共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 15 毫秒
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Elanor Taylor 《Philosophical Studies》2018,175(1):197-219
Explanatory realism is the position that all explanations give information about whatever metaphysically determines the explanandum. This view is popular and plays a central role in metaphysics, but in this paper I argue that explanatory realism is false. In Sect. 1 I introduce explanatory realism in its weak and strong versions, and discuss the argumentative work that explanatory realism is used for in contemporary metaphysics. In Sect. 2 I present a series of problem cases for explanatory realism, including explanation by analogy, explanations involving rules, reduction ad absurdum explanations and certain statistical explanations. In Sect. 3 I consider and reject two modified versions of explanatory realism: the position that explanatory realism is true only of explanation in metaphysics, and the position that determinative explanation is the most complete form of explanation. In conclusion I consider explanatory antirealism and explanatory pluralism as alternatives to explanatory realism. 相似文献
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Chris John Daly 《Synthese》2008,162(1):37-52
David Lewis’s genuine modal realism is a controversial thesis in modal metaphysics. Charles Chihara and Ross Cameron have
each argued that Lewis’s defence of his thesis involves his committing serious methodological errors; in particular, that
his replies to two well-known and important objections are question-begging. Scott Shalkowski has further argued that Lewis’s
attempt to analyse modal talk in non-modal terms is viciously circular. This paper considers the methodology which Lewis uses
to argue for his thesis, and the paper tries to show that it is guilty of no methodological errors. 相似文献
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Recently, some philosophers have suggested that a form of robust realism about ethics, or normativity more generally, does
not face a significant explanatory burden in metaphysics. I call this view metaphysically quietist normative realism. This paper argues that while this view can appear to constitute an attractive alternative to more traditional forms of normative
realism, it cannot deliver on this promise. I examine Scanlon’s attempt to defend such a quietist realism, and argue that
rather than silencing metaphysical questions about normative reasons, his defense at best succeeds only in shifting the focus
of metaphysical enquiry. I then set aside the details of Scanlon’s view, and argue on general grounds that that the quietist
realist cannot finesse a crucial metanormative task: to explain the contrast between the correct normative system and alternative
putatively normative standards. 相似文献
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Philosophical Studies - Non-naturalist realists are committed to the belief, famously voiced by Parfit, that if there are no non-natural facts then nothing matters. But it is morally objectionable... 相似文献
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Philosophical Studies - Perceptions are externally-directed—they present us with a mind-independent reality, and thus contribute to our abilities to think about this reality, and to know what... 相似文献
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William James Earle 《Metaphilosophy》2023,54(2-3):341-351
An examination of late Rorty shows that he does not abandon belief in an external world about which we can, and indeed must, acquire knowledge. His disapproval of the correspondence theory of truth does not involve the idea that anything other than local weather, for example, could falsify remarks about local weather. It is just that once we get done looking out the window or, if we are outside, feeling the right kind of drops make contact with our skin, there is nothing else we can do, nothing better, to make ourselves more certain, more cognitively secure. One can see this in the detailed work that enables scientific progress. Science improves itself by doing more of the same. G. E. Moore's famous open question stays open only as a reminder that our fallibility never disappears and that our cognitive security is never better than pro tem. Rorty, as a faithful pragmatist and undogmatic meliorist, thinks this is perfectly O.K. 相似文献
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