What Pessimism about Moral Deference Means for Disagreement

Many writers have recently argued that there is something distinctively problematic about sustaining moral beliefs on the basis of others’ moral views. Call this claim pessimism about moral deference. Pessimism about moral deference, if true, seems to provide an attractive way to argue for a bold conclusion about moral disagreement: moral disagreement generally does not require belief revision. Call this claim steadfastness about moral disagreement. Perhaps the most prominent recent discussion of the connection between moral deference and moral disagreement, due to Alison Hills, uses pessimism about the former to argue for steadfastness about the latter. This paper reveals that this line of thinking, and others like it, are unsuccessful. There is no way to argue from a compelling version of pessimism about moral deference to the conclusion of steadfastness about moral disagreement. The most plausible versions of pessimism about moral deference have only very limited implications for moral disagreement.     

Beliefs About Older Workers' Learning and Development Behavior in Relation to Beliefs About Malleability of Skills,Age‐Related Decline,and Control1

This study investigated beliefs about older workers' ability and inclination to develop career‐relevant skills, concepts that have not been empirically examined previously in any depth. Two sets of distinct but conceptually related variables were examined in relation to these beliefs. First, participants' implicit theory of abilities (whether they are fixed or changeable) was investigated, and was not found to predict beliefs about older workers' ability or inclination to develop. Second, their beliefs about the age‐related decline of learning‐relevant abilities and the controllability of such decline were examined. Beliefs about the decline of such abilities significantly predicted beliefs about older workers' ability to develop and beliefs about their inclination to develop. A significant relationship was also found between beliefs about controllability of decline and beliefs about older workers' learning goal orientation. Implicit theories significantly predicted beliefs about controllability of decline. These results empirically link research on beliefs about age‐related decline of abilities with the older worker stereotype literature. The results also link literature on beliefs about controllability of decline with literature on implicit theories of skill malleability.     

Effect on Mood of Thinking About Extreme Emotional Terms

The hypothesis that being asked to think about extreme emotional terms influences mood in the direction of the polarity of the terms was tested in three experiments. Subjects answered items about their mood before and after being asked to think about nine extreme, positive emotional terms (e.g., ecstatic) or nine extreme, negative emotional terms (e.g., wretched). It was found that when subjects were asked to think about extreme, positive emotional terms, mood changed in a positive direction, and when they were asked to think about extreme negative emotional terms, mood changed in a negative direction. The effect on mood of being asked to think about extreme emotional terms did not depend on whether the subjects were asked just to think about the terms(Experiment 1), to think about the terms in relation to the self (Experiment 2), or to think about the meaning of the terms (Experiment 3).     

Differences in early parent-child conversations about negative versus positive emotions: implications for the development of psychological understanding

The authors examined whether the quality and content of everyday parent-child conversations about negative emotions are the same or different from everyday talk about positive emotions. Extensive longitudinal speech samples of 6 children and their parents were analyzed for several critical features when the children were between 2 and 5 years of age. Results showed that children and parents talked about past emotions, the causes of emotions, and connections between emotions and other mental states at higher rates during conversations about negative emotions than during conversations about positive emotions. Discourse about negative emotions also included a larger emotion vocabulary, more open-ended questions, and more talk about other people. These differences appeared before the children's 3rd birthdays and remained consistent through the preschool years. The findings strengthen and clarify current understanding of young children's articulation and knowledge about people's minds, lives, and emotions.     

What do children want to know about animals and artifacts? Domain-specific requests for information

Children's questions may reveal a great deal about the characteristics of objects they consider to be conceptually important. Thirty-two preschool children were given opportunities to ask questions about unfamiliar artifacts and animals. The children asked ambiguous questions such as "What is it?" about artifacts and animals alike. However, they were more likely to ask about the functions of artifacts, but about category membership, food choices, and typical locations of animals. They never asked questions about either artifacts or animals that would be considered inappropriate by adults. The results indicate that children hold different expectations about the types of information important for categorizing living and artifact kinds. Young children conceive of artifacts in terms of functions, but conceive of animals in terms of biologically appropriate characteristics. Such results speak to debates about the role of function in children's biological reasoning and to accounts of children's artifact concepts.     

Knowledge About Genetics Among African Americans

Although knowledge about genetic concepts is important for individuals to be active participants in medical technologies that use genetic science, limited information is available on knowledge about basic genetic concepts and terminology in African Americans. The purpose of this study was to evaluate knowledge about general genetic concepts and medical genetics terminology among African Americans and to identify factors having independent associations with knowledge. Participants were 109 adult African Americans enrolled in a study on attitudes about race, genetics, and smoking. The majority of respondents were knowledgeable about general genetic concepts, but were less knowledgeable about medical genetics terminology. Education was the only factor independently associated with knowledge about sporadic disorders in multivariate logistic regression analysis. Respondents with at least some college education were most likely to be knowledgeable about sporadic disorders (OR=2.70, 95% CI=1.10, 6.67, p=.03). The results of this study suggest that genetics education targeted to African Americans may need to focus on increasing understanding about technical concepts related to genetics.     

Dummett on Bringing About the Past

In ‘Bringing about the Past’ Michael Dummett attempted to defend the coherence of the idea of bringing about the past. I agree that bringing about the past is conceptually no more problematic than bringing about the future, but argue, against Dummett, that there is no need to restrict the scope of an agent’s knowledge in order to make sense of intentionally bringing about past events.     

EFFECTS OF STEREOTYPES ABOUT FEMINISTS ON FEMINIST SELF-IDENTIFICATION

This study examined whether negative stereotypes about feminists serve as a barrier to self-identifying as a feminist. College women were exposed to positive stereotypes about feminists, negative stereotypes about feminists, or were not exposed to stereotypes about feminists (control condition) in a between-participants design. Women who read a paragraph containing positive stereotypes about feminists were twice as likely to self-identify as feminists as women in the control condition or the condition in which they read a paragraph containing negative stereotypes about feminists. Women exposed to positive feminist stereotypes had greater nontraditional gender-role attitudes and performance self-esteem compared to the no-stereotype-control condition.     

Adolescents’ Social Reasoning About Relational Aggression

We examined early adolescents’ reasoning about relational aggression, and the links that their reasoning has to their own relationally aggressive behavior. Thinking about relational aggression was compared to thinking about physical aggression, conventional violations, and personal behavior. In individual interviews, adolescents (N = 103) rated the acceptability of relational aggression, physical aggression, conventional violations, and personal behavior, and justified their ratings. Results indicated that adolescents’ views about relational aggression are complex. Although gossip was viewed as very wrong (comparable to beliefs about physical aggression), exclusion was perceived to be somewhat acceptable (less wrong than conventional violations, but more wrong than personal behaviors). With regard to associations between beliefs about aggression and aggressive behavior, the results indicated that beliefs about gossip were associated with gossiping behavior, and that beliefs about physical aggression were associated with physically aggressive behavior. No links emerged between beliefs about exclusion and exclusionary behavior. Implications and suggestions for future research are discussed within the frameworks of social domain theory and social information processing models of aggressive behavior.     

Effects of the 1989 San Francisco earthquake on frequency and content of nightmares.

In a systematic evaluation of the effects of a natural disaster on nightmares, nightmare frequency was found to be about twice as high among 92 San Francisco Bay area college students as among 97 control subjects in Tucson, Arizona, after the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake. Subjects in California had not only more nightmares in general but substantially more nightmares about earthquakes. Over a 3-week period, about 40% of those in the San Francisco Bay area reported one or more nightmares about an earthquake, as compared with only 5% of those in Arizona. However, nightmares about earthquakes were not more emotionally intense than other nightmares. These findings support the long-held view that the experience of a potentially traumatic event can result in more frequent nightmares, particularly about the event itself, but contradict the common opinion that nightmares about such events are unusually intense.     

Predicting your own and others' thoughts and feelings: More like a stranger than a friend

Subjects made predictions about the likely cognitions or affective reactions that they, a well-known other, and a prototypic other, would have to ink-blot and pictorial stimuli. Their responses were categorized using Karniol's (1986) 10 transformation rules. No differences between the targets of prediction were found on any of the measures when ink-blot stimuli were used. For pictorial stimuli, a greater variety of transformation rules was used to make predictions about a well-known other than about self, and a greater variety of transformation rules was used for self than for a prototypic other. Again, for pictorial stimuli, more predictions about a well-known other were made using associations, transformation rules that represent personalized knowledge than about self, and more predictions using associations were made about self than about a prototypic other. Finally, the specific transformation rules used to make predictions about self and a prototypic other were more often the same than were the rules used to make predictions about self and a well-known other. The implications of the findings for the way procedural and declarative knowledge are represented are discussed within the context of the transformation rule model. © 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

No unchallengeable epistemic authority,of any sort,regarding our own conscious experience – Contra Dennett?

Dennett argues that we can be mistaken about our own conscious experience. Despite this, he repeatedly asserts that we can or do have unchallengeable authority of some sort in our reports about that experience. This assertion takes three forms. First, Dennett compares our authority to the authority of an author over his fictional world. Unfortunately, that appears to involve denying that there are actual facts about experience that subjects may be truly or falsely reporting. Second, Dennett sometimes seems to say that even though we may be mistaken about what our conscious experience is, our reports about “what it’s like to be us” must be correct. That view unfortunately requires a nonstandard and unremarked distinction between facts about consciousness and facts about “what it’s like.” Third, Dennett says that reports about experience may be “incorrigible.” However, that claim stands in tension with evidence, highlighted by Dennett himself, that seems to suggest that people can be demonstrably mistaken about their own experience. Dennett needlessly muddies his case against infallibilism with these unsatisfactory compromises.     

The development of spontaneous trait inferences about the actor and spontaneous trait transferences about the informant: Evidence from children aged 8–13 years

In social‐cognitive research, little attention has been paid to the developmental course of spontaneous trait inferences about the actor (STIs about the actor) and spontaneous trait transferences about the informant (STTs about the informant). Using a false recognition paradigm, Study 1 investigated the developmental course of STIs and Study 2 investigated the developmental course of STTs, comparing 8‐, 9‐, 10‐, 11‐, 12‐ and 13‐year olds. The results of Study 1 showed that 8‐year olds could make STIs about the actor, and the magnitude of STIs increased from ages 8 to 10 years, stabilised at the age of 10, 11, 12 years, and decreased from ages 12 through 13 years. The results of Study 2 showed that 8‐year olds could make STTs about the informant, and the magnitude of STTs did not vary with age. In all age groups, the magnitude of STIs about the actor was greater than that of STTs about the informant.     

Reasoning about the referent of a picture versus reasoning about the picture as the referent: An effect of visual realism

Research on picture perception and picture-based problem solving has generally considered the information that enables one to “see” and think about a picture’s subject matter. However, people often reason about a picture or representation as the referent itself. The question addressed here is whether pictorial features themselves help determine when one reasons about the referent of an image, as with an engrossing movie, and when one reasons about the image in its own right, as with abstract art. Two experiments tested the hypothesis that pictures with relatively high fidelity to their referents lead people to think about those referents, whereas pictures with relatively low fidelity lead people to think about the picture as a referent. Subjects determined whether marks on the bottom and top boards of an open hinge would meet if the hinge were closed. Accuracy and latency results indicated that subjects who saw realistic displays simulated the physical behavior of the hinge through analog imagery. In contrast, subjects who saw schematic displays tended to reason about static features of the display such as line lengths and angles. The results demonstrate that researchers must be cautious when generalizing from reasoning about diagrammatic materials to reasoning about the referents themselves.     

Speaking freely: on free will and the epistemology of testimony

Peter Graham has recently given a dilemma purportedly showing the compatibility of libertarianism about free will and the anti-skeptical epistemology of testimony. In the first part of this paper I criticize his dilemma: the first horn either involves a false premise or makes the dilemma invalid. The second horn relies without argument on an implausible assumption about testimonial knowledge, and even if granted, nothing on this horn shows libertarianism does not entail skepticism about testimonial justification. I then argue for the incompatibility of (i) a view entailed by Open Theism, viz., that there are no true counterfactuals of freedom, (ii) a popular form of process reliabilism about justification and knowledge, and (iii) a weak anti-skepticism about testimonial justification and knowledge. I conclude that there is a costly tension between certain views about testimony and about free will.     

Elucidating The Etiology and Nature of Beliefs about Parenting Styles

This study was designed to investigate relationships among self‐reported and spouse‐reported beliefs about parenting styles, the characteristics of the individuals manifesting these styles, and the contextual characteristics of parenting. Demographic characteristics, life circumstances, family functioning, personality traits, ability indices, and parenting‐styles indicators were collected from a sample of 452 women and 293 men, all of whom were raising adolescents in contemporary Russia. Of the families studied, 275 were intact (i.e. consisted of married and cohabiting couples). It was found that individual characteristics and contextual characteristics (e.g. family functioning) together predicted about 20% of the variance in reported beliefs about parental styles of responsiveness and demandingness. Moreover, these variables discriminated about 65% of the parents reporting indulging, neglectful, authoritarian or authoritative beliefs about parenting. The percentage of explained variance doubled when beliefs about parenting styles of partners were placed in the model. Thus, in attempts to understand the etiology of parents’ beliefs about parenting styles, more attention should be given to beliefs about parenting styles of their spouses. It might be that beliefs about parenting styles emerge as a structure shared by spouses; they are mediated, but not solely determined, by the individual characteristics of parents and their children.     

Factors influencing juror verdict in a case involving repressed memories of abuse

Mental health professionals acting as expert witnesses are expected to testify about the prevalence of sexual abuse, and also about the veracity of memory. In cases involving adult survivors of sexual abuse, this testimony is typically about repressed and false memory syndromes. Many professionals have noted concerns about the lack of definitive data to support either syndrome. This study examined the following variables: juror knowledge and experience with repressed and false memory syndromes, juror attitudes about sexual abuse and memory recovery techniques, and gender of juror on verdict. Results include effects for repressed memory knowledge/experience and gender. Gender differences were found regarding attitudes about abuse and memory. Concluding comments include practical and research implications of the study results.     

E. Joseph Shoben,Jr.: Synthesizer in an Age of Specialization

E. Joseph Shoben, Jr., a pioneer in the development of counseling, was interviewed about his intellectual and career development, his views of the present and future of counseling, his ideas about several issues in psychotherapy, and his reflections about himself and his career. In addition, several others who know Shoben were interviewed about him.