Conversation and Communication by J. A. M. Meerloo

Recent research shows that adolescents are a high-risk group for HIV infection, and that educational campaigns designed to reduce risk taking concerning HIV/AIDS have been largely ineffective with this population. It is probable that irrational psychodynamic processes underlie this risky behavior. In order to explore these behaviors, a sample of low-risk high-school adolescents and one of high-risk institutionalized juvenile offenders were formed into small groups for psychodynamic group therapy. This article presents preliminary findings based on qualitative analysis of the group process. Several sources of participants' difficulties in forming realistic appraisals of HIV/AIDS risk and of acting in accordance with them were unidentified, especially attempts to cope with experiences of loss, developing sexuality, and sexual identity and changing relations with adults. Certain problems were developmentally salient with all adolescents, whereas others were especially marked for the high-risk population of developmentally disturbed adolescents.     

The Two Faces of Evidentialism

In this paper I hope to demonstrate two different (and seemingly independent) ways of interpreting the tenets of evidentialism and show why it is important to distinguish between them. These two ways correspond to those proposed by Feldman (Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 60, 667–695, 2000, Evidentialism: Essays in epistemology, Oxford University Press, 2004) and Adler (Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 23, 267–285, 1999, Beliefs own ethics, MIT Press, 2002). Feldman’s way of interpreting evidentialism makes evidentialism a principle about epistemic justification, about what we ought to believe. Adler’s, on the other hand, makes evidentialism a principle about how we come to believe, what it is, broadly speaking, rational for us to believe. Having identified this difference, I consider two complaints levied against evidentialism, namely what I call the threshold problem and what I call the availability problem, and hope to show that: (a) only an independent, bracketed justification principle of evidentialism can deal with those problems; (b) the rationality principle of evidentialism is not in fact independent from the justification principle; (c) the rationality principle is hard to motivate; and that (d) in the final analysis the argument for the justification principle depends on the rationality principle. I thus conclude that although it may be convenient for evidentialists to treat these two principles as independent, such an independence cannot be maintained.

The Two Faces of Fire

Abstract

“You don't change your heart in your head,” we are told by one bit of folk wisdom. And the feasts and seasons of our church year, especially the paschal season, have to do with the transformation of hearts, which we call conversion. Yet good liturgical celebration requires thought, planning, organization, on the part of a team of coordinating group so that the entire assembly can give its full participation to a welldesigned whole.

The checklist that follows is general so as to apply to all liturgies; naturally, it must be adapted to particular Sundays and seasons. Lent-Eastertime has much about it that is unique, and the chapters that follow are designed to describe that uniqueness in detail. The checklist, however, is step one in the planning process. It might be (1) reviewed by all liturgy planners in a congregatiodparish; (2) given to all new members of a liturgy-planning team as part of a packet of materials; (3) passed out at the annual leadership retreat, in an effort to apprise all parishlcongregation leaders of the work involved in liturgy planning.     

The Two Faces of Mental Imagery

Mental imagery has often been taken to be equivalent to “sensory imagination”, the perception-like type of imagination at play when, for example, one visually imagines a flower when none is there, or auditorily imagines a music passage while wearing earplugs. I contend that the equation of mental imagery with sensory imagination stems from a confusion between two senses of mental imagery. In the first sense, mental imagery is used to refer to a psychological attitude, which is perception-like in nature. In the second sense, mental imagery refers to a mental content, which can be grasped via different attitudes. I will show that failure to acknowledge the distinction between these senses of mental imagery has muddled philosophical discussion. This distinction brings much needed clarity to debates where sensory imagination and mental imagery are invoked, shedding light on issues such as the nature of imagistic mental states, and the representational powers and limits of mental imagery. I will conclude by sketching a general attitudinal account of imagination that does justice to both senses of mental imagery, outlining a promising framework for understanding imagination.     

The Two Faces of Codependent Relating: A Research-Based Perspective

Using an overview of the controversial concept of codependency as a backdrop, the paper summarizes outcomes of a project devoted to developing and applying a technique for assessing codependent relating. Results support the clinically based contention that there is a pattern of relating in dysfunctional relationships that warrants the label codependent, and that some (but not all) cases of such relating stem from a distinctive codependency personality syndrome. These results gave rise to a perspective that combines a relational process with a dispositional view of codependent relating, and proposes that codependency may be either endogenous (chronic) or exogenous (reactive).     

The Two Faces of Familism: A Cross-Cultural Research in India and Italy

In the present research, we developed a familism scale comprised of two dimensions, namely support obligations and traditional norms, in order to examine cross-cultural and gender differences in a group of Indian (n = 107) and of Italian students (n = 106). We hypothesised and found that support obligations were judged more important than traditional norms in both groups. Moreover, the Indian participants considered both dimensions of familism more important than did their Italian counterparts. Indian women gave greater importance to traditional norms than Indian men did, while Italian women gave greater importance to support obligations than Italian men did. The social implications of cross-cultural and gender differences in familism are discussed.     

正义的两面：道德心理学的，非形而上学的

《正义的两面》认为,作为利益交换的规则,正义是有条件的;作为道德命令,正义又是无条件的。作者慈继伟从道德心理学的进路出发,借助“相互性”和“社会化”这两个核心概念,解释看似矛盾的正义之两面如何在道德的历史变迁中实现某种程度的共存。本文认为全书的基本结论可以总结为:正义的有条件性(也即相互性)是分析的、绝对的和根源的;而正义的无条件性则是社会化的后果,是相对的和衍生的。此书不仅填补了正义研究的一项空白,而且澄清了正义与“自向倾向”所具有的概念关联,对正义研究贡献颇大。     

Certainty and Uncertainty: The Two Faces of the Hindsight Bias

“Hindsight Bias” is a person's tendency, after learning about the actual outcome of a situation or the correct answer to a question, to distort a previous judgment in the direction of this new information. In the literature, hindsight bias has been mostly discussed as an inevitable result of a “judgment under uncertainty.” We think that the hindsight bias is due to memorial as well as inferential processes: Whereas certainty about the recollection is memorial and concerns the recollective experience, certainty at the time of the judgment is inferential and concerns the individual's metaknowledge (“I know that I knew that”). In two experiments participants' feelings of certainty were measured indirectly (Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996) by giving participants the option of leaving those questions unanswered about which they felt uncertain. This free-report option was offered to half of the participants in the first estimate phase (concerning time of judgment) and to the second half in the memory phase (concerning the recollective experience). At the end of the session, participants were presented again with the questions they had skipped and were now required to answer them. This procedure allowed us to compare the amount of hindsight bias for the skipped, uncertain items to the spontaneously answered, certain ones. Both experiments demonstrated that the hindsight bias is a result of the interaction of both uncertainty and certainty.     

The other Man by Donald J. West

The American Group Psychotherapy Association began in 1942 as an elite, strictly Freudian organization. Its dramatic growth in the 1960s and 1970s was accompanied by much theoretical disagreement and professional “chauvinism.” During the past decade, however, the ideological controversy has yielded to pluralism* in theory and eclecticism in practice.     

Two Forms of the Straw Man

The authors identify and offer an analysis of a new form of the Straw Man fallacy, and then explore the implications of the prevalence of this fallacy for contemporary political discourse.     

自恋双面性与行为系统的关系：性别的调节作用

为探索不同自恋得分的个体对奖赏与惩罚的敏感性及性别在其中的作用,本研究采用钦佩–竞争自恋问卷(NARQ)、BIS/BAS量表在483名在校大学生中进行调查。对数据进行共同方法偏差检验、相关分析以及基于多元回归的调节效应检验,结果发现：(1)钦佩性自恋与行为趋近系统存在显著正相关,与行为抑制系统存在显著负相关;(2)竞争性自恋与行为抑制系统存在显著正相关,而与行为趋近系统的相关不显著;(3)性别在自恋双面性与行为系统之间起调节作用。结果表明,女性自恋双面性得分越高,对奖赏和惩罚均越敏感;在男性被试中未表现出这种模式。     

Two Faces of Representativeness: The Effects of Response Format on Beliefs about Random Sampling

Two beliefs that act in concert have been proposed as the basis for the representativeness heuristic in general, and judgments about random sampling in particular: samples resemble their parent populations (resemblance), and random sampling is a self-correcting process (balancing). Based on the results of a preliminary experiment, we proposed the ‘rule-cuing’ hypothesis, which is that different aspects of sampling problems can invoke these two beliefs separately. We found that when response formats required subjects to estimate themean of a sample, subjects’ responses reflected resemblance beliefs, whereas when subjects estimated the total score in a sample, balancing beliefs were elicited. In additional experiments we eliminated two rival hypotheses: theproblem difficulty hypothesis, and thearithmetic inconsistency hypothesis. Results suggest that beliefs, as well as preferences, may be constructed on-line in response to task characteristics.     

The Karolinska Directed Emotional Faces: A validation study

Although affective facial pictures are widely used in emotion research, standardised affective stimuli sets are rather scarce, and the existing sets have several limitations. We therefore conducted a validation study of 490 pictures of human facial expressions from the Karolinska Directed Emotional Faces database (KDEF). Pictures were evaluated on emotional content and were rated on an intensity and arousal scale. Results indicate that the database contains a valid set of affective facial pictures. Hit rates, intensity, and arousal of the 20 best KDEF pictures for each basic emotion are provided in an appendix.     

The Many Faces of Psychoontology

Psychoontology is a philosophical theory of the cognizing subject and various related matters. In this article. I present two approaches to the discipline—the first proposed by Jerzy Perzanowski, the second by Jesse Prinz and Yoram Hazony. I then undertake to bring these into unity using certain ideas from Husserl and Frege. Applying the functor qua, psychoontology can be described as a discipline concerned with: (a) the cognizing subject qua being—this leads to the question: what kind of being is the subject (is it an object?, simple or complex?, a process?) and what makes him/her/it possible; (b) being qua cognized, this leads to the question: under what conditions can we access the world? Since the notion of being qua cognized might seem peculiar, I present its context and discuss it in detail in the last section.