The Logic of Feeling

The contribution of the feelings‐as‐information hypothesis to our understanding of the role of affect in judgment and decision making is discussed. Basic principles and regularities in how affective feelings guide judgments and decisions are then identified. Based on these principles and regularities, it is argued that the role of feelings in judgment and decision making may be more adaptive than has been assumed in most academic circles. This adaptivity transpires (a) in the variety of goal‐relevant signals that feelings convey, (b) the flexibility with which feelings are interpreted, (c) the judgmental properties of feelings, and (d) the selectivity with which feelings are invoked. It is speculated that affective feelings may tap into a separate system of judgment and decision making with its unique strengths and weaknesses.     

Does any aspect of mind survive brain damage that typically leads to a persistent vegetative state? Ethical considerations

Recent neuroscientific evidence brings into question the conclusion that all aspects of consciousness are gone in patients who have descended into a persistent vegetative state (PVS). Here we summarize the evidence from human brain imaging as well as neurological damage in animals and humans suggesting that some form of consciousness can survive brain damage that commonly causes PVS. We also raise the issue that neuroscientific evidence indicates that raw emotional feelings (primary-process affects) can exist without any cognitive awareness of those feelings. Likewise, the basic brain mechanisms for thirst and hunger exist in brain regions typically not damaged by PVS. If affective feelings can exist without cognitive awareness of those feelings, then it is possible that the instinctual emotional actions and pain "reflexes" often exhibited by PVS patients may indicate some level of mentality remaining in PVS patients. Indeed, it is possible such raw affective feelings are intensified when PVS patients are removed from life-supports. They may still experience a variety of primary-process affective states that could constitute forms of suffering. If so, withdrawal of life-support may violate the principle of nonmaleficence and be tantamount to inflicting inadvertent "cruel and unusual punishment" on patients whose potential distress, during the process of dying, needs to be considered in ethical decision-making about how such individuals should be treated, especially when their lives are ended by termination of life-supports. Medical wisdom may dictate the use of more rapid pharmacological forms of euthanasia that minimize distress than the de facto euthanasia of life-support termination that may lead to excruciating feelings of pure thirst and other negative affective feelings in the absence of any reflective awareness.     

Suppressing feelings: A double‐edged sword to consumer judgment and choice

Consumers may suppress their feelings toward the attractive looks of products when they wish to minimize the influence of feelings on their judgments and choices. However, this research suggests that feeling suppression may result in a paradoxical reliance on feelings in product judgments and choices, especially when the product performance judgment is difficult to make. Findings from a series of experiments suggest that this paradoxical effect stems from the requisite resource input for feeling suppression and the consequent resource competition with functionality processing which then impairs product performance judgment.     

中学生学习成功感量表的初步研究

在访谈、开放式问卷等的基础上,自编了中学生学习成功感量表,并对上海市随机抽取的642名中学生进行了测量。结果表明：该量表的49个项目均有较好的区分度;四个分量表之间的相关表明该量表的建构是正确的;因素分析表明成功感分量表可以分为：与学习本身有关的积极情感、与他人有关的积极情感、满意感和学业自我效能感四个因子;该量表有较高的信度和效度,可以作为评鉴中学生学习成功感的有效工具。     

Pseudo-Guilt: Defense,Transaction, and Resistance

The term guilt is used as an umbrella to cover a variety of feelings and phenomena. The working through of guilt feelings represents one major area of clinical work. Therefore, it is essential that the nuances and variations inherent in the term guilt be well understood. Clarity is particularly important, since the expression of other feelings may masquerade as guilt, sharing the same language and gestures.     

Memory for emotions

It is argued that memory reproduces emotional data as well as cognitive information. Retrieval of feelings may be cue-dependent, emotionally mediated or coincidental. Infantile emotions can be presumed to vary strongly due to the lack of control, and, poorly labelled, they could produce powerful, but un-identifiable memories, possible components in various adult experiences. In later childhood there is greater independence, and moderately positive memories from this period have possibly fewer “withdrawal effects.” Though an event may be linked with certain remembered feelings at the time of impact, it can later be recombined with other echoes. Remembered emotions can be rewarding, and if they are found to be lacking, substitutes will often be sought, or repressed feelings may surface. These theoretical considerations are applied to the phenomena of anger, depression, and anxiety, each involving (reproduced) feeling-states influencing cognitive processing. “Turning down” the memory channel, or the timely retrieval of positive feelings could increase tolerance in this respect. Human attraction is also briefly analysed.     

Effects of chronic exercise on feelings of energy and fatigue: a quantitative synthesis

The authors investigated the effect of chronic exercise on feelings of energy and fatigue using meta-analytic techniques. Chronic exercise increased feelings of energy and lessened feelings of fatigue compared with control conditions by a mean effect delta of 0.37. The effect varied according to the presence or absence of a placebo control or whether chronic exercise was completed alone or in combination with an additional therapy. Investigations that used a placebo control and examined chronic exercise alone found no effect of chronic exercise on feelings of energy and fatigue. Certain placebo controls may increase feelings of energy and lessen feelings of fatigue when used with older adults or people with psychological distress. The results highlight the need for research identifying the most useful control conditions for accurately interpreting mental health outcome data obtained in chronic exercise investigations.     

An inferential approach to the knew-it-all-along phenomenon

Two studies tested the hypothesis that the knew-it-all-along effect may be the result of an inferential process. Specifically, that individuals use their feelings and experiences (e.g., "This question seems so familiar to me, surely I would have known the answer!") to infer their judgement. Drawing on subjective feelings such as certainty or perceptual fluency, individuals can use a provided actual value as an informational cue and draw inferences from it. Thus, the occurrence of the knew-it-all-along effect is expected to depend on the experienced feeling of confidence with a question. This feeling may indicate to an individual that he or she did know the answer; a total lack of such a feeling may suggest that he or she never would have known the answer. In the reported studies we both measured feelings of confidence (Study 1) and induced them by manipulating perceptual fluency (Study 2) to show that the knew-it-all-along effect proves to be a phenomenon of inferences based on these experienced feelings. Participants experiencing high confidence or high perceptual fluency more strongly assimilated their judgements to the provided values, than did participants experiencing low confidence or low perceptual fluency.     

An inferential approach to the knew-it-all-along phenomenon

Two studies tested the hypothesis that the knew-it-all-along effect may be the result of an inferential process. Specifically, that individuals use their feelings and experiences (e.g., "This question seems so familiar to me, surely I would have known the answer!") to infer their judgement. Drawing on subjective feelings such as certainty or perceptual fluency, individuals can use a provided actual value as an informational cue and draw inferences from it. Thus, the occurrence of the knew-it-all-along effect is expected to depend on the experienced feeling of confidence with a question. This feeling may indicate to an individual that he or she did know the answer; a total lack of such a feeling may suggest that he or she never would have known the answer. In the reported studies we both measured feelings of confidence (Study 1) and induced them by manipulating perceptual fluency (Study 2) to show that the knew-it-all-along effect proves to be a phenomenon of inferences based on these experienced feelings. Participants experiencing high confidence or high perceptual fluency more strongly assimilated their judgements to the provided values, than did participants experiencing low confidence or low perceptual fluency.     

Feelings of mental pollution subsequent to sexual assault

This paper describes an investigation of the phenomenon of mental pollution in a sample of 50 female victims of sexual assault. Feelings of mental pollution were assessed using an interview and a questionnaire. An experimental procedure was employed to determine if feelings of dirtiness and the urge to wash could be provoked by deliberate attention to the assault memory. Thirty (60%) of the 50 participants reported some feelings of mental pollution subsequent to the assault, and feelings of mental pollution were related to post-assault washing behaviour. Deliberate recall of the assault resulted in stronger feelings of dirtiness and the urge to wash than did deliberate attention to a pleasant memory or scene. Nine women reported washing their hands in response to deliberate recall of the assault. These findings suggest that feelings of mental pollution may be prominent in victims of sexual assault.     

Controversies about stuttering therapy

Current controversies with respect to (1) the need to attend to the feelings and attitudes of stutterers; (2) the teaching of controlled stuttering as opposed to shaping fluency; (3) criteria for determining successful therapy; (4) the problem of relapse; and (5) therapy for the young stutterer are briefly discussed. It is noted that while there may be many controversies in the area of stuttering therapy, the author presently believes that the issue of whether or not to attent to the feelings and attitudes of stutterers is the most important and that the proliferation on the market of exclusively behavior-oriented therapy programs may be fostering the training of technicians without the skills necessary to assist others in identifying and handling feelings and attitudes.     

Aging and qualitative characteristics of memories for perceived and imagined complex events

Older and younger adults' memory for perceived and imagined events was examined with a procedure in which everyday situations are simulated in the laboratory. Subjects perceived some situations and imagined others. Later, they were asked to rate their memory for various aspects of these situations (e.g., amount of perceptual detail, thoughts and feelings). A recall test followed the ratings. On the rating scale, for both perceived and imagined events, older subjects reported better memory for their thoughts and feelings than did younger subjects. In addition, on the recall test, older subjects produced more thoughts and feelings than did younger subjects, whereas younger subjects produced more perceptual and spatial information. These results suggest that older subjects may not inhibit personal information (e.g., thoughts and feelings), and this information may interfere with memory for other aspects of information, such as perceptual and contextual details (Hasher & Zacks, 1988).     

The role of self-esteem in the experience of envy

It is the thesis of this paper that although analysts have always recognized that narcissistic injury may trigger envious feelings, the significance of self-esteem as both a motivator and response to envious feelings has not yet been sufficiently explored. Traditional drive-defense or object instinctual explanations tend to diminish awareness of the importance of self-esteem in the experience of envy. The focus on drives or repetition of early patterns of object relations does not always take into account the significance of the cycle in which damaged self-esteem leads to envy, the component parts of which may cause further damage to self-esteem, leading to more envy, and so on. I am suggesting that it is often an attempt to avoid painful injury to one's self-esteem, as well as the related attempt to maintain a positively colored sense of self, and not a repression of drives or a repetition of some aspect of early object relationships which must be understood in order to fully comprehend both feelings of envy and the need to keep such feelings out of conscious awareness.     

Favorable Evaluations of Blacks and the Handicapped: Positive Prejudice,Unconscious Denial,or Social Desirability?1

Prior research has shown that subjects in an impression formation setting rated an interviewee more favorably if he was labeled as either black or physically handicapped than if he was not labeled. This seems to contradict common assumptions about the nature of stigma. Three interpretations of these findings are advanced: They may reflect actual positive biases held by college students regarding members of these outgroups; they may represent unconscious distortions of subjects' true feelings; or they may represent conscious distortions of true feelings in order to make socially desirable responses. The present study was undertaken to test the third possibility by means of a so-called bogus pipeline manipulation, in which some subjects were led to believe that the experimenter had access to their actual feelings about the interviewee. The results indicated that the high rating of the black was a social desirability phenomenon, but the high rating of the handicapped person was not.     

A critical examination of existential feeling

Matthew Ratcliffe (2008, 2015) has argued that existential feelings form a distinct class of bodily and non-conceptual feelings that pre-intentionally structure our intentional experience of others, the world, and ourselves. In this article, I will identify and discuss three interrelated areas of concern for Ratcliffe’s theory of existential feelings. First, the distinct senses in which existential feelings are felt as background bodily feelings and as spaces of possibility calls for further clarification. Second, the nature of the suggested bi-directional relationship between existential feelings and intentional experience remains ambiguous. Third, viewed in light of existential guilt, the categorically non-conceptual nature of existential feelings may not be as definite as presumed. The aim of the article is to draw critical attention to aspects of the theory that would benefit from further development, and therefore, to advance the ongoing discussion about existential feelings.     

Reassessing the dimensionality of the moral emotions

The dimensionality of the moral emotions was tested to examine whether theoretical distinctions between specific emotions were empirically supported. A total of 720 drink‐driving offenders indicated the degree to which they experienced feelings associated with the moral emotions, in an interview conducted after attending court or a restorative justice conference. Expected distinctions between shame and guilt were not found. Instead the principal components analysis identified three factors: shame‐guilt, embarrassment‐exposure, and unresolved shame. The results also show that shame‐guilt was related to higher feelings of empathy and lower feelings of anger/hostility. It is concluded that differences between shame and guilt may be overstated. Furthermore, it is suggested that the relationship between situational experiences of shame and the disposition to feel it may be more complicated than initially thought.     

Depression and empathic accuracy in couples: an interpersonal model of gender differences in depression

We examine the link between depression and empathic accuracy, the ability to infer other people's thoughts and feelings, as a possible mechanism underlying gender differences in the association between depression and interpersonal difficulties within intimate relationships. Fifty-one heterosexual couples completed questionnaires assessing depressive symptoms and participated in both a lab and a daily diary procedure assessing empathic accuracy. In the lab measures, women's (but not men's) higher levels of depressive symptoms were associated with lower empathic accuracy regarding partners' thoughts and feelings. In the daily diary data, women's depressive symptoms were specifically associated with lower levels of empathic accuracy for negative feelings but not for positive feelings, and with lower levels of their partners' empathic accuracy for the women's negative feelings. Men's depressive symptoms were again unrelated to levels of empathic accuracy. Our findings suggest that depressive symptoms may have a stronger impact on interpersonal perception in intimate relationships among women than among men.     

Ethical issues in therapy: therapist self-disclosure of sexual feelings

Although therapist sexual attraction to clients is common, and therapist self-disclosure is an often-used intervention, therapist self-disclosure of sexual feelings to clients is an understudied phenomenon. In this article, I critically review the small base of literature on therapist self-disclosure of sexual feelings, including information on prevalence rates, empirical research, and case studies. By incorporating these findings with information from relevant sections of the American Psychological Association (2002) Ethics Code, my intent is to evaluate different aspects of therapist self-disclosure of sexual feelings and arrive at conclusions regarding therapists' use of these disclosures. It appears that direct, explicit disclosure of sexual feelings can run the risk of harming clients and may therefore be unethical. Therefore, the use of this technique is discouraged. I discuss the issue of using less explicit interventions.     

The relation between the sense of agency and the experience of flow

This article investigates the relation between people’s feelings of agency and their feelings of flow. In the dominant model describing how people are able to assess their own agency—the comparator model of agency—when the person’s intentions match perfectly to what happens, the discrepancy between intention and outcome is zero, and the person is thought to interpret this lack of discrepancy as being in control. The lack of perceived push back from the external world seems remarkably similar to the state that has been described as a state of flow. However, when we used a computer game paradigm to investigate the relation between people’s feelings of agency and their feelings of flow, we found a dissociation between these two states. Although these two states may, in some ways, seem to be similar, our data indicate that they are governed by different principles and phenomenology.     

Interpreting references to group membership in context: feelings about intergroup contact depending on who says what to whom

Contact research often manipulates the salience of group membership, with little consideration of how such manipulations affect feelings toward intergroup contact, and how contextual features may moderate its effects. We propose that feelings toward intergroup contact may not depend solely on the degree to which group membership appears to be salient, but on how references to group membership are interpreted in the intergroup context. Two experimental studies examined how references to group membership may be interpreted differently depending on their source (ingroup or outgroup) and the recipient (minority or majority), and how these interpretations predict feelings toward cross‐group interactions. In Study 1, references to group membership were interpreted more negatively from an outgroup source among majority participants, yet a reverse pattern was observed for minority participants. Similar effects were obtained in Study 2, yet participants tended to respond negatively when an outgroup member referred specifically to their group. Moreover, feelings about cross‐group interactions were predicted only (Study 1) and strongly (Study 2) by the degree to which outgroup members' references were interpreted negatively, beyond what was predicted by participants' general awareness of group membership. Implications of these findings for future research on contact and salience are discussed. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.