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1.
Lisa Rivera 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2007,10(1):69-87
When a person gives up an end of crucial importance to her in order to promote a moral aim, we regard her as having made a
moral sacrifice. The paper analyzes these sacrifices in light of some of Bernard Williams’ objections to Kantian and Utilitarian
accounts of them. Williams argues that an implausible consequence of these theories is that that we are expected to sacrifice
projects that make our lives worth living and contribute to our integrity. Williams’ arguments about integrity and meaning
are shown to be unconvincing when the content of projects is left open. However, a look at his later arguments suggests a
reason to be concerned about defensible ethical projects as understood through what he refers to as “the morality system”.
The problem for theories of this type turns out to be not merely conflicts between ethical projects and moral demands but
making sense of some of the ethically relevant features of these projects. Accommodations to moral theories that leave room
for ethical projects may be insufficient to explain such features, for example in cases where agents demand more of themselves
than the theories require. Making the theories more demanding is also problematic. Williams’ view about the role ethics plays
in our conception of the life we want to lead provides a better account of these cases.
相似文献
Lisa RiveraEmail: |
2.
Henning Peucker 《Axiomathes》2012,22(1):135-146
This article is composed of three sections that investigate the epistemological foundations of Husserl’s idea of logic from
the Logical Investigations. First, it shows the general structure of this logic. Husserl conceives of logic as a comprehensive, multi-layered theory
of possible theories that has its most fundamental level in a doctrine of meaning. This doctrine aims to determine the elementary
categories that constitute every possible meaning (meaning-categories). The second section presents the main idea of Husserl’s
search for an epistemological foundation for knowledge, science and logic. Their epistemological clarification can only be
reached through a detailed analysis of the structure of those intentions that give us what is meant in our intentions. To
reveal the intuitive giveness of logical forms is the ultimate aim of Husserl’s epistemology of logic. Logical forms and meaning-categories
can only be given in a certain higher-order intuition that Husserl calls categorical intuition. The third section of this
article distinguishes different kinds of categorical intuition and shows how the most basic logical categories and concepts
are given to us in a categorical abstraction. 相似文献
3.
Jeanette C. Gadt Ph.D. 《American journal of psychoanalysis》1994,54(2):173-187
Summary O’Keeffe put into visual language the psychic splitting that had occurred between the sexes in the United States, attempting
to integrate what had formerly been separated as feminine and masculine into the female psyche. In her most important contribution,
she explored presence rather than absence and opened up possibilities for thinking about openings. The concept of the female
opening in particular had heretofore been assigned a negative meaning, signifying more often than not a gaping wound rather
than a space and place of possibilities.
Klein’s complex and evocative understanding of some of the earliest mental processes of life enabled researchers to delve
into the meanings made of the presence of the mother and father and baby, in the context of the baby’s body-mind. Klein’s
female or male baby desires to know from the beginning. She discovered splitting and projective identification, the development
of anxiety and guilt under the aegis of these mental processes, the multiple meanings of aggression, and, significantly, she
permitted the female baby’s body to have its own language.
The answers provided by O’Keeffe and Klein bequeathed new possibilities for women’s self-invention and remain pivot points
for female identity throughout the century, to be confronted again by the second wave of feminism beginning in the late 1960s,
by ‘postfeminist’ debates, and by a challenged psychoanalysis. A more careful probing of these issues may help us to better
understand our past so as to have greater resources for a more comprehensive reading of our present. 相似文献
4.
Kurtis Hagen 《Dao》2011,10(1):53-70
Xunzi is often interpreted as offering a method for transforming our desires. This essay argues that, strictly speaking, he
does not. Rather, Xunzi offers a method of developing an auxiliary motivational structure capable of overpowering our original
desires, when there is a conflict. When one succeeds in transforming one’s overall character, original desires nevertheless
remain and are largely satisfied. This explains why one may be motivated to follow the way even before one has developed noble
intentions. On Xunzi’s view, following dao provides the best chance of satisfying one’s original desires, as well as fulfilling the more noble aspirations that arise
from the process. 相似文献
5.
Natalja Deng 《Philosophia》2010,38(4):741-753
This article is a response to Clifford Williams’s claim that the debate between A- and B theories of time is misconceived
because these theories do not differ. I provide some missing support for Williams’s claim that the B-theory includes transition,
by arguing that representative B-theoretic explanations for why we experience time as passing (even though it does not) are
inherently unstable. I then argue that, contra Williams, it does not follow that there is nothing at stake in the A- versus
B debate. 相似文献
6.
Jure Zovko 《Synthese》2008,162(3):425-438
In this article, I discuss the manner in which Dieter Henrich’s theory of subjectivity has emerged from the fundamental questions
of German Idealism, and in what manner and to what extent this theory effects a reinstatement of metaphysics. In so doing,
I shall argue that Henrich’s position represents a viable refutation of the attempt of the physicalist explanation of the
world to prove the concept of the subject to be superfluous. Henrich’s metaphysics of subjectivity is primarily focused on
the ‘ultimate questions’ which also compose “the deep levels of our subjectivity” and concern the factors that should promote
stability in our emotional, moral and intellectual life. I argue with Henrich that the indisputable facticity of our conscious
life is worthy of our special consideration and interpretation, explanation and clarification, just as the deeper meaning
(the individual and collective subconscious structure) hidden beneath the layers of apparent comprehensibility calls for urgent
investigation. Such interpretation and elucidation of life’s meaning has a tripartite character: first, it consists of clarification
of the totality of human experience together with the realities playing a part in it; second, it builds on the process by
which the contents of experience are cognized, and the knowledge thereof which results; thirdly, it embraces the transcendental
precondition enabling each and every one of us to consciously lead our lives—for life, in a human sense, does not merely happen to one. Henrich’s metaphysical foundation of subjectivity is
compared with Kolak‘s position, according to which individual consciousness is not insular, but integrated into the totality
of overall unity that some have called “the Universal Self”, “the Noumenal Self”. 相似文献
7.
XIAOMEI YANG 《Metaphilosophy》2006,37(1):112-129
Abstract: Kant has argued that moral requirements are categorical. Kant's claim has been challenged by some contemporary philosophers; this article defends Kant's doctrine. I argue that Kant's claim captures the unique feature of moral requirements. The main arguments against Kant's claim focus on one condition that a categorical imperative must meet: to be independent of desires. I argue that there is another important, but often ignored, condition that a categorical imperative must meet, and this second condition is crucial to understanding why moral requirements are not hypothetical. I also argue that the claim that moral requirements are not categorical because they depend on desires for motivation is beside the point. The issue of whether moral requirements are categorical is not an issue about whether moral desires or feelings are necessary for moral motivation but are rather an issue about the ground of moral desires or moral feelings. Moral requirements are categorical because they are requirements of reason, and reason makes moral desires or feelings possible. 相似文献
8.
Allen Coates 《Philosophical Studies》2006,129(2):295-315
Cognitive internalism is the view that moral judgments are both cognitive and motivating. Philosophers have found cognitive
internalism to be attractive in part because it seems to offer support for the idea that moral reasons are categorical, that
is, independent of agents’ desires. In this paper, I argue that it offers no such support. 相似文献
9.
Mikel Burley 《Philosophia》2006,34(4):411-416
This Article critically discusses Clifford Williams’ claim that the A-theory and B-theory of time are indistinguishable. I
examine three considerations adduced by Williams to support his claim that the concept of time essentially includes transition
as well as extension, and argue that, despite its prima facie plausibility, the claim has not been adequately justified. Williams
therefore begs the question against the B-theorist, who denies that transition is essential. By Williams’ own lights, he ought
to deny that the B-theory is a (realist) theory of time; and thus his claim that A-time and B-time do not differ significantly
should be rejected.
相似文献
Mikel BurleyEmail: |
10.
Mark Chekola 《Journal of Happiness Studies》2007,8(1):51-78
The paper starts with a general discussion of the concepts of happiness and the good life. I argue that there is a conceptual
core of happiness which has to do with one’s life as a whole. I discuss affective and attitude or life satisfaction views
of happiness and indicate problems faced by those views. I introduce my own view, the life plan view, which sees happiness
as the ongoing realizing of global desires of the person. I argue that on such a view one’s life could be happy without a
high level of rationality or a high level of autonomy; such rationality and autonomy are not built into the concept of happiness.
So while happiness is a final value, and good for the person, it is not the only final value. Rationality and autonomy are
also final values and, where they exist, are good as ends for the person, part of the good life. 相似文献
11.
Timothy Chappell 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2007,10(3):255-265
I discuss Bernard Williams’ ‘integrity objection’ – his version of the demandingness objection to unreasonably demanding ‘extremist’
moral theories such as consequentialism – and argue that it is best understood as presupposing the internal reasons thesis.
However, since the internal reasons thesis is questionable, so is Williams’ integrity objection. I propose an alternative
way of bringing out the unreasonableness of extremism, based on the notion of the agent’s autonomy, and show how an objection
to this proposal can be outflanked by a strategy that also outflanks the ‘paradox of deontology.’
相似文献
Timothy ChappellEmail: |
12.
Derek Baker 《Philosophical Studies》2010,150(1):37-47
Ambivalence is most naturally characterized as a case of conflicting desires. In most cases, an agent’s intrinsic desires
conflict contingently: there is some possible world in which both desires would be satisfied. This paper argues, though, that
there are cases in which intrinsic desires necessarily conflict—i.e., the desires are not jointly satisfiable in any possible
world. Desiring a challenge for its own sake is a paradigm case of such a desire. Ambivalence of this sort in an agent’s desires
creates special problems for the project of reducing all facts about an agent’s desires to facts about his or her preferences
over options. If this reductive project fails, there is reason to suspect that the Decision Theory cannot give us a complete
theory of Humean rationality. 相似文献
13.
I examine an argument that appears to take us from Parfit’s [Reasons and Persons, Oxford: Clarendon Press (1984)] thesis that we have no reason to fulfil desires we no longer care about to the conclusion
that the effect of posthumous events on our desires is a matter of indifference (the post-mortem thesis). I suspect that many
of Parfit’s readers, including Vorobej [Philosophical Studies 90 (1998) 305], think that he is committed to (something like) this reasoning, and that Parfit must therefore give up the
post-mortem thesis. However, as it turns out, the argument is subtly equivocal and does not commit Parfit to the post-mortem
thesis. I close with some doubts about Parfit’s case for his indifference thesis. 相似文献
14.
Stephen Mulhall 《International Journal for Philosophy of Religion》2011,69(1):29-43
This paper critically evaluates the work of Charles Taylor and Alasdair MacIntyre by comparing their understanding of the
narrative structure of selfhood with paradigms derived from three other sources: Heidegger’s conception of human being as
Dasein; Rowan Williams’ interpretation of Dostoevsky’s theology of narrative; and Kierkegaard’s project of reading the Old
Testament narrative of Abraham and Isaac as part of the Christian God’s autobiography. These comparisons suggest that Taylor
and MacIntyre’s own narratives of Western culture lack a certain, theologically required openness to a variety of specific
ways in which both individuality and history resist understanding in narrative terms as much as they demand it. 相似文献
15.
Great ape gesture has become a research topic of intense interest, because its intentionality and flexibility suggest strong
parallels to human communication. Yet the fundamental question of whether an animal species’ gestures carry specific meanings
has hardly been addressed. We set out a systematic approach to studying intentional meaning in the gestural communication
of non-humans and apply it to a sample of orangutan gestures. We propose that analysis of meaning should be limited to gestures
for which (1) there is strong evidence for intentional production and (2) the recipient’s final reaction matches the presumed
goal of the signaller, as determined independently. This produces a set of “successful” instances of gesture use, which we
describe as having goal–outcome matches. In this study, 28 orangutans in three European zoos were observed for 9 months. We
distinguished 64 gestures on structural grounds, 40 of which had frequent goal–outcome matches and could therefore be analysed
for meaning. These 40 gestures were used predictably to achieve one of 6 social goals: to initiate an affiliative interaction
(contact, grooming, or play), request objects, share objects, instigate co-locomotion, cause the partner to move back, or
stop an action. Twenty-nine of these gestures were used consistently with a single meaning. We tested our analysis of gesture
meaning by examining what gesturers did when the response to their gesture did not match the gesture’s meaning. Subsequent
actions of the gesturer were consistent with our assignments of meaning to gestures. We suggest that, despite their contextual
flexibility, orangutan gestures are made with the expectation of specific behavioural responses and thus have intentional
meanings as well as functional consequences. 相似文献
16.
Anindita Bhattacharya 《Psychological studies》2011,56(3):280-288
The present study explores the relationship of meaning in life with subjective well-being among a sample of young adults launching
their career. Using a qualitative approach, ten young adults were asked to share their life experiences using a semi structured
interview schedule. A grounded theory analysis revealed that happiness forms a core concern for an individual where it depends
not only on the cultural norm involving an individual where social relationships form an important part, but also goals and
aims (s) he/she wishes to achieve in life. It exists in temporality but is impacted by the larger dimension of meaning in
life which is relatively stable and covers a huge expanse of an individual’s existence. Finding a meaning in life involves
both personal goals such as self growth and attainment of peace, and also professional goals like fulfillment of one’s academic
aim. Meaning in life is also seen as being impacted by an individual’s past happenings, belief in self- worth and social responsibility. 相似文献
17.
Ruohui Li 《Frontiers of Philosophy in China》2011,6(1):1-19
“How is the meaning of the Dao to be understood?” To answer this question, we should not make indiscreet remarks outside of
the framework of Laozi’s thought; rather, we should enter the system, helping Laozi to establish a philosophical system on
the Dao. Such an establishment is equivalent to that of a logical system of Laozi’s philosophy. We consider the presentation
of Laozi’s thought as unverified propositions, and the purpose of this essay is to expound on these propositions and make
them philosophy in a strict sense: The Dao that can be talked about is not Dao anymore, and while “the Dao” seems to have
its name, it actually does not. Names are also particular things. The Dao is neither a name nor a thing; instead, the Dao
implies nonexistence. Nonexistence means the possibility of the being of all things, and all these things are the manifestation
of the Dao, thus nonexistence is also existence. Things are discriminated from the Dao, and because all these things are discriminated
from each other, there is de 德 (virtues). Where the discrimination is removed, there is the Dao, and adherence to the discrimination means deviation from
the Dao. The diversity of things stirs up desires, and the control and utilization of things are a departure from the Dao.
Only desires without self are compatible with nature. Desire discriminates with artificial measurements, and thus leads to
knowledge. To acquire knowledge is to learn, and learning develops the capability to differentiate between the self and the
other, so only a decline in learning can be conducive to human life. One can achieve something, transform external things
and withstand nature only after he learns and acquires knowledge. On the other hand, wuwei 无为 (doing nothing) leads to wuwo 无我 (self-denial), avoiding the invention or differentiation of things. So, life is just the movement of the Dao, in which
all things are allowed to take their own courses and nothing is left unaccomplished. 相似文献
18.
Kim Sungmoon 《Dao》2011,10(3):291-309
This article argues that, contrary to conventional wisdom, Xunzi’s and Hobbes’s understandings of human nature are qualitatively
different, which is responsible for the difference in their respective normative political theory of a civil polity. This
article has two main theses: first, where Hobbes’s deepest concern was with human beings’ unsocial passions, Xunzi was most
concerned with human beings’ appetitive desires (yu 欲), material self-interest, and resulting social strife; second, as a result, where Hobbes strove to transform the pathological
(anti-)politics of resentment into the politics of recognition by creating rational egalitarian citizenship under the all-encompassing
constitutional sovereign power, Xunzi attempted to nourish human beings’ basic appetitive desires (yu 欲) by instituting a li 禮 ordered civil entity. This article concludes by showing how Confucian civility that Xunzi reconstructed by means of the
li 禮 can effectively deal with unsocial passions. 相似文献
19.
Stefan E. Schulenberg Lindsay W. Schnetzer Michael R. Winters Robert R. Hutzell 《Journal of Contemporary Psychotherapy》2010,40(2):95-102
Viktor Frankl’s logotherapy posits that human life has purpose and that human beings are motivated to discover meaning in
their lives. This paper’s objective is to present a case for incorporating meaning into couples therapy as a way of enhancing
a clinician’s existing approach. Logotherapy is a potentially useful modality, regardless of the clinician’s theoretical orientation,
given its collaborative nature and focus on the significance of meaning and values to the human condition. A logotherapeutic
approach to couples therapy (i.e., meaning-centered couples therapy) would involve values clarification (individually and
collectively) and emphasis on a love that is based on acceptance and self-transcendent growth. Logotherapy techniques are
discussed, a composite illustration is presented, and recommendations for research are offered. 相似文献
20.
In my recent article, I addressed the question of whether a potential categorical exclusion of decisionally impaired patients
from non-therapeutic medical research would be inaccordance with the Principle of Justice as Fairness. I came to the conclusion
that a categorical exclusion of decisionally impaired persons from relevant research projects may collide with Rawls’s understanding
of Justice as Fairness. Derek Bell has criticized my paper by denying that it is legitimate to apply Rawls to this bioethical
problem. In my restatement I try to show that an extrapolation of John Rawls’s thought to such bioethical cases is possible,
because Rawls himself has written that his orientation towards decisionally non-impaired persons is an idealized situation
that allows extrapolations. In a second part I try to show that Bell hasroughly misunderstood my concept of “presumed consent”
which I make a prerequisite for the legitimisation of research on decisionally impaired persons. In using advance consent
as a proposal for resolving the problem, Bell has indirectly confirmed my approach because he is using a similar construct
of consent, which operates with similar hypotheses and probabilities of error. I see here no categorical difference between
Bell’s conclusion and my discussion. Thus, Bell’s reply does not represent a refutation of my thoughts, but rather it is a
para phrased confirmation of my central theses. I conclude by showing the relevance of Rawls, pointing out that the discussion
between Bell and me illustrates how Rawls’s concept of reflective equilibrium is an appropriate approach to finding a solution
to this bioethical problem.
This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. 相似文献