The Deep Structure of Group Life: Unconscious Dimensions

There is a reconsideration and renaissance of interest in expanded conceptions of unconscious processes as they affect individuals and groups (Grotstein, 1999). Recent focus on social unconscious (Hopper, 1996) and cultural unconscious processes (Henderson, 1988) and the nature of intersubjectivity (Harwood and Pines, 1998) raise questions about the location of group analysis. This paper considers the deep structure of group life by examining four functions of the unconscious: repressive, conservative, creative, and mythopoetic (Ellenberger, 1970). On an individual level of analysis, these functions are equated respectively with formative ideas about the: personal–subjective, social–political, intersubjective–cultural and collective–objective unconscious. Group level analogs, as they develop and affect groups and their members, are explored as synthetic, shared, symbolicy and synchronous unconscious processes.     

The Unconscious Mind

ABSTRACT— The unconscious mind is still viewed by many psychological scientists as the shadow of a "real" conscious mind, though there now exists substantial evidence that the unconscious is not identifiably less flexible, complex, controlling, deliberative, or action-oriented than is its counterpart. This "conscious-centric" bias is due in part to the operational definition within cognitive psychology that equates unconscious with subliminal . We review the evidence challenging this restricted view of the unconscious emerging from contemporary social cognition research, which has traditionally defined the unconscious in terms of its unintentional nature; this research has demonstrated the existence of several independent unconscious behavioral guidance systems: perceptual, evaluative, and motivational. From this perspective, it is concluded that in both phylogeny and ontogeny, actions of an unconscious mind precede the arrival of a conscious mind—that action precedes reflection.     

无意识信息加工中的“完型”——无意识捆绑假说的新证据

采用连续闪烁范式(Continuous Flash Suppression,CFS)考察了无意识状态下完型能否发生.研究通过2(线条完整性)×2(意义破坏)×2(熟悉性)的被试内实验设计考察了8种条件下图片的突破抑制时间(Suppression Time,ST).结果发现:线条完整和意义未破坏的图片能更快地克服噪音图片的抑制进入意识;熟悉性不影响突破抑制时间.重要的是,不完整的图片也可以出现意义破坏效应.这表明即使在被抑制的状态下,不完整图形的信息也能够传达至与完型相关的高级视觉区域形成客体表征.研究为无意识捆绑假说(The Unconscious Binding Hypothesis)提供了新的实验证据.     

Architecture and the Unconscious

The way we plan and live our built environments reflect unconscious forms of thinking realised through architecture. Cities become holding environments that offer inhabitants differing forms of psychic engagement with the object world. The way they are planned and the types of objects they offer add up to degrees of ''imageability'', an attribute of any city that could become part of a psychoanalysis of the built world, or what Bachelard termed a ''topoanalysis''. Cities also play with life and death as those who inhabit built structures will be outlived by the places they inhabit, yet they enliven the inorganic spaces they construct. All buildings may, then, be forms of death brought into lived experience, and architects negotiate complex issues involving the matriculation of forms of death into human life. The ''spirit'' of human endeavour needs representation in the built environment and we may consider the ways in which a psychoanalysis of the built world could lead to a psycho-spiritual representation of human life.     

Rhetoric and the Unconscious

This paper develops the ideas of rhetorical psychology by applying them to some basic Freudian concepts. In so doing, the paper considers whether there might be a Dialogic Unconscious. So far rhetorical psychology has tended to concentrate upon conscious thought rather than on the unconscious. It has suggested that thinking is modelled on argument and dialogue, and that rhetoric provides the means of opening up matters for thought and discussion. However, rhetoric may also provide the means for closing down topics and, thereby, provide the means of repression. It will be suggested that language is not merely expressive but it is also repressive. Moreover, the repressive aspects of language are built into the very practices of dialogue. In learning language, we learn the codes for socially appropriate ways of speaking. These must be acquired as habits, so that we learn to repress routinely the desire to transgress the codes of appropriate speech. Thus, the routine use of language provides the resources for repression. If language is repressive, then this applies equally to the language of psycho-analysis itself. Freud's famous case histories, such as that of Dora, can be re-examined, in order to see what Freud's own theory of repression was itself repressing.     

Architecture of the Unconscious

Finally, when Freud unveiled the predominant role of the unconscious in psychic processes, it turned out that our ego does not even rule its own house.

— Slavoj ?i?ek, How to Read Lacan

Get up off the pavement, brush the dirt up off my psyche …

— rapper Earl Sweatshirt, “Chum” In the Kitchen

Psychoanalysis is known primarily for its preoccupation with the “truth” that “speaks.” Following the critical tradition pioneered by Lacan and now ?i?ek, I would instead like to shift our attention to the “site[s]” where these pivotal experiments in truth take place—the environments we transform and the objects we fashion as we “learn to live with” the social plight we have inherited. Simply put, the aim of this paper is to explore the architecture of the unconscious. To develop this argument, I draw upon an array of genres and cultural artifacts, including personal memoir, cartoons, and hip hop lyricism.     

The Unconscious: A Conceptual Study

Books reviewed:
Alasdair MacIntyre, The Unconscious: A Conceptual Study , Revised Edition (London and New York: Routledge, 1958, 2004). 119 pages + index. ISBN 0-415-33304-0 Reviewed by Louis A. Ruprecht, Jr., Claremont School of Theology Claremont School of Theology 1325 North College Ave Claremont California 91711 lruprecht@cst.edu     

Unconscious sensations

D. M. Armstrong proposes to explain the possibility of unconscious sensations by means of a distinction between the perceptual consciousness, which is essentially involved in sensations, and our introspective consciousness of sensations. He holds that unconscious sensations are instances of perceptual consciousness of which we are not introspectively conscious. I contend that, although Armstrong's distinction is plausible and significant, it fails to explain his own examples of unconscious sensation. I argue that the puzzle of how unconscious sensations are possible arises at the level of perceptual consciousness and does not concern our introspective awareness of mental states.This paper grew out of research supported by the National Endowment for the Humanities at Cornell University in 1985. I would like to express my gratitude to the National Endowment, to Cornell, and to Sydney Shoemaker.     

Unconscious Emotion

Abstract— Conscious feelings have traditionally been viewed as a central and necessary ingredient of emotion. Here we argue that emotion also can be genuinely unconscious. We describe evidence that positive and negative reactions can be elicited subliminally and remain inaccessible to introspection. Despite the absence of subjective feelings in such cases, subliminally induced affective reactions still influence people's preference judgments and even the amount of beverage they consume. This evidence is consistent with evolutionary considerations suggesting that systems underlying basic affective reactions originated prior to systems for conscious awareness. The idea of unconscious emotion is also supported by evidence from affective neuroscience indicating that subcortical brain systems underlie basic "liking" reactions. More research is needed to clarify the relations and differences between conscious and unconscious emotion, and their underlying mechanisms. However, even under the current state of knowledge, it appears that processes underlying conscious feelings can become decoupled from processes underlying emotional reactions, resulting in genuinely unconscious emotion.     

Dancing With the Unconscious: The Art of Psychoanalysis

This article examines psychoanalytic work as an art and uses the metaphor of dance between two unconscious minds to describe the rich creativity of mental life. Free association, transference/countertransference, and dreamwork are each discussed for their creative dimensions and their coupling in the cure. A compelling session with dream analysis of a transsexual patient is presented verbatim (along with the author's inner thoughts) to illustrate the art of dance that takes place between analyst and analysand.     

Unconscious Evidence

Can beliefs that are not consciously formulated serve as part of an agent's evidence for other beliefs? A common view says no, any belief that is psychologically immediate is also epistemically immediate. I argue that some unconscious beliefs can serve as evidence, but other unconscious beliefs cannot. Person‐level beliefs can serve as evidence, but subpersonal beliefs cannot. I try to clarify the nature of the personal/subpersonal distinction and to show how my proposal illuminates various epistemological problems and provides a principled framework for solving other problems.     

Unconscious Insights

From early in the history of psychology, theorists have argued about whether insights are initially unconscious or whether they are conscious from the start. Empirically identifying unconscious insights has proven difficult, however: How can we tell if people have had an insight if they do not tell us they have had one? Fortunately, although obtaining evidence of unconscious insights is difficult, it is not impossible. The present article describes an experiment in which evidence of unconscious insights was obtained. Almost 90% of second graders generated an arithmetic insight at an unconscious level before they were able to report it. Within five trials of the unconscious discovery, 80% of the children made the discovery consciously, as indicated by their verbal reports. Thus, the initial failure to report the insight could not be attributed to the children lacking the verbal facility to describe it. The results indicate that at least in some cases, insights arise first at an unconscious level, and only later become conscious. Rising activation of the new strategy may be the mechanism that leads children to become conscious of using it.     

Trauma and the Unconscious: Double Conscience,The Uncanny and Cruelty

Relatively little has been written on the role of trauma in conceptions of the unconscious. This paper explores Freud’s conceptions of the unconscious, comparing his ideas with the original French notion of “double conscience” and exploring their implications for technique. Whereas Freud’s concept of the unconscious mainly depends upon a theory of internal drives, Ferenczi’s ascribed a central role to trauma, shifting the focus to the individual in the context of relationships. The comparison is illustrated with a case history.