Working with Norms in Social Work Practice: Introjection,Discipline, and Self-Determination

Since its beginnings, social work has emphasized the ways in which environmental factors and internal dynamics influence individuals. I propose that practitioners continue and strengthen this emphasis by exploring the role that norms play in conflicts and choices. Contemporary and longstanding concepts from sociology and psychoanalysis concerning norms can help us explore what we can change in ourselves, what norms might be outside our capacity to influence, and what change can be undertaken through advocacy or another method. In considering norms, I discuss the introjection process, research in sociology, and the role that discipline and self-determination (including external and internal freedom) play in our choices.     

Substantive and procedural norms in normative multiagent systems

Procedural norms are instrumental norms addressed to agents playing a role in the normative system, for example to motivate these role playing agents to recognize violations or to apply sanctions. Procedural norms have first been discussed in law, where they address legal practitioners such as legislators, lawyers and policemen, but they are discussed now too in normative multiagent systems to motivate software agents. Procedural norms aim to achieve the social order specified using regulative norms like obligations and permissions, and constitutive norms like counts-as obligations. In this paper we formalize procedural, regulative and constitutive norms using input/output logic enriched with an agent ontology and an abstraction hierarchy. We show how our formalization explains Castelfranchi's notion of mutual empowerment, stating that not only the agents playing a role in a normative system are empowered by the normative system, but the normative system itself is also empowered by the agents playing a role in it. In our terminology, the agents are not only institutionally empowered, but they are also delegated normative goals from the system. Together, institutional empowerment and normative goal delegation constitute a mechanism which we call delegation of power, where agents acting on behalf of the normative system become in charge of recognizing which institutional facts follow from brute facts.     

Young children use pedagogical cues to modulate the strength of normative inferences

Young children understand pedagogical demonstrations as conveying generic, kind‐relevant information. But, in some contexts, they also see almost any confident, intentional action on a novel artefact as normative and thus generic, regardless of whether this action was pedagogically demonstrated for them. Thus, although pedagogy may not be necessary for inferences to the generic, it may nevertheless be sufficient to produce inductive inferences on which the child relies more strongly. This study addresses this tension by bridging the literature on normative reasoning with that on social learning and inductive inference. Three‐year‐old children learned about a novel artefact from either a pedagogical or non‐pedagogical demonstration, and then, a series of new actors acted on that artefact in novel ways. Although children protested normatively in both conditions (e.g., ‘No, not like that’), they persisted longer in enforcing the learned norms in the face of repeated non‐conformity by the new actors. This finding suggests that not all generic, normative inferences are created equal, but rather they depend – at least for their strength – on the nature of the acquisition process.     

Normativity in the Philosophy of Science

This paper analyzes what it means for philosophy of science to be normative. It argues that normativity is a multifaceted phenomenon rather than a general feature that a philosophical theory either has or lacks. It analyzes the normativity of philosophy of science by articulating three ways in which a philosophical theory can be normative. Methodological normativity arises from normative assumptions that philosophers make when they select, interpret, evaluate, and mutually adjust relevant empirical information, on which they base their philosophical theories. Object normativity emerges from the fact that the object of philosophical theorizing can itself be normative, such as when philosophers discuss epistemic norms in science. Metanormativity arises from the kind of claims that a philosophical theory contains, such as normative claims about science as it should be. Distinguishing these three kinds of normativity gives rise to a nuanced and illuminating view of how philosophy of science can be normative.     

Analogical Reasoning in Handling Emerging Technologies: The Case of Umbilical Cord Blood Biobanking

How are we individually and as a society to handle new and emerging technologies? This challenging question underlies much of the bioethical debates of modern times. To address this question we need suitable conceptions of the new technology and ways of identifying its proper management and regulation. To establish conceptions and to find ways to handle emerging technologies we tend to use analogies extensively. The aim of this article is to investigate the role that analogies play or may play in the processes of understanding and managing new technology. More precisely we aim to unveil the role of analogies as analytical devices in exploring the “being” of the new technology as well the normative function of analogies in conceptualizing the characteristics and applications of new technology. Umbilical cord blood biobanking will be used as a case to investigate these roles and functions.     

Analogical reasoning in handling emerging technologies: the case of umbilical cord blood biobanking

How are we individually and as a society to handle new and emerging technologies? This challenging question underlies much of the bioethical debates of modern times. To address this question we need suitable conceptions of the new technology and ways of identifying its proper management and regulation. To establish conceptions and to find ways to handle emerging technologies we tend to use analogies extensively. The aim of this article is to investigate the role that analogies play or may play in the processes of understanding and managing new technology. More precisely we aim to unveil the role of analogies as analytical devices in exploring the "being" of the new technology as well the normative function of analogies in conceptualizing the characteristics and applications of new technology. Umbilical cord blood biobanking will be used as a case to investigate these roles and functions.     

Using Stars for Moral Navigation: An Ethical Exploration into Celebrity

What role do celebrities play in our moral lives? Philosophers have explored the potential for celebrities to function as moral exemplars and role models. We argue that there are more ways in which celebrities play a role in helping us navigate our moral lives. First, gossiping about celebrities helps us negotiate our moral norms and identify competing styles of life. Second, fandom for celebrities serves as the basis for the development of distinct moral communities and identities. Third, celebrities possess high levels of epistemic power which can be used to help change and adapt our moral norms. We will then investigate two kinds of problems that arise from using celebrities in this way. Firstly, harm is done to celebrities because they are used in the ways explained in the first part of the article; secondly, celebrity life has a distinctive nature that can affect the moral agency of celebrities. Fame, we suggest, might lead to a morally unhealthy asymmetry in human relationships. We end by discussing the ethical implications of our analysis and conclude that when using stars for moral navigation, we should take into account the harm this does to them and the distinctive nature of their lives.     

On the Conceptual, Psychological, and Moral Status of Zombies, Swamp-Beings, and Other 'Behaviourally Indistinguishable'Creatures

In this paper 1 argue that it would be unprincipled to withhold mental predicates from our behavioural duplicates however unlike us they are "on the inside." My arguments are unusual insofar as they rely neither on an implicit commitment to logical behaviourism in any of its various forms nor to a verificationist theory of meaning. Nor do they depend upon prior metaphysical commitments or to philosophical "intuitions". Rather, in assembling reminders about how the application of our consciousness and propositional attitude concepts are ordinarily defended, 1 argue on explanatory and moral grounds that they cannot be legitimately withheld from creatures who behave, and who would continue to behave, like us. I urge that we should therefore reject the invitation to revise the application of these concepts in the ways that would be required by recent proposals in the philosophy of mind.     

Caught between cultures: cultural norms in Jungian psychodynamic process

Abstract: In our increasingly mobile world, more of us are caught between cultures rather than in one culture. We straddle different ethnic, racial, political, geographical, and religious groups, forced into awareness of the precarious nature of our self‐definition, involuntarily gazing at the constructed nature of our cultural norms, unable to avoid reckoning with the choices of which collective to honour. The impossibility of separating individual from collective is foundational to work as Jungian practitioners, but a paradox of individuation is becoming free of the control of collective norms while simultaneously living within those very norms. In such a conflict it becomes easy to overlook the fact that when the norms we have incorporated into ourselves are from cultures vastly different from the one in which we live, the cacophony can be overwhelming. In this paper, I will draw from postmodern theorists such as Derrida, Foucault and Irigaray in an effort to re‐imagine the role of culture in psychodynamic process. The case of a Muslim Iranian man working with a Christian American woman analyst will be used to explore the complexity of a multitude of cultural norms present in the consulting room.     

对环保行为的心理学解读——规范焦点理论述评

社会规范对个体行为的影响常被低估.通过将社会规范区分为描述性规范和命令性规范,并强调注意焦点的作用,规范焦点理论重新强调了社会规范的重要作用.根据规范焦点理论,不同类型的社会规范有不同的作用,恰当地使用相应的社会规范信息对环保行为进行干预,可以减少乱丢垃圾、促进垃圾分类,改善节能、节约和保护资源等行为.立足于环保应用,总结了运用这种既科学又省力的措施时应注意的问题.最后,从文化差异和我国社会现阶段特征两个方面,论述了规范焦点理论及其所倡导的措施对我国环保工作的适用性.     

眼睛效应不稳定与感知规范：一个新视角

眼睛效应指人们面对眼睛或类似眼睛的图案时会发生行为改变的现象。但是, 眼睛效应的稳健性备受争议, 主要有4种观点：促使人们更亲社会、更遵守社会规范、降低反社会行为、无效果。结合规范错觉和创新扩散理论, 基于感知规范的视角, 当感知亲社会规范流行程度较高时, 眼睛效应既会“促进亲社会行为”或“促进人们遵守社会规范”, 也会“降低反社会行为”; 但当感知亲社会规范流行程度较低时, 眼睛效应对一些反社会行为“无效果”; 当规范错觉较大且无规范干预时, 眼睛效应同样对一些反社会行为无效果。因此, 将以上4种争议观点整合为“不同感知规范条件下的眼睛效应”, 揭示了眼睛效应不稳定的原因, 为未来实证研究和实践应用提供理论基础。     

Belief Norms and Blindspots

I defend the thesis that beliefs are constitutively normative from two kinds of objections. After clarifying what a “blindspot” proposition is and the different types of blindspots there can be, I show that the existence of such propositions does not undermine the thesis that beliefs are essentially governed by a negative truth norm. I argue that the “normative variance” exhibited by this norm is not a defect. I also argue that if we accept a distinction between subjective and objective norms, there need be no worrying tension between doxastic norms of truth and doxastic norms of evidence. I show how a similar approach applies to the attitude of guessing. I then suggest that if we distinguish between practical and theoretical rationality, we will prefer a negative form of norm that does not positively oblige us to form beliefs. I finish by considering an alternative possible subjunctive form of norm that would also avoid problems with blindspots, but I suggest this has a nonintuitive consequence.     

What Reflective Endorsement Cannot Do1

According to John McDowell and Bill Brewer, our experiences have the type of content which can be the content of judgements ‐ content which is the result of the actualization of specific conceptual abilities. They defend this view by arguing that our experiences must have such content in order for us to be able to think about our environment. In this paper I show that they do not provide a conclusive argument for this view. Focusing on Brewer’s version of the argument, I show that it rests on a questionable assumption ‐ namely, that if a subject can recognize the normative bearing of a mental content upon what she should think and do, then this content must be the result of the actualization of conceptual capacities (and in this sense conceptual). I argue that considerations regarding the roles played by experience and concepts in our mental lives may require us to reject this assumption.     

The effects of smoking norms and attitudes on quitting intentions in Malaysia,Thailand and four Western nations: A cross-cultural comparison

This research investigated the influence of smoking attitudes and norms on quitting intentions in two predominantly collectivistic countries (Malaysia and Thailand) and four predominantly individualistic Western countries (Canada, USA, UK and Australia). Data from the International Tobacco Control Project (N = 13,062) revealed that higher odds of intending to quit were associated with negative personal attitudes in Thailand and the Western countries, but not in Malaysia; with norms against smoking from significant others in Malaysia and the Western countries, but not in Thailand; and with societal norms against smoking in all countries. Our findings indicate that normative factors are important determinants of intentions, but they play a different role in different cultural and/or tobacco control contexts. Interventions may be more effective if they are designed with these different patterns of social influence in mind.     

Emerging Medical Technologies and Emerging Conceptions of Health

Using ideas gleaned from the philosophy of technology of Martin Heidegger and Hans Jonas and the philosophy of health of Georges Canguilhem, I argue that one of the characteristics of emerging medical technologies is that these technologies lead to new conceptions of health. When technologies enable the body to respond to more and more challenges of disease, we thus establish new norms of health. Given the continued development of successful technologies, we come to expect more and more that our bodies should be able to respond to ever-new challenges of environment and disease by establishing ever-new norms of health. Technologies may aim at the prevention and treatment of disease, but they also bring about modifications of what we consider normal for the human being. Thus, new norms of health arise from technological innovation.     

The Normative Significance of Forgiveness

P.F. Strawson claimed that forgiveness is such an essential part of our moral practices that we could not extricate it from our form of life even if we so desired. But what is it about forgiveness that would make it such a central feature of our moral experience? In this paper, I suggest that the answer has to do with what I will call the normative significance of forgiveness. Forgiveness is normatively significant in the sense that, in its paradigmatic instances, forgiving alters the operative norms bearing on the interaction between the victim and the wrongdoer in certain characteristic ways. My project here is, first, to clarify the ways that paradigmatic cases of forgiveness alter the norms of interaction between victim and wrongdoer and to argue that it is in this respect that forgiveness is a normatively significant feature of our moral responsibility practices. Second, I show that most extant theories of forgiveness fail to explain the characteristic ways in which forgiving alters norms. Third, I offer a theory of forgiveness that accounts for this significant normative feature. I conclude by addressing two objections to my proposal.     

“We Must Be the Change We Want to See in the World”: Integrating Norms and Identities through Social Interaction

In this article, we propose a social psychological mechanism for the formation of new social change movements. Here, we argue that social change follows the emergence of shared injunctive social norms that define new collective identities, and we systematically spell out the nature of the processes through which this comes about. We propose that these norms and identities are created and negotiated through validating communication about a normative conflict; resulting in an identity‐norm nexus (INN), whereby people become the change they want to see in the world. We suggest that injunctive norms are routinely negotiated, validated, and integrated with shared identity in order to create the potential to effect change in the world. Norms and identities need not be integrated or connected in this way, but the power of social actors to form new social movements to bring about sociopolitical change will tend to be severely limited unless they can bring about the integration of identity and action.     

Towards a normative change approach in child labour: A theoretical analysis and empirical exploration of the constituted and constitutive procedural social norms

Growing evidence in the field of child labour has identified social norms among the key antecedents. Social norms regulate actions of people within the social order. Where social norms are institutionalized and legitimized, people conform to them out of a sense of duty. It is argued that legitimate, deep-rooted, and institutionalized social norms are difficult to change. Yet, there have been some significant improvements in research suggesting that normative change programs can effectively shift deep-rooted social norms. In this study, we explored a pathway to change social norms that underpin child labour practices in four major hubs of cocoa and sea fishing. We employed a bottom-up practice research approach to co-design the study, and implemented it through narrative vignette interviews. Using vignette stimulus, we interviewed parents (n = 40), with 20 of them perceived to have engaged their children in child labour, and stakeholders in the communities (n = 10). Findings from the narrative interviews revealed norms on informal apprenticeship, inheriting family business, and hard work, among the core child labour norms. We unraveled the constitutive procedural norms that legitimize and justify the child labour norms in the communities. Based on this, a normative change framework has been designed and supported with suggested intervention programs to shift the social norms.     

Excuses,exemptions, and derivative norms

Distinguishing between excuses and exemptions advances our understanding of a standard range of problem cases in debates about epistemic norms. But it leaves open a problem of accounting for blameless norm violation in ‘prospective agents’. By shifting focus in our theory of excuses from rational excellence to norms governing the dispositions of agents, we can account for a fuller range of normative phenomena at play in debates about epistemic norms.