Aggregating with reason(s)

Judgment aggregation is naturally applied to the modeling of collective attitudes. In the individual case, we represent agents as having not just beliefs, but also as supporting them with reasons. Can the Judgment Aggregation help model a concept of collective reason? I argue that the resources of the standard judgment aggregation framework are insufficiently general. I develop a generalization of the framework that improves along this dimension. In the new framework, new aggregation rules become available, as well as a natural account of collective reasons.     

The End(s) of Mercy

In philosophy and in religious ethics, accounts of mercy are typically developed in relation to justice. The essays in this focus issue each insist on an integral connection between mercy and justice, yet each reconfigures that relationship by arguing that mercy is best understood as a normative response to others in their need. Defining mercy as our response to others’ need highlights the value of mercy as an effective public virtue, grounded in realism about the human condition and focused on reparative and restorative action.     

The Case(s) of Gordon Allport

ABSTRACT Gordon Allport has frequently been criticized for advocating the use of idiographic studies but undertaking only one such study himself. This article describes Allport's work on the case of Marion Taylor, an unpublished study that clearly contributed to his later work on the case method. The unfinished Taylor case materials suggest that Ada Allport was an important collaborator in Allport's work with individual cases. The case of Taylor is compared with the later case of Jenny Masterson using Allport's rules for the preparation of case studies in order to shed light on Allport's ambivalence regarding case studies.     

Animals and Relational Egalitarianism(s)

According to relational egalitarianism, a society is just insofar as the relations in that society are equal. Exclusively, relational egalitarians have been concerned with why humans, in particular adults, must relate as equals. This is unfortunate since relational egalitarians claim to be in line with the concerns of real-life egalitarians; but real-life egalitarians, such as vegans and vegetarians, clearly care about injustices committed against non-human animals. In this article, I thus explore the role of non-human animals in relational egalitarianism. I distinguish four accounts of relational egalitarianism and argue that they differ in what they imply for relationships between humans and animals. Interestingly, it will also become clear that in relational egalitarianism, a relation may not only be unequal or equal; it may also be non-unequal.     

"The" interpretation(s) of conditionals

Recent studies indicate that a vast majority of people judge the probability of a conditional as equivalent to the conditional probability of . This means that in evaluating the applicability of a conditional people do not seem to take into account situations in which the antecedent is false. This has been taken as evidence against the model theory of Johnson-Laird and Byrne (2002). This theory, however, claims that the conditional interpretation in which false-antecedent cases are relevant is only one of many possible interpretations of "if." We present new evidence that confirms this flexibility of the interpretive system. When people are primed by thinking (1) about truth and the difference between the and or (2) are invited to judge which situations are consistent with the conditional, they are more likely to select a probability estimate that takes into account the false-antecedent cases.     

Heidegger and the source(s) of intelligibility

Wittgensteinian readings of Being and Time, and of the source of the intelligibility of Dasein's world, in terms of language and the average everyday public practices of das Man are partly right and partly wrong. They are right in correcting overly individualist and existentialist readings of Heidegger. But they are wrong in making Heidegger into a proponent of language or everydayness as the final word on intelligibility and the way the world is disclosed to us. The everydayness of das Man and language are partial sources of intelligibility but only insofar as they are comprehended within the greater unitary structure of care and temporality. Care and temporality constitute the foundational underpinnings for disclosure and the intelligibility ofthat wherein Dasein dwells.     

Interpretation(s) of elasticity in operant demand

This brief report provides an account of varying interpretations of elasticity (η ) in the operant demand framework. General references to “demand elasticity” have existed since the Exponential model of operant demand was proposed by Hursh and Silberberg (2008). This term has been used interchangeably with Essential Value (EV), P_MAX, and the rate of change constant α . This report provides an in-depth account of η and the various ways in which this metric has been used to interpret fitted demand functions. A review of relevant mathematic terms, operations associated with differentiating parameters, and worked solutions for η are provided for linear and nonlinear demand functions. The relations between η and EV, P_MAX, and α are described and explained in terms of their mathematical bases and recommendations are provided regarding their individual interpretation. This report concludes with recommendations for providing additional mathematical detail in published works and emphasizing a consistent use of terms when describing aspects of operant demand.     

建设同他者交互关系的未来

本文的核心主题是如何建立同他者的交互关系。作者认为,伦理行为应该从呼吸开始,这是人类最为原初的举动,但在西方文化中一直未得到尊重。忘却呼吸的结果造成了精神和身体的分离,也形成了二元对立的文化传统。要建立二者的伦理关系,首先就要拥有自我爱慕的能力,这是一种栖居在自我状态、能够主宰自己行动和思维的能力,是维持自己家园的前提。在此基础上,作者认为应该开放自我的世界迎接他者的到来,把自己封闭在自我世界的结果将导致对他者异质性的排斥。同时,有必要保持沉默,要耐心倾听,更要换一个方式讲话,充分开发知觉感受,以尊重他者完成自我的超越。二者关系也因此得以建立,这一尊重差异基础之上的二者关系不仅适用于处理性别关系,也可以应用于处理其他文化差异中的二者关系,而无数的二者关系最终组成了多元的世界。     

Orientalism and the Invention of Kashmiri Religion(s)

The sordid research process behind the Lallā-Vākyāni, the first major English translation of poetry attributed to the fourteenth-century saint Lal Ded, reveals strategies employed by George Grierson, Lionel Barnett, and Mukund Ram Shastri to recast Lal Ded and the cultural heritage of Kashmir as exclusively Hindu. Contradicting the earliest depictions of Lal Ded in sixteenth-century Persian hagiographies, the Lallā-Vākyāni was instrumental to the modern invention of Kashmiri ?aiva Hinduism as the true religion and culture of Kashmir completely devoid of any connection—religious, historical, or social—with Islam, simultaneously serving Orientalist agendas and politics of the ?ogrā court.     

Social epistemology and the aim(s) of education

In Knowledge in a Social World (1999) Alvin Goldman has defended a ‘veritistic’ or truth-oriented, monistic account of the aim of education. In particular, he argued that the inculcation of true belief constitutes the ultimate goal of education, with other educational activities having only instrumental value insofar as they aid in this goal. In contrast, Harvey Siegel has defended a pluralistic alternative, on which the critical capacity for sustaining rational belief represents an independent, non-instrumental epistemic end of education. I argue that while some of Siegel's objections represent challenges to the sufficiency of Goldman's veritistic model, his alternative account fails to recognise the necessity of truth as an educational goal. This therefore commits Siegel to an unsatisfying pluralism regarding the ideal aim of education. Crucially, this disagreement hinges on two very different ways of understanding the nature of rationality: as instrumental or as epistemic. On Goldman's instrumentalist view, rationality merely involves the ordering of one's means to the end of true belief. However, Kelly (2003) has raised significant counterexamples against the instrumentalist view, and I adapt these to the case of the epistemic ends of education. I thus defend a non-pluralistic account of the ultimate end of education as involving knowledge in the ‘strong’ sense. This, I argue, overcomes the objections raised against Goldman and Siegel's accounts, and better accords with the notion of an ideal characterisation of the aim of education.     

Recent books on ≡ world religion(s)

Books reviewed in this article:
Dan Cohn-Sherbok, A Concise Encyclopedia of Judaism
Klaus K. Klostermaier, A Concise Encyclopedia of Hinduism
Geoffrey Parrinder, A Concise Encyclopedia of Christianity
Dan Cohn-Sherbok, Judaism
Jamal J. Elias, Islam
Bradley K. Hawkins, Buddhism
Cybelle Shattuck, Hinduism
Brian Wilson, Christianity
Mary Pat Fisher, Religion in the Twenty-first Century     

Revisiting Wittgenstein on Family Resemblance and Colour(s)

We argue that all general concepts are family resemblance concepts. These include concepts introduced by ostension, such as colour(s). Concepts of colour and of each of the specific colours are family resemblance concepts because similarities concerning an open‐ended range of colour or of appearance features crop up and disappear. After discussing the notion of “same colour” and Wittgenstein's use of the phrase “our colours”, we suggest family resemblance concepts in one tradition can often be extended to family resemblance concepts in another tradition, illustrated by Wittgenstein's use of the words Spiel and “game”.