Cognitive Science: What One Needs to Know

Cognitive science is a new paradigm that informs and involves several disciplines, including artificial intelligence, neuroscience, cognitive psychology, cognitive ethology, and the philosophy of mind. Cognitive science studies the mind as an information processor, with the computer often operating as a metaphor for the operations of the mind. Developments in the cognitive sciences stand to affect tremendously how we think of the mind and, consequently, how we think of theological and religious claims that concern the human subject. The unity of self, claims of human uniqueness, the relation of mind and body, human nature, and the personal agency of God are all areas of religious import in which the cognitive sciences need to be taken into account.     

The problem of mind in Confucianism

This essay explores the Confucian theory of mind. Doing so, it first examines the early Confucian concept of the human mind as a substance that has both moral and cognitive functions and a universal nature. It then explores the neo-Confucian concept of the human mind, the original mind, and the relationships between the human mind and human nature, as well as between the human mind and the human body. Finally, it explores the Confucian concept of cultivation of the mind.     

幼儿心理理论发展的一般认知基础--不同心理理论任务表现的特异性与一致性

本研究试图探究中国幼儿心理理论发展的一般变化趋势,通过探查90位3～5岁幼儿在不同心理理论任务表现的特殊性及内在一致性,结果表明：3～5岁间幼儿的心理理论发生急剧变化;幼儿在各任务上的表现总体上存在某种潜在的一致性;但他们在不同任务上的表现存在较大差异,这表明心理理论表现具有显著的任务特异性。     

A longitudinal investigation of the relationship between maternal mind‐mindedness and theory of mind

Data are presented from a longitudinal investigation examining the relationship between maternal mind‐mindedness (MM) in infancy and socio‐cognitive development in childhood. We revisited children (n = 18) who had taken part in a longitudinal study as infants. MM had been assessed at 10, 12, 16, and 20 months of age. We followed up these children at 5–6 years of age to test their higher order theory of mind (ToM) (using the strange stories task). The convergent validity, temporal stability, and predictive validity of the construct of MM were examined in a longitudinal data set. The five measures of MM were not significantly correlated. Mother's production of appropriate mind‐related comments (but no other measures) showed evidence of temporal stability throughout infancy. Thus, MM (as measured by appropriate mind‐related comments) was confirmed as a stable construct. Children's ToM at 5–6 years of age was significantly predicted by their mother's MM up to 4 years earlier, with MM accounting for 40% of the variance of the strange stories task scores. These findings identify a relationship between MM across a protracted period of infancy and socio‐cognitive development at 5–6 years of age.     

幼儿说谎认知的年龄特征及其与心理理论水平的关系

研究探讨了3～4岁幼儿说谎认知的年龄特征,并在此基础上考察了说谎的概念理解水平与道德评价之问的关系,及说谎认知与心理理论水平的关系。结果表明：3岁和4岁幼儿在说谎和说真话概念的判断上年龄差异显著,在对说谎的道德评价上,年龄差异不显著;幼儿心理理论与说谎概念的相关显著,4岁组的心理理论与道德评价的相关显著。     

Emergence of Joint Attention: Relationships Between Gaze Following,Social Referencing,Imitation, and Naming in Infancy

The authors investigated the extent to which the joint-attention behaviors of gaze following, social referencing, and object-directed imitation were related to each other and to infants' vocabulary development in a sample of 60 infants between the ages of 8 and 14 months. Joint-attention skills and vocabulary development were assessed in a laboratory setting. Split-half reliability analyses on the joint-attention measures indicated that the tasks reliably assessed infants' capabilities. In the main analysis, no significant correlations were found among the joint-attention behaviors except for a significant relationship between gaze following and the number of names in infants' productive vocabularies. The overall pattern of results did not replicate results of previous studies (e.g., M. Carpenter, K. Nagell, & M. Tomasello, 1998) that found relationships between various emerging joint-attention behaviors.     

幼儿对心理状态的认识

本研究探讨３—５岁儿童对自身和他人心理状态认识的发展过程．借助图片和玩具结合四种作业任务,对１９１名儿童进行了实验和短期追踪实验。结果表明：３岁儿童尚不能对心理状态作出认识,４岁半左右是儿童认识心理状态的转折期,到５岁末能完全把握自身和他人的心理状态．在四项作业任务中,儿童通过的先后次序为他人误念判断和他人未知判断、现象一实在区分、表征变换．这一方面与儿童的认知发展趋势有关,另一方面也与实验的情景和材料有关．     

关于自闭症的临床、实验心理学的研究

最近,国际上的临床心理学、实验心理学对自闭症的诊断、分类、发生率以及教育与治疗等,从各个角度展示了许多新的研究结果。实验心理学的调查结果表明,自闭症儿童的注意力异常,对视、听、触等感觉反应处理样式,不同于弱智儿童和正常儿童。语言障碍是自闭症儿童发展障碍中的核心症侯,这与自闭症在社会性和人际关系上存在障碍有着密切的关系。进入９０年代以后,对自闭症“心的理论”的各种实验研究,引起各国研究者的注目和争论     

Digging deeper into the link between socio‐cognitive ability and social relationships

In this commentary on ‘Friendlessness and theory of mind: A prospective longitudinal study’ by Fink, Begeer, Peterson, Slaughter, and de Rosnay (Brit. J. Dev. Psychol, 2015; 33, 1–17) we reconsider the link between early mastery of theory of mind (ToM) and social relationships by focusing on connections with other related areas of socio‐cognitive ability such as emotional competence, ToM development across age, and the effect of interventions.     

THE EXTENDED MIND

The extended mind is the thesis that some mental—typically cognitive—processes are partly composed of operations performed by cognizing organisms on the world around them. The operations in question are ones of manipulation, transformation, or exploitation of environmental structures. And the structures in question are ones that carry information pertinent to the success or efficacy of the cognitive process in question. This essay examines the thesis of the extended mind and evaluates the arguments for and against it.     

The Mentality of Apes Revisited

Although early comparative psychology was seriously marred by claims of our species'supremacy, the residual backlash against these archaic evolutionary views is still being felt, even though our understanding of evolutionary biology is now sufficiently advanced to grapple with possible cognitive specializations that our species does not share with closely related species. The overzealous efforts to dismantle arguments of human uniqueness have only served to show that most comparative psychologists working with apes have yet to set aside the antiquated evolutionary "ladder." Instead, they have only attempted to pull chimpanzees up to the ladder's highest imaginary rung — or perhaps, to pull humans down to an equally imaginary rung at the height of the apes. A true comparative science of animal minds, however, will recognize the complex diversity of the animal kingdom, and will thus view Homo sapiens as one more species with a unique set of adaptive skills crying out to be identified and understood.     

Development of predictive responses in theory of mind brain regions

When we watch movies, we consider the characters’ mental states in order to understand and predict the narrative. Recent work in functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) uses movie‐viewing paradigms to measure functional responses in brain regions recruited for such mental state reasoning (the theory of mind [“ToM”] network). Here, two groups of young children (n = 30 3–4 years old, n = 26 6–7 years old) viewed a short animated movie twice while undergoing fMRI. As children get older, ToM brain regions were recruited earlier in time during the second presentation of the movie. This “narrative anticipation” effect is specific: there was no such effect in a control network of brain regions that responds just as robustly to the movie (the “Pain Matrix”). These results complement prior studies in adults that suggest that ToM brain regions play a role not just in inferring, but in actively predicting, other people's thoughts and feelings, and provide novel evidence that as children get older, their ToM brain regions increasingly make such predictions.     

多元智能理论的神经心理学基础

香港和澳门地区近年积极提倡素质教育 ,美国学者加德纳 (HowardGardner)的多元智能理论 (TheoryofMultipleIntellgences)逐渐受到教育工作者的重视 ,期望这理论可以作为适性教育的指导思想。本文旨在阐释人类心灵的生物构造 ,以及从神经心理学 (neuropsychology)角度分析心灵 (mind)发展的三个层面 (感知的、创意的、统整的 ) ;继而介绍加德纳如何通过介定智能的八项基准 ,来建立至目前为止关于人类认知发展最完整的理论 ;最后尝试根据心灵发展的三个层面 ,辨别“智能”和“智慧”的涵意     

Older (but not younger) preschoolers understand that knowledge differs between people and across time

We examined 3‐ to 5‐year‐olds' understanding of general knowledge (e.g., knowing that clocks tell time) by investigating whether (1) they recognize that their own general knowledge has changed over time (i.e., they knew less as babies than they know now), and (2) such intraindividual knowledge differences are easier/harder to understand than interindividual differences (i.e., Do preschoolers understand that a baby knows less than they do?). Forty‐eight 3‐ to 5‐year‐olds answered questions about their current general knowledge (‘self‐now’), the general knowledge of a 6‐month‐old (‘baby‐now’), and their own general knowledge at 6 months (‘self‐past’). All age groups were significantly above chance on the self‐now questions, but only 5‐year‐olds were significantly above chance on the self‐past and baby‐now questions. Moreover, children's performance on the baby‐now and self‐past questions did not differ. Our findings suggest that younger preschoolers do not fully appreciate that their past knowledge differs from their current knowledge, and that others may have less knowledge than they do. We situate these findings within the research on knowledge understanding, more specifically, and cognitive development, more broadly.     

Social cognition is not associated with cognitive reserve in older adults

Social and general cognitive abilities decline in late life. Those with high cognitive reserve display better general cognitive performance in old age; however, it is unknown whether this is also the case for social cognition. A total of 115 healthy older adults, aged 60–85 years (m = 44, f = 71) were assessed using The Awareness of Social Inference Test (TASIT-R; social cognition), the Lifetime of Experiences Questionnaire (LEQ; cognitive reserve), and the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI-II; general cognitive ability). The LEQ did not predict performance on any TASIT-R subtest: Emotion Evaluation Test (β = -.097, p = .325), Social Inference – Minimal (β = -.004, p = .972), or Social Inference – Enriched (β = -.016, p = .878). Sensitivity analyses using two alternative cognitive reserve measures, years of education and the National Adult Reading Test, supported these effects. Cognitive reserve was strongly related to WASI-II performance. Unlike general cognitive ability, social cognition appears unaffected by cognitive reserve. Findings contribute to the emerging understanding that cognitive reserve differentially affects individual cognitive domains, which has implications for the theoretical understanding of cognitive reserve and its brain correlates. Cognitive measures unbiased by cognitive reserve may serve as best indicators of brain health, free of compensatory mechanisms.     

Minds and Bodies: Human and Divine

Does God have a mind? Western theism has traditionally construed God as an intentional agent who acts on creation and in relation to humankind. God loves, punishes, and redeems. God's intentionality has traditionally been construed in analogy to human intentionality, which in turn has often presumed a supernatural dualism. Developments in cognitive science, however, render supernatural dualism suspect for explaining the human mind. How, then, can we speak of the mind of God? Borrowing from Daniel Dennett's intentional stance, I suggest that analogical reasoning regarding the mind of God be abandoned in favor of an ontologically agnostic approach that treats God as an intentional system. In this approach, God's purposive action is an explanatory feature of the believer's universe, a real pattern that informs our values and beliefs about the world and our place in it.     

成人依恋与心理理论的关系:认知融合与经验性回避的中介作用

为探究成人依恋、认知融合、经验性回避与心理理论的关系及其作用机制,研究者采用实验法和问卷法对312名成年人进行了测量。研究结果表明：（1）不安全的成人依恋负向预测心理理论;（2）经验性回避在成人依恋与心理理论之间起中介作用;（3）认知融合在成人依恋与心理理论之间不存在中介作用;（4）成人依恋的两种类型（依恋回避、依恋焦虑）呈现出不同的链式中介作用：认知融合与经验性回避在依恋回避与心理理论之间起部分中介作用,而在依恋焦虑与心理理论之间起完全中介作用。研究从心理灵活性的角度考察成人依恋与心理理论的关系及其作用机制,并探究接纳承诺训练在提升社会认知能力上的实践意义。     

Why are there limits on theory of mind use? Evidence from adults' ability to follow instructions from an ignorant speaker

Keysar et al. (Keysar, Barr, Balin, & Brauner, 2000 Keysar, B., Barr, D. J., Balin, J. A. and Brauner, J. S. 2000. Taking perspective in conversation: The role of mutual knowledge in comprehension. Psychological Sciences, 11: 32–38. [Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]; Keysar, Lin, & Barr, 2003 Keysar, B., Lin, S. H. and Barr, D. J. 2003. Limits on theory of mind use in adults. Cognition, 89(1): 25–41. [Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) report that adults frequently failed to use their conceptual competence for theory of mind (ToM) in an online communication game where they needed to take account of a speaker's perspective. The current research reports 3 experiments investigating the cognitive processes contributing to adults' errors. In Experiments 1 and 2 the frequency of adults' failure to use ToM was unaffected by perspective switching. In Experiment 3 adults made more errors when interpreting instructions according to the speaker's perspective than according to an arbitrary rule. We suggest that adults are efficient at switching perspectives, but that actually using what another person knows to interpret what they say is relatively inefficient, giving rise to egocentric errors during communication.     

心理理论研究三十年：回顾与反思

自Premack和Woodruff于1978年提出心理理论至今,心理理论研究已走过了30年的历程。当前心理理论研究已经成为发展心理学、心灵哲学、认知科学所关注的热门课题。文章回顾了心理理论研究的缘起和概念、内容与基本范式、问题与困境,在此基础上反思了心理理论研究困境与解释模型的关系,并对该领域未来研究方向做了展望。