In defense of the one-factor doxastic account: A phenomenal account of delusions

According to the doxastic model, delusions are beliefs. In the metacognitive model, delusions are imaginings mistaken for beliefs. I argue that endorsement of false second-order beliefs could also create unpleasant dissonance, that mentally healthy people often endorse irrational or conflicting beliefs, and that the lack of delusion-motivated action can be explained by the influence of nonbelief factors on action. The two-factor doxastic model posits irrationality as necessary, and one metric of rationality many scholars employ is whether a response is easily understood by folk psychology. A precedent for folk-psychological acceptance of contextually bizarre beliefs as a result of personal experience can already be found in the lack of imaginative resistance encountered not in response to the impossibilities portrayed in speculative fiction, but in response to the characters’ ability to incorporate these occurrences into their mental frameworks, despite them often being at odds with these characters’ bedrock understanding of the world.     

Beliefs, experiences and misplaced being: an interactionist account of delusional misidentification

This paper contrasts an interactionist account of delusional misidentification with more traditional one- and two-stage models. Unlike the unidirectional nature of these more traditional models, in which the aetiology of the disorder is said to “progress” from a neurological disruption via an anomalous experience to a delusional belief, the interactionist account posits the interaction of top-down and bottom-up processes to better explain the maintenance of the delusional belief. In addition, it places a greater emphasis on the patient’s underlying phenomenal experience in accounting for the specificity of the delusional content. The role played by patient phenomenology is examined in light of Ratcliffe’s recent phenomenological account. Similarities and differences are discussed. The paper concludes that a purely phenomenological account is unable to differentiate between non-delusional patient groups, who have what appear to be equivalent phenomenal experiences to patients suffering from delusional misidentification but without the delusional belief, and delusional groups, something the interactionist model is able to do.     

Dream recall frequency and openness to experience: a negative finding

The question of whether personality dimensions explain the interindividual differences in dream recall frequency has often been investigated by dream researchers. Previous research has shown that traits such as absorption, hypnotic susceptibility and thin boundaries which are related to the openness-to-experience factor of the Five-Factor-Model of personality correlate substantially with dream recall frequency. The present study, however, was unable to demonstrate a relationship between openness and the six facet scales and dream recall frequency. It may be hypothesized that other factors such as visual memory, sleep behavior or creativity explain the interindividual differences in dream recall.     

A developed nature: a phenomenological account of the experience of home

Though “dwelling” is more commonly associated with Heidegger’s philosophy than with that of Merleau-Ponty, “being-at-home” is in fact integral to Merleau-Ponty’s thinking. I consider the notion of home as it relates to Merleau-Ponty’s more familiar notions of the “lived body” and the “level,” and, in particular, I consider how the unique intertwining of activity and passivity that characterizes our being-at-home is essential to our nature as free beings. I argue that while being-at-home is essentially an experience of passivity—i.e., one that rests in the background of our experience and provides a support and structure for our life that goes largely unnoticed and that is significantly beyond our “conscious” control—being-at-home is also a way of being to which we attain. This analysis of home reveals important psychological insights into the nature of our freedom as well as into the nature of the development of our adult ways of coping and behaving.     

Explaining delusions: a cognitive perspective

There is now considerable evidence for reasoning, attention, metacognition and attribution biases in delusional patients. Recently, these findings have been incorporated into a number of cognitive models that aim to explain delusion formation, maintenance and content. Although delusions are commonly conceptualized as beliefs, not all models make reference to models of normal belief formation. This review considers those models that explain delusions as a breakdown of normal belief formation (belief-positive models), approaches that explain the pathology only (belief-negative models) and approaches that view delusions as one end of a distribution of anomalous mental phenomena (the continuum view). A cognitive theory that includes the 'pragmatic pathology' of delusions will be able to address both the phenomenology and the treatment of delusion-related distress.     

Religious delusions and filicide: a psychodynamic model

In this article, we present a psychodynamic explanation for the complex crime of filicide motivated by religious delusions. To begin, we provide an overview of filicide, including its typology and epidemiology. Second, we examine the psychoanalytic theories of Heinz Kohut and Otto Kernberg so as to better understand how family-of-origin experiences add to the ways in which psychotic disorders later take shape in filicide cases. Third, we offer an explication of the psychology of religion, including the role that religious defences and religious delusions play in cases involving filicide. Ultimately, we hypothesise that mothers with religious delusions commit acts of filicide due to the dynamic and reciprocal interaction between mental illness, psychological functioning, and the psychological role played by religion. We conclude our article with a case illustration to demonstrate our theoretical model.     

An Israeli account of a near-death experience: A case study of cultural dissonance

The text of an Israeli near-death experience (NDE) is presented in translation from the Hebrew. This account is contrasted with the traditional Hebrew sources on NDEs or their equivalents, which formed part of the NDEr's native subculture. In the present case, the lack of congruence between the reported NDE and the expected cultural form led to intense confusion described by the NDEr. Further study is needed of folk traditions of NDEs.     

An encounter frequency account of how experience affects likelihood estimation

When making judgments, people often favor information received from a few individual sources over largesample statistical data. Individual information is usually acquired piece by piece, whereas statistical information combines many observations into a single summary. We examined whether this difference in the frequency of encounters affects how data are weighted. In two experiments, subjects read statistical information indicating an event to be rare and contrasting information from individual cases suggesting the event to be common. We controlled whether the individual cases were summarized into a single summary like statistical information, or presented serially, case by case. Subjects’ estimates of event frequencies were higher when the individual cases were presented in serial, rather than summarized, format. A third study demonstrated that subjects treat each data sample as an instance, and do not weight according to sample size. These results support the conclusion that people weight information according to encounter frequency.     

Acquaintance and the sublime: an alternative account of theistic sublime experience

In this paper I argue that when one has an epiphany of the form ‘God is F’ (e.g., ‘God is wise’) upon having a sublime experience one can be accurately described as being acquainted with the fact that God is F as opposed to inferring that God is F from the experience at hand. To argue for this, I will, first, outline what a sublime experience is, in general, before outlining what a theistic sublime experience is in particular. Second, I will outline two ways of understanding theistic sublime experiences. First, I will outline a model that I will call the ‘inference model’ which, put simply, says that when one has an epiphany of the form ‘God is F’, upon having a theistic sublime experience, one is drawing this conclusion via a process of ‘inference-to-the-best-explanation’ (Chignell and Halteman in: Costelloe (ed) The sublime: From antiquity to the present, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2012, p. 426). Second, I will outline an alternative model that I call the ‘acquaintance model’ which, put simply, says that no inferential process occurs when one has an epiphany of the form ‘God is F’ upon having a theistic sublime experience, but one is made directly aware of the fact that God is F. Third, and finally, I will respond to some objections to the acquaintance model.     

Cognitive functioning in delusions: a longitudinal analysis

BACKGROUND: This study explored the longitudinal course of the relationship between delusions and different aspects of cognitive functioning. METHODS: Deluded patients were compared to psychiatric and non-clinical controls on three tasks: negative priming, a probabilistic judgement task (the 'beads' task), and the pragmatic inference task (PIT). All groups were tested at two time points, once when actively symptomatic, and once when in remission. RESULTS: Deluded individuals exhibited a 'jump-to-conclusions' (JTC) reasoning bias: i.e., they made decisions on the basis of limited evidence and were more likely to revise their estimates when faced with disconfirmatory evidence. This JTC bias remained stable over time, although probability judgments seemed to normalise in remission. No deficits in cognitive inhibition were found on negative priming. The deluded group displayed an excessive self-focus on the PIT at both time points, but did not show a depressive attributional style. Only a small sub-sample, characterised by the "bad-me" type of paranoia [Trower & Chadwick, 1995 Clinical Psychology: Science and Practice, 2, 263-278.], demonstrated depressive schemas when symptomatic, but no longer did so when remitted. Few relationships were found between tasks, suggesting that different areas of functioning are relatively independent. The only measures associated with delusion symptom scores were from the 'beads' task. CONCLUSIONS: Overall these findings suggest that the JTC bias is a stable factor associated with delusional thinking, while the depressive attributional style characteristic of a small sub-sample of paranoid patients fluctuates with delusional course.     

Deconstructing delusions: A qualitative study examining the relationship between religious beliefs and religious delusions

Delusions have been conceptualized as forming in response to experience, yet the relationship between religious belief, and beliefs regarded as delusional, has received little research attention. This is despite the high prevalence of delusions featuring religious content. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with seven participants who had been diagnosed as experiencing delusions. Participants from a range of religious backgrounds were asked about their religious experiences and beliefs, family background and experiences of psychosis. These interviews were analysed qualitatively. Whilst religious background affected the content of delusions, the nature of delusions appeared to be influenced by other factors, such as early family experiences, particularly an absent parent and conflict within the family. Individuals often used a religious framework to understand unusual experiences, and there seemed to be a role for the process of identification and wish fulfilment in influencing delusional content. Whilst this research is clearly limited by its exploratory nature, it offers a possible framework of understanding which helps make sense of religious delusions, and suggests approaches which may be helpful in recovery.     

Observer memory and immunity to error through misidentification

Synthese - Are those judgments that we make on the basis of our memories immune to error through misidentification (IEM)? In this paper, I discuss a phenomenon which seems to suggest that they are...