追寻美德的统一——古希腊德性统一性问题

德性是古希腊一个重要的道德观念,对德性统一性的追求也是古希腊道德实践与思想领域的一个显著特征。从荷马史诗、苏格拉底、柏拉图到亚里士多德,表现了对德性统一性追求的不同路径。而德性统一性问题与古希腊对德性本身的理解有着必然联系,但从更深层意义上说,是由古希腊现实社会状况所决定的。     

The Nature of the Interaction between Moral and Artistic Value

This article aims to advance our understanding of the interaction between moral and artistic value by asking what it means that an artwork's moral virtue or defect is an artistic virtue or defect and how we can prove or disprove such a claim. I approach these questions first by distinguishing between intrinsic and contextual value interactions and then by examining two strategies commonly used to establish claims about contextual value interaction: (1) appealing to the counterfactual dependence of the work's artistic value on its moral virtue or defect and (2) arguing that the work is artistically valuable (or defective) and morally valuable (or defective) for the same reasons. I argue that these strategies fail. I then propose new directions for research on the interaction between moral and artistic value.     

Virtue theory and abortion

The sort of ethical theory derived from Aristotle, variously described as virtue ethics, virtue-based ethics, or neo-Aristotelianism, is becoming better known, and is now quite widely recognized as at least a possible rival to deontological and utilitarian theories. With recognition has come criticism, of varying quality. In this article I shall discuss nine separate criticisms that I have frequently encountered, most of which seem to me to betray an inadequate grasp either of the structure of virtue theory or of what would be involved in thinking about a real moral issue in its terms. In the first half I aim particularly to secure an understanding that will reveal that many of these criticisms are simply misplaced, and to articulate what I take to be the major criticism of virtue theory. I reject this criticism, but do not claim that it is necessarily misplaced. In the second half I aim to deepen that understanding and highlight the issues raised by the criticisms by illustrating what the theory looks like when it is applied to a particular issue, in this case, abortion.     

EMPATHY AND THE EVOLUTION OF COMPASSION: FROM DEEP HISTORY TO INFUSED VIRTUE

This article poses a challenge to contemporary theories in psychology that portray empathy as a negative force in the moral life. Instead, drawing on alternative psychological and philosophical literature, especially Martha Nussbaum, I argue that empathy is related to the virtue of compassion and therefore crucial for moral action. Evidence for evolutionary anthropological accounts of compassion in early hominins provides additional arguments for its positive value in deep human history. I discuss this work alongside Thomistic notions of practical wisdom, compassion, misericordia, and the importance of reason in the moral life. The tension between “bottom up” accounts of empathy and that according to a theological interpretation of “infused” virtues also needs to be addressed. From a secular perspective, infused virtue is a projection of the ideal moral life, but from a theological perspective, it is a way of understanding how human capacities through the action of grace can reach beyond what seem to be the limits of psychological moral identity.     

Humility: An Emerging Construct in Moral Psychology

The virtue of humility is lauded by most authorities but opinions of what it is, what it includes and what it does not are multifarious. Religious and philosophical traditions in India stress its role in emancipating the ego and providing an understanding for one’s perspective as contrasted against the magnanimity of the Almighty, the Supernatural or the Universe. Most academicians within the scientific psychological realm also look upon humility as a virtue. Accredited as a powerful tool for personal, social and organisational well-being, humility, as a moral construct, deserves a thorough and detailed exploration to reveal what it entails, what its corollaries are and how it can be measured. It is particularly useful in Indian context, as indigenous traditions have always emphasised humility. However, such efforts have remained relatively neglected till recent years. Of course, a few researchers with emphasis on moral and positive psychology have probed and prodded this concept to lay bare its comprising elements and to build tools to measure it. These attempts have been discussed here. Information was culled from surveying the scientific literature of the past four decades from psychological and philosophical journals and handbooks. Its overlap with Indian concept of humility has been discussed, and the unresolved questions about its nuances are put forward for future research endeavour.     

The Salience of Moral Character

In this essay I review an underappreciated strand of thought according to which the best Kantian moral theory has less in common with paradigmatically deontological theories and more in common with virtue theories than is standardly maintained. I then argue this program should be continued further, to provide not only a virtue‐based account of moral judgment but also a virtue‐based account of moral worth. I make a case that this fusion of Kantian theory with virtue theory provides the best account of moral rules, and I close by suggesting that it generates a promising new understanding of moral rights.     

The moral virtue of open-mindedness

This paper gives a new and richer account of open-mindedness as a moral virtue. I argue that the main problem with existing accounts is that they derive the moral value of open-mindedness entirely from the epistemic role it plays in moral thought. This view is overly intellectualist. I argue that open-mindedness as a moral virtue promotes our flourishing alongside others in ways that are quite independent of its role in correcting our beliefs. I close my discussion by distinguishing open-mindedness from what some might consider its equivalent: empathy and tolerance.     

The notion of the moral: the relation between virtue ethics and virtue epistemology

In this paper I argue that virtue ethics should be understood as a form of ethics which integrates various domains of the practical in relation to which virtues are excellences. To argue this it is necessary to distinguish two senses of the “moral”: the broad sense which integrates the domains of the practical and a narrow classificatory sense. Virtue ethics, understood as above, believes that all genuine virtue should be understood as what I call virtues proper. To possess a virtue proper (such as an excellent disposition of open-mindedness, an epistemic virtue) is to possess a disposition of overall excellence in relation to the sphere or field of the virtue (being open to the opinions of others). Overall excellence in turn involves excellence in integrating to a sufficient degree, standards of excellence in all relevant practical domains. Epistemic virtues, sporting virtues, moral virtues, and so on are all virtues proper. In particular it is impossible for an epistemic virtue to be a moral (narrow sense) vice.     

Acting rightly: Three dimensions of moral conduct

Philosophical literature in normative ethics has tended to concentrate on (1) what we should do—what acts we should perform—or (2) virtues of character, understood as leading to the right deeds or (3), as most notable in Kant, the importance of motivation appraising agents and actions. All these elements—actions, virtues, and motives—are ethically significant. But there is a dimension of moral responsibility that should be given a place beside obligations to act, virtues of character, and appraisability of actions in relation to their motivation. It is the manner in which actions are performed. This can be right or wrong, an object of intention, and behavior for a reason; and it is important for assessing moral virtue. This paper explores manners of action, shows why they apparently do not reduce to kinds of actions, and proposes an account of their importance. The result is a wider conception of acting rightly than the common understanding on which it simply doing the right thing, a partial account of how acting rightly figures in the content of intention, and a sketch of the moral dimensions of the manners in which we act.     

Virtue Ethics,Social Difference,and the Challenge of an Embodied Politics

Following the revival of virtue theory, some moral theorists have argued that virtue ethics can provide the basis for a radical politics. Such a politics essentially departs from the liberal model of the moral agent as an autonomous reason‐giver. It instead privileges an understanding of the agent as conditioned by her community, and in the case of social oppression and marginalization, communal virtues may become a vehicle for social change. This essay compares political appropriations of virtue theory by Christian theologian Stanley Hauerwas and secular feminist thinkers Lisa Tessman and Margaret Urban Walker. Hauerwas and feminist theorists both embrace a kind of embodied vulnerability as a political virtue, arguing that it enables more genuine social recognition. The virtue feminist critique is more robust than Hauerwas's, however, insofar as it understands mutual recognition to involve acknowledgment of social difference and the concomitant pursuit of justice.     

Knowing that, knowing how, and knowing to do

Ryle’s distinction between knowing that and knowing how has recently been challenged. The paper first briefly defends the distinction and then proceeds to address the question of classifying moral knowledge. Moral knowledge is special in that it is practical, that is, it is essentially a motive. Hence the way we understand moral knowledge crucially depends on the way we understand motivation. The Humean theory of motivation is wrong in saying that reason cannot be a motive, but right in saying that desire is essential for motivating us. The right response to the Humean theory of motivation is to see that moral knowledge is desire-related rationality or thought-related desire. Moral knowledge is neither knowing that nor knowing how but rather a third species of knowledge which we may call “knowing to do.” Knowing to do is to be rationally disposed to do the right thing. This understanding of moral knowledge is exactly what we can learn from Aristotle’s ethics.     

Seeing by Feeling: Virtues,Skills, and Moral Perception

Champions of virtue ethics frequently appeal to moral perception: the notion that virtuous people can “see” what to do. According to a traditional account of virtue, the cultivation of proper feeling through imitation and habituation issues in a sensitivity to reasons to act. Thus, we learn to see what to do by coming to feel the demands of courage, kindness, and the like. But virtue ethics also claims superiority over other theories that adopt a perceptual moral epistemology, such as intuitionism – which John McDowell criticizes for illicitly “borrow[ing] the epistemological credentials” of perception. In this paper, I suggest that the most promising way for virtue ethics to use perceptual metaphors innocuously is by adopting a skill model of virtue, on which the virtues are modeled on forms of practical know-how. Yet I contend that this model is double-edged for virtue ethics. The skill model belies some central ambitions and dogmas of the traditional view, especially its most idealized claims about virtue and the virtuous. While this may be a cost that its champions are unprepared to pay, I suggest that virtue ethics would do well to embrace a more realistic moral psychology and a correspondingly less sublime conception of virtue.     

Is Open‐mindedness a Moral Virtue?

Is open‐mindedness a moral virtue? Surprisingly, this question has not received much attention from philosophers. In this paper, we fill this lacuna by arguing that there are good grounds for thinking that it is. In particular, we show that the extant account of open‐mindedness as a moral virtue faces an objection that appears to show that exercising the character trait may not be virtuous. To offset this objection, we argue that a much stronger argument can be made for the case that open‐mindedness is a moral virtue by appealing to the notion of moral understanding. Specifically, we provide a new rationale as to why we should exercise open‐mindedness and offer several arguments to allay the concern that doing so can at times cause us to be in an epistemically and morally weaker position.     

道德心理学的哲学思考--论心理学与伦理学的会通与融合

道德心理学把规范伦理学与实证心理学在哲学层面上结合起来,为理解人的道德行为提供了一种新的视角。伦理学与心理学的这种融合具体体现为：个人同一性与道德行为必须在心理上保持一致,才能形成真正的道德同一性,因此,美德有其独特的气质和情绪心理学机制。道德是在社会生活中形成的,处理好道德的社会关系是培养良好美德的基础。道德既有理性的层面,也有非理性的层面,培养和确立人的内在理性是成为道德人的心理学基础。基于心理学对道德生活的重要性,一种以心理学为基础的美德伦理学正在出现。     

The destiny of modern virtue ethics

The revival of Aristotelian virtue ethics since the 1980s does not signify that it goes back to its original form; rather, it is generally manifested in three different variations: The first is a variation of what is known as communitarianism, the second is universalism, and the third is phronesis. On the social level of morality, the serious attempt of modern virtue ethics towards improving the moral spirit of society is laudable. However, its method and reasoning deviates greatly from the demands of modern society’s integration of its operating rules and regulations, and concept of values; hence all of its attempts can hardly escape the fate of becoming just a fantasy. Yet, on the level of dealing with ethic conflicts and moral paradox, modern virtue ethics—via interpreting the theory of phronesis by Aristotle—proposes the valuable thought of a balanced morality that principlism should concern itself with and nourish itself from.     

Justice and Care in Close Relationships

The essay examines the impartialist view of justice as the first virtue of all relationships. I argue that in close associations where duties, obligations, and rights of persons are situationally contingent, abstract principles of justice fail to yield a unified moral perspective about what is fair. Solidarity and trust as moral emotions develop more complex moral competencies that go beyond what principles of justice alone require.     

Why the Concept of Moral Status Should be Abandoned

The use of the concept of moral status is commonplace today in debates about the moral consideration of entities lacking certain special capacities, such as nonhuman animals. This concept has been typically used to defend the view that adult human beings have a status higher than all those entities. However, even those who disagree with this claim have often accepted the idea of moral status as if it were part of an undisputed received way of thinking in ethics. This paper argues that the use of this concept, however common, distorts our understanding of how to behave towards different individuals in different circumstances. When moral status is identified with the interest in living or the capacity for well-being, it becomes an arbitrary and irrelevant criterion. When it is used as a synonym of moral consideration or considerability, in a way that is compatible with the principle of equal consideration, it becomes trivial and confusing. When used, instead, to defend the unequal moral consideration of interests of equal weight, it has several implausible implications. In particular, the claim that unequal status is justified because of the value (either final or intrinsic, or instrumental) of cognitive capacities implausibly entails that our exercising those capacities should have priority over the promotion of our wellbeing. The idea of full moral status is also problematic as it implies the possibility of status monsters. In addition, its use is based in a misconceived way of what it would really entail to have a full status by virtue of having rational capacities. The paper concludes that we have strong reasons to abandon the concept of moral status altogether.     

Moral Luck,Responsibility, and Systems of Tort Liability

Bernard Williams drew our attention to what might be wrong with denying the role of luck in our understanding of agency and responsibility. Susan Wolf and David Enoch, in separate works, have asked us to focus instead on what might be virtuous and valuable in embracing that role, and on how our institutions might assist us in that regard. They claim that the agent who ‘takes’ a responsibility that law or morality do not already assign to them may be displaying a special moral virtue or exercising a distinctive moral power. I raise some objections to Wolf’s and Enoch’s case for that claim, and query some of its purported institutional implications for tort law systems.

     

The problem with moralism

Moralism is often described as a vice. But what exactly is wrong with moralism that makes it aptly described as a character flaw? This paper will argue that the problem with moralism is that it downgrades the force of legitimate moral criticism. First, I will argue that moralism involves an inflated sense of the extent to which moral criticism is appropriate. Next, I will examine the value of legitimate moral criticism, arguing that its value stems from enabling us to take a stand against immoral behavior. Finally, I will argue that unwarranted moral criticism downgrades the force of legitimate moral criticism and that this is why moralism should be seen as a vice.     

Contemporary virtue ethics and action-guiding objections

Many defenders of contemporary virtue ethics contend that it directly competes with modern ethical theories such as consequentialism and deontology. One of the most common responses is that contemporary virtue ethics does not compare well because its proponents fail to provide guidance to an agent who is deliberating about what she should do. There are at least four different types of action-guiding objections to an ethical theory. They are based on moral dilemmas, indeterminacy, knowledge, and reasonable judgment. I will show how three current versions of virtue ethics are subject to at least one of those objections.