Rethinking Emancipation,Rethinking Education

In this paper I discuss the possibility of the idea of emancipation within an educational philosophy that does not accept schooling as its first premise. The first part of the paper will take Sweden as an example of an educational state defined through educational policies such as life long learning, accountability and evidence-based research, and argue that these words are only meaningful within the myth of schooling and not in a language of education/emancipation. The second part of the paper discusses different but related conceptions of emancipation by exploring its ambiguous nature. In the third part of the paper I specify the role and place of emancipation within a philosophy of education that seeks to articulate its social value.     

Rethinking creativity

John S. Dacey. Fundamentals of Creative Thinking. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, Division of D.C. Heath, 1989, 314 pp., $39.00 hardcover, ISBN 0–669–16140–30.     

Rethinking Power

This paper argues that feminists have yet to develop a satisfactory account of power. Existing feminist accounts of power tend to have a one-sided emphasis either on power as domination or on power as empowerment. This conceptual one-sided’ ness must be overcome if feminists are to develop an account complex enough to illuminate women's diverse experiences with power. Such an account is sketched here.     

Rethinking justice

Changes in the way people marry, bear children and live together, combined with the changing nature of support for families, has put pressure on the justice system to adjust to new family and community realities in order to accomplish justice goals. Although the entire legal system is implicated by the changing nature of families and communities, most scholars and practitioners have focused on the judicial system and those courts most relevant to family issues: namely, the juvenile, family, and criminal courts. As scholars and practitioners began to 'rethink justice,' whole new reform movements of therapeutic jurisprudence, restorative justice, and community justice (among others) have emerged to offer new paradigms for the administration of justice. In this essay we discuss ways in which families and the justice system interact to strengthen and weaken each other to accomplish justice goals.     

Rethinking Bivalence

Classical logic rests on the assumption that there are two mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive truth values. This assumption has always been surrounded by philosophical controversy. Doubts have been raised about its legitimacy, and hence about the legitimacy of classical logic. Usually, the assumption is stated in the form of a general principle, namely the principle that every proposition is either true or false. Then, the philosophical controversy is often framed in terms of the question whether every proposition is either true or false. The main purpose of the paper is to show that there is something wrong in this way of putting things. The point is that the common way of understanding the controversial assumption is misconceived, as it rests on a wrong picture of propositions. In the first part of the paper I outline this picture and I argue against it. In the second part I sketch a different picture of propositions and I suggest how this leads to conceive the issue of classical logic in different terms.     

Rethinking Knowledge

The view that the subject matter of epistemology is the concept of knowledge is faced with the problem that all attempts so far to define that concept are subject to counterexamples. As an alternative, this article argues that the subject matter of epistemology is knowledge itself rather than the concept of knowledge. Moreover, knowledge is not merely a state of mind but rather a certain kind of response to the environment that is essential for survival. In this perspective, the article outlines an answer to four basic questions about knowledge: What is the role of knowledge in human life? What is the relation between knowledge and reality? How is knowledge acquired? Is there any a priori knowledge?     

Rethinking Revision

We sketch a broadening of the Gupta-Belnap notion of a circular or revision theoretic definition into that of a more generalized form incorporating ideas of Kleene’s generalized or higher type recursion. This thereby connects the philosophically motivated, and derived, notion of a circular definition with an older form of definition by recursion using functionals, that is functions of functions, as oracles. We note that Gupta and Belnap’s notion of ‘categorical in L’ can be formulated in at least one of these schemes.

     

再评费尔巴哈

<唯一者及其所有>出版后,受到施蒂纳猛烈批评的费尔巴哈在1845年<维干德季刊>第2期撰文反驳,施蒂纳随即在该杂志第3期作了对费尔巴哈及其他批评者的再反驳.他对费尔巴哈再批判的核心是:费尔巴哈只要坚持人的本质的观念,就仍然是虔信者和唯心主义者,就无法在唯物主义的层面上理解具体的、特殊的、现实的个人.——译注     

Rethinking Philosophy

Can philosophy still be fruitful, and what kind of philosophy can be such? In particular, what kind of philosophy can be legitimized in the face of sciences? The aim of this paper is to answer these questions, listing the characteristics philosophy should have to be fruitful and legitimized in the face of sciences. Since the characteristics in question demand that philosophy search for new knowledge and new rules of discovery, a philosophy with such characteristics may be called the ‘heuristic view’. According to the heuristic view, philosophy is an inquiry into the world which is continuous with the sciences. It differs from them only because it deals with questions which are beyond the present sciences, and in order to deal with them must try unexplored routes. By so doing, when successful, it may even give birth to new sciences. In listing the characteristics that philosophy should have, the paper systematically compares them with classical analytic philosophy, because the latter has been the dominant philosophical tradition in the last century.     

Rethinking Prophecy

Abstract

This essay demonstrates that Argula von Grumbach’s understanding of prophecy and interpretation of Old Testament prophecy show direct alignment with Martin Luther’s views as they appear in his early 1520s German works. We recall that it is too restrictive to view ‘prophecy’ in the sixteenth century in merely apocalyptic terms. Rather, the author points to the wider view of prophecy of a contemporary male Protestant in which ‘prophecy’ is specifically aligned with the call to interpret and apply Scripture. The author sets illustrated several ways in which this new definition of prophecy played out in the writings, self-conception, and ministry of the aristocrat, Argula von Grumbach. She and Luther both emphasized the call of Christians to interpret Scripture, speak out against unbiblical teaching, distinguish between true and false prophets, and read contemporary situations in the light of Old Testament prophecy. Argula is, therefore, a prime example of one kind of early Luther reception in informed, lay circles.     

Rethinking research ethics

Contemporary research ethics policies started with reflection on the atrocities perpetrated upon concentration camp inmates by Nazi doctors. Apparently, as a consequence of that experience, the policies that now guide human subject research focus on the protection of human subjects by making informed consent the centerpiece of regulatory attention. I take the choice of context for policy design, the initial prioritization of informed consent, and several associated conceptual missteps, to have set research ethics off in the wrong direction. The aim of this paper is to sort out these confusions and their implications and to offer instead a straightforward framework for considering the ethical conduct of human subject research. In the course of this discussion I clarify different senses of autonomy that have been confounded and present more intelligible justifications for informed consent. I also take issue with several of the now accepted dogmas that govern research ethics. These include: the primacy of informed consent, the protection of the vulnerable, the substitution of beneficence for research's social purpose, and the introduction of an untenable distinction between innovation and research.     

Rethinking Research Ethics

Contemporary research ethics policies started with reflection on the atrocities perpetrated upoconcentration camp inmates by Nazi doctors. Apparently, as a consequence of that experience, the policies that now guide human subject research focus on the protection of human subjects by making informed consent the centerpiece of regulatory attention. I take the choice of context for policy design, the initial prioritization of informed consent, and several associated conceptual missteps, to have set research ethics off in the wrong direction. The aim of this paper is to sort out these confusions and their implications and to offer instead a straightforward framework for considering the ethical conduct of human subject research. In the course of this discussion I clarify different senses of autonomy that have been confounded and present more intelligible justifications for informed consent. I also take issue with several of the now accepted dogmas that govern research ethics. These include: the primacy of informed consent, the protection of the vulnerable, the substitution of beneficence for research's social purpose, and the introduction of an untenable distinction between innovation and research.