Backward Referral,Flash-Lags,and Quantum Free Will: A Response to Commentaries on Articles by Pockett,Klein, Gomes,and Trevena and Miller

The first priority of this response is to address Libet's rebuttal of my reinterpretation of his data. Then, because many authors have commented on various aspects of the debate, the rest of the response is organized in terms of subject matter, not as replies to each individual commentator. First, I reply to an objection expressed by two separate commentators to part of my reinterpretation of those of Libet's data supposedly supporting backward referral. This leads to a brief discussion of the whole concept of backward referral. The relevance of the flash-lag illusion to possible measurement errors in the Libet/Trevena and Miller paradigm is addressed next. Finally, I have a few words to say on the relationship between quantum mechanical ontology and free will.     

Peace,Self‐Determination and Reckoning with the Past: A Reply to Butt,Lippert‐Rasmussen,Pasternak, Wellman and Stemplowska

In this article, I offer responses to five commentaries on my recently published book, Cosmopolitan Peace. Those articles address my conception of individual and collective agency, my account of self‐determination (and its implication for the problem of annexation during and after the war), and my accounts of, respectively, reparations and remembrance after war. I revise or provide further defences of those accounts in the light of my commentators’ probing remarks.     

On Kant's Conception of Inner Sense: Self‐Affection by the Understanding

Among the extensive literature on the first Critique, very few commentators offer a thorough analysis of Kant's conception of inner sense. This is quite surprising since the notion is central to Kant's theoretical philosophy, and it is very difficult to provide a consistent interpretation of this notion. In this paper, I first summarize Kant's claims about inner sense in the Transcendental Aesthetic and show why existing interpretations have been unable to dissolve the tensions arising from the conjunction of these claims. Secondly, I present my own reconstruction of Kant's model of inner sense, relying essentially on Kantian considerations found in the B‐version of the Transcendental Deduction. My main idea is that inner sense, for Kant, is a passive faculty that gets affected by the understanding performing its figurative synthesis on material given in outer sense. In the remainder of the paper, I highlight a few consequences of my interpretation and outline ways to deal with some objections.     

Leibniz on Conatus, Causation, and Freedom

Abstract: In this paper, I address the topic of free will in Leibniz with particular attention to Leibniz's concept of volition, and its analogue in his physics – his concept of force. I argue against recent commentators that Leibniz was a causal determinist, and thus a compatibilist, and I suggest that logical consistency required him to adopt compatibilism given some of the concepts at work in his physics. I conclude by pointing out that the pressures to adopt causal determinism in Leibniz's system are perhaps more severe than those facing the contemporary libertarian, pressures that stem from empirical considerations about the behavior of bodies in the physical world, and the “well‐founding” of those bodies in simple substances.     

Enigmatic Masculinities: A Reply to Swartz and Grossmark

In reply to Swartz and Grossmark’s commentaries on my paper about encounters with the masculine, I elaborate from a reflexive stance on the notions of context, positionality, and warrants to speak in my writing and the responses. My account is part of an unfolding exploration of how I stand as a gendered being within psychotherapeutic praxis, and in line with that, how what was intimated in my original paper points to Laplanche’s theorizing on the sexual and to his notion of enigmatic seduction in ongoing gendering processes. The reply finds itself haunted by the abject and its position within the postcolony, and with a desire for what is an illusory transcendence.     

NATURAL GOODNESS,RIGHTNESS, AND THE INTERSUBJECTIVITY OF REASON: REPLY TO ARROYO,CUMMISKEY, MOLAND,AND BIRD‐POLLAN

Abstract: In response to Arroyo, I explain my position on the concept of “natural goodness” and how my use of that concept compares to that of Geach and Foot. An Aristotelian or functional notion of goodness provides the material for Kantian endorsement in a theory of value that avoids a metaphysical commitment to intrinsic values. In response to Cummiskey, I review reasons for thinking Kantianism and consequentialism incompatible, especially those objections to aggregation that arise from the notion of the natural good previously described. In response to Moland, I explain why I think Hegelian worries about the supposed emptiness of the Kantian self do not apply to my account. And in response to both Moland and Bird‐Pollan, I argue that, contrary to the view of some Hegelians, the intersubjective normativity of reason is not something developed through actual social relations; rather, it is something essential to an individual's relations with himself or herself.     

Reply to Commentaries

In my response to the commentaries, I take up Dr. Cushman's concerns about my use of the term “empathy,” grounding my use in the term's changing definitions over time. I take up Dr. Harris's concerns by elaborating on my views about the complexity of identifications and the fluidity of both subjective agency and power structures.     

MALEBRANCHE'S DOCTRINE OF FREEDOM / CONSENT AND THE INCOMPLETENESS OF GOD'S VOLITIONS

‘God needs no instruments to act’, Malebranche writes in Search 6.2.3; ‘it suffices that He wills in order that a thing be, because it is a contradiction that He should will and that what He wills should not happen. Therefore, His power is His will’ (450). After nearly identical language in Treatise 1.12, Malebranche writes that ‘[God's] wills are necessarily efficacious... [H]is power differs not at all from [H]is will’ (116). God's causal power, here, clearly traces only to His volitions - not merely to the fact that He wills, but specifically to the content of His volitions (‘“what” He wills’). Yet despite the obviously key role the ordinary notion of volitional content plays for Malebranche, recent writers have paid surprisingly little attention either to it or its exegetical implications. I hope to rectify this situation here. The plan of this paper is this: first, to borrow current work in the philosophy of mind to sketch the notion of an incomplete volition, i.e. one whose content is ‘incomplete’ in a sense to be explained; second, to show that Malebranche clearly allows and uses something like this notion; third, to apply the notion to Malebranche's doctrine of human freedom. In so doing, I believe, we can understand this doctrine in a new way, and one which: (i) is clearly consistent with his texts, and (ii) unlike other interpretations makes coherent sense out of the conflicting streams in his heroic attempt to reconcile his occasionalism - the doctrine that no finite substances have genuine causal powers - with our freedom; fourth, Contrast my interpretation with those of two recent writers: Sleigh et al. (1998) and Schmaltz (1996); and Fifth, Summarize the major results.     

Surprise Endings: Cephalus and the Indispensable Teacher of Republic X1

Plato imputes an important form of understanding to Cephalus in Book I of the Republic and revisits it at the end of Book X. Plato's astute observations of mental life in old age tie Cephalus’ conversation to the concept of “life review” in contemporary geriatric psychology. This provides the basis for an argument that Cephalus exemplifies the indispensable teacher described in Book X, and this raises interesting new epistemological and ethical issues. Finally, I ask why commentaries on the Republic have overlooked this theme, and argue that an ageist bias against Cephalus has distorted commentators’ reading of the text.     

Categorial Indeterminacy,Generality and Logical Form in Wittgenstein's Tractatus

Many commentators have attempted to say, more clearly than Wittgenstein did in his Tractatus logico‐philosophicus, what sort of things the ‘simple objects’ spoken of in that book are. A minority approach, but in my view the correct one, is to reject all such attempts as misplaced. The Tractarian notion of an object is categorially indeterminate: in contrast with both Frege's and Russell's practice, it is not the logician's task to give a specific categorial account of the internal structure of elementary propositions or atomic facts, nor, correlatively, to give an account of the forms of simple objects. The few commentators who have hitherto maintained this view have mainly devoted themselves to establishing that this was Wittgenstein's intention, and do not much address the question why Wittgenstein held that it is not the logician's business to say what the objects are. The present paper means to fill this lacuna by placing this view in the context of the Tractatus's treatment of logic generally, and in particular by connecting it with Wittgenstein's treatment of generality and with his reaction to Russell's approach to logical form.     

Kant’s Regulative Metaphysics of God and the Systematic Lawfulness of Nature

In the “Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic” of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant contends that the idea of God has a positive regulative role in the systematization of empirical knowledge. But why is this regulative role assigned to this specific idea? Kant's account is rather opaque, and this question has also not received much attention in the literature. In this article, I argue that an adequate understanding of the regulative role of the idea of God depends on the specific metaphysical content Kant attributes to it in the Critique and other writings. I show that neither a heuristic principle of conceptual systematicity, nor conceiving God as a hypothesis of an intelligent designer, can satisfy the demands of reason to make the unity and necessity of the laws of nature intelligible. Regarding the positive account about the metaphysical content of the idea of God, I support my argument by referring to Kant's precritical discussion of the usefulness of the conception of God for the project of science, and by expounding Kant's critical account of the necessity of the laws of nature. Thus, my account sheds light on the continuity of Kant's conception of God and his appropriation of his own rationalistic metaphysics.     

Response to Commentaries

In replying to the commentaries, I continue to explore differences between a complexity model of the mind and an intrapsychic one, and elaborate aspects of the complex negotiation process that occurred between my patient, Kerri, and me. Taking up Chefetz's notion that a “change in self-state predicts observed fluctuations in the capacity to mentalize,” I consider ways that self-states in both the patient and analyst fluctuate, influence, and reorganize the unfolding process, including the systemic capacity to mentalize.     

Alasdair MacIntyre's Analysis of Tradition

I argue that, in analysing the structure and development of moral traditions, MacIntyre relies primarily on Kuhn's model of scientific tradition, rather than (as is held by at least two influential commentators) on Lakatos' model. I unpack three foci of Kuhn's conception of the sciences, namely: the ‘crisis’ conception of scientific development, what I call the ‘systematic conception’ of scientific paradigms, and the view that successive paradigms are incommensurable. I then show that these three foci are integrated into MacIntyre's account of the development of moral traditions with a surprising degree of faithfulness to Kuhn. And crucially, I argue against the overall cogency of his account, given the disparities I pinpoint between scientific and moral traditions. My overall critique is, however, fundamentally friendly, since nothing I have to say invalidates the very notion of a moral tradition, and all I am calling for are less problematic construals of that notion.     

The Dialectics of Relational Psychoanalysis and Group Psychotherapy: Commentary on Paper by Robert Grossmark

In this commentary, I address the question of why so few psychoanalysts become group therapists as I respond to the thoughtful and impressive paper written by Robert Grossmark on his work with a psychotherapy group, now in its 10th year of meeting. Prior to discussing the clinical material, and to set the stage for a discussion of Grossmark's work, I comment on my sense of the prevailing attitudes on group affiliations and group therapy within our culture and field as they have progressed over time. I then discuss my reactions to Grossmark's handling of his group session. Many of his conceptualizations of group treatment are in accordance with my own beliefs. There are some differences, however, in how I view my role as a leader and some ideas I have about group treatment that Grossmark did not address.     

From the method of proofs and refutations to the methodology of scientific research programmes

The paper is an attempt to interpret Imre Lakatos's methodology of scientific research programmes (MSRP) on the basis of his mathematical methodology, the method of proofs and refutations (MPR). After sketching MSRP and MPR and analysing their relationship to Popper's and Poly a's work, I argue that MSRP was originally conceived as a methodology in the same sense as MPR. The most conspicuous difference between the two, namely that MSRP is fundamentally backward‐looking, whereas MPR is primarily forward‐looking, is due to the fact that Lakatos could not carry out his project in the full sense. I also explain why he could not.     

Bribery and Intimidation: A Discussion of Sandra Lee Bartky's Femininity and Domination: Studies in the Phenomenology of Oppression

A review of my undergraduate students’ commentaries on two of Bartky's essays serves as the occasion for elaborating on Bartky's analyses of factors that sustain and perpetuate the subjection and disempowerment of women. In my elaboration I draw from John Stuart Mill's statement: “In the case of women, each individual of the subject-class is in a chronic state of bribery and intimidation combined.” I conclude by raising the question, How is personal transformation possible?     

Kant's Account of Nature's Systematicity and the Unity of Theoretical and Practical Reason1

In this paper I argue that if one is to do justice to reason's unity in Kant, then one must acknowledge that reason's practical ends are presupposed in every theoretical investigation of nature. Thus, contrary to some other commentators, I contend that the notion of the metaphysical ground of the unity of nature should not be attributed to the “dynamics of reason” and its “own practical purposes.” Instead, the metaphysical ground of the unity of nature is in fact an indispensable and necessary notion for reason in both its theoretical and practical functions, but this need of reason to presuppose such a notion can only find its adequate proof in the practical. By offering a synopsis of Kant's accounts of nature's systematicity in the Transcendental Ideal of the Critique of Pure Reason (Part I), the Appendix to the Dialectic of the Critique of Pure Reason (Part II), and in the Critique of Judgment (Part III), I identify in each section Kant's theoretical and practical arguments for reason's presupposition of the “unconditioned,” demonstrate their structural interdependence, and show a general continuity in Kant's position on this issue throughout his critical system.     

A Tower Unto Heaven: Toward an Expanded Framework for Psychopathology

I respond to commentaries on my target article “An Evolutionary Life History Framework for Psychopathology.” I start by addressing criticism of my basic assumptions about life history strategies and their implications for individual differences in human behavior. Next, I examine the theoretical structure of the proposed framework and respond to the commentators’ challenges to its generality and flexibility. I show how the framework can be expanded to include multiple levels of analysis and to integrate behavioral control with neurological functionality; I also reinterpret the recent finding of a general factor of psychopathology in the context of the expanded framework. In the last section I discuss specific psychopathological conditions, namely attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder, borderline personality disorder, substance abuse, autism spectrum disorders, schizophrenia spectrum disorders, obsessive-compulsive disorder, eating disorders, and depression. For each condition, I reply to the commentators’ criticism of my life history analysis, integrate their suggestions and insights, highlight the present weaknesses of the theory, and indicate promising directions for future research.     

The Identity Status Approach: In Need of Fundamental Revision and Qualitative Change

This article is a response to the commentaries of Waterman (this issue) and Berzonsky and Adams (this issue) on my review of the identity status field (van Hoof, this issue). The commentaries illustrate that the identity status researchers attribute different meanings to the identity statuses and identity status research; while Waterman finds it difficult to recognize the field in my review, Berzonsky and Adams agree with several of my conclusions. The two commentaries represent two pillars on which the status approach rests. The difference between the review and the commentaries is that the first includes both pillars, whereas each commentary consists primarily of a selective presentation of assumptions and data. This response focuses on two main points of the commentaries: (a) are the statuses sufficiently validated? and (b) to what extent are they suitable for testing developmental identity hypotheses? Using specific examples I show that the line of reasoning in the commentaries and the data proposed in support of these arguments in fact often support the conclusions of my review, for I demonstrate that the statuses are insufficiently validated and that the statuses are unsuitable for measuring identity development. These conclusions call for a fundamental revision of the identity status approach and a qualitative change in identity theory and research. Finally, the alternative approaches presented by Berzonsky and Adams are evaluated with respect to their contribution to an indispensable qualitative change in the identity status field.     

The Importance of Cartesian Triangles: A New Look at Descartes's Ontological Argument

In this paper, I argue that commentators have missed a significant clue given by Descartes in coming to understand his 'ontological' proof for the existence of God. In both the analytic and synthetic presentations of the proof throughout his writings, Descartes notes that the proof works 'in the same way' as a particular geometrical proof. I explore the significance of such a parallel, and conclude that Descartes could not have intended readers to think that the argument consists of some kind of intuition. I argue that for Descartes the attribute of existence is a 'second-order' attribute that is demonstrated to belong to the idea of God on the basis of 'first-order' attributes. The proof, properly understood, is in fact a demonstration. Having brought to light the geometrical parallels between the ontological and geometrical proofs, we have new evidence to resolve the 'intuition versus demonstration' controversy that has characterized much of the discussion of Descartes's ontological argument.