Resisting persuasion by the skin of one's teeth: the hidden success of resisted persuasive messages

Recent research has suggested that when people resist persuasion they can perceive this resistance and, under specifiable conditions, become more certain of their initial attitudes (e.g., Z. L. Tormala & R. E. Petty, 2002). Within the same metacognitive framework, the present research provides evidence for the opposite phenomenon--that is, when people resist persuasion, they sometimes become less certain of their initial attitudes. Four experiments demonstrate that when people perceive that they have done a poor job resisting persuasion (e.g., they believe they generated weak arguments against a persuasive message), they lose attitude certainty, show reduced attitude-behavioral intention correspondence, and become more vulnerable to subsequent persuasive attacks. These findings suggest that resisted persuasive attacks can sometimes have a hidden yet important success by reducing the strength of the target attitude.     

A new look at the consequences of attitude certainty: the amplification hypothesis

It is well established that increasing attitude certainty makes attitudes more resistant to attack and more predictive of behavior. This finding has been interpreted as indicating that attitude certainty crystallizes attitudes, making them more durable and impactful. The current research challenges this crystallization hypothesis and proposes an amplification hypothesis, which suggests that instead of invariably strengthening an attitude, attitude certainty amplifies the dominant effect of the attitude on thought, judgment, and behavior. In 3 experiments, the authors test these competing hypotheses by comparing the effects of attitude certainty manipulations on univalent versus ambivalent attitudes. Across experiments, it is demonstrated that increasing attitude certainty strengthens attitudes (e.g., increases their resistance to persuasion) when attitudes are univalent but weakens attitudes (e.g., decreases their resistance to persuasion) when attitudes are ambivalent. These results are consistent with the amplification hypothesis.     

Embodied Attitude Change: A Self‐Validation Perspective

Our behavior can change what we like and dislike. Although it seems clear that we might like something more when we smile (versus frown), or when we nod our heads (versus shake), it is important to understand the processes responsible for these changes in evaluation. It might be that agreement behaviors such as smiling and nodding work as cue, make us think about everything in a positive light, or it might be that they encourage us not to think much about the information we receive. This review describes the basic processes underlying embodied change, highlighting the role of a recently discovered meta‐cognitive process (called self‐validation) by which bodily responses can validate or invalidate (instead of changing) our thoughts. This new mechanism can account for some already established outcomes in embodied persuasion (e.g., more persuasion with smiling than frowning), but by a different process than postulated previously (smiling increases confidence in thoughts), as well as for some new findings (e.g., more persuasion for low than high powerful postures; more self‐confidence when performing doubtful postures).     

Investigating the social-adjustive and value-expressive functions of well-grounded attitudes: Implications for change and for subsequent behavior

Recent demonstrations of the plausibility of functional theories of persuasion have occurred within advertising contexts or have targeted potentially nebulous or uninvolving attitudes, and may thus have demonstrated the utility of functional explanations of attitude formation rather than attitude change. In the present study, attitudes that participants have acted on and consider important (i.e., the criteria they use to select dating partners) were the targets of persuasion. High and low self-monitoring individuals, who hold different dating attitudes that serve different functions, were exposed to functionally relevant or functionally irrelevant messages that reached either proattitudinal or counterattitudinal conclusions. As anticipated by functional theory, (a) low self-monitoring individuals changed their dating attitudes only after hearing a counterattitudinal message that addressed thevalue-expressive functions their dating attitudes served, whereas (b) high self-monitoring individuals changed their opinions only after hearing a counterattitudinal message that addressed thesocial-adjustive functions served by their dating attitudes. Although the data revealed that important attitudes can be changed via a functionally relevant appeal, only the low self-monitoring individuals subsequently used their changed attitudes to guide their behavior in a subsequent couple-matching task. Implications of these results for functional theories of persuasion and for variations in attitude/behavior consistency were discussed. This research is based on a Master’s thesis conducted by the first author under the direction of the second author.     

Message sidedness in advertising: the moderating roles of need for cognition and time pressure in persuasion

Persuasion has been extensively researched for decades. Much of this research has focused on different message tactics and their effects on persuasion (e.g., Chang & Chou, 2008; Lafferty, 1999). This research aims to assess whether the persuasion of a specific type of message is influenced by need for cognition (NFC) and time pressure. The 336 undergraduates participated in a 2 (message sidedness: one-sided/two-sided) × 3 (time pressure: low/moderate/high) between-subjects design. Results indicate that two-sided messages tend to elicit more favorable ad attitudes than one-sided messages. As compared with low-NFC individuals, high-NFC individuals are likely to express more favorable ad attitudes, brand attitudes and purchase intention. Moderate time pressure tends to lead to more favorable ad attitudes than low time pressure and high time pressure. In addition, moderate time pressure is likely to elicit more favorable brand attitudes and purchase intentions than high time pressure, but does not elicit more favorable brand attitudes and purchase intentions than low time pressure. Furthermore, when high-NFC individuals are under low or moderate time pressure, two-sided messages are more persuasive than one-sided messages; however, message sidedness does not differentially affect the persuasion when high-NFC individuals are pressed for time. In contrast, one-sided messages are more persuasive than two-sided messages when low-NFC individuals are under low or high time pressure, and two-sided messages are more persuasive than one-sided messages when low-NFC individuals are under moderate time pressure.     

The Prevalence of Metacognitive Routes to Judgment

Metacognitive routes to judgment may be taken more often than suggested by Schwarz (2004). First, judgments that appear to be consistent with a systematic processing account may be based on higher order metacognitive theories. Specifically, individuals’ inferential judgments based on naive theories about retrieval ease may be interpreted to be potentially biased, resulting in an adjustment in the opposite direction of the initial judgment to correct for the bias. Second, whereas favorable attitudes may reflect the positive experience of processing fluency, favorable attitudes may also reflect naive theories at work. When the target (e.g., brand name, logo, etc.) can be more easily processed, the hedonic experience of processing fluency gives rise to more favorable attitudes toward the target. However, when information about the target (e.g., an ad highlighting benefits of the brand) can be more easily processed, individuals may interpret the experience of processing fluency based on naive theory and attribute the experience to the information being more persuasive, resulting in more favorable attitudes toward the target.     

元认知:态度与说服研究的新视角

态度元认知指个体对所持态度的主观判断(如态度是否正确、重要与否等),是态度强度的重要维度,并能在态度说服过程中发挥关键作用。首先介绍态度元认知的主要成分(态度确定性、重要性及矛盾性),然后重点阐述新近对态度说服元认知过程的解释模型:认知加工精细程度模型(ELM),内隐-外显双过程模型(APE)和元认知模型(MCM),并从来源属性(来源可信度)、受众属性(情绪及身体动作)、信息属性(信息与受众的匹配程度)和情景四个方面阐释了影响说服元认知过程的因素。未来可以在态度元认知成分及其影响、说服元认知过程的心理机制、态度元认知神经机制等方面展开进一步研究。     

The interplay of persuasion inference and flow experience in an entertaining food advergame

Increasingly, unhealthy food is being advertised through online games known as advergames. The advergame is designed for entertaining fun to promote the brand featured in the game. But what happens if the food advertised is healthy or the source of the game is non‐commercial? This study examines how people's entertainment (flow experience) interacts with their inference about the persuasion impact of food brands featured in an advergame, which vary according to their persuasion knowledge about the source (e.g., non‐commercial versus commercial) and the perceived persuasion effect on self (e.g., beneficial versus harmful). Results of an experiment show that flow is positively associated with persuasion effects of the advergame. Brand attitudes and purchase intentions were the most favorable for non‐commercial brands with perceived benefits (healthy food) followed by commercial brands (healthy food) and commercial brands with harmful effects (less healthy food). However, persuasion effects for purchase intention were mitigated when participants were immersed in a flow state. Ramifications for persuasion and health promotions are discussed. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Contextual contrast and perceived knowledge: Exploring the implications for persuasion

The present research tested the notion that perceived target knowledge can be affected by the amount of information one has about other recently encountered stimuli—whether that information is relevant or not. Furthermore, the present research tested the implications of this effect for persuasion. In 4 experiments, participants were presented with a persuasive message promoting a fictitious department store, but first received another message containing more or less information about something else (e.g., another store, a car, or a person). Regardless of the type or valence of initial information received, the initial message had a contrast effect on perceived target knowledge, which influenced target attitudes. The less information the initial message contained, the more persuasive knowledge participants thought they received from the target message, and the more their attitudes agreed with that message. These findings suggest that the perceived amount of persuasive information one has about a target stimulus can be manipulated to increase persuasion, even when the actual amount of information about the target stimulus does not vary.     

Happiness versus sadness as a determinant of thought confidence in persuasion: a self-validation analysis

The present research introduces a new mechanism by which emotion can affect evaluation. On the basis of the self-validation hypothesis (R. E. Petty, P. Bri?ol, & Z. L. Tormala), the authors predicted and found that emotion can influence evaluative judgments by affecting the confidence people have in their thoughts to a persuasive message. In each study, participants first read a strong or weak persuasive communication. After listing their thoughts about the message, participants were induced to feel happy or sad. Relative to sad participants, those put in a happy state reported more thought confidence. As a consequence, the effect of argument quality on attitudes was greater for happy than for sad participants. These self-validation effects generalized across different emotion inductions, different persuasion topics, and different measures of thought confidence. In one study, happy and sad conditions each differed from a neutral affect control. Most important, these metacognitive effects of emotion only occurred under high elaboration conditions. In contrast, individuals with relatively low motivation to think showed a main effect of emotion on attitudes, regardless of argument quality.     

情绪即社会信息模型的理论及应用

情绪即社会信息(Emotions as Social Information model, EASI)模型旨在阐释他人情绪如何通过情感反应和推断加工机制影响观察者的决策, 以及认知动机和合适性判断在其中的调节作用。文章将EASI模型与相关理论进行了辨析, 并基于对63项使用该理论的实证研究的分析, 梳理归纳了EASI模型在领导力、团队、顾客服务、谈判及说服领域展开的应用, 以及影响EASI模型的边界条件——信息加工程度和合适性判断的具体因素。未来研究需加强系统化验证、深化与其它理论的整合、拓展应用情境和优化测量方法。     

Resistance can be good or bad: how theories of resistance and dissonance affect attitude certainty

This research investigated how lay theories about resisting persuasion can affect attitude certainty. Specifically, people who believed that resistance was negative (i.e., implies close-mindedness) showed different levels of attitude certainty after resisting persuasive messages than people who believed resistance was positive (i.e., implies intelligence). When people held positive lay theories of resistance and overcame ostensibly strong arguments, they showed increased attitude certainty (compared to those who overcame ostensibly weak arguments). However, individuals who believed that resistance was negative did not show increases in attitude certainty when overcoming strong arguments. Experiment 2 suggests that the effect of lay theories and perceived argument strength on attitude certainty was due to dissonance created by believing that resistance is undesirable but nonetheless resisting persuasion.     

Metaphor and Persuasive Communication: A Multifunctional Approach

Metaphors are pervasive in both mass communication and interpersonal exchanges and can play an important role in persuasion. Metaphor serves multiple functions in persuasive communication, and the effect of metaphor on persuasion is potentially mediated by multiple psychological process mechanisms. Nevertheless, we propose that past and future research in this area can be organized or grouped into three simple categories. First, metaphorical statements can activate information that is directly applied to the communication topic and thereby influence attitudes toward the communication topic. Second, metaphorical language may influence impressions of the communication source and thereby impact attitudes toward the communication topic. Third, metaphors may affect attitudes toward the communication topic by influencing the direction or amount of elaboration that takes place when recipients process literal statements contained in the communication. A review of past research is organized into these three categories, and proposals for future research in each category are introduced. It is concluded that future research within each of these domains should focus on two related questions: under what conditions does metaphor elicit a given psychological process in the receiver (e.g., attribute mapping, valence transfer), and under what conditions will a given process result in an increase versus decrease in persuasion?     

LEARNING THEORY APPROACHES TO PERSUASION

This review synthesizes relevant research dealing with the processes of learning and suggests its applications to compliance gaining. The two major issues addressed are: (1) to what degree can learning theories explain the acquisition of new attitudes and behaviors, and (2) to what degree are attitudinal and behavioral changes governed by learning theory principles? The learning theories discussed are grouped into three categories: stimulus-response or connectionist approaches; cognitive approaches; and stochastic, mathematical, and cybernetic approaches. The stimulus-response models, which encompass most of the research examined in this paper, are further broken down into four types: (1) classical conditioning, (2) contiguity models, (3) instrumental (or operant) conditioning and (4) models including drive and drive reduction. Principles and major research evidence from numerous learning theories are reviewed and analyzed, and suggestions are made as to how this evidence may aid in the construction of more complete theories of persuasion and attitude change.     

When credibility attacks: The reverse impact of source credibility on persuasion

Recent research on the self-validation hypothesis suggests that source credibility identified after message processing can influence the confidence people have in their own thoughts generated in response to persuasive messages (Briñol, Petty, & Tormala, 2004). The present research explored the implications of this effect for the possibility that high credibility sources can be associated with more or less persuasion than low credibility sources. In two experiments, it is demonstrated that when people generate primarily positive thoughts in response to a message (e.g., because the message contains strong arguments) and then learn of the source, high source credibility leads to more favorable attitudes than does low source credibility. When people have primarily negative thoughts in response to a message (e.g., because it contains weak arguments), however, this effect is reversed—that is, high source credibility leads to less favorable attitudes than does low source credibility.     

Exploring the Process of Inference Generation in Sarcasm: A Review of Normal and Clinical Studies

This article evaluates two theoretical accounts of how sarcasm is understood; the traditional model, which asserts that listeners derive a counterfactual inference from the sarcastic comment, and relevance theory, which asserts that listeners recognize sarcasm as a scornful echo of a previous assertion. Evidence from normal speakers provides only partial support for both theories. Evidence from brain-injured populations suggests that aspects of the pragmatic process can be arrested in ways not predicted by either theory. It is concluded that sarcasm is more effortful to process than nonsarcastic comments and that inferences about the facts of the situation and the mental state of the speaker (e.g., attitudes, knowledge, and intentions) are important to comprehending sarcasm. It is questioned whether inferences about mental state are relatively more difficult for brain-injured subjects and, if so, whether this is a continuum of difficulty or reflects reliance upon different cognitive processes.     

Magnitude comparison revisited: An alternative approach to binary choice under uncertainty

Two generations of psychologists have been interested in understanding binary choice under uncertainty. In the 1970s and 1980s, researchers assumed that people rely on a two-stage magnitude comparison process to make these decisions (Banks, 1977; Moyer & Dumais, 1978). More recently, the focus has shifted to approaches that rely on probabilistic cues and simple heuristics (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, Psychological Review 103, 650-669, 1996). Here, we test competing predictions derived from these two very different approaches and conclude that the magnitude comparison process plays a central role in this task. In support of this conclusion, we present an experiment in which participants were timed as they decided which of two vehicles was more expensive. Pairs composed of one luxury vehicle (e.g., BMW 323i) and one nonluxury vehicle (e.g., Toyota 4Runner) were critical because the magnitude comparison approach correctly predicted that reaction times would decrease with subjective distance, whereas the heuristics approach incorrectly predicted that there would be no relation.     

Group-based emotions as determinants of ingroup identification

Events affecting an ingroup with which one identifies trigger group-based emotions. Thus, identification with a group seems to be a crucial determinant of group-based emotions. However, some theories (e.g., Russell, 2003) suggest bi-directional causal links between components of emotions. The current research examines whether group-based emotions may also influence ingroup identification. In a study, type of emotion (happiness vs. anger) and object of emotion (ingroup vs. outgroup) were manipulated. The results show an interaction effect of type of emotion and object of emotion on change in ingroup identification. Identification increases with happiness towards the ingroup or anger towards the outgroup, whereas identification decreases with anger toward the ingroup and happiness toward the outgroup. Moreover, the intensity of emotions determines the degree of change in identification. The implications for approaches of group-based emotions are discussed.     

Attitudes toward hiring people with disabilities: A meta-cognitive approach to persuasion

Attitudes toward hiring people with disabilities are becoming critical for promoting diversity and egalitarianism within organizations. The few interventions designed to promote positive attitudes toward people with disabilities have relied on changing either the direction and/or the amount of thoughts people generate with regard to this discriminated, understudied group. In the present research, we examine the impact of a different psychological process of attitude change based on meta-cognition, or thinking about thinking. We used a meta-cognitive approach to changing prejudiced attitudes because thoughtful processes are often overlooked or denied with regard to this particular group. Specifically, we explored the impact of thought confidence on attitude change across two studies designed to change attitudes toward the incorporation of people with disabilities in companies. In each study, participants first generated either positive or negative thoughts about the proposal (thought valence manipulation). Then, the confidence in those thoughts was measured (Study 1) or manipulated (Study 2). In concert with the self-validation hypothesis, results showed that when thought confidence was relatively high (vs. low), thought valence had a greater impact on attitudes. Thus, thought valence was more predictive of attitudes when participants were confident in their thoughts. Specifically, confidence in thoughts enhanced persuasion for positive thoughts but reduced persuasion for negative thoughts. These findings provide insights into assessing effects of interventions aiming at improving attitudes toward the inclusion of minority groups in organizations.