Covariation information,causal questioning,and interpersonal behavior

The effects of covariation information on perceivers' behavior toward a target person were investigated in a face-to-face setting. Subjects observed a female stimulus person behave in an impolite fashion. They were then presented with consensus, consistency, and distinctiveness information, patterned to imply either a person or an entity explanation for the rude behavior. Some subjects immediately completed a measure of their attributions, whereas others did not answer any attribution question. Subjects then interacted with the target person in an interview setting and afterward rated her on several evaluative dimensions. As predicted, the covariation information presented to subjects affected their impressions of the target person and their behavior toward her during the interaction. These effects were consistent across measures when subjects did not answer the attribution question, but appeared only on certain measures when subjects answered the attribution item prior to the interaction. This pattern of findings was interpreted as showing that the attribution question made subjects uncertain about the true cause of the target's rude behavior.     

The other way around: Effects of causal attributions on estimates of consensus,distinctiveness, and consistency

It was hypothesized that the attributed cause of a given person's behavior will affect inferences about its generalizability over persons (consensus), stimuli (distinctiveness), and circumstances (consistency). Moreover, these effects were expected to parallel the effects of consensus, distinctiveness, and consistency information on causal attributions. Experiment 1 provided support for these predictions but also showed that attribution affected consensus judgments less than it affected judgments of distinctiveness and consistency, particularly when consensus was not the first characteristic estimated. Using a different set of stimulus materials and a different manipulation of attribution, Experiments 2 and 3 provided further evidence for the effects of attribution on inferences of consensus information. Experiment 3 indicated that the false consensus effect—actors' tendency to assume that the majority of people share their behavior—may be due to actors' tendency to attribute their behavior to situational factors. Implications of the present studies for biased estimates of consensus and the use of consensus and attribution as mediating variables are discussed.     

External motivators of self-touching behavior

Previous research has shown that nonverbal self-touching behaviors can be induced by external motivators such as videos and literary passages about insects. This study investigated whether the number of self-touching behaviors differed between presentation of what was assumed to be an anxiety-inducing stimulus (listening to the reading of a passage about leeches and answering questions) or a nonanxiety-inducing stimulus (a passage about canaries). It also investigated whether there was a difference in frequency of self-touching when subjects were passively listening to passages or actively answering questions. The difference in frequency of self-touching between men and women was also observed. Over-all, subjects did not perform significantly more self-touching gestures during the anxiety-inducing stimulus than during the nonanxiety-inducing, as previous research had indicated. Subjects did touch themselves significantly more, however, while answering questions than while listening to the passage. Over-all, men performed significantly more self-touching behaviors than women. And, women touched themselves significantly more during the active anxiety-inducing cell than in any other condition.     

Locus of causality and the use of information in the development of causal attributions1

Two studies were conducted to examine whether attributions made about events may be influenced by individual assumptions regarding causation that are age related. In Study 1, 96 subjects at three age levels (four and five years, eight and nine years, and college students) observed a target actor on videotape select an item from an unseen array, and four other actors either agree (high consensus) or disagree (low consensus) with the choice. Subjects were asked to decide why the actor liked the chosen object best—because of something about the actor (person attribution) or because of something about the item (entity attribution). The results showed that perceived locus of causality shifted from entity to person attributions with age. In addition, subjects at all ages were able to utilize the consensus information when they had no opportunity to form their own impressions about the items in the array. In Study 2, 126 subjects at four age levels (five and six years, seven and eight years, nine and ten years, and high school students) chose an item from among an array for themselves and responded to a person (self)/entity attribution question regarding the locus of their own choice. The entity to person shift with age was again found and was supported by additional measures. The results are discussed in terms of children's causal reasoning capacities and social environmental factors affecting developmental change in social judgments.     

Attribution and reconstructive memory

Two experiments were conducted to test the effects of making an attribution on later memory for the event that gave rise to the attribution. Subjects in Experiment 1 observed a scenario in which an actor's behavior was associated with high or low variance (distinctiveness) across situations, and high or low congruence (consensus) to the actions of others. Subjects either made attributions for the actor's behavior immediately following the scenario or not. One week later, subjects were asked to recall consensus and distinctiveness for the actor's original behavior. Subjects who made attributions were significantly better at estimating the high-high and low-low combinations of consensus and distinctiveness than were their no-attribution counterparts. It was suggested that making an attribution may allow for a reconstructed memory for the original event, but not enhance direct access to the original event information. A second experiment tested this concept further by having subjects view an edited version of the scenario in which either the distinctiveness or the consensus information was deleted and having subjects make attributions or not. One week later, subjects were asked to indicate their certainty that consensus and distinctiveness information was a part of the original scenario and to estimate the levels of consensus and distinctiveness. Subjects who made attributions were more confident and accurate in estimating the level of consensus or distinctiveness that was given in the original scenario than were no-attribution subjects. However, attribution subjects were also more confident that consensus information or distinctiveness information was contained in the scenario (when it was not) than were the noattributio subjects. Results of the two experiments suggest that eliciting attributions can distort subsequent memory for the event on which the attributions were based.     

A Gricean approach to the use of consensus and distinctiveness in causal attributions of verbally described interpersonal events

Various causal attribution theories, starting with the covariation model, argue that people use consensus, distinctiveness, and consistency information to causally explain events and behaviors. Yet, the visual presentation of the covariation model in the form of a cube is based on the assumptions that these dimensions generally affect attributions independently, symmetrically, and equally. A Gricean analysis suggests that these assumptions may not generally hold in the case of causal judgments for verbally communicated interpersonal events. We had participants judge the causal role of an actor and a patient in interpersonal events that were described through actor‐verb‐patient sentences under high versus low consensus and distinctiveness (Studies 1, 2, and 3) or without such information (Studies 2 and 3). As predicted by Gricean logic, consensus and distinctiveness effects on causality ratings depended on the target whose causal role participants assessed, on the information about the alternative dimension, and, most consistently, on consensus and distinctiveness being high versus low. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Hedges enhance memory but inhibit retelling

We examined the effects of hedges and the discourse marker like on how people recalled specific details about precise quantities in spontaneous speech. We found that listeners treated hedged information differently from like-marked information, although both are thought to be indicators of uncertainty or vagueness. In addition, hedges had different effects depending on whether speakers were (1) retelling conversations to another person or (2) answering questions about material they had heard. When retelling to another person, listeners were more likely to report information that was either unmarked or marked with a like than hedged information (Experiment 1). Yet when answering questions by themselves, hedges enhanced memory for details, in comparison with likes (Experiment 2). Hedges appear to provide pragmatic cues about what information is reliable enough to repeat in a conversational context. But although hedged information may be left out, it is not forgotten.     

Acquisition of dispositional attributions: effects of sample size and covariation

Two experiments examined whether dispositional attributions are sensitive to the sample size of the evidence indicating a given level of covariation between person and behavior. Participants were given high or low levels of covariation (i.e. consensus and distinctiveness), and the acquisition of dispositional attributions was monitored by requesting dispositional trait ratings at fixed intervals. The results showed that dispositional attributions were sensitive to sample size, and increased given more evidence on high person‐behavior covariation while they decreased given more evidence on low person‐behavior covariation. Additional analyses suggested that in making dispositional inferences (e.g. about the actor), there was a slight preference for agreement information (e.g. low distinctiveness) over difference information (e.g. low consensus). The effects of sample size are inconsistent with current statistical or probabilistic models of covariation, but are in line with connectionist networks using an error‐correcting learning algorithm. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Attribution difficulty and memory for attribution-relevant information

This research compared the processing and retrieval of attribution-relevant information when the attributional inference is easy or difficult to make. Subjects attributed behavioral events to the person or to the situation, based on several items of context information. Each context sentence implied either the person or the entity as causal agent. When the attributional inference was difficult to make (an equal number of context sentences implied actor and entity as the causal agent), subjects recalled more of the behavioral events, recalled more context sentences, and were less confident in their attributions than when the attributional inference was easy to make (most context sentences implied the same causal agent). Subjects also recalled context information that was implicationally incongruent with the majority of the other context sentences with a higher probability than when that same information was implicationally congruent.     

Answering yes-no questions about causes: Question acts and question categories

Three experiments examined the cognitive process of answering yes-no questions about causes. Singer’s VAIL model of question answering predicted that readers would take longer to correctly answer “no” than “don’t know” to such questions. In Experiment 1, the antecedent sentences used either the causal conjunction so orbecause. Experiment 2 compared so with an implicit causal link. In all conditions, the main prediction was strongly supported. However, when the questions referred to brief stories in Experiment 3, correct “no” and “don’t know” response latencies did not differ. It was concluded that (1) VAIL identifies the cognitive operations underlying the answering of causal questions; (2) answering yes-no questions about causes resembles answering yes-no questions about case-filling elements; (3) the yes-no versus wh- distinction is orthogonal to the type of relation asked about; and (4) studying question answering about sentences will contribute to the understanding of question answering about text.     

An intrasubject approach to causal attribution

The present investigation draws on the judgment research tradition in order to examine the causal attributions made by individual subjects in an often used attribution task. Formal empirical tests of Kelley's (1967) attribution theory have demonstrated that attributions are influenced by the interaction of consensus, distinctiveness, and consistency information. None of these studies, however, have separately examined attributions made by individual judges. Implicit assumptions about individual differences, for example, have been made by the template-matching model of causal attribution (Orvis, Cunningham, & Kelley, 1975) but have not been scrutinized at the intrasubject level. Log linear modeling of attributions in the present research showed that while subjects were influenced by the causal information in the task, the relation between this information and attributions was more importantly characterized by individual differences than by uniform patterning. The nature of these individual differences and the significance of an idiographic approach to causal analysis are discussed.     

Difficulties in comprehending causal relations among children with ADHD: the role of cognitive engagement

The present study examined whether time spent in long looks (i.e., >or=15 s), an index of cognitive engagement, would account for differences between children with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and comparison children in understanding causal relations. Children viewed two televised stories, once in the presence of toys and once in their absence. Dependent variables were visual attention and questions tapping factual information and causal relations. Comparison children answered significantly more causal relations questions than did the children with ADHD, but only in the toys-present condition. Four lines of evidence revealed that the difficulties children with ADHD had in answering causal relations questions in the toys-present condition could be linked specifically to this group's decreased time spent in long looks.     

Priming and communication: Social determinants of information use in judgments of life satisfaction

Two experiments examined the effects of answering a question about a specific component of life satisfaction on respondents' assessment of their overall satisfaction with life. The results suggest that the use of primed information in forming subsequent judgments is determined by Grice's conversational norms. In general, answering the specific question increases the accessibility of information relevant to that question. However, the effect that this has on the general judgment depends on the way in which the two questions are presented. When the two questions are merely placed in sequence without a conversational context, the answer to the subsequent general question is based in part on the primed specific information. As a result, the answer to the general question becomes similar to that for the specific question (i.e. assimilation). However, this does not occur when the two questions are placed in a communication context. Conversational rules dictate that communicators should be informative and should avoid redundancy in their answers. Therefore, when a specific and a general question are perceived as belonging to the same conversational context, the information on which the answer to the specific question was based is disregarded when answering the general one. This attenuates the assimilation effect. The conditions under which these different processes occur are identified and experimentally manipulated, and the implications of these findings for models of information use in judgment are discussed.     

Learning motor synergies makes use of information on muscular load

Prism adaptation, a form of procedural learning, requires the integration of visual and motor information for its proper acquisition. Although the role of the visual feedback has begun to be understood, the nature of the motor information necessary for the development of the adaptation remains unknown. In this work we have tested the idea that modifying the arm load at different stages of the adaptation process, and the ensuing change of motor information perceived by the subjects, would modify the final properties of the adaptation. We trained a set of subjects to throw balls to a target while wearing prism glasses and varied the weight of their arms at different time points during the task. We observed that the acquisition of the adaptation was not affected by the change in load. However, its persistence (i.e., the aftereffect) was reduced when tested under a weight condition different from the training trials. Furthermore, when the training weight conditions were restored later during testing, a second, late aftereffect was unmasked, suggesting that the missing aftereffect did not disappear but had remained latent. Our results show that the internal representation of a motor memory incorporates information about load conditions and that the memory stored under a specific weight condition can be fully retrieved only when the original training condition is restored.