Reductions in type a behavior,anxiety, anger,and physical illness as related to changes in irrational beliefs: Results of a demonstration project in industry

A series of stress management workshops was conducted in a Rational-Emotive Therapy (RET) format for an entire department in a large corporation (N=49). The population was rather general, i.e., nonstudent, nonclinical, and nonvolunteer. Measures were obtained before the program began and three to four months following completion on the dependent variables of Type A behavior, anxiety, anger, depression, assertiveness, and physical illness symptoms, and on the cognitive independent variables of irrational beliefs. Major changes were obtained on all dependent measures supporting previous work on the usefulness of an RET approach in reducing various types of distress. Further, these changes were shown to be strongly related to changes in irrational beliefs and changing such irrational beliefs was the major focus of the program. It is concluded, therefore, that a fundamental assumption of Rational-Emotive Therapy and theory is given additional empirical support.Paul J. Woods, Ph.D., co-editor of this Journal, is an associate fellow and an RET training supervisor of the Institute for Rational-Emotive Therapy     

The endorsement of irrational beliefs in a general clinical population

Burgess' Attitude and Belief Scale, a measure of Ellis' irrational beliefs, was administered to a large sample of outpatients. All 13 subscales demonstrate very adequate internal consistency. A factor analysis yielded one factor accounting for 83% of the variance, which was labeled irrationality. Clients endorsed focused items more than overgeneralized items, self-referential items more than non-self-referential items, and preferential items more than irrational items. Clients also received higher scores on the irrational process of demandingness than they did on the irrational process of awfulizing, self-worth and low frustration tolerance. The results were consistent with new formulations in Rational-Emotive theory. Suggestions were made for the construction of measures of irrational beliefs.     

Objectively reliable subjective probabilities

Subjective Bayesians typically find the following objection difficult to answer: some joint probability measures lead to intuitively irrational inductive behavior, even in the long run. Yet well-motivated ways to restrict the set of reasonable prior joint measures have not been forthcoming. In this paper I propose a way to restrict the set of prior joint probability measures in particular inductive settings. My proposal is the following: where there exists some successful inductive method for getting to the truth in some situation, we ought to employ a (joint) probability measure that is inductively successful in that situation, if such a measure exists. In order to do show that the restriction is possible to meet in a broad class of cases, I prove a Bayesian Completeness Theorem, which says that for any solvable inductive problem of a certain broad type, there exist probability measures that a Bayesian could use to solve the problem. I then briefly compare the merits of my proposal with two other well-known proposals for constraining the class of admissible subjective probability measures, the leave the door ajar condition and the maximize entropy condition.The author owes special thanks to Kevin Kelly, for a number of helpful ideas for the proof of the Bayesian Completeness Theorem, as well as other aspects of the paper. Thanks also to Clark Glymour for some helpful suggestions for improvement of an earlier draft. Part of the work leading to this paper was funded by a Summer Research Grant from the University Research Institute of the University of Texas at Austin.     

The Primacy of the “Shoulds”: Where Is the Evidence?

A central tenet of rational emotive behaviour therapy (REBT) has always been that irrational beliefs which express demands through absolutistic shoulds, musts or oughts are the basic cause of emotional disturbance. This premise is characteristic of Ellis' theory but is not always supported by other REBT writers or other writers within the cognitive therapy field. This paper reviews a range of research findings which appear to call into question Ellis' tenet of the primacy of the shoulds and which, in turn, raise theoretical and methodological difficulties in the measurement of beliefs. This along with the current theoretical debate regarding irrational belief processes may preclude the possibility of testing the proposition that demandingness is the primary irrational or dysfunctional belief.     

A study of “Belief” and “Non-belief” items from the jones irrational beliefs test with implications for the theory of RET

Evidence supporting the fundamental position of Rational-Emotive Therapy (RET) that dysfunctional emotions and behaviors are heavily influenced by irrational beliefs has been questioned due to the fact that many measures of beliefs contain items that actually refer to emotions and behaviors. In this study individual items on the Jones Irrational Beliefs Test (IBT) (Jones, 1968/69) were rated by a panel of experts in RET as to whether they referred to beliefs, behaviors, emotions, or were ambiguous. Then Belief items and Non-belief items from the responses of 368 participants were extracted and scored separately. The Non-belief scores, based on items mostly referring to emotions and behaviors, were strongly related to measures of distress, as would be expected. But scores based on items unequivocally referring to beliefs were also significantly related to measures of emotional distress, psychosomatic symptoms, and suicidal contemplation. These findings are interpreted as clear support for RET's position on the relationship between irrational beliefs (B's) and dysfunctional emotions and behaviors (C's).Co-Editor of thisJournal, is a Fellow of the Institute for Rational-Emotive Therapy in New York City, a Professor of Psychology at Hollins College, and a Licensed Psychologist in independent practice in Roanoke, Virginia.     

The Deep Structure of Group Life: Unconscious Dimensions

There is a reconsideration and renaissance of interest in expanded conceptions of unconscious processes as they affect individuals and groups (Grotstein, 1999). Recent focus on social unconscious (Hopper, 1996) and cultural unconscious processes (Henderson, 1988) and the nature of intersubjectivity (Harwood and Pines, 1998) raise questions about the location of group analysis. This paper considers the deep structure of group life by examining four functions of the unconscious: repressive, conservative, creative, and mythopoetic (Ellenberger, 1970). On an individual level of analysis, these functions are equated respectively with formative ideas about the: personal–subjective, social–political, intersubjective–cultural and collective–objective unconscious. Group level analogs, as they develop and affect groups and their members, are explored as synthetic, shared, symbolicy and synchronous unconscious processes.     

An educational-therapeutic group for drug and alcohol abusing combat veterans

Vietnam veterans have had a high incidence of substance abuse, resulting from attempts to control posttraumatic symptoms. Their recovery from drug and alcohol dependency has meant involvement in treatment for resolution of posttraumatic symptoms. The author found that the addition of a short-term educational-therapeutic group experience, focusing on the symptoms of posttraumatic stress disorder, was helpful for the participants. They worked-through important war-related experiences via the following phases: (1) Breaking through detachment and establishing control over disruptive symptoms, (2) Revealing experiences of death and dehumanization (3) Describing the internal death of self experience, and (4) Beginning the grief response.     

On a certain class ofm-address machines

Conclusion It follows from the proved theorems that ifM =Q, (whereQ={0,q ₁,q ₂,...,q }) is a machine of the classM _F then there exist machinesM _i such thatM _i(1,c)=M (q _i,c) andQ _i={0, 1, 2, ..., +1} (i=1, 2, ..., ).And thus, if the way in which to an initial function of content of memorycC a machine assigns a final onecC is regarded as the only essential property of the machine then we can deal with the machines of the formM ={0, 1, 2, ..., }, and processes (t) (wheret=1,c,cC) only.Such approach can simplify the problem of defining particular machines of the classM _F , composing and simplifying them.Allatum est die 19 Januarii 1970     

On finite approximability of ψ-intermediate logics

The aim of this note is to show (Theorem 1.6) that in each of the cases: = {, }, or {, , }, or {, , } there are uncountably many -intermediate logics which are not finitely approximable. This result together with the results known in literature allow us to conclude (Theorem 2.2) that for each : either all -intermediate logics are finitely approximate or there are uncountably many of them which lack the property.     

Embeddability,syntax, and semantics in accounts of scientific theories

Recently several philosophers of science have proposed what has come to be known as the semantic account of scientific theories. It is presented as an improvement on the positivist account, which is now called the syntactic account of scientific theories. Bas van Fraassen claims that the syntactic account does not give a satisfactory definition of empirical adequacy and empirical equivalence. He contends that his own semantic account does define these notations acceptably, through the concept of embeddability, a concept which he claims cannot be defined syntactically. Here, I define a syntactic relation which corresponds to the semantic relation of embeddability. I suggest that the critical differences between the positivist account and van Fraassen's account have nothing to do with the distinction between semantics and syntax.     

Time courses in visual-information processing: Some theoretical considerations

Summary In the literature two different views with regard to the time course of activation of recognition units —hypothetical entities that represent identity information —are proposed. Both views are derived from a restricted set of phenomena in visual perception. The first view gets its intuitions from phenomena such as those summarized by Bloch's law; these phenomena show integration or summation of activation over time. This grow-and-grow view assumes that recognition units accumulate activation gradually over times The second view finds its inspiration in phenomena such as Mach-bands and simultaneous contrast; these phenomena show inhibition or steady-state suppression over time. This grow-and-shrink view assumes that the activation levels increase fast initially and then start to decrease.The perception literature strongly suggests that it may be light intensity that determines whether mainly integration (and phenomena such as Bloch's law) or inhibition (and phenomena such as Mach-bands) is obtained. So it is also likely that both information-processing views apply only to a limited range of intensity conditions; the grow-and-grow view to conditions of low-flight intensities, and the grow-and-shrink view to conditions of intermediate-and high-light intensities.It is argued that, to arrive at a complete view, a visual phenomenon that applies to the complete range of light intensities should be taken as a background for generating hypotheses about time courses in visual-information processing. The Broca-Sulzer effect is such a phenomenon. Starting from this phenomenon a simple, synthesizing, information-processing model is derived that is compatible with both the grow-and-grow view and the grow-andshrink view. It is shown that, besides the relevant temporal properties, this model also produces the appropriate spatial properties.     

Group beliefs

It is argued in this paper that there can be both normative and nonnormative, merely factual group beliefs. The former involve the whole social group in question, while the latter only relate to the distributions of personal beliefs within the group. The paper develops a detailed theory, called the positional account of group beliefs, to explicate normative, group-involving group beliefs. Normative group beliefs are characterized within this approach in terms of joint acceptances of views by the group members — or their representatives — acting in their right positions and tasks, and in a sense creating group commitments for all the members to accept (and keep accepting) the view in question. Also aggregate accounts of group belief are considered in the paper, especially the shared we-belief approach. Such aggregate accounts purport to account for merely factual group beliefs.I wish to thank Kaarlo Miller and Philip Pettit for critical comments.     

Axioms for Deliberative Stit

Based on a notion of companions to stit formulas applied in other papers dealing with astit logics, we introduce choice formulas and nested choice formulas to prove the completeness theorems for dstit logics in a language with the dstit operator as the only non-truth-functional operator. The main logic discussed in this paper is the basic logic of dstit with multiple agents, other logics discussed include the basic logic of dstit with a single agent and some logics of dstit with multiple agents each of which corresponds to a semantic condition concerning the number of possible choices for agents.     

Elementary Extensions of External Classes in a Nonstandard Universe

In continuation of our study of HST, Hrbaek set theory (a nonstandard set theory which includes, in particular, the ZFC Replacement and Separation schemata in the st--language, and Saturation for well-orderable families of internal sets), we consider the problem of existence of elementary extensions of inner "external" subclasses of the HST universe.We show that, given a standard cardinal , any set R * generates an "internal" class S(R) of all sets standard relatively to elements of R, and an "external" class L[S(R)] of all sets constructible (in a sense close to the Gödel constructibility) from sets in S(R). We prove that under some mild saturation-like requirements for R the class L[S(R)] models a certain -version of HST including the principle of +-saturation; moreover, in this case L[S(R)] is an elementary extension of L[S(R)] in the st--language whenever sets R R satisfy the requirements.     

The Client Is the Most Important Common Factor: Clients' Self-Healing Capacities and Psychotherapy

I first briefly review the dodo bird verdict and suggest that we should be responding to it by looking for a new way to conceptualize how therapy works. Then I describe the dominant medical or treatment model of psychotherapy and how it puts the client in the position of a dependent variable who is operated on by supposedly potent therapeutic techniques. Next I argue that the data do not fit with this model. An alternative model is that the client is the most important common factor and that it is clients' self-healing capacities which make therapy work. I then argue that therapy has two phases—the involvement phase and the learning phase—and that the involvement phase is the most important. I next review the five learning opportunities provided by therapy. Finally, I argue that a relational model of therapy focused on consultation, collaboration, and dialogue is better than a treatment model.     

The Stability Theory of Knowledge and Belief Revision: Comments on Rott

In this commentary on Rotts paper Stability, Strength and Sensitivity: Converting Belief into Knowledge, I discuss two problems of the stability theory of knowledge which are pointed out by Rott. I conclude that these problems offer no reason for rejecting the stability theory, but might be grounds for deviating from the standard AGM account of belief revision which Rott presupposes.     

Solo pioneers: Single-minded rationality

There is an increasing number of single women in the United States. These women are having to confront new emotional problems as well as previously unknown opportunities for personal growth and development. The current article identifies two polarities of female singlehood, i.e., the desperate, dependent woman and the solo pioneer woman. The cognitive and behavioral characteristics of the two polar types are delineated.Desperate, dependent women endorse irrational beliefs which involve their self-worth being contingent upon the love and approval of men. Solo pioneers are autonomous in their personal identity and are able to construct meaningful lives for themselves outside of the context of marriage. Single mothers by choice are presented as being a prototype of solo pioneers.Laura Primakoff, Ph.D. has developed a cognitive-behavioral treatment program for individuals living alone (Primakoff, 1983).     

Model theoretic results for infinitely deep languages

We define a subhierarchy of the infinitely deep languagesN described by Jaakko Hintikka and Veikko Rantala. We shall show that some model theoretic results well-known in the model theory of the ordinary infinitary languages can be generalized for these new languages. Among these are the downward Löwenheim-Skolem and o's theorems as well as some compactness properties.     

Predicate Logics on Display

The paper provides a uniform Gentzen-style proof-theoretic framework for various subsystems of classical predicate logic. In particular, predicate logics obtained by adopting van Behthem's modal perspective on first-order logic are considered. The Gentzen systems for these logics augment Belnap's display logic by introduction rules for the existential and the universal quantifier. These rules for x and x are analogous to the display introduction rules for the modal operators and and do not themselves allow the Barcan formula or its converse to be derived. En route from the minimal modal predicate logic to full first-order logic, axiomatic extensions are captured by purely structural sequent rules.     

Community,subjectivity, and intersubjectivity

This paper deals with the notions of subjectivity, intersubjectivity, and community from several different points of view that include subjective and intersubjective agency, a sense of community, the community as a social institution, and the idea of social justice. The context of these considerations can be found in the Community–Social–Psychological approach to social action as it is often practiced in Latin America. A review of these themes is considered important because different models of community intervention and practice may lead to different expressions of community interaction.