Oppression and Responsibility: a Wittgensteinian Approach to Social Practices and Moral Theory

Book reviewed:
O'Connor, Peg, Oppression and Responsibility: a Wittgensteinian Approach to Social Practices and Moral Theory , The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002, 151 pp., ISBN 0-271-02202-7.     

The Responsibility of Men for the Oppression of Women

ABSTRACT Feminist writers arguing that women are oppressed have pointed to men as the oppressors. They have, however, directed little attention to the question of the extent to which men are morally responsible for this oppression, a question which is of special concern for male feminists. Seven categories of men potentially responsible for the oppression of women are identified here; four are argued to be individually responsible for oppressing women and three not. The question of whether men are collectively responsible for the oppression of women is addressed, and three main difficulties are revealed in the endeavour to establish that they are. It is argued that one who is in no way responsible on an individual basis for oppressing women cannot be responsible by sole virtue of being a male. The result has implications for the status of men in the feminist movement.     

Oppression and Victimization; Choice and Responsibility

This essay discusses a cluster of problems for feminist theory and practice which concern responsibility and choice under conditions of oppression. I characterize four major perspectives from which situations of oppression or victimization can be seen and questions about choice and responsibility answered: The Perspective of the Oppressor; The Perspective of the Victim; The Perspective of the Responsible Actor; and The Perspective of the Observer/Philosopher. 1 compare their strengths and weaknesses and discuss their compatibility.     

Development and validation of the Internalized Racial Oppression Scale for Black individuals

This article describes the development and validation of the Internalized Racial Oppression Scale (IROS) for Black individuals in 2 studies using a total sample of 468 Black college students. The IROS is intended to measure the degree to which racial oppression is internalized and replicated by Black individuals in the United States. An exploratory factor analysis suggested a five-factor solution: Belief in the Biased Representation of History (BRH), Devaluation of the African Worldview and Motifs (DAW), Alteration of Physical Appearance (APA), Internalization of Negative Stereotypes (INS), and Hair Change (HC). Confirmatory factory analysis supported an adequate model fit of a four-factor model: BRH, APA, INS, and HC. All factors of the IROS were positively correlated with the Pre-Encounter subscale of the Racial Identity Attitude Scale (RIAS-B; J. E. Helms & T. A. Parham, 1996), and 4 of the factors were negatively correlated with the Immersion/Emersion subscale of the RIAS-B. Four factors of the IROS were negatively correlated with all subscales and total scores of the African Self-Consciousness Scale (J. A. Baldwin & Y. R. Bell, 1985). These results provide some support of the validity of the IROS.     

Moral Responsibility for Self-Deluding Beings

Philosophia - In this article, I argue for four theses. First, libertarian and compatibilist accounts of moral responsibility agree that the capability of practical reason is the central feature of...     

解读"道德责任"

本文从理论和历史的角度,对道德责任内涵、道德责任归因、道德责任的前提条件、道德责任的谅解、道德责任冲突的解决进行了分析和探讨.其中道德责任归因理论和责任冲突解决理论具有可操作性和重要的现实意义.     

Moral Responsibility Invariantism

Moral responsibility invariantism is the view that there is a single set of conditions for being morally responsible for an action (or omission or consequence of an act or omission) that applies in all cases. I defend this view against some recent arguments by Joshua Knobe and John Doris.     

Pride and Moral Responsibility

Having the emotion of pride requires taking oneself to stand in some special relation to the object of pride. According to agency accounts of this pride relation, the self and the object of pride are suitably related just in case one is morally responsible for the existence or excellence of the object of one's pride. I argue that agency accounts fail. This argument provides a strong prima facie defence of an alternate account of pride, according to which the self and the object of pride are suitably related just in case one's relation to the object of pride indicates that one's life accords with some of one's personal ideals. I conclude that the pride relation, though distinct from the relation of moral responsibility, is nonetheless a relation of philosophical interest that merits further attention. 1 … the objects which excite these passions [pride and humility], are very numerous, and seemingly very different from each other. Pride or self‐esteem may arise from the qualities of the mind; wit, good‐sense, learning, courage, integrity: from those of the body; beauty, strength, agility, good mien, address in dancing, riding, fencing: from external advantages; country, family, children, relations, riches, houses, gardens, horses, dogs, cloaths. [I] afterwards proceed to find out that common circumstance, in which all these objects agree, and which causes them to operate on the passions. —David Hume 2     

Situationism and Moral Responsibility

In section 1, I will describe how moral responsibility requires normative competence. In section 2, I will introduce an influential social psychology experiment and consider one of its philosophical interpretations, situationism. In section 3, I will discuss the possession response in defense of normative competence. This is an approach to save normative competence via possession, and in turn the concept of the morally responsible agent, by relinquishing the need for exercising normative competence. After discussing its pros and cons, section 4 will focus on the exercise response, which emphasizes each singular exercise of normative competence. Given these two responses, I will argue that we are faced with a dilemma. If we admit that the concept of the morally responsible agent is grounded in the mere possession of normative competence, then the concept becomes useless in a practical sense, forcing us to embrace a concept that is tied to the exercise of normative competence. If we admit that the morally responsible agent is grounded in only the exercise of normative competence, the concept of the morally responsible agent no longer aligns with common sense.     

Suffering and Moral Responsibility

Book Information Suffering and Moral Responsibility. Suffering and Moral Responsibility Meyerfeld Jamie New York Oxford University Press ix + 237 Hardback £35 By Meyerfeld Jamie. Oxford University Press. New York. Pp. ix + 237. Hardback:£35,