Neural Synchrony and the Causal Efficacy of Consciousness

The purpose of this paper is to address a well-known dilemma for physicalism. If mental properties are type identical to physical properties, then their causal efficacy is secure, but at the cost of ruling out mentality in creatures very different to ourselves. On the other hand, if mental properties are multiply realizable, then all kinds of creatures can instantiate them, but then they seem to be causally redundant. The causal exclusion problem depends on the widely held principle that realized properties inherit their causal powers from their realizers. While this principle holds for functional realization, it fails on a broader notion of realization that permits the realization of complex qualitative properties such as spatial and temporal patterns. Such properties are best seen as dependent powerful qualities, which have their causal roles in virtue of being the qualities they are, and do not inherit powers from their realizers. Recent studies have identified one such property—neural synchrony—as a correlate of consciousness. If synchrony is also partially constitutive of consciousness, then phenomenal properties are both multiply realizable and causally novel. I outline a version of representationalism about consciousness on which this constitution claim holds.

     

Knowledge,Cause, and Abstract Objects: Causal Objections to Platonism

Book Information Knowledge, Cause, and Abstract Objects: Causal Objections to Platonism. Knowledge, Cause, and Abstract Objects: Causal Objections to Platonism Colin Cheyne, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001, xvi + 236, £55 (cloth) By Colin Cheyne. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Pp. xvi + 236. £55,     

On the Causal Completeness of Physics

According to an increasing number of authors, the best, if not the only, argument in favour of physicalism is the so‐called ‘overdetermination argument’. This argument, if sound, establishes that all the entities that enter into causal interactions with the physical world are physical. One key premise in the overdetermination argument is the principle of the causal closure of the physical world, said to be supported by contemporary physics. In this paper, I examine various ways in which physics may support the principle, either as a methodological guide or as depending on some other laws and principles of physics.     

On the Historicity of Scientific Objects

The historical variation of scientific knowledge has lent itself to the development of historical epistemology, which attempts to historicize the origin and establishment of knowledge claims. The questions I address in this paper revolve around the historicity of the objects of those claims: How and why do new scientific objects appear? What exactly comes into being in such cases? Do scientific objects evolve over time and in what ways? I put forward and defend two theses: First, the ontology of science is so rich and variegated that there are no universally valid answers to these questions. Second, we need a pluralist account of scientific objects, a pluralist metaphysics that can do justice to their rich diversity and their various modes of being and becoming. I then focus on hidden objects, which are supposed to be part of the permanent furniture of the universe, and I discuss their birth and historicity: They emerge when various phenomena coalesce as manifestations of a single hidden cause and their representations change over time. Finally, I examine the conditions under which an evolving representation may still refer to the same object and I illustrate my argument drawing upon the early history of electrons.     

On Attachment to Internal Objects

This paper considers some clinical implications of attachment theory from the perspective of the theory of internal object relationships and the unconscious phantasies that derive from such relationships. The paper focuses on the contributions of Bowlby and his followers, particularly Mary Main, who has developed a language-based methodology to study representational processes in adults and children, bridging the gap between the systematic study of human behavior and clinical psychoanalysis. The theory of inherent role responsiveness in the internal object world—mental representations of self and other in interaction and externalized in complementary role relationships through exchanges of unconscious and conscious messages—is presented as the psychoanalytic complement of Bowlby's theory of internal working models of attachment. Role responsiveness occurs internally as well as externally, so that one can speak of attachment to phantasy objects as well as external objects. Clinical examples illustrate how the therapist, through maintaining a free-floating responsiveness to the patient's enactments, may reconstruct the internal working models of attachment and their origins in the transference. The paperthus illustrates the way in which the origins of phantasy derive from the wished for and feared states related to early experiences of felt security, or lack of it, in relation to the attachment objects, thereby integrating the psychoanalytic theory of phantasy with attachment theory.     

Causal Exclusion and Causal Bayes Nets

In this paper I reconstruct and evaluate the validity of two versions of causal exclusion arguments within the theory of causal Bayes nets. I argue that supervenience relations formally behave like causal relations. If this is correct, then it turns out that both versions of the exclusion argument are valid when assuming the causal Markov condition and the causal minimality condition. I also investigate some consequences for the recent discussion of causal exclusion arguments in the light of an interventionist theory of causation such as Woodward's ( 2003 ) and discuss a possible objection to my causal Bayes net reconstruction.     

不在之在何以存在? --论拉康关于实在的理论

想像、象征和实在是拉康自创的三个概念,在其整个理论中占据着基石般的地位。他本人对前两者的论述较为清楚、详细,对后者所费的笔墨则不多。鉴于此,后人的研究往往也偏重于前两者,而忽略了对后者的探索。这固然有其本人对实在论述甚少这一方面的原因,但是,最重要的恐怕还在于实在概念本身。因为实在作为一种缺场之在场是语言无法直接描     

Causal Analyses in Interpersonal Relations: On Importance of the Control Condition

Most studies of interpersonal relations employ the high and low levels of an independent variable and attribute the high–low difference to the high level only. However, such a difference can be due to the positivity effect of the high level, the negativity effect of the low level, or both. To specify the loci of the high–low difference, a control condition is necessary. In my research into interpersonal attraction and impression formation, I ascertained the magnitude of the positivity and negativity effects relative to the response to a control condition of no-individuating information. The negativity effects of dissimilar attitudes and negative traits were greater than the positivity effects of similar attitudes and positive traits. One source of this positive–negative asymmetry was the person positivity bias in the participants. A greater weighting of negative than positive level could be another factor. Research is needed to separate the contributions of these two variables to the positive–negative asymmetry demonstrated.     

虚拟与虚拟实在

虚拟是这个时代的热门词,也是当下文化的关键词.在三亿多的网民中,很多人见面时的问候语从吃过没有变为魔兽了吗抑或摘菜了没有,网络虚拟生活已经成为国人乃至世人一种必不可少的生活方式.二十年前美国学者迈克海姆写过一本关于虚拟实在的书,大约十年前引入国内,引发了国内学者关于虚拟实在的研究和讨论.但由于当时国内的信息技术尚未普及,网民数量稀少,所以他的书和这场讨论未能引起社会轰动并深入持久下去.如今恰逢读网时代,我们重拾虚拟实在,重新探讨它的形而上以及与虚拟的区别与联系,因为它是我们在谈及当下文化时绝不能回避和忽略的问题.     

Causal Closure,Causal Exclusion,and Supervenience Physicalism

This article considers the recent defense of the supervenience approach to physicalism due to Jaegwon Kim. Kim argues that supervenience supports physical causal closure, and that causal closure supports physicalism – indeed, a kind of reductive physicalism – and thus that supervenience suffices for physicalism. After laying out Kim's argument, I ask whether its success would truly vindicate the role of supervenience in defining physicalist positions. I argue that it would not, and that insofar as Kim's defense of supervenience physicalism succeeds, it does so by showing that supervenience physicalism is not a unique, nonredundant way to be a physicalist.     

General and Familiar Trust in Websites

When people rely on the web to gather and distribute information, they can build a sense of trust in the websites with which they interact. Understanding the correlates of trust in most websites (general website trust) and trust in websites that one frequently visits (familiar website trust) is crucial for constructing better models of risk perception and online behavior. We conducted an online survey of active Internet users and examined the associations between the two types of web trust and several independent factors: information technology competence, adverse online events, and general dispositions to be trusting or cautious of others. Using a series of nested ordered logistic regression models, we find positive associations between general trust, general caution, and the two types of web trust. The positive effect of information technology competence erases the effect of general caution for general website trust but not for familiar website trust, providing evidence that general trust and self-reported competence are stronger associates of general website trust than broad attitudes about prudence. Finally, the experience of an adverse online event has a strong, negative association with general website trust, but not with familiar website trust. We discuss several implications for online behavior and suggest website policies that can help users make informed decisions about interacting with potentially risky websites.     

Formalization and the Objects of Logic

There is a long-standing debate whether propositions, sentences, statements or utterances provide an answer to the question of what objects logical formulas stand for. Based on the traditional understanding of logic as a science of valid arguments, this question is firstly framed more exactly, making explicit that it calls not only for identifying some class of objects, but also for explaining their relationship to ordinary language utterances. It is then argued that there are strong arguments against the proposals commonly put forward in the debate. The core of the problem is that an informative account of the objects formulas stand for presupposes a theory of formalization; that is, a theory that explains what formulas may adequately substitute for an inference in proofs of validity. Although such theories are still subject to research, some consequences can be drawn from an analysis of the reasons why the common accounts featuring sentences, propositions or utterances fail. Theories of formalization cannot refer to utterances qua expressions of propositions; instead they may refer to sentences and rely on additional information about linguistic structure and pragmatic context.