Factual Evidence without Knowledge

A central function of our evidence is to constrain the epistemic rationality of our propositional attitudes. Our knowledge does this. That fact supports Timothy Williamson's contention that our evidence is identical to our knowledge, ‘E=K’. But it is argued here that some true propositions are evidence without being known. Some of them cannot be known; others are contingently not known. Propositions play the rational role of evidence whenever they are clearly true, whether or not they are known.     

XI—Propositional Attitudes?

According to the standard lore on propositions, there are many propositional attitudes, including belief, fear and desire. The standard lore is partly correct: belief is a propositional attitude. But, so this paper argues, fear and desire are never propositional attitudes, not even when the content of the relevant fear or desire can be fully expressed by using a that-clause.     

Propositional or non-propositional attitudes?

Propositionalism is the view that intentional attitudes, such as belief, are relations to propositions. Propositionalists argue that propositionalism follows from the intuitive validity of certain kinds of inferences involving attitude reports. Jubien (Philos Stud 104(1):47–62, 2001) argues powerfully against propositions and sketches some interesting positive proposals, based on Russell’s multiple relation theory of judgment, about how to accommodate “propositional phenomena” without appeal to propositions. This paper argues that none of Jubien’s proposals succeeds in accommodating an important range of propositional phenomena, such as the aforementioned validity of attitude-report inferences. It then shows that the notion of a predication act-type, which remains importantly Russellian in spirit, is sufficient to explain the range of propositional phenomena in question, in particular the validity of attitude-report inferences. The paper concludes by discussing whether predication act-types are really just propositions by another name.     

Some studies on the internal structure of propositions

Summary Five experiments were carried out to test the information processing of the propositional arguments instrument and beneficiary. Proceeding from the assumption that propositions are basic units of memory, it was hypothesized that instrument and beneficiary would show different effects in recall experiments, depending on whether they were components of appropriate propositions or not. Experiments I and II were conducted to test this assumption. The results showed that things are more complicated than was expected. Besides propositional structure, the semantic integration of concrete propositions has to be taken into account to predict their psychological processing. Experiments III, IV, and V were conducted to prove this. On the whole, it was found that instruments can always be considered as arguments but beneficiaries only when they are obligatory; and further that in general instrument arguments are semantically more strongly implied by their predicates than beneficiary arguments are.I would like to thank Trevor Scott for his help in writing the English text. Requests for offprints should be sent to Johannes Engelkamp, Psychologisches Institut, Universität des Saarlandes, D-6600 Saarbrücken, Federal Republic of Germany     

A Measurement Theoretic Account of Propositions

In the first section of this paper I review Measurement Theoretic Semantics – an approach to formal semantics modeled after the application of numbers in measurement, e.g., of length. In the second section it is argued that the measurement theoretic approach to semantics yields a novel, useful conception of propositions. In the third section the measurement theoretic view of propositions is compared with major other accounts of propositional content.     

A New–old Characterisation of Logical Knowledge

We seek means of distinguishing logical knowledge from other kinds of knowledge, especially mathematics. The attempt is restricted to classical two-valued logic and assumes that the basic notion in logic is the proposition. First, we explain the distinction between the parts and the moments of a whole, and theories of ‘sortal terms’, two theories that will feature prominently. Second, we propose that logic comprises four ‘momental sectors’: the propositional and the functional calculi, the calculus of asserted propositions, and rules for (in)valid deduction, inference or substitution. Third, we elaborate on two neglected features of logic: the various modes of negating some part(s) of a proposition R, not only its ‘external’ negation not-R; and the assertion of R in the pair of propositions ‘it is (un)true that R’ belonging to the neglected logic of asserted propositions, which is usually left unstated. We also address the overlooked task of testing the asserted truth-value of R. Fourth, we locate logic among other foundational studies: set theory and other theories of collections, metamathematics, axiomatisation, definitions, model theory, and abstract and operator algebras. Fifth, we test this characterisation in two important contexts: the formulation of some logical paradoxes, especially the propositional ones; and indirect proof-methods, especially that by contradiction. The outcomes differ for asserted propositions from those for unasserted ones. Finally, we reflect upon self-referring self-reference, and on the relationships between logical and mathematical knowledge. A subject index is appended.     

STOIC DISAGREEMENT AND BELIEF RETENTION

Propositions are generally thought to have a truth‐value only relative to some parameter or sequence of parameters. Many apparently straightforward notions, like what it is to disagree or retain a belief, become harder to explain once propositional truth is thus relativized. An account of disagreement within a framework involving such ‘stoic’ propositions is here presented. Some resources developed in that account are then used to respond to the eternalist charge that temporalist propositions can't function as belief contents because they don't allow us to make adequate sense of what belief retention amounts to.     

Against Characterizing Mental States as Propositional Attitudes

The reason for characterizing mental states as propositional attitudes is sentence form: ' S V s that p '. However, many mental states are not ascribed by means of such sentences, and the sentences that ascribe them cannot be appropriately paraphrased. Moreover, even if a paraphrase were always available, that in itself would not establish the characterization. And the mental states that are ascribable by appropriate senses do not form any natural subset of mental states. A reason for the characterization relying on beliefs, etc., about non-existing things is also rejected. Last, some sentences ascribing abilities and dispositions have the same grammatical form as some senses that ascribe mental states, so that the attempt to paraphrase the latter would obscure the conceptual relations between the two sorts. It follows that mental states are not relations to propositions.     

Propositions as Structured Cognitive Event-Types

According to act theories, propositions are structured cognitive act-types. Act theories appear to make propositions inherently representational and truth-evaluable, and to provide solutions to familiar problems with alternative theories, including Frege’s and Russell’s problems, and the third-realm and unity problems. Act theories have critical problems of their own, though: acts as opposed to their objects are not truth evaluable, not structured in the right way, not expressed by sentences, and not the objects of propositional attitudes. I show how identifying propositions with other cognitive event-types, namely thoughts, has the perceived virtues of act theories without the defects.     

Content in a Dynamic Context

The standing tradition in theorizing about meaning, since at least Frege (1882), identifies meaning with propositions, which are, or determine, the truth‐conditions of a sentence in a context. But a recent trend has advocated a departure from this tradition: in particular, it has been argued that modal claims do not express standard propositional contents. This non‐propositionalism has received different implementations in expressivist semantics (Moss, 2015; Swanson, 2006; Yalcin, 2007) and certain kinds of dynamic semantics (Gillies, 2004, 2010; von Fintel and Gillies, 2007; Veltman, 1985, 1996). They maintain that the key aspect of interpretation of modal claims is the characteristic dynamic effect they have on the context. I argue that pessimism about truth‐conditions arises from an overly simplistic picture of content, context and their interaction. While I agree with the critics that an important aspect of modal meaning is the dynamic effect modals have on the context, I argue that they have mischaracterized the nature and the complexity of this effect. A more nuanced account of the interaction between modals and context shows that far from being incompatible with propositional meaning, the dynamic aspect of meaning is precisely what allows us to predict the correct propositional content of an utterance.     

An Admissible Semantics for Propositionally Quantified Relevant Logics

The Routley-Meyer relational semantics for relevant logics is extended to give a sound and complete model theory for many propositionally quantified relevant logics (and some non-relevant ones). This involves a restriction on which sets of worlds are admissible as propositions, and an interpretation of propositional quantification that makes ∀ pA true when there is some true admissible proposition that entails all p-instantiations of A. It is also shown that without the admissibility qualification many of the systems considered are semantically incomplete, including all those that are sub-logics of the quantified version of Anderson and Belnap’s system E of entailment, extended by the mingle axiom and the Ackermann constant t. The incompleteness proof involves an algebraic semantics based on atomless complete Boolean algebras.     

Truth and Nonsense: A Unified Reading of the Tractatus

Upon reading the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, readers might be confused about the nature of the book, since there seems to be a paradox introduced by the author’s two claims: a) the book conveys truths; b) propositions in the book are nonsense. Commentators disagree as to how best to resolve this paradox. Some hold that there are ineffable truths conveyed by nonsense propositions. Others deny this kind of truth, arguing that the book is not all nonsense, for there are some propositions in the book expressing at least the therapeutic truth that philosophical propositions are just nonsense. Recently, some interpreters have claimed that there is no truth at all. While the incoherence of the context is genuine, the purpose of the book is ethical. By diagnosing these interpretations, this paper intends to provide a new perspective toward reading the book by resolving the paradox. The truth of the Tractatus is not a propositional truth, but a specific true thought. The nonsense of the Tractatus is a transcending nonsense, rather than a pure nonsense. The book intends to attain the true thought about the mystical ethics by way of transcending nonsense. In this case, the Tractatus is not an incoherent work at all, since the paradox is not genuine. The fact that the nonsense part is a means to fulfill its ethical purpose makes the book a unified whole.     

Reading rate and retention as a function of the number of propositions in the base structure of sentences

English texts were constructed from propositional bases. One set of 16-word sentences was obtained from semantic bases containing from 4 to 9 propositions. For another set of sentences and paragraphs, number of words and number of propositions covaried. Subjects read the texts at their own rate and recalled them immediately. For the 16-word sentences, subjects needed 1.5 sec additional reading time to process each proposition. For longer texts, this value increased. In another experimental condition reading time was controlled by the experimenter. The analysis of both the text and the recall protocols in terms of number of propositions lent support to the notion that propositions are a basic unit of memory for text. However, evidence was also obtained that while the total number of propositions upon which a text was based proved to be an effective psychological variable, all propositions were not equally difficult to remember: superordinate propositions were recalled better than propositions which were stucturally subordinate.     

On The Computational Consequences of Independence in Propositional Logic

Sandu and Pietarinen [Partiality and Games: Propositional Logic. Logic J. IGPL 9 (2001) 101] study independence friendly propositional logics. That is, traditional propositional logic extended by means of syntax that allow connectives to be independent of each other, although the one may be subordinate to the other. Sandu and Pietarinen observe that the IF propositional logics have exotic properties, like functional completeness for three-valued functions. In this paper we focus on one of their IF propositional logics and study its properties, by means of notions from computational complexity. This approach enables us to compare propositional logic before and after the IF make-over. We observe that all but one of the best-known decision problems experience a complexity jump, provided that the complexity classes at hand are not equal. Our results concern every discipline that incorporates some notion of independence such as computer science, natural language semantics, and game theory. A corollary of one of our theorems illustrates this claim with respect to the latter discipline.     

Structured propostions and sentence structure

It is argued that taken together, two widely held claims ((i) sentences express structured propositions whose structures are functions of the structures of sentences expressing them; and (ii) senteces have underlying structures that are the input to semantic interpretation) suggest a simple, plausible theory of propositional structure. According to this theory, the structures of propositions are the same as the structures of the syntactic inputs to semantics they are expressed by. The theory is defended against a variety of objections.I have benefitted from discussions with Michael Jubien, Michacl Liston, Paul Teller, Howard Wettstein, Mark Wilson and especially David Copp. The comments of Mark Richard and an anonymous referee for Journal of Philosophical Logic on an earlier draft resulted in a much improved paper. Various circumstances resulted in this paper appearing after King [1995], though the latter was written later and amends the present view in several ways. See notes 9, 13, 15 and 33 of King [1995].     

Are associative and propositional processes qualitatively distinct? Comment on Gawronski and Bodenhausen (2006)

The authors comment on B. Gawronski and G. V. Bodenhausen's (2006) associative-propositional evaluation model of implicit and explicit attitudes by examining the claims that (a) truth value is attached to propositions but not to associations; (b) pattern activation is qualitatively different from syllogistic structure of arguments; and (c) Pavlovian conditioning may be propositional, whereas evaluative conditioning is not. They conclude that despite surface dissimilarities between implicit and explicit attitudes both may be mediated by the same underlying process.