Interpretation, psychoanalysis, and the philosophy of mind

I suggest that a conflict between two philosophical models of the mind so far unremarked in discussions of psychoanalysis is at the heart of questions about its status as a science, the objectivity of psychoanalytic interpretations, and the nature of the unconscious. In philosophy one model is embodied in the tradition of Descartes, Hobbes, Locke, Kant, among many others, which construes thought as prior to and independent of language. According to this tradition the mind is self-contained and mental contents or "ideas" are essentially subjective phenomena. It follows that knowledge of other minds and the material world is radically problematic. In the second and more contemporary model the phenomenon of meaning is dependent on interactions between minds, and between mind and the world. Since meaning is understood to be intrinsically social, so in an important sense is mind. I develop this second philosophic model, indicating its relevance for psychoanalysis. I also point out some of the contributions of psychoanalysis to philosophy of mind.     

Descartes' dreams

Abstract: René Descartes is often regarded as the ‘father of modern philosophy’. He was a key figure in instigating the scientific revolution that has been so influential in shaping our modern world. He has been revered and reviled in almost equal measure for this role; on the one hand seen as liberating science from religion, on the other as splitting soul from body and man from nature. He dates the founding of his philosophical methods to the night of 10^th November 1619 and in particular to three powerful dreams he had that night. This article utilizes Descartes' own interpretations of the dreams, supported by biographical material, as well as contemporary neuroscientific and psychoanalytic theory, to reach a new understanding of them. It is argued that the dreams can be understood as depicting Descartes' personal journey from a state of mind‐body dissociation to one of mind‐body deintegration. This personal journey may have implications for a parallel journey from Renaissance to modern culture and from modernity to post‐modern culture.     

Thinking Developmentally: Perspectives Following Loewald and Klein

In this article, I explore two perspectives on development that are central to how I think and work as an analyst, one drawn from the work of Hans Loewald and one from Melanie Klein. Loewald turned the usual psychoanalytic way of thinking, rooted in the past, on its head when he theorized that development proceeds by internalization of the parent’s future vision of the child and, by corollary, the analyst’s future vision of the patient. Using a vignette from Klein’s work with 10-year-old Richard, I show how the analyst’s image of the patient’s potential can facilitate growth and development. Melanie Klein also introduced a radical reordering of traditional psychoanalytic theory when she theorized that the mind develops and is structured as positions, not as successive phases. For Klein, the mind is organized in groupings of anxieties, defenses, and object-relations that are in a continuous state of oscillation throughout life independent of chronological age. Through a clinical vignette, I illustrate how one understands a patient differently when development is seen as occuring in momentary shifts between different levels of the personality rather than as stages over time.     

The seventh penis: towards effective psychoanalytic work with pre‐surgical transsexuals

The author reflects on his contrasting analytic work with two transsexual patients. He uses three previous psychoanalytic studies (Stoller, Morel and Lemma) to explore whether effective analytic work with the issues driving a person's determined wish for sex reassignment surgery (SRS) is possible. Particular consideration is given to how such work might navigate a path between traumatizing and pathologizing the patient on the one hand and avoiding important analytic material out of fear of so doing on the other. The author proceeds to ask whether it is possible to tell in advance, with any degree of reliability, who is and who is not likely to benefit from surgery. He considers certain diagnostic issues in relation to these questions. Illustrations are given of how, in practice, countertransference anxieties about psychopathologizing transsexual patients can contribute to significant difficulties in working clinically with them. It is argued that the understanding and containment of such anxieties could eventually lead to more effective analytic work, and that such work might be further facilitated by considering the contribution of mind‐body dissociation to transsexualism.     

On Doubt

Despite the prominence of doubt in philosophy since Descartes, the published philosophical literature includes no extended treatment of the nature of doubt. In this paper, I summarize the main contributions that have been made to the subject and then develop a commonsense functionalist account of doubt by specifying (a significant part of) the functional role of doubt that something is the case. After adding two further wrinkles, I show how the resulting account can be used to address the questions of how doubt is related to belief and whether suspension of judgment can be identified with (some appropriate level or levels of) doubt. Although the account is partisan, it should hold interest for those who favor other positions in the philosophy of mind, since (a) much of the account can be taken on board by those in other camps, and (b) the paper demonstrates how a sufficiently detailed account of doubt can be put to work addressing longstanding questions of interest across philosophical sub-disciplines.     

Sex in the Head

Abstract Recent philosophical writing on sexual desire divides broadly into two camps. Reductionists take sexual desire to aim at an essentially physical bodily pleasure, whereas intentionalist accounts take a focus upon the reciprocal interaction of the mental states of the partners to be crucial for understanding the phenomenon. I argue that the apparent plausibility of reductionism rests upon the flawed assumption that sexual pleasure has the same uniform bodily character in all sexual encounters, which rests in turn upon flawed assumptions in the philosophy of mind. Drawing on an Aristotelian understanding of persons as essentially embodied minds, I outline an alternative account of sexual desire, showing how the nature of the sexual pleasure we take in the body of another can be transformed by the significance the person or situation has for us. I proceed to show that my account of sexual desire is able to accommodate the entire range of sexual phenomena, including those that seem to undermine standard intentionalist accounts as well as those that reductionists have difficulty in fully explaining. Finally I make some brief remarks about the implications of my account of sexual desire for sexual morality, suggesting some reasons why it casts doubt on the view that universal participant consent is sufficient for a sexual act to be morally unproblematic.     

Attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD): An affect‐processing and thought disorder?

In the literature on child and adolescent psychoanalysis attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) is described as complex syndrome with wide‐ranging psychodynamic features. Broadly speaking, the disorder is divided into three categories: 1. a disorder in early object relations leading to the development of a maniform defence organization in which object‐loss anxieties and depressed affects are not worked through via symbolization but are organized in a body‐near manner; 2. a triangulation disorder in which the cathexis of the paternal position is not stable; structures providing little support alternate with excessive arousal, affect regulation is restricted; 3. current emotional stress or a traumatic experience. I suggest taking a fresh look at ADHD from a psychoanalytic vantage point. With respect to the phenomenology of the disorder, the conflict–dynamic approach should be supplemented by a perspective regarding deficits in α‐function as constitutive for ADHD. These deficits cause affect‐processing and thought disorders compensated for (though not fully) by the symptomatology. At a secondary level, a vicious circle develops through the mutual reinforcement of defective processing of sense data and affects into potential thought content, on the one hand, and secondary, largely narcissistic defence processes on the other. These considerations have major relevance for the improved understanding of ADHD and for psychoanalytic technique.     

Dualism in medicine,Christian theology,and the aging

Distinguishing a person's soul or mind from a person's body describes dualism, the philosophical premise that fails to integrate the person as one, but instead leaves the person as two, usually as souland body or as mindand body. In dualism, one tends to think of the soul or the mind as the person and the body as an appendage. I argue that 1) dualism is rampant in medicine; 2) that Christian theology has fundamentally opposed it, and 3) that cultural dualism today threatens the aging in particular. To deal with this threat, I argue that the moral task of being human is to become one in mind and body. That is, I argue that the unity of the person which is the unity of the mind and body is not really a metaphysical given, but rather the goal or end of being human.     

Neurophilosophy of Number

Neurosciences and cognitive sciences provide us with myriad empirical findings that shed light on hypothesised primitive numerical processes in the brain and in the mind. Yet, the hypotheses on which the experiments are based, and hence the results, depend strongly on sophisticated abstract models used to describe and explain neural data or cognitive representations that supposedly are the empirical roots of primary arithmetical activity. I will question the foundational role of such models. I will even cast doubt upon the search for a general and unified philosophical foundation of an empirical science. First, it seems to me hard to draw a global and coherent view from the innumerable and piecemeal neuropsychological experiments and their variable, and sometimes uneasily compatible or fully divergent interpretations. Secondly, I think that the aim of empirical research is to describe dynamical processes, establishing correlations between different sets of data, without meaning to fix an origin or to point to a cause, let alone to a ground. From the very scientific and philosophical point of view it is essential to distinguish between explanations, which provide correlations or, at best, causal mechanisms, and grounding, which involves a claim to some form of determinism.     

On the nature and standing of psychoanalytic psychotherapy

In this paper, I offer some reflections on the standing of psychoanalytic psychotherapy in the National Health Service (NHS), with special reference to contemporary forms of evidence-based thinking. I consider what may follow when a narrow view of science or psychotherapeutic practice becomes conventional wisdom and assumes dominance. I place stress on the potential loss to NHS psychology and psychiatry if psychoanalytic psychotherapy becomes increasingly marginalized on the one hand, or overly standardized on the other.     

Sartre and Spinoza on the nature of mind

What surfaces first when one examines the philosophy of mind of Sartre and Spinoza are the differences between them. For Spinoza a human mind is a mode of the divine mind. That view is a far cry from Sartre’s view of human consciousness as a desire never achieved: the desire to be god, to be the foundation of one’s own existence. How could two philosophers, one a determinist and the other who grounds human freedom in the nature of consciousness itself, be seen as having any commonalities worth exploring? How could the noted user of the deductive method and one of the most important phenomenologists of the twentieth century share any philosophical ground at all? I will argue in this paper that despite the very real differences between their two philosophies, there are striking similarities between Sartre’s view of consciousness and Spinoza’s view of the mind. They become apparent when one examines each one’s analysis of the nature of mind and its relationship to itself, the body, and the world. Both are heir to a kind of Aristotelian naturalism. This commonality between them derives from their mutual rejection of Descartes’ substance dualism. I first explore the consequences of that rejection on how each one conceives of the relationship between the mind and its objects. Next I examine their view of the mind’s relation to itself and finally I look at how each one understood the mind’s relationship to the body and the world. The examination of their two views reveals how much they anticipate and support theories of mind defended by contemporary analytic philosophers of mind.     

Fool-proof proofs of God?

Summary Two claims have been explored, the first, that fool-proof proofs of the sort that there could be if there were a God like the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob are not to be expected, on good religious grounds (a claim I found wanting); and second, that there cannot be philosophical proofs of God which work beyond reasonable doubt.The argument that there cannot be philosophical proofs beyond a reasonable doubt is supported by an examination of some of the fundamental issues in the traditional discussions of proofs for God's existence, and by claims about the relativity of methodological rules to world-views which, I maintain, the traditional discussions indicate. I do not claim to have proved that relativity, only to have illustrated the claim that it is there.It is my further opinion, but I do not claim really to have proved it, that the failure of religious excuses for the lack of public demon strations constitutes a good reason for concluding that there is no God of the sort described as the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob; hence that if there is a God, it must be the God of the philosophers. However I admit that there might be sufficient hidden reasons which would offer persuasive excuses for the God of the ordinary believer.Lastly, I have made some comments about what I think is the more valuable way to view the proofs for God. Such an interpretation does justice to the otherwise baffling and continual philosophical disagreements better than rival theories. It is time we take these disagreements with utmost seriousness, and one can hardly do that while treating basic metaphysical arguments as fool-proof proofs.Readers of the literature on proofs will recognize many of the historical and current discussions on which comment is being made. To provide sources for all the comments would be not only cumbersome but impossible because they are found in so many different places and are not the property of any one in particular.     

The analyst's knowledge and authority: a critique of the "new view" in psychoanalysis

A critical assessment is presented of positions recently taken by Mitchell and Renik, who are taken as representatives of a "new view" in psychoanalysis. One article by Mitchell and two by Renik are examined as paradigmatic of certain ways of construing the nature of mind, the analyst's knowledge and authority, and the analytic process that are unduly influenced by the postmodern turn in psychoanalysis. Although "new view" theorists have made valid criticisms of traditional psychoanalytic theory and practice, they wind up taking untenable positions. Specifically called into question are their views on the relation between language and interpretation, on the one hand, and the mental contents of the patient on the other. A disjunction is noted between their discussion of clinical material and their conceptual stance, and their idiosyncratic redefinitions of truth and objectivity are criticized. Finally, a "humble realism" is suggested as the most appropriate philosophical position for psychoanalysts to adopt.     

Reflection on the relationship between psychoanalysis and christianity

Coming to terms with Freud's ideas and attitudes toward religion is prerequisite to any consideration of the compatibility between psychoanalysis and Christianity. In a previous essay and in this one I have attempted to sort out Freud's ambivalence and ambiguity in the area and to point out their relevance to the issue at hand. In this paper I survey and criticize the opinions of a number of writers, as well as putting forward some of my own. I emphasize that the compatibility question is one of value, rather than of fact, and that one's answer to it depends largely on one's conception of psychoanalysis itself. The issue is not clear-cut. Some aspects of psychoanalytic theory and practice appear more reconcilable with Christian theology, ethics, and spirituality than others. A few psychoanalytic tenets seem in direct contradiction to religious ones. I close with an historical-sociological point that I believe has some bearing on the matter.     

Psychoanalytic Engagements With Death: Discussion of Martin Frommer’s “Death Is Nothing at All: On Contemplating Non-Existence”

In this discussion, I reflect on some historical, theoretical, and clinical implications of Martin Frommer’s thesis that death anxieties are best navigated via reaffirming attachments with that which is beyond the self. Frommer’s examples of active engagement with his patients in personal modes of discourse about shared existential concerns are considered in terms of the ethics and responsibilities of self-disclosure and the therapist’s own subjective reactions to the death anxieties. Frommer’s contribution is applauded as an exemplar of relational psychoanalytic therapy that incorporates and goes beyond Freud’s formulations of internal processes of identification with the deceased.     

Aid Agencies: The Epistemic Question

For several decades, there has been a debate in the philosophical literature concerning whether those of us who live in developed countries are morally required to give some of our money to aid agencies. Many contributors to this debate have apparently taken it that one may simply assume that the effects of the work such agencies do are overwhelmingly positive. If one turns to the literature on such agencies that has emerged in recent decades, however, one finds a number of concerns about such agencies and the work they do that put that assumption in serious doubt. This situation raises a number of pressing questions, many of which have received little or no attention from philosophers. After articulating a number of those questions, I focus mainly on what I call the ‘Epistemic Question (for potential contributors to aid agencies)’: How can those of us who are not experts in international aid arrive at an estimate concerning the effects of the work aid agencies do that we have at least some good reason to believe accurate?     

Phantasies, Neurotic-Beliefs, and Beliefs-Proper

This paper presents a philosophical analysis of three cognitive states familiar and important to psychoanalysts—phantasy, neurotic-belief, and belief-proper. It explores the differences among these three propositional attitudes and finds that the development of secondary process capacities of reality testing and truth directness out of earlier primary process operations (themselves prior to considerations of truth or falsity) plays a crucial role. Difficulties in the proper typing of cognitive states are discussed, as are the consequences of such confounds. This use of a philosophical method serves to sharpen the familiar psychoanalytic clinical concepts of phantasy and neurotic-belief. In addition, these same clinical concepts, once properly specified, have much to offer the philosophy of mind, where current understanding of representational cognitive states is restricted to those that are largely conscious and rational. When psychoanalytic concepts such as phantasy and neurotic-belief can be better integrated within the discipline of philosophy of mind, both philosophers and psychoanalysts will have a more complete and adequate theory of mind.     

Candidates’ Responses to Sexual Boundary Violations

This paper addresses the subtle and not-so-subtle power that sexual boundary violations have on the candidates within psychoanalytic institutes. The unspoken leaves things shrouded in secrecy, generating powerful feelings in candidates. Multiple psychological responses, including splitting, envy, and paranoia, along with reactions that range from the sanctimonious to the apathetic, are explored. I address how elusive boundary violations can be and the multiple forms they can take (physical/sexual and nonsexual). I examine some of the reasons for a resulting generalized passivity in both faculty and candidates, including the evocation of early conflicts centered on primal scene and oedipal anxieties and reflect on the ongoing difficulties of finding a personal voice as a candidate.     

Ecumenism between the world religions

Conclusion We seem then to be left with the fourth position outlined above as the best solution we have to the problem of religious diversity. No doubt this will be far too radical for some religious believers in that, while it allows a believer to hold that his or her religion has some kind of paradigmatic status it also admits that genuine religious developments may take place in other religions. On the other hand it will not be radical enough for other people who will see it as denying the integrity and autonomy of other religious ways and sanctioning some degree of religious exclusivity and intolerance in that, by seeing Christianity as having some essential core of truth that Buddhism lacks, I am claiming superiority for Christianity. And vice versa, if I claim that Buddhism is the privileged way of enlightenment, I am claiming superiority for Buddhismvisà-vis Christianity. Nevertheless, even if this position does notsolve the problem of religious diversity it does at least show which of the alternative solutions are finally untenable, both on religious and philosophical grounds. And it does provide a basis for genuine ecumenical dialogue between the world religions. Indeed, by recognising that a religious believer can hold that genuine developments of religious values may take place in other religions, it makes such dialogue absolutely necessary in much the same way as the Christian Churches have been led to see ecumenical dialogue as not merely an option but a necessity.     

Primary femininity: clinical advances and theoretical ambiguities

This paper examines the use of the term "primary femininity" in current psychoanalytic thinking. The concept of primary femininity arose in reaction to early theories about female sexuality and development; based on a model of male development, these presented problems when applied to females. The author attempts to demonstrate the clinical advances that have resulted from the idea of primary femininity. At the same time she argues that the idea has been used to carry widely differing meanings, and has reflected many writers' differing frames of reference, which range from gender identity through biological traits, object relations, genital anxieties, and bisexuality. Like the terms it originally was intended to replace or augment, it has come to be used reductionistically or loosely. The author warns against its misuse and argues that primary femininity is not a unitary concept, but rather encompasses a related group of ideas about the female body and mind.