (including the so-called Pact of ?‘Umar) of dhimmīs insulting the Prophet Muhammad or the Qur'an. This comparison will show that, while blasphemy was illegal and could be harshly sanctioned and there were lines that religious minorities must not cross, these lines were often not clearly delimited, and became the object of conflict and negotiation.     

Pragmatic Dogma: Understanding the Ideological Continuities in Iran's Response to the Charlie Hebdo Attacks

ABSTRACT

Ayatollah Khomeini's 1989 fatwa against Salman Rushdie cemented Iran's space within Western discourses surrounding blasphemy and Islam. The fatwa has earned its place within the polarizing debate between free speech and religious tolerance, which fundamentally serves the political ambitions of those involved. This article therefore argues that, in order to understand accusations of blasphemy in Iran, one must address the political concerns in which the accusation takes place since these reveal Iran's tendency towards pragmatic dogma – the practice of meeting the needs of the state in a way that accords with its religious ideology. The responses of Iranian officials to the Charlie Hebdo killings in 2015 provide a useful case study for the analysis of this pragmatic dogma, since the Islamic Republic pursued a different approach to the Charlie Hebdo “blasphemy” from that which it had followed with Rushdie. Instead of condoning the killings, Iran's political and religious elite chose to condemn the actions of both the cartoonists and the gunmen, without outlining a punishment. The article will argue that this case demonstrates many of the continuing themes in Iran's approach to blasphemy, since the Charlie Hebdo cartoons have largely been used to reinforce the Islamic Republic's overall worldview.     

Religious or Minority? Examining the Realisation of International Standards in Relation to Religious Minorities in the Middle East

Abstract

The Middle East region has had a long, and periodically impressive, record of religious diversity, yet there is much concern regarding the contemporary standing of its religious minorities. Rather than assessing the chequered historical record of religious minorities in the Middle East, the purpose of this article is to provide an assessment of how international human rights standards may best be utilised to advance their rights. The contention of this article is that the human rights of religious minorities in the Middle East have primarily been considered under the lens of freedom of religion or belief. Relevant though this framework is to their concerns, it will be suggested that promoting the rights of the Middle East's religious minorities through the framework of minority rights may provide a more promising avenue for their protection. The purpose of the article is therefore to provide a reassessment of how best to negotiate the rights of religious minorities in the Middle East. The focus will be on formal legal and political obstacles to the enjoyment of their rights entitlements. Though a broader contextual analysis also assessing economic, cultural and sociological factors would be highly informative, it lies beyond the scope of this article. Despite the fact that minority rights provisions apply to members of minorities alongside all other human rights – among them freedom of religion or belief – the two lenses of minority rights and freedom of religion or belief highlight somewhat different provisions and protections. The two are certainly not mutually exclusive or in contradiction with one another, but a state that prioritises one set of legal and policy options over the other will arrive in different places.     

The Dark Side of Liberalization: How Myanmar's Political and Media Freedoms Are Being Used to Limit Muslim Rights

This article describes how divisive groups have taken advantage of Myanmar's new political and media freedoms to pursue an agenda that will limit the civil and political rights of the country's Muslim population. The article argues that enforcement of the four Protection of Race and Religion Laws will disadvantage Myanmar's already politically marginalized Muslim residents by creating a de facto religious test for full Myanmar citizenship rights. The article examines both the positive and negative aspects of Myanmar's liberalizations, the nature of the ‘Protection of Race and Religion' legislative package and how this will interact with Myanmar's citizenship laws.     

Pakistan Federal Shariat Court's Collective Ijtihād on Gender Equality,Women's Rights and the Right to Family Life

This article argues on the basis of recent case law that the judges of the Pakistan Federal Shariat Court (FSC) have asserted their right to ijtihād and have indeed engaged in collective ijtihād. While in some areas, such as freedom of religion, Islamic law has been interpreted rigidly in a non-human-rights-friendly fashion in Pakistan, in some other areas, the flexibility and pluralism of Islamic law has been used to improve gender equality, women's rights and the right to family life. By using its constitutional powers, with its collective ijtihād, the FSC has been tackling the traditionally illiberal interpretation and application of Muslim laws in these areas. Regardless of the methodology and process of this ijtihādic endeavor, the output shows that the FSC has been either modifying the traditional ijtihāds or coming up with totally new ijtihāds to answer contemporary questions faced by Islamic law. The findings of the article once again challenge the views of scholars such as Schacht, Coulson and Chehata, who have argued that, by the fourth/tenth century, the essentials of Islamic legal doctrine were already fully formulated and that the doctrine remained fixed.     

Rights to the Oceans: Foundational Arguments Reconsidered

This article examines theories of ocean rights based on the works of Hugo Grotius and Samuel von Pufendorf. Grotius's object‐centred view uses features of the natural world to justify claims to external objects. I show that Grotius's view is inadequate, because it relies on an outdated claim that oceanic resources are sufficiently abundant for anybody to use. Further, adaptations of his view are wanting, because they either rely on arbitrary distinctions or disregard the values of cultural minorities. Pufendorf's relational view constructs rights through the exercise of human will. While Pufendorf believes that agreements create rights, he also argues that property rights can be unilaterally acquired from the commons without express consent from others. The relational view is a viable alternative to the object‐centred view, because it both delimits territorial claims over the ocean to a ‘modest’ size and also respects cultural variability. A major aim of this article is to present Pufendorf's theory of territorial rights extended over oceans and to demonstrate how it is useful for assessing contemporary disputes. In the final sections, I apply the relational view to Canadian claims to the Northwest Passage, and I also sketch implications for assessing expanding claims to the seabed.     

Rethinking citizenship rights of non‐Muslims in an Islamic state: Rashid al‐Ghannūshi's contribution to the evolving debate

Of interest to Islamists of the twentieth century has been the question of minority rights in an Islamic state and of how non‐Muslim minorities should be treated: in particular, should they enjoy equal citizenship rights and responsibilities with Muslims? Traditional Islamic law did not accord equal rights to non‐Muslim protected minorities (ahl al‐dhimma), placing Muslims above them in several key areas. Notwithstanding the law, however, early Muslim rulers exercised some pragmatic discretion according to the imperatives of their day. With the Islamic revival of the twentieth century, the traditional view has been adopted by several Muslim thinkers and leaders, though the traditional view is at odds with the concept of the nation‐state. The nation‐state is built on a secular premise, with no single religious group favoured over another. Within this context, a number of Muslim thinkers have attempted to reinterpret the traditionally held view of ‘citizenship rights’. This article will focus on the contribution of one such thinker, the Tunisian Islamist Rashid al‐Ghannūshi, who espouses somewhat ‘liberal’ views on the issue and argues for rethinking on a number of related aspects. Commencing with some background to the problem, the article explores the issue of citizenship rights as espoused by Ghannūshi, and notes the key importance of the concept of justice as their basis, in his view. Specific rights examined are: freedom of belief, including for Muslims who wish to change their religion; the holding of public office by non‐Muslims; equal treatment for Muslims and non‐Muslims in terms of fiscal duties and benefits. Throughout his arguments, Ghannūshi emphasizes justice as central to the issue, and as the basis of interpreting and developing related rules and laws. Although Ghannūshi's views are not entirely new, he goes well beyond what has been acceptable in Islamic law, and his contribution should be considered important in the efforts at rethinking Islamic law in this area.     

Human rights and ethnic attitudes in Spain: The role of cognitive, social status, and individual difference factors

Cognitive, individual differences, and intergroup contact factors were examined in the formation of attitudes about human rights and ethnic bias in two studies conducted in Spain. A 7‐item scale measuring knowledge about human rights laws in Spain and the European Union was used in both studies. Participants were university students enrolled at the Universidad Autónoma de Madrid. In study one, participant (n = 127) knowledge about human rights laws, intergroup contact, Right Wing Authoritarianism (RWA), and Gough's Prejudice/Tolerance (Pr/To) scale were examined in relationship to bias towards Gitanos. Findings revealed that knowledge about human rights and social status variables (gender and age) were not significant predictors of Gitano bias, whereas Pr/To, RWA, and contact were all (R² = .28) significant predictors of bias against Gitanos. Findings provided cross‐cultural replication (Dunbar & Simonova, in press) of the relationship of Pr/To and RWA to Gitano bias. In study two, participant (n = 100) knowledge and feelings (measured on a three‐item semantic differential scale) about human rights laws, Pr/To, and RWA were examined in relation to strategies influencing peer attitudes about human rights on the Raven Social Influence Inventory (RSII) scale. Findings indicated that knowledge about human rights laws were correlated (r = .47, p < .001) with positive feelings about these laws. Results of a hierarchical regression analysis, controlling for knowledge about human rights laws and participants' social status, found that the Prejudice/Tolerance scale and feelings about human rights were related with both hard (R² = .11) and soft (R² = .08) social influence strategies influencing peer human rights attitudes on the RSII. Men and higher‐scoring participants on Pr/To both employed more hard social influence strategies. Findings indicate that while knowledge of human rights laws is unrelated to ethnic bias, more accurate knowledge is correlated to more positive feelings about laws meant to protect the rights of ethnic minorities.     

The Tyranny of the Enfranchised Majority? The Accountability of States to their Non-Citizen Population

The debate between legal constitutionalists and critics of constitutional rights and judicial review is an old and lively one. While the protection of minorities is a pivotal aspect of this debate, the protection of disenfranchised minorities has received little attention. Policy-focused discussion—of the merits of the Human Rights Act in Britain for example—often cites protection of non-citizen migrants, but the philosophical debate does not. Non-citizen residents or ‘denizens’ therefore provide an interesting test case for the theory of rights as trumps on ordinary representative politics. Are they the ultimate success story of the human rights framework? Or was Michael Walzer correct to describe government of denizens by citizens as a modern form of ‘tyranny’? This paper argues that neither liberal rights theorists nor democratic republicans provide a coherent response to the existence of denizens. Liberal rights theorists overstate the extent to which a politically powerless status can secure individual rights, while democratic republicans idealise the political process and wrongly assume that all those affected by laws are eligible for political participation. The paper outlines an alternative model for assessing the accountability of states to their non-citizen population, informed by the republican ideal of non-domination. It identifies gaps in state accountability to denizens–such as where there is inadequate diplomatic protection—and argues that these gaps are particularly troubling if their exit costs of leaving the state are high.     

Reforming England's Blasphemy Law to Protect the Individual

Using a framework of legal analysis proposed by Robert Post, this article examines the novel possibility of a reform in England's current criminal law of blasphemy. As previous attempts to include faiths other than Christianity faltered politically and theoretically, the article proposes a reform of the law to protect individual citizens and not religious groups. Different from incitement to racial or religious hatred legislation, this new offense would rest on what Joel Feinberg calls 'vicarious harm', the harm done directly to a person by deliberately wounding her sense of the sacred. The essay takes as given the propositions that equality before the law is desirable, a clear and ordered criminal offense is better than a vague criminal offense, and, as given specifically by the circumstances in England, a reverence for the transcendent sacred is privileged above other forms of reverence.     

Smile when you call me that!: The problems with punishing hate motivated behavior

During the last several years, many jurisdictions have enacted laws meant to punish behavior motivated by racial hatred or other forms of bigotry. The actual impact of these laws is probably largely symbolic. These laws, which are often called “hate crime” laws, have a number of problems. Hate crime laws may violate the constitution, but this problem can usually be avoided through careful drafting. More importantly, there are a number of practical and policy problems with hate crime laws; not only are these crimes difficult to identify, but they involve the problematical consideration of the offender's motive. In addition, social scientific theories suggest that the laws may actually increase bigotry and disempower minorities. For these reasons, it is recommended that policy-makers explore other means of reducing bigotry.     

Citizenship Rights of Non-Muslims in the Islamic State of H # kimiyya Espoused by Sayyid Qutb

In the late twentieth century, the ultimate goal of the Egyptian thinker and activist Sayyid Qutb was to establish an Islamic order; that is, an Islamic state supervised and guided by h # kimiyya . For him, h # kimiyya, practically, is the Shar I 'a (Islamic Code). It comprises the clear-cut commands and prohibitions conveyed in the Qur' # n and the traditions (Hadith) of the Prophet of Islam. With those commands, the h # kimiyya deals with the individuals and groups, links them to the society and defines the individual's rights within the limits of the community. In Qutb's view, the non-Muslim minority in the Islamic state is not outside of the jurisdiction of the ' h # kimiyya ', which regulates the relationship between the state and its citizens, Muslims and non-Muslims and individuals and groups. Thus the rights of non-Muslim minorities in the Islamic state of h # kimiyya, how they should be treated and the question of whether they should enjoy equal citizenship rights and responsibilities with Muslims have increasingly come to be one of the pressing and 'sensitive' issues in the debate. Contributing to the debate, this paper intends to investigate the issue of citizenship rights of non-Muslim minorities in the Islamic state of h # kimiyya espoused by the Egyptian Islamist Sayyid Qutb, the key figure of the Muslim Brotherhood, whose works were considered as the manual of the Islamic groups, al-Jam # ' # t al-Isl # miyya, in Egypt and abroad. In so doing, the paper will begin with some background to the issue, and then outline the essential points of Qutb's concept of justice as central to his view on citizenship rights and responsibilities. It follows that the right to freedom of belief for non-Muslims, and also for Muslims who want to change their religion, will be examined. Equality between Muslims and non-Muslims in matters related to finance, benefits and amenities with the focus on taxation will be outlined. The rights of non-Muslims to hold public office will also be investigated. It will be seen at the end that Qutb's concept of citizenship rights is centered on the concepts of justice, complete human equality and firm social solidarity in their broadest sense. His discussion stresses the notion of universality and humanism as one of the characteristics of the Islamic system. Qutb's views on the subject were grounded in the authoritative texts, namely the Qur' # n and the traditions of the Prophet, but in essence they were an attempt to assuage the concerns of the non-Muslim minorities themselves. In the light of the aim of Islamic activism for which Qutb was and perhaps continues to be the ideologue, Qutb's view on the status of non-Muslims in an Islamic state, specifically through the prism of h # kimiyya, lends this study special importance.     

Predicting opposition to the civil rights of trans persons in the United Kingdom

Although there is considerable evidence tcirc trans persons are victims of discrimination, social psychologists have rarely explored prejudice against this minority group. We extrapolated from models of heterosexism to test hypotheses about support for and opposition to trans persons' civil rights. Opposition to trans persons civil rights among 151 participants was correlated with heterosexism, authoritarianism, a belief that there are only two sexes, beliefs that gender is biologically based and several demographic variables. Linear regression showed that heterosexism, authoritarianism, contact with sexual minorities and beliefs in biological gender predicted unique variance in opposition to trans persons' civil rights. Differences and similarities between prejudice towards sexual and gender minorities are discussed. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Why Toleration Is Not the Appropriate Response to Dissenting Minorities' Claims

For many liberal democrats toleration has become a sort of pet‐concept, to which appeal is made in the face of a myriad issues related to the treatment of minorities. Against the inflationary use of toleration, whether understood positively as recognition or negatively as forbearance, I argue that toleration may not provide the conceptual and normative tools to understand and address the claims for accommodation raised by at least one kind of significant minority: democratic dissenting minorities. These are individuals, or aggregates of them, who oppose, on principled grounds, the outcomes of the majoritarian decision‐making process. I argue that democratic dissenting minorities' claims are better understood as calls for respect for a person's capacity for self‐legislation. I view respect as the cornerstone of justice in a liberal democracy: all norms resulting in a constraint on a person's conduct should be appropriately justified to her. I argue that the reconciliation of democratic dissenting minorities' claims requires an enhancement of the justificatory strategies of democratic decisions by enhancing in turn citizens' rights to political participation. This should be done both during decision making and after a provision is enacted by also securing space for contestation through such forms of illegal protest as civil disobedience and conscientious objection.     

Sustainable Masculinity in Ecumenical Perspective

Gender is an important topic of the WCC's Pilgrimage of Justice and Peace. It is the result of both theological anthropological concerns and the ongoing search for justice and peace. In other words, it is a typical area where traditional Faith and Order and Life and Work concerns coincide. Yet, gender is often taken to mean concerns of the role, rights, and treatment of women primarily, with some attention to the position and treatment of transgender persons and sexual minorities. This article argues that, precisely from the point of view of these ecumenical theological concerns, attention for masculinity as a gender is also required. The reason for this is that although many different forms of masculinity are supported with an appeal to the Christian tradition, not all forms of masculinity are compatible with a desire for safeguarding human dignity and a sustainable journey into the future.     

Cornelius of Pakistan: Catholic chief justice of a Muslim state

This essay is a study of the philosophy of state craft of Pakistan's most eminent Chief Justice — A.R. Cornelius, whose tenure on the Supreme Court was from 1951 to 1968. The analysis is based on a remarkable friendship between Cornelius and the author which started in 1960 when the author was an advisor to the Government of Pakistan. It continued with a series of letters from Cornelius through 1970. These sources are augmented by analysis of hundreds of court decisions, speeches and articles by Cornelius. Cornelius developed a profound admiration for Islam which deepened towards the end of his life. He died in 1991 at the age of 88. As a self‐described ‘Neo‐Thomist’ he synthesized Christian and Islamic values through the medium of natural law. This synthesis is a case study in the compatibility of Islam and Christianity developed not on theological grounds but within the context of jurisprudence. It negates the contention that Islam and the West are necessarily at odds and that their interaction will result in a ‘clash of civilizations’. This essay is an adaptation of the first chapter of the author's Chief Justice Cornelius of Pakistan: an analysis with letters and speeches (Karachi, Oxford University Press, 1999). It appears here with permission of the publisher. The text of Cornelius’ letters and speeches and the memorial lecture referred to as ‘Appendix’ and ‘Letter to the Author’ in notes 2, 32, 40, 47, 60, 65, 66, 75, 84, 91, 122, 135, 139 are included in that volume.     

On the Strength of Children's Right to Bodily Integrity: The Case of Circumcision

This article considers the question of how much weight the infringement of children's right to bodily integrity should be given compared with competing considerations. It utilises the example of circumcision to explore this question, taking as given this practice's opponents' view of circumcision's harmfulness. The article argues that the child's claim against being subjected to (presumably harmful) circumcision is neither a mere interest nor a right so strong that it trumps all competing interests. Instead, it is a right of moderate strength. Indeed, even the aggregate strength of children's rights against the practice of (presumably harmful) circumcision as a whole is not so weighty so as to always trump competing interests. The harms are not sufficiently serious to justify such a status. And the expressive wrongs associated with non‐negligently benevolent harming are much less serious than those associated with intentional harming. The debate over banning circumcision thus cannot be conducted only in terms of competing rights. Competing interests, such as those that would be set back by the departure of religious citizens, should be considered as well and might plausibly justify allowing even a rights‐infringing practice to continue.     

The ʿUlamāʾ, Fatāwā and Challenges to Democracy in Contemporary Indonesia

This article examines the fatāwā issued by the Council of Indonesian ?ulamā? (Majelis Ulama Indonesia; MUI) regarding democracy, pluralism and religious minorities and explores their socio-historical contexts. The MUI emerges as having an ambiguous attitude towards democracy. The 1998 reform in Indonesia offered a backdrop that encouraged the MUI to be more independent from the state. This enabled the MUI to produce Islamic religious discourses that intersect with democracy, civil society, law enforcement, human rights, public security and elections. The MUI has accepted several principles that are prerequisites for a democratic society and state, such as equality before the law, good governance, protection of human rights, maintenance of public peace and security, and participation in fair elections. However, the Council is very conservative when comes to safeguarding Islamic faith and theology. It rejects pluralism, religious freedom and Muslim minorities such as the Ahmadiyya. The MUI's strict interpretation of Islam and support for Islamist ideology and conservatism prevent it from accepting democracy fully.     

Hobbes's Account of Distributive Justice as Equity

This paper examines the rationale for and grounds and implications of Hobbes's redefinition of distributive justice as equity. I argue that this unprecedented reformulation served to ensure the justness of distributive laws. Hobbes acknowledges that the sovereign can distribute rights and goods iniquitously by failing to treat citizens as equals. However, he insists that improper allocations are not unjust, properly speaking – they do not `wrong' citizens. To support this claim, Hobbes puts forth the un-Aristotelian maxim that merit in distributive justice is due by grace alone. You deserve what the sovereign gives you: there is no desert prior to and independent of his allocation of rights. For Hobbes, distributive justice does not track but create merit. It follows that distributive laws cannot fail to give what is due (which would be unjust). This paper proceeds to analyze the nature of the limits equity sets to the apportionment of goods. I argue that these limits are moral and purely procedural: citizens cannot invoke equity to claim a fair share of the goods distributed. Thanks to Hobbes's redefinition of distributive justice, the justness of the sovereign's conduct, and hence his legal immunity, remains intact.