Neural Synchrony and the Causal Efficacy of Consciousness

The purpose of this paper is to address a well-known dilemma for physicalism. If mental properties are type identical to physical properties, then their causal efficacy is secure, but at the cost of ruling out mentality in creatures very different to ourselves. On the other hand, if mental properties are multiply realizable, then all kinds of creatures can instantiate them, but then they seem to be causally redundant. The causal exclusion problem depends on the widely held principle that realized properties inherit their causal powers from their realizers. While this principle holds for functional realization, it fails on a broader notion of realization that permits the realization of complex qualitative properties such as spatial and temporal patterns. Such properties are best seen as dependent powerful qualities, which have their causal roles in virtue of being the qualities they are, and do not inherit powers from their realizers. Recent studies have identified one such property—neural synchrony—as a correlate of consciousness. If synchrony is also partially constitutive of consciousness, then phenomenal properties are both multiply realizable and causally novel. I outline a version of representationalism about consciousness on which this constitution claim holds.

     

Knowledge,Cause, and Abstract Objects: Causal Objections to Platonism

Book Information Knowledge, Cause, and Abstract Objects: Causal Objections to Platonism. Knowledge, Cause, and Abstract Objects: Causal Objections to Platonism Colin Cheyne, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001, xvi + 236, £55 (cloth) By Colin Cheyne. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Pp. xvi + 236. £55,     

On the Causal Completeness of Physics

According to an increasing number of authors, the best, if not the only, argument in favour of physicalism is the so‐called ‘overdetermination argument’. This argument, if sound, establishes that all the entities that enter into causal interactions with the physical world are physical. One key premise in the overdetermination argument is the principle of the causal closure of the physical world, said to be supported by contemporary physics. In this paper, I examine various ways in which physics may support the principle, either as a methodological guide or as depending on some other laws and principles of physics.     

On the Historicity of Scientific Objects

The historical variation of scientific knowledge has lent itself to the development of historical epistemology, which attempts to historicize the origin and establishment of knowledge claims. The questions I address in this paper revolve around the historicity of the objects of those claims: How and why do new scientific objects appear? What exactly comes into being in such cases? Do scientific objects evolve over time and in what ways? I put forward and defend two theses: First, the ontology of science is so rich and variegated that there are no universally valid answers to these questions. Second, we need a pluralist account of scientific objects, a pluralist metaphysics that can do justice to their rich diversity and their various modes of being and becoming. I then focus on hidden objects, which are supposed to be part of the permanent furniture of the universe, and I discuss their birth and historicity: They emerge when various phenomena coalesce as manifestations of a single hidden cause and their representations change over time. Finally, I examine the conditions under which an evolving representation may still refer to the same object and I illustrate my argument drawing upon the early history of electrons.     

On the Reality of Illusory Conjunctions

The reality of illusory conjunctions in perception has been sometimes questioned, arguing that they can be explained by other mechanisms. Most relevant experiments are based on migrations along the space dimension. But the low rate of illusory conjunctions along space can easily hide them among other types of errors. As migrations over time are a more frequent phenomenon, illusory conjunctions can be disentangled from other errors. We report an experiment in which series of colored letters were presented in several spatial locations, allowing for migrations over both space and time. The distribution of frequencies were fit by several multinomial tree models based on alternative hypothesis about illusory conjunctions and the potential sources of free-floating features. The best-fit model acknowledges that most illusory conjunctions are migrations in the time domain. Migrations in space are probably present, but the rate is very low. Other conjunction errors, as those produced by guessing or miscategorizations of the to-be-reported feature, are also present in the experiment. The main conclusion is that illusory conjunctions do exist.     

On Attachment to Internal Objects

This paper considers some clinical implications of attachment theory from the perspective of the theory of internal object relationships and the unconscious phantasies that derive from such relationships. The paper focuses on the contributions of Bowlby and his followers, particularly Mary Main, who has developed a language-based methodology to study representational processes in adults and children, bridging the gap between the systematic study of human behavior and clinical psychoanalysis. The theory of inherent role responsiveness in the internal object world—mental representations of self and other in interaction and externalized in complementary role relationships through exchanges of unconscious and conscious messages—is presented as the psychoanalytic complement of Bowlby's theory of internal working models of attachment. Role responsiveness occurs internally as well as externally, so that one can speak of attachment to phantasy objects as well as external objects. Clinical examples illustrate how the therapist, through maintaining a free-floating responsiveness to the patient's enactments, may reconstruct the internal working models of attachment and their origins in the transference. The paperthus illustrates the way in which the origins of phantasy derive from the wished for and feared states related to early experiences of felt security, or lack of it, in relation to the attachment objects, thereby integrating the psychoanalytic theory of phantasy with attachment theory.     

Causal Exclusion and Causal Autonomism

The causal exclusion problem is often considered as one of the major difficulties for which non-reductive physicalists have no easy solution to offer. Some non-reductive physicalists address this problem by arguing that mental properties are to some extent causally autonomous. If this is the case, then mental properties will not be causally excluded by their physical realizers because causation, in general, is a relation between properties of the same level. In this paper, I argue that the response from causal autonomy cannot be successful for two reasons. First, it does not offer a satisfactory explanation for how mental particulars can have causal efficacy in a non-reductive physicalist framework. Second, the causal considerations underpinning this response do not really support the conclusion that mental properties are causally autonomous.     

Causal Exclusion and Causal Bayes Nets

In this paper I reconstruct and evaluate the validity of two versions of causal exclusion arguments within the theory of causal Bayes nets. I argue that supervenience relations formally behave like causal relations. If this is correct, then it turns out that both versions of the exclusion argument are valid when assuming the causal Markov condition and the causal minimality condition. I also investigate some consequences for the recent discussion of causal exclusion arguments in the light of an interventionist theory of causation such as Woodward's ( 2003 ) and discuss a possible objection to my causal Bayes net reconstruction.     

不在之在何以存在? --论拉康关于实在的理论

想像、象征和实在是拉康自创的三个概念,在其整个理论中占据着基石般的地位。他本人对前两者的论述较为清楚、详细,对后者所费的笔墨则不多。鉴于此,后人的研究往往也偏重于前两者,而忽略了对后者的探索。这固然有其本人对实在论述甚少这一方面的原因,但是,最重要的恐怕还在于实在概念本身。因为实在作为一种缺场之在场是语言无法直接描     

Humanism and Terrorism: On the Dialogic Imagination of a Grotesque Reality

This article addresses the question as to how humanism should relate to the evil of terrorism. The main source of inspiration is the Pulitzer Prize-winning novel American Pastoral by Philip Roth. In this novel, the struggle between a father and his extremist daughter mirrors a struggle between different social imaginaries of America, raising intriguing questions concerning humanism, especially with regard to Bildung. The inability of the main characters to reconcile the conflicting ideals reveals a weakness in Bildung humanism. This humanist school is blind to the conflicting desires, emotions, and passions that lie behind the battle of ideas. Dialogic imagination can help us relate to destructive forces and desires that oppose the humanist ideal of reason. Bildung humanism—with its higher ideals of order, synthesis, and perfection—collides with the capricious human condition. Furthermore, the novel demonstrates that extreme violence or even terrorism can be a reaction to the pursuit of order and perfection. Ideals that deny the existence of imperfections are in themselves violent. Without an occasional reality check, idealism easily turns into blind arrogance. This unintentionally fuels terrorism. Bildung humanism has a responsibility to reflect profoundly on these side effects of idealism. This article seeks to contribute to a realistic reflection on the struggle between humanism and terrorism.