Oppression and Responsibility: a Wittgensteinian Approach to Social Practices and Moral Theory

Book reviewed:
O'Connor, Peg, Oppression and Responsibility: a Wittgensteinian Approach to Social Practices and Moral Theory , The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002, 151 pp., ISBN 0-271-02202-7.     

The Responsibility of Men for the Oppression of Women

ABSTRACT Feminist writers arguing that women are oppressed have pointed to men as the oppressors. They have, however, directed little attention to the question of the extent to which men are morally responsible for this oppression, a question which is of special concern for male feminists. Seven categories of men potentially responsible for the oppression of women are identified here; four are argued to be individually responsible for oppressing women and three not. The question of whether men are collectively responsible for the oppression of women is addressed, and three main difficulties are revealed in the endeavour to establish that they are. It is argued that one who is in no way responsible on an individual basis for oppressing women cannot be responsible by sole virtue of being a male. The result has implications for the status of men in the feminist movement.     

Oppression and Victimization; Choice and Responsibility

This essay discusses a cluster of problems for feminist theory and practice which concern responsibility and choice under conditions of oppression. I characterize four major perspectives from which situations of oppression or victimization can be seen and questions about choice and responsibility answered: The Perspective of the Oppressor; The Perspective of the Victim; The Perspective of the Responsible Actor; and The Perspective of the Observer/Philosopher. 1 compare their strengths and weaknesses and discuss their compatibility.     

Development and validation of the Internalized Racial Oppression Scale for Black individuals

This article describes the development and validation of the Internalized Racial Oppression Scale (IROS) for Black individuals in 2 studies using a total sample of 468 Black college students. The IROS is intended to measure the degree to which racial oppression is internalized and replicated by Black individuals in the United States. An exploratory factor analysis suggested a five-factor solution: Belief in the Biased Representation of History (BRH), Devaluation of the African Worldview and Motifs (DAW), Alteration of Physical Appearance (APA), Internalization of Negative Stereotypes (INS), and Hair Change (HC). Confirmatory factory analysis supported an adequate model fit of a four-factor model: BRH, APA, INS, and HC. All factors of the IROS were positively correlated with the Pre-Encounter subscale of the Racial Identity Attitude Scale (RIAS-B; J. E. Helms & T. A. Parham, 1996), and 4 of the factors were negatively correlated with the Immersion/Emersion subscale of the RIAS-B. Four factors of the IROS were negatively correlated with all subscales and total scores of the African Self-Consciousness Scale (J. A. Baldwin & Y. R. Bell, 1985). These results provide some support of the validity of the IROS.     

Moral Responsibility for Self-Deluding Beings

Philosophia - In this article, I argue for four theses. First, libertarian and compatibilist accounts of moral responsibility agree that the capability of practical reason is the central feature of...     

Moral Responsibility Invariantism

Moral responsibility invariantism is the view that there is a single set of conditions for being morally responsible for an action (or omission or consequence of an act or omission) that applies in all cases. I defend this view against some recent arguments by Joshua Knobe and John Doris.     

Self-Deception and Moral Responsibility

The self‐deceived are usually held to be moral responsible for their state. I argue that this attribution of responsibility makes sense only against the background of the traditional conception of self‐deception, a conception that is now widely rejected. In its place, a new conception of self‐deception has been articulated, which requires neither intentional action by self‐deceived agents, nor that they posses contradictory beliefs. This new conception has neither need nor place for attributions of moral responsibility to the self‐deceived in paradigmatic cases. Accordingly, we should take the final step toward abandoning the traditional conception, and drop the automatic attribution of responsibility. Self‐deception is simply a kind of mistake, and has no more necessary connection to culpability than have other intellectual errors.     

Moral Responsibility as Guiltworthiness

It is often alleged that an agent is morally responsible in a liability sense for a transgression just in case s/he deserves a negative interpersonal response for that transgression, blaming responses such as resentment and indignation being paradigms. Aside from a few exceptions, guilt is cited in recent discussions of moral responsibility, if at all, as merely an effect of being blamed, or as a reliable indicator of moral responsibility, but not itself an explanation of moral responsibility. In this paper, I argue that an agent is morally responsible in a liability sense for a transgression just in case s/he deserves to feel moral guilt for that transgression. I argue that this alternative view offers all that the predominant blame-focused view offers, while also solving some puzzling features of moral responsibility. Specifically, it offers a compelling way to reconcile conflicting intuitions about the suberogatory, and allows those who do not understand what Darwall calls ‘second-personal’ reasons to be morally responsible for their immoral acts.     

Suffering and Moral Responsibility

Book Information Suffering and Moral Responsibility. Suffering and Moral Responsibility Meyerfeld Jamie New York Oxford University Press ix + 237 Hardback £35 By Meyerfeld Jamie. Oxford University Press. New York. Pp. ix + 237. Hardback:£35,