Nature,corruption, and freedom: Stoic ethics in Kant's Religion

Kant's account of “the radical evil in human nature” in the 1793 Religion within the Bounds of Reason Alone is typically interpreted as a reworking of the Augustinian doctrine of original sin. But Kant does not talk about Augustine explicitly there, and if he is rehabilitating the doctrine of original sin, the result is not obviously Augustinian. Instead, Kant talks about Stoic ethics in a pair of passages on either end of his account of radical evil and leaves other clues that his argument is a reworking of an old Stoic problem. “Radical evil” refers to the idea that our moral condition is—by default and yet by our own deed—bad or corrupt; and that this corruption is the root (radix) of human badness in all its variety, ubiquity, and sheer ordinariness. Kant takes as his premise a version of the Stoic idea that nature gives us “uncorrupted starting points” (Diogenes Laertius 7.89). What sense can be made of the origin of human badness, given such a premise? Kant's account of radical evil is an answer to this old Stoic problem, which requires a conception of freedom that is not available in his Stoic sources.     

Indulging anxiety: human enhancement from a Protestant perspective.

At the heart of any ethics of human enhancement must be some normative assumptions about human nature. The purpose of this essay is to draw on themes from a Protestant theological anthropology to provide a basis for understanding and evaluating the tension between maintaining our humanity and enhancing it. Drawing primarily on the work of theologian Reinhold Niebuhr, I interpret enhancement as proceeding from the anxiety that characterizes human experience at the juncture of freedom and finiteness. Religious and moral dimensions of human sinfulness are considered in relation to cultural values that motivate human enhancement generally. I employ these dimensions in a series of benchmarks to suggest a background of theological, anthropological, and moral considerations against which enhancement is not to be condemmed but rather critically evaluated.     

Reading Reinhold Niebuhr against Himself Again: On Theological Language and Divine Action

Since 1937, when Reinhold Niebuhr articulated his most developed understanding of the function of theological language, there has been debate about how his approach should be understood. Recent readings of Niebuhr have assumed that Niebuhr's account of theological language rests upon dualistic presuppositions. While acknowledging manifestations of post‐Cartesian dualism in Niebuhr's thought, this article argues that Niebuhr's thought also reflects a more compelling strain of Augustinian/Kierkegaardian anti‐dualism, and that reading Niebuhr through the lens of this anti‐dualism allows for a fruitful account of his treatment of theological language.     

Human agency in the twenty-first century: the views of P. S. Davies,R. Niebuhr,and A. N. Whitehead

With neuroscience and psychology making significant advances in contemporary brain research, fundamental questions concerning the nature of human life and activity will become evermore critical as we proceed further into the twenty-first century. Put simply, are we creatures who exercise some genuine degree of freedom and agency in the world or are we creatures whose actions are largely if not wholly determined by biological, neurological, and psychological factors far below the radar of our conscious awareness? This article explores this important and timely question by examining the views of Paul Sheldon Davies, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Alfred North Whitehead. Drawing on contemporary science, Davies dismisses Niebuhr’s existential analysis of human existence and any meaningful conception of human agency. Succinctly stated, can one take both the results of contemporary neuroscience seriously, as Davies does, and the affirmation of human agency seriously, as Niebuhr does? The thesis of this essay is that Whitehead offers a constructive bridge between Davies’ affirmation of science and Niebuhr’s existential account of human existence. In sum, it is argued that Whitehead’s process philosophy enables us to affirm the genuine influence of nonconscious factors in experience as well as the authenticity of human agency and subjectivity in the world.     

HENRY NELSON WIEMAN ON RELIGION AND REINHOLD NIEBUHR

Henry Nelson Wieman and Reinhold Niebuhr were theologically poles apart—Wieman a “new naturalist” and Niebuhr a “new super naturalist”—according to Wieman's nomenclature. Wieman devoted more time and attention to Niebuhr than Niebuhr did to him. The reason for this was the result of Wieman's sustained attack on the “new supernaturalism” with which he identified Niebuhr as one of the major American representatives. This article traces the background to Wieman's view of Niebuhr—Wieman's own views on science, on religion, and on Christianity—then proceeds to Wieman's analysis of Niebuhr's theology and his relation to the “new supernaturalism,” concluding with Niebuhr's reply to Wieman.     

Sociobiology and Original Sin

This paper argues that the creation narrative of the Fall in Genesis 2:4b–3:24 is not history and does not contain a doctrine of original sin. The doctrine of original sin as a theory of human nature needs a new foundation. The contemporary science of sociobiology has a theory of human nature that is remarkably similar to major versions of the Christian doctrines of original sin. To incorporate sociobiology's theory of human nature into Christianity is to lay the foundation for a new, ecumenical understanding of original sin.     

'Willing Is Not Choosing': Some Anthropological Implications of Dyothelite Christology

Abstract:  The dyothelite Christology of Maximus the Confessor provides a basis for countering modern worry that an Augustinian doctrine of the bondage of the will undermines human integrity. Modern discomfort with Augustine presupposes an anthropology that equates genuine agency with freedom of choice. In defending the principle that Christ has a fully human will, Maximus challenges this presupposition by denying that a human agent's willing is to be identified with choosing. Thus, while Maximus does not share Augustine's doctrine of original sin, he offers a framework within which to explore possible convergence between Eastern and Western understandings of the will.     

Reinhold Niebuhr's Paradox: Groundwork for Social Responsibility

This paper is an examination of Reinhold Niebuhr's embrace of the paradoxical in relation to his conception of the self. While it explores the theoretical and practical difficulties entailed in Niebuhr's account, it also seeks to defend his position, suggesting that in the light of Niebuhr's negative apologetic, the paradoxical self represents the only intelligible means of self–understanding available. Though Niebuhr never develops this epistemological ground, it may provide a way of avoiding the moral consequentialism to which Niebuhr appears to be resigned. The resulting framework points toward moral pragmatism, retaining its orientation and relevance in the midst of deliberations concerning means and ends.     

On Original Sin

This article sets out a constructive account of original sin that attempts to take seriously the Christian tradition (particularly, the Reformed tradition), and that avoids the serious theological drawback of the doctrine of original guilt. I dub this account the moderate Reformed doctrine of original sin. I also argue that an adequate understanding of original sin must be open‐textured enough to accommodate some version of the story of evolutionary human development. Although I do not offer an account of how original sin is consistent with evolutionary human development, the doctrine set out here is commensurate with several live options on this controversial theological topic, which I take to be a strength, rather than a weakness, of the view.     

Freedom immediately after Kant

Kant's effort to defend the co‐existence of transcendental freedom and natural necessity is one of the crowning achievements of the first Critique. Yet by identifying the will with practical reason in his moral philosophy, he lent support to the view that the moral law is the causal law of a free will—the result of which, as Reinhold argued, left immoral action impossible. However, Reinhold's attempt to separate the will from practical reason generated difficulties of its own, which Maimon was quick to point out. By identifying freedom with indifferent choice, Maimon argued, Reinhold had no resources to explain why a free will acts at all. My aim in this article is to show how Fichte's theory of freedom seeks to reconcile these two commitments: The key lies in what I call Fichte's Genetic Model, according to which indifferent choice is the original condition of the will, but a condition we must actively overcome.     

Reason and Emotion in the Ethics of Self‐Restraint

In this essay I argue that Reinhold Niebuhr's ethics of self‐restraint, though promising, is based on an incomplete and imprecise moral psychology. Although Niebuhr claims that reason cannot provide a sufficient grounding to motivate self‐restraint, he does not disclose which human capacity might serve this purpose. I suggest that we can address this oversight by strengthening Niebuhr's tentative embrace of David Hume, and by developing a concept of the emotions in order to explain how human beings can cultivate a stable inclination to self‐restraint. This project is informed by and in the service of feminist critiques of Niebuhr and social concerns.     

Truth as transcendental in Thomas Aquinas

Aquinas presents his most complete exposition of the transcendentals inDe veritate 1, 1, that deals with the question “What is truth?”. The thesis of this paper is that the question of truth is essential for the understanding of his doctrine of the transcendentals. The first part of the paper (sections 1–4) analyzes Thomas's conception of truth. Two approaches to truth can be found in his work. The first approach, based on Aristotle's claim that “truth is not in things but in the mind”, leads to the idea that the proper place of truth is in the intellect. The second approach is ontological: Thomas also acknowledges that there is truth in every being. The famous definition of truth as “adequation of thing and intellect” enables him to integrate the two approaches. Truth is a relation between two terms, both of which can be called “true” because both are essential for the conformity between thing and intellect. The second part of the paper (sections 5–7) deals with the manner in which Thomas gives truth a place in the doctrine of the transcendentals, and shows that his conception of truth leads to important innovations in this doctrine: the introduction of relational transcendentals and the correlation between spirit and being. If “truth” is transcendental, it must be convertible with “being”. Sect. 6 discusses objections that Thomas advances himself to this convertibility. Sect. 7 deals with a difficulty in his account of truth as a relational transcendental. Ontological truth expresses a relation to an intellect but the relation to the human intellect is accidental for the truth of things. Essential for their truth can only be a practical intellect that causes things. In this way, Thomas argues, the divine intellect relates to all things.     

The Body in the Psychology of Religion

Hutch's position that psychology of religion has neglected the mortal body is affirmed but reinterpreted. Although it may be true that psychology has adopted as postmodern bias toward defining the human being as primarily cognitive, it is less true that the psychology of religion has been unaware of how religion emerges from the experience of living. Noting that Hutch could be understood as a modern Romantic, I reinterpret, in an alternate frame- work, his contention that reexperiencing the sexuality and mortality of the body will reinstate eros into the psychology of religion. The I story model of Donald McKay and the existential paradigm of Reinhold Niebuhr are of- fered as reconceptions of what Hutch is proposing. These theorists state Hutch's position in ways that allow for a more substantive picture of what religion is and how it emerges from the life process.     

DEFENDING NIEBUHR FROM HAUERWAS

In his 2001 book, With the Grain of the Universe, Stanley Hauerwas has made an extended case for Karl Barth as the model for how to do Christian ethics, and for Reinhold Niebuhr as the model for how not to do it. Though Barth's closer and deeper theological connection to the Christian tradition appeals to a Jewish traditionalist by analogy, nevertheless, Niebuhr's approach to social ethics, based as it is on a version of natural law, is of greater appeal. That is because it is more philosophically arguable in a secular society and culture, and because it is more politically effective there. It is what made Niebuhr a more effective opponent of Nazism than was Barth. Also, Niebuhr's version of natural law is not a christianized version of Stoic natural law teaching but, rather, a profound use of the biblical prohibition of idolatry, having heretofore unnoticed affinities with rabbinic developments of that prohibition.     

Reinhold Niebuhr in Contemporary Scholarship

Recent studies of Reinhold Niebuhr's life and work demonstrate his continued importance in theology, ethics, and political thought. Historical studies by Heather Warren, Mark Kleinman, and Normunds Kamergrauzis provide new assessments of Niebuhr's role as a political and religious leader in his own time and trace the consequences of the movements in which he participated. They also show us more clearly how his work was connected to the ideas and programs of his contemporaries. Colm McKeogh offers a more systematic treatment of Niebuhr's political realism in relation to just war theory. Niebuhr's intellectual legacy remains disputed, with Stanley Hauerwas and Langdon Gilkey offering radically different assessments of his theology. Hauerwas sees in Niebuhr a close connection to the religious liberalism of William James that precludes any authentic Christian witness. Niebuhr's empiricism reduces God to a necessary feature of human consciousness. Gilkey notes Niebuhr's early use of James' psychology, but discerns a theology of history that is central to Niebuhr's mature work. In that theology, the ground of hope necessarily lies beyond human consciousness, and indeed beyond history itself.     

"Let Us Be Saints if We Can"

Stanley Hauerwas's Gifford Lectures are, at least in part, an interpretation of the Giffords that came before him. As a contribution to intellectual and theological history, however, I wish Hauerwas had given witness to Santayana's Hermes the hermeneut, along with the considerable, indeed considerate, witness he does give to his own Christian faith. Hauerwas seems to dislike Reinhold Niebuhr and, by my account, misreads William James. Thus I have to conclude that With the Grain of the Universe does not measure up to his own more capacious and incisive works.     

Retrieving a Mature Reformed Doctrine of Original Sin: A Conversation with Some Recent Proposals

A ‘broadly Augustinian’ doctrine of original sin continues to receive support in contemporary Catholic and Protestant theological discourse as the best account of human experience and biblical teaching. Notwithstanding this, substantial challenges arise in connection with this doctrine which Catholics and Protestants have classically sought to address in their own ways. With a contemporary Protestant audience in mind, I attempt to rehabilitate the theological viability of the oft‐criticized mature Reformed doctrine of original sin which entails the immediate imputation of Adamic guilt. In dialogue with some recent dogmatic contributions, I draw upon eloquent advocates of the Reformed doctrine, such as Petrus van Mastricht and Francis Turretin, to argue that the notion of immediate imputation continues to provide a coherent and biblically defensible explanation for the just imposition of inherited corruption. Faring somewhat better than other proposals, it deserves reconsideration in contemporary reconstructions of the doctrine, especially in those which might self‐consciously seek to identify with the Protestant confessional tradition.     

A critical discussion of Prior’s philosophical and tense-logical analysis of the ideas of indeterminism and human freedom

This paper is a critical discussion of A.N. Prior’s contribution to the modern understanding of indeterminism and human freedom of choice. Prior suggested that these ideas should be conceived in terms of his tense logic. It can be demonstrated that his approach provides an attractive formalization that makes it possible to discuss indeterminism and human freedom of choice in a very precise manner and in a broader metaphysical context. It is also argued that Prior’s development of this approach was closely linked to his very personal struggles with fundamental religious and metaphysical questions. In his opinion, holding the doctrine of divine foreknowledge together with the doctrine of human freewill gives rise to difficult logical and philosophical problems. It appears that Prior, rather early on, decided to support what was later known as the Peircean solution, although he also analysed what he considered to be the most important alternative solution—the Ockhamist solution. This paper offers a discussion of some of Prior’s published books and papers as well as some of the papers in his Nachlass.