Another look at dreaming: disentangling Freud's primary and secondary process theories

The Interpretation of Dreams contains Freud's first and most complete articulation of the primary and secondary mental processes that serve as a framework for the workings of mind, conscious and unconscious. While it is generally believed that Freud proposed a single theory of dreaming, based on the primary process, a number of ambiguities, inconsistencies, and contradictions reflect an incomplete differentiation of the parts played by the two mental processes in dreaming. It is proposed that two radically different hypotheses about dreaming are embedded in Freud's work. The one implicit in classical dream interpretation is based on the assumption that dreams, like waking language, are representational, and are made up of symbols connected to latent unconscious thoughts. Whereas the symbols that constitute waking language are largely verbal and only partly unconscious, those that constitute dreams are presumably more thoroughly disguised and represented as arcane hallucinated hieroglyphs. From this perspective, both the language of the dream and that of waking life are secondary process manifestations. Interpretation of the dream using the secondary process model involves the assumption of a linear two-way "road" connecting manifest and latent aspects, which in one direction involves the work of dream construction and in the other permits the associative process of decoding and interpretation. Freud's more revolutionary hypothesis, whose implications he did not fully elaborate, is that dreams are the expression of a primary mental process that differs qualitatively from waking thought and hence are incomprehensible through a secondary process model. This seems more adequately to account for what is now known about dreaming, and is more consistent with the way dream interpretation is ordinarily conducted in clinical practice. Recognition that dreams are qualitatively distinctive expressions of mind may help to restore dreaming to its privileged position as a unique source of mental status information.     

William James and Sigmund Freud: "The Future of Psychology Belongs to Your Work"

Although James and Freud are generally not considered scientific by experimental psychologists, both wrote about their view of what a scientific psychology should look like. Their radically different philosophical epistemologies and historical origins are reviewed, to provide an understanding of their respective visions for psychology. James took his stand on a new metaphysical foundation for the way experiments should be conducted with his formulation of radical empiricism. Freud attempted a neurological explanation of the unconscious in his "Project for a Scientific Psychology." Remarkably, their definitions of psychology as a science had a similar ring. Likely, this is because both took a phenomenological position with regard to how they defined science, which is also probably the primary reason their ideas on the subject have always been rejected by experimentalists. The humanistic implications of the neuroscience revolution, however, have caused a reassessment of their respective positions, as philosophical questions about the nature of consciousness have brought both Freud and James back into vogue, but in new and unexpected ways.     

Gall's psychophysiological concept of function: the rise and decline of "internal essence".

Gall did not employ the term "function" to refer to adaptive mental processes or to observable behavior. To the contrary, he and the phrenologists took a traditional concept of function regarding the contribution or duties of a part within the overall "animal economy" and argued that the "faculties" of the soul are among the functions of the nervous system. In particular, he brought this psychophysiological use of the term into his Enlightenment perspective when he aligned it with internal essence, juxtaposed it to its external sign, and argued that the cerebral organs are the material instruments through which the internal faculties manifest themselves in behavior and in the shape of the skull. Gall did not believe that the faculties are a product of the organs but that the organs, being material incarnations of the internal functions, contain the power to express the faculties externally. Purely psychological uses of function are infrequent among the works of Gall and his followers. It was not until the functionalists at the turn of the century that the word was applied to the adaptive utility of mental processes in relation to the environment and not until the advent of behaviorism that it was employed to refer to the end or adaptive utility of a particular behavior.     

Anxiety, signal anxiety, and unconscious anticipation: neuroscientific evidence for an unconscious signal function in humans

A central tenet of psychoanalysis, and arguably of any comprehensive theory of mind, is the existence of a psychological unconscious. Years of clinical investigation into the nature of unconscious processes have facilitated the development of psychoanalysis as a clinical method. Empirical investigations of unconscious mental processes, however, have lagged behind clinical inquiry. With few exceptions, attempts to understand unconscious processes using rigorous experimental controls have remained sequestered in scientific domains other than psychoanalysis, where they have proliferated recently. In view of this recent upsurge of research on unconscious processes outside of psychoanalysis, efforts to integrate such knowledge into general theories of psychopathology and clinical investigation are critical. In this paper, an interdisciplinary approach is taken to the study of one aspect of unconscious mental functioning--what Freud originally termed signal anxiety. Signal anxiety is examined using information from cognitive psychology and learning theory, psychophysiology, behavioral neuroscience, and psychoanalytic theory. Though the original concept of signal anxiety is supported by recent research, it is concluded that signal anxiety is probably best thought of not as the affect of anxiety but as a subset of unconscious mental processes that have a signal function of anticipating danger. Such unconscious anticipatory processes are a general feature of the mind that includes responses to both real and imagined (neurotic) appraisals of a situation. The neurophysiological structures and processes associated with unconscious anticipation in humans are just beginning to be understood.     

ARE THEORIES OF PERCEPTION NECESSARY? A REVIEW OF GIBSON'S THE ECOLOGICAL APPROACH TO VISUAL PERCEPTION

Representational theories of perception postulate an isolated and autonomous "subject" set apart from its real environment, and then go on to invoke processes of mental representation, construction, or hypothesizing to explain how perception can nevertheless take place. Although James Gibson's most conspicuous contribution has been to challenge representational theory, his ultimate concern was the cognitivism which now prevails in psychology. He was convinced that the so-called cognitive revolution merely perpetuates, and even promotes, many of psychology's oldest mistakes. This review article considers Gibson's final statement of his "ecological" alternative to cognitivism (Gibson, 1979). It is intended not as a complete account of Gibson's alternative, however, but primarily as an appreciation of his critical contribution. Gibson's sustained attempt to counter representational theory served not only to reveal the variety of arguments used in support of this theory, but also to expose the questionable metaphysical assumptions upon which they rest. In concentrating upon Gibson's criticisms of representational theory, therefore, this paper aims to emphasize the point of his alternative scheme and to explain some of the important concerns shared by Gibson's ecological approach and operant psychology.     

SOMNIUM BOSWELLI

I had a strong curiosity to be satisfied if he persisted in disbeleiving a future state even when he had death before his eyes. I was persuaded from what he now said, and from his manner of saying it, that he did persist. … and he added that it was a most unreasonable fancy that he should exist for ever. …'Well', said I, 'Mr Hume, I hope to triumph over you when I meet you in a future state; and remember you are not to pretend that you was joking with all this Infidelity.
— from James Boswell's last interview with David Hume ¹     

Herbert Spencer's contributions to behavior analysis: a retrospective review of principles of psychology

Herbert Spencer's Principles of Psychology (1855, first edition) was regarded by his contemporaries, including William James and John Dewey, as a major contribution to what was then a very new discipline. In this book he first expounded his ideas about both evolution of species and how behavior of the individual organism adapts through interaction with the environment. His formulation of the principle that behavior changes in adaptation to the environment is closely related to the version of the law of effect propounded some years later by Thorndike. He can thus be seen as the first proponent of selectionism, a key tenet of behavior analysis. He also explicitly attacked the then prevailing view of free will as being incompatible with the biologically grounded view of psychological processes that he was advocating, and thus put forward ideas that were precursors of B. F. Skinner's in this important area of debate.     

On "Telepathic dreams?": an unpublished paper by Robert J. Stoller

In 1973 Robert Stoller wrote a paper on a series of dreams-his own and his patients'--that he reluctantly found himself calling "telepathic." He never submitted the paper for publication, though he returned to the topic of unconscious communication and telepathy with increasing fascination in the years before his death. Publication of Stoller's paper seems particularly opportune just now. In it he pleads for open-minded examination of data, however alien to current scientific belief those data seem. In the past, despite numerous published reports of possibly telepathic experiences in analysis, their investigation remained relatively one-sided, since a technical posture of anonymity with patients constrained analysts from revealing that a communication struck them as telepathic. This has limited what analysts have been able to learn about the information actually exchanged, how it was exchanged, and whether the communication was experienced as uncanny by the patient. Recent attention to the intersubjective nature of the analytic situation has led to a deemphasis of anonymity, opening freer dialogue that may facilitate the rigorous investigation Stoller calls for. Such investigation may further analytic understanding of unconscious mental function and communication in the clinical setting, and lend perspective to the growing body of carefully controlled experimental research on anomalous mental phenomena.     

The morality of faith in Martin Buber and William James

Some philosophers have become atheists because of “intellectual probity.” Martin Buber relates two occasions during which he advocated his view of the term “God” and rejected alternative perspectives. He never justified the basis for either his advocacy or his rejection, yet both play an important role in all his writing, especially his specific type of Zionism. Using what has been called the mere theism of William James’ “The Will to Believe” and the criteria for faith that James advances in that essay illuminates both Buber’s general view of the divine and more particularly his Zionism. Once Buber, no less than James, is understood as a mere theist the basis of what he accepts and what he rejects as true religion becomes clearer. Buber’s theism meets James’ requirement of being a live, forced, momentous option and his Zionism also strives to meet those standards.     

Unconscious phantasy: Some historical and conceptual dimensions

This paper seeks firstly to grasp both conceptually and historically the different phenomenologies that are captured by the term ‘Unconscious Phantasy’. The term is shown to refer to a number of distinct though overlapping conceptual domains. These include: phantasy as scene, phantasy as representation of drive, phantasy as representation of wish as its fulfilment, phantasy as split off activity of the mind functioning under the aegis of the pleasure principle; phantasy as representation of the minds own activities (which Wollheim calls’ the way “the mind represents its own activities to itself’’). Lastly unconscious phantasy is understood as being the basic foundation of all mental life, including drives, impulses, all anxiety situations and defences. Having mapped out this territory through following the development of the concept in the work of Freud and Klein, the author draws on the work of the philosopher Richard Wollheim who, the author contends, has made a fundamental contribution to our conceptual understanding of unconscious phantasy. In the last section of the paper, the author draws a distinction between what he terms ‘objects’ (namely psychic objects) and what he terms ‘facts’. It is suggested that this distinction, though implicit in much of our work, benefits from being made explicit and that in so doing an important dimension of analytic work is illuminated. We aim to help the patient to discover what he is like, to understand the ways in which he conceives and misconceives himself, to unravel the fact‐ness of himself and his world from its ‘object qualities’, to differentiate between unconscious phantasy and reality.     

Unconscious sensations

D. M. Armstrong proposes to explain the possibility of unconscious sensations by means of a distinction between the perceptual consciousness, which is essentially involved in sensations, and our introspective consciousness of sensations. He holds that unconscious sensations are instances of perceptual consciousness of which we are not introspectively conscious. I contend that, although Armstrong's distinction is plausible and significant, it fails to explain his own examples of unconscious sensation. I argue that the puzzle of how unconscious sensations are possible arises at the level of perceptual consciousness and does not concern our introspective awareness of mental states.This paper grew out of research supported by the National Endowment for the Humanities at Cornell University in 1985. I would like to express my gratitude to the National Endowment, to Cornell, and to Sydney Shoemaker.     

Unwittingly Recapitulating Freud: Searle's Concept of a Vocabulary of the Unconscious

This paper aims to show that the pivotal notion in John Searle's account of the unconscious, despite his representation of Freud's position, is found in Freud's work as part of a very similar view of the issues surrounding the concept of the unconscious. The pivotal notion in question consists in treating the concept of the unconscious as a vocabulary without ontological commitment which Searle claims we must do for the following reason: to reconcile what he considers to be the dualistic concept of the unconscious with an ontology of the mental which recognises no states but conscious states and states of the neurophysiology with the capacity to cause them. The role of the concept in Searle's account is explained. Then his representation of Freud is challenged: firstly, by explicating how Freud accepted that the concept of the unconscious entailed no ontological commitment and, secondly, by showing how this fitted into his wider thinking on how the concept of the unconscious could be understood in terms of a vocabulary, leading ultimately to a justification of the concept of the unconscious in terms of explanatory power. On the basis of this exposition, Searle's charge of dualism against Freud is disputed     

Are implicit affective evaluations related to mental rotation performance?

Conscious and unconscious emotions are related to mental rotation. In this study, we investigated if also unconscious emotional evaluations of the stimuli are related to mental rotation performance. 114 students (39 men, 75 women) solved implicit and explicit affective evaluations and a psychometric mental rotation test with cube and pellet figures. Furthermore, the use of spatial toys, the stereotyping of spatial abilities, and the self-rating in spatial abilities were registered. The mental rotation test with pellet figures was more difficult than the one with cube figures. Mental rotation performance was predicted by the self-rating of spatial abilities. For the cube figures, it was additionally predicted by the implicit affective evaluation of those figures. The results did not differ between men and women. The study provides evidence for a relation between affective emotional evaluations and mental imagery processes, although this does not hold true for all stimulus types.     

On the Logic of Classes as Many

The notion of a "class as many" was central to Bertrand Russell's early form of logicism in his 1903 Principles of Mathematics. There is no empty class in this sense, and the singleton of an urelement (or atom in our reconstruction) is identical with that urelement. Also, classes with more than one member are merely pluralities — or what are sometimes called "plural objects" — and cannot as such be themselves members of classes. Russell did not formally develop this notion of a class but used it only informally. In what follows, we give a formal, logical reconstruction of the logic of classes as many as pluralities (or plural objects) within a fragment of the framework of conceptual realism. We also take groups to be classes as many with two or more members and show how groups provide a semantics for plural quantifier phrases.     

Subjectivity and unconsciousness

Concepts of the unconscious were crucial to both Jung's and Freud's thinking. Psychoanalytic and analytical psychological views of the unconscious are compared and contrasted, and both are critically reviewed. It is suggested that we need to revise our conceptualization so as to take better account of the role of the analyst's expectations and inferences, and therefore of his or her subjectivity, whenever he or she makes a clinical judgement that unconscious mental processes are in operation. Some technical implications of a revised definition of unconsciousness are considered, especially indications for self-disclosure by an analyst of his or her own experience of events within the treatment.     

Epinephrine,Arousal, and Emotion: A New Look at Two-factor Theory

Ever since William James, psychologists of emotion have tended to view affective states as intrinsically conscious. We argue that nonconscious affect also exists, and focus specifically on the possibility of unconscious "liking". We present evidence that positive and negative affective reactions can be elicited subliminally, while a person is completely unaware of any affective reaction at all (in addition to being unaware of the causal stimulus). Despite the absence of any detectable subjective experience of emotion, subliminally induced unconscious "liking" can influence later consumption behaviour. We suggest that unconscious "liking" is mediated by specific subcortical brain systems, such as the nucleus accumbens and its connections. Ordinarily, conscious liking (feelings of pleasure) results from the interaction of separate brain systems of conscious awareness with those core processes of unconscious affect. But under some conditions, activity in brain systems mediating unconscious core "liking" may become decoupled from conscious awareness. The result is a genuinely unconscious emotion.     

Psychology between science and common sense: William James and the problems of psychological language in the Principles

The suspicion that language can become an obstacle to human knowledge is not new in the Western intellectual tradition. Following the empiricist legacy, many authors have suggested the perils and pitfalls of common sense language for science. Applied to psychology, this leads to the issue of the reliability of psychological language for scientific psychology. William James, in his Principles of Psychology, was one of the first psychologists to address this problem explicitly. The goal of this paper is to situate his position and contrast it with contemporary debates over the status of folk psychology. The results indicate that James conceived of common sense psychology in a very complex manner, and pointed to a kind of illusion that remains ignored in the current literature, with negative consequences for psychology. I conclude by suggesting the relevance of James for contemporary debates in theoretical and philosophical psychology.     

Recent reformulations of Freud's development and abandonment of his seduction theory: historical/scientific clarification or a continued assault on truth?

It is well known that, as part of Freud's early work with "hysteria," he reported making discoveries of sexual abuse that he interpreted first as genuine but subsequently as fantasy. Several writers now argue that Freud never made such discoveries; rather that he lied about them, only inferred abuse from his patients' symptoms, or suggested false memories to his clients. The present authors evaluate Freud's original work and these recent claims and conclude that (a) they are not new and are similar to the original reaction that Freud received; (b) the assertion that Freud did not make discoveries of abuse is unwarranted; and (c) these recent writers frequently have supported their positions by misrepresenting what Freud actually wrote, ignoring evidence that contradicted their position, failing to consider obvious and more plausible explanations for Freud's behavior, and going beyond the available data and stating with certainty what cannot be determined.     

Beyond the three snares: Implications of James’ ‘psychologist’s fallacy’ for 21st century science

William James in his Principles of Psychology (1890, pp. 194–197) warned psychologists against their own habits of assuming that other human beings are like they are. He outlined “three snares” which he considered as obstacles for psychology becoming a science: 1. The misleading influence of language, 2. The confusion of one’s own standpoint with that of mental fact, and 3. The assumption of conscious reflection in the participant as that is the case for the researcher. His challenges remain valid to the discipline also in our 21st century, yet an unsolved problem remains: development of formal theoretical systems that generalize from the “pure experience” of living in irreversible time to basic principles of meaning-making. By pointing to the three snares 125 years ago, William James himself created a new one—that of pragmatism.