知情权 选择权 责任与义务

讨论患者的知情权、选择权与医生的责任义务很有现实意义。病人一旦就医,安全和早日康复是第一位的,当医生面对患者时,救死扶伤不惜一切地去挽救患者的生命是医生的天职,患者一旦推动生命,其他权力都是空话。     

Equality,Bias, and the Right to an Equal Say

Philosophia - Thomas Christiano argues that democracies acquire a right to rule by being the unique embodiment of publicly accessible rules. Justice requires the equal advancement of the interests...     

Double Standards, Racial Equality and the Right Reference Class

ABSTRACT  There is a popular way of appealing to consistency of judgment or principle whose result is to rule out relevant information. To avoid the danger of judging similar cases differently, relevantly different cases are treated alike. So the information distinguishing them is lost. I try to formulate, defend and apply a requirement upon determining whether situations are similar with respect to a principle. Adherence to the requirement is a way to prevent the loss of information through illicit appeals to consistency. Part II examines a difficulty for the requirement proposed. The difficulty concerns determinateness: given the requirement's broad scope, it cannot yield judgments on specific cases without prejudging substantive issues. Without reaching any solution to the difficulty, I point out that parallel difficulties arise for similar requirements in diverse areas, and that the problem can be mitigated to varying degrees in actual applications of these requirements.     

权利优先、还是义务优先——对涉及人的生物医学研究中受试者权利与义务关系的理性思考

对“权利与义务”从“公正”方面进行了解读,论述了在涉及人的生物医学研究中,受试者权利与义务之间的复杂关系,提出“受试者权利优先”是平衡两者关系的基本原则;确立了“受试者权利优先”的具体策略：首先尊重受试者的权利（首要性）;当受试者的权利与受试者的义务出现一定矛盾时,应该把尊重受试者的权利放在首位（至上性）;在尊重受试者的权利中,化解两者矛盾。     

论艾滋病人及艾滋病毒感染者权利与义务的平衡

《艾滋病防治条例》,对于艾滋病病毒感染者和艾滋病人的权利和义务进行了精巧的设计.本着保护人权和预防疾病的需要,对艾滋病病毒感染者和艾滋病人在医疗活动、人身权益和社会经济各方面的权利与义务都进行了很好的平衡.     

论艾滋病人及艾滋病毒感染者权利与义务的平衡

《艾滋病防治条例》,对于艾滋病病毒感染者和艾滋病人的权利和义务进行了精巧的设计。本着保护人权和预防疾病的需要,对艾滋病病毒感染者和艾滋病人在医疗活动、人身权益和社会经济各方面的权利与义务都进行了很好的平衡。     

Obligation,Responsibility, and History

I argue that, each of the following, appropriately clarified to yield a noteworthy thesis, is true. (1) Moral obligation can affect moral responsibility. (2) Obligation succumbs to changes in responsibility. (3) Obligation is immune from changes in responsibility.     

Frankfurt-Type Examples, Obligation, and Responsibility

I examine John Martin Fischer's attempt to block an argument for the conclusion that without alternative possibilities, morally deontic judgments (judgments of moral right, wrong, and obligation) cannot be true. I then criticize a recent attempt to sustain the principle that an agent is morally blameworthy for performing an action only if this action is morally wrong. I conclude with discussing Fisher's view that even if causal determinism undermines morally deontic judgments, it still leaves room for other significant moral assessments including assessments of moral blameworthiness.     

Ability,Frankfurt Examples,and Obligation

Frankfurt examples invite controversy over whether the pertinent agent in these examples lacks the specific (as opposed to the general) ability to do otherwise, and whether what she does can be obligatory or permissible. We develop an account of ability that implies that this agent does not have the specific ability to refrain from performing the germane action. The account also undergirds a view of obligation that entails that it is morally required or prohibited for an agent to perform an action only if she has the specific ability to do, and to do otherwise than, perform it. Therefore, in Frankfurt examples, it is neither obligatory nor impermissible for the relevant agent to do what she does.     

Liberty,Security, and Fairness

What constraints should be imposed on individual liberty for the sake of protecting our collective security? A helpful approach to answering this question is offered by a theory that grounds political obligation and authority in a moral requirement of fair contribution to mutually beneficial cooperative schemes. This approach encourages us to split the opening question into two—a question of correctness and a question of legitimacy—and generates a detailed set of answers to both subsidiary questions, with a nuanced and plausible set of implications. The plausibility of its treatment of the issues surrounding liberty and security, I argue, helps to confer credibility on the fairness-based theory that carries these implications.

     

Training, Perfectionism and Fairness

abstract This paper considers the question of whether unemployed individuals have a duty of fairness to accept retraining as a condition of receiving unemployment benefit. It is argued, in response to Stuart White, that, although there are some circumstances where individuals do have such a moral duty, for an egalitarian it is never the case that there is sufficient reason for enforcing such a duty by means of the law.