Working memory load differentially affects tip-of-the-tongue states and feeling-of-knowing judgments

Tip-of-the-tongue states (TOTs) are judgments of the likelihood of imminent retrieval for items currently not recalled, whereas feeling-of-knowing judgments (FOKs) are predictions of successful recognition for items not recalled. The assumption has been that similar metacognitive processes dictate these similar judgments. In Experiment 1, TOTs and FOKs were compared for general information questions. Participants remembered four digits (working memory load) during target retrieval for half of the questions, and there was no memory load for the other questions. Working memory did not affect recall but decreased the number of TOTs and increased FOKs. In Experiment 2, participants maintained six digits during retrieval. TOTs decreased in the working memory condition, but FOKs remained constant. Experiment 3 replicated the results of Experiment 2 while asking for FOKs for recall. In each of the first three experiments, positive metacognitive judgments also affected working memory performance, supporting the idea that working memory and metamemory use similar monitoring processes. In Experiment 4, visual working memory did not affect TOTs or FOKs. The data support a view that TOTs and FOKs are separable metacognitive entities.     

Bidirectional semantic priming in the attentional blink

The time course of semantic priming between two associated words was tracked using rapid serial visual presentation of two synchronized streams of stimuli appearing at about 20 items/sec, each stream including a target word. The two words were semantically related or unrelated and were separated by stimulus onset asynchronies (SOAs) of 0–213 msec. Accuracy in reporting the first target (T1) versus the second target (T2) has been shown to interact dramatically with SOA over this range. The materials were in English in Experiment1 and Italian in Experiment2. T1 was semantically primed only at short SOAs, whereas T2 was primed at all SOAs (Experiment 1) or at all SOAs except the shortest one (Experiment2). The results indicate a strong competition between target words early in processing, with T2 often becoming the first word identified at short SOAs, thus priming T1.     

Influences of metamemory on performance predictions for text

When predicting future performance on tests over text material, do individuals estimate retention in addition to assessing comprehension? In Experiment 1, participants either rated their comprehension or predicted performance for each text, with lower ratings indicating lower confidence either in comprehension or in eventual performance. Judgement magnitude was significantly lower for performance predictions than for comprehension ratings, suggesting that predictions were based partly on retention estimates. In Experiment 2, predictions varied with anticipated test delay (15 min or 2 weeks) whereas comprehension ratings did not, providing further evidence that individuals estimate retention when predicting performance. Analyses of individual differences suggest that both good and poor performers incorporate retention estimates when predicting performance, but better performers do so in a more discriminative manner. Implications for theory of metacognitive judgements are discussed.     

Social influence on metacognitive evaluations: The power of nonverbal cues

Metacognitive evaluations refer to the processes by which people assess their own cognitive operations with respect to their current goal. Little is known about whether this process is susceptible to social influence. Here we investigate whether nonverbal social signals spontaneously influence metacognitive evaluations. Participants performed a two-alternative forced-choice task, which was followed by a face randomly gazing towards or away from the response chosen by the participant. Participants then provided a metacognitive evaluation of their response by rating their confidence in their answer. In Experiment 1, the participants were told that the gaze direction was irrelevant to the task purpose and were advised to ignore it. The results revealed an effect of implicit social information on confidence ratings even though the gaze direction was random and therefore unreliable for task purposes. In addition, nonsocial cues (car) did not elicit this effect. In Experiment 2, the participants were led to believe that cue direction (face or car) reflected a previous participant's response to the same question—that is, the social information provided by the cue was made explicit, yet still objectively unreliable for the task. The results showed a similar social influence on confidence ratings, observed with both cues (car and face) but with an increased magnitude relative to Experiment 1. We additionally showed in Experiment 2 that social information impaired metacognitive accuracy. Together our results strongly suggest an involuntary susceptibility of metacognitive evaluations to nonverbal social information, even when it is implicit (Experiment 1) and unreliable (Experiments 1 and 2).     

The relation of tip-of-the-tongue states and retrieval time

The tip-of-the-tongue state (TOT) is the phenomenological experience that a word is on the verge of being recalled. Participants rated TOTs as either emotional or nonemotional. In Experiment 1, given general-information questions, participants spent more time attempting retrieval during emotional TOTs than during nonemotional TOTs or n-TOTs (retrieval failures not accompanied by TOTs). Experiment 2 replicated the effect that TOTs show longer retrieval times than n-TOTs. In Experiment 3, with word definitions as stimuli, retrieval times were longer for emotional TOTs. Experiment 4 showed the same relation between retrieval times and TOTs even when participants made retrospective decisions about whether they had experienced a TOT before they retrieved the correct target. Valence of emotion was correlated with correct resolution of the TOT. These results are discussed in the context of a metacognitive model, in which TOTs serve to monitor and control cognition.     

The effects of nonconsciously priming emotion concepts on behavior

Current empirical evidence regarding nonconsciously priming emotion concepts is limited to positively versus negatively valenced affect. This article demonstrates that specific, equally valenced emotion concepts can be nonconsciously activated, remain inaccessible to conscious awareness, and still affect behavior in an emotion-specific fashion. In Experiment 1A, participants subliminally primed with guilty emotion adjectives showed lower indulgence than did participants subliminally primed with sad emotion adjectives; even after the addition of a 5-min time delay, these results were replicated in Experiment 1B. Participants in the different priming conditions showed no differences in their subjective emotion ratings and were unaware of the emotion prime or concept activation. Experiments 2A and 2B replicated these findings using a helping measure, demonstrating that individuals primed with guilt adjectives show more helping than do individuals primed with sadness adjectives. In all studies, effects were moderated by individuals' specific emotion-response habits and characteristics.     

Cue familiarity but not target retrievability enhances feeling-of-knowing judgments.

Two hypotheses concerning people's ability to predict later memory performance for unrecalled items were investigated. The target retrievability hypothesis states that feeling-of-knowing judgments (FKJs) are based on partial target information; and the cue familiarity hypothesis asserts that they are based on recognition of the cues. In Experiments 1 and 2, subjects either generated or read the targets of paired associates. Half of the cues had been primed in a pleasantness-rating task. The generation manipulation increased recall but had no effect on FKJs. Cue priming had no effect on recall but increased FKJs. In Experiment 3, using general information questions, primed after the initial recall attempt, both cue and target priming increased FKJs. Experiment 4, which remedied difficulties in Experiment 3, showed no effect of target priming whereas cue priming increased FKJs. The results favor the cue familiarity hypothesis.     

What's Context Got to Do with It? Comparative Difficulty of Test Questions Influences Metacognition and Corrected Scores for Formula‐scored Exams

Summary: On formula‐scored exams students receive points and penalties for correct and incorrect answers, respectively, but they can avoid the penalty by withholding incorrect answers. However, test‐takers have difficulty strategically regulating their accuracy and often set an overly conservative metacognitive response bias (e.g., Higham, 2007). The current experiments extended these findings by exploring whether the comparative difficulty of surrounding test questions (i.e., easy vs. hard)—a factor unrelated to the knowledge being tested—impacts metacognitive response bias for medium‐difficulty test questions. Comparative difficulty had no significant influence on participants' ability to choose correct answers for medium questions, but it did affect willingness to report answers and confidence ratings. This difference carried over to corrected scores (scores after penalties are applied) when comparative difficulty was manipulated within‐subjects: Scores were higher in the hard condition. Results are discussed in terms of implications for interpreting formula‐scored tests and underlying mechanisms of performance.Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Regulation of memory accuracy with multiple answers: the plurality option

We report two experiments that investigated the regulation of memory accuracy with a new regulatory mechanism: the plurality option. This mechanism is closely related to the grain-size option but involves control over the number of alternatives contained in an answer rather than the quantitative boundaries of a single answer. Participants were presented with a slideshow depicting a robbery (Experiment 1) or a murder (Experiment 2), and their memory was tested with five-alternative multiple-choice questions. For each question, participants were asked to generate two answers: a single answer consisting of one alternative and a plural answer consisting of the single answer and two other alternatives. Each answer was rated for confidence (Experiment 1) or for the likelihood of being correct (Experiment 2), and one of the answers was selected for reporting. Results showed that participants used the plurality option to regulate accuracy, selecting single answers when their accuracy and confidence were high, but opting for plural answers when they were low. Although accuracy was higher for selected plural than for selected single answers, the opposite pattern was evident for confidence or likelihood ratings. This dissociation between confidence and accuracy for selected answers was the result of marked overconfidence in single answers coupled with underconfidence in plural answers. We hypothesize that these results can be attributed to overly dichotomous metacognitive beliefs about personal knowledge states that cause subjective confidence to be extreme.     

Hindsight bias in insight and mathematical problem solving: Evidence of different reconstruction mechanisms for metacognitive versus situational judgments

This article presents two experiments that used insight and mathematical problems to investigate whether different factors would affect hindsight bias on metacognitive and situational judgments. In both studies, participants initially rated their likelihood of solving each problem within a certain amount of time (metacognitive judgments) and rated the importance of each component of the problem for finding the solution (situational judgments). Next, participants attempted to solve each problem. In Experiment 1, all participants were given solution feedback information, but in Experiment 2, participants were not given any solution feedback. After 1 week, participants were asked to recall their original judgments. Hindsight bias was assessed by comparing the initial with the final ratings. Insight problems and math problems showed different patterns of hindsight bias effects on the metacognitive and situational judgments. The results suggest that two competing models of hindsight effects are actually complementary explanations for judgment reconstruction on different types of judgment tasks.     

Measuring the search image: expectation,detection, and recognition in pigeon visual search

Pigeons searched computer screens for a grating target that varied in spatial frequency and orientation. In Experiment 1, a pretrial cue signaled that a particular target would appear. The cue speeded response to this primed target and to targets of the same orientation and similar spatial frequency to the primed target. However, the cue slowed search for targets differing from the primed target in orientation. In Experiment 2, pecks to a single target were reinforced. Responding generalized somewhat to targets of spatial frequency similar to the primed target and to targets of either orientation. Thus, stimulus aspects that affect detection may differ from those that affect recognition; if a common representation serves both, it functions differently in the 2 cases.     

The hypercorrection effect in younger and older adults

ABSTRACT

The hypercorrection effect, which refers to the finding that errors committed with high confidence are more likely to be corrected than are low confidence errors, has been replicated many times, and with both young adults and children. In the present study, we contrasted older with younger adults. Participants answered general-information questions, made confidence ratings about their answers, were given corrective feedback, and then were retested on questions that they had gotten wrong. While younger adults showed the hypercorrection effect, older adults, despite higher overall accuracy on the general-information questions and excellent basic metacognitive ability, showed a diminished hypercorrection effect. Indeed, the correspondence between their confidence in their errors and the probability of correction was not significantly greater than zero, showing, for the first time, that a particular participant population is selectively impaired on this error correction task. These results potentially offer leverage both on the mechanisms underlying the hypercorrection effect and on reasons for older adults’ memory impairments, as well as on memory functions that are spared.     

Children's appraisals of sex-typed behavior in their peers

Four experiments evaluated the effect of variations in sex-typed behavior in hypothetical peers on children's ratings of friendship. In all four studies, the children were heterogeneous with regard to social class, ethnicity, and race. In Experiment 1, children (71 boys, 90 girls) in Grades 3–6 read five stories about a target boy and in Experiment 2 (102 boys, 137 girls) about a target girl who displayed four sex-typed behaviors that ranged from exclusively masculine to exclusively feminine. In Experiment 1, boys preferred the exclusively masculine boy most as a friend. With each addition of a feminine behavior (and corresponding subtraction of a masculine behavior), the friendship ratings became increasingly negative. In contrast, the girls preferred the exclusively feminine boy most as a friend and, with each addition of a masculine behavior, the friendship ratings became increasingly negative. In Experiment 2, the converse was found although girls' ratings of friendship were less sharply affected by the target girl's sex-typed behavior than was observed for boys' ratings in Experiment 1. In Experiment 3, children (33 boys, 38 girls) in Grades K—2 were read three stories about a target boy, accompanied by detailed chromatic illustrations, whose four sex-typed behaviors were exclusively masculine, equally masculine and feminine, or exclusively feminine. The boys had significantly more favorable friendship ratings than the girls; however, in contrast to Experiments 1 and 2, the target boy's sex-typed behavior did not affect friendship ratings of either boys or girls. Experiment 4 (28 boys, 27 girls) repeated the procedure of Experiment 3 with children in kindergarten and Grade 1; in addition, the children made forced-choice friendship ratings for each of the three possible story pairs. In contrast to Experiment 3, boys' friendship ratings were affected by the target boy's sex-typed behavior, as observed in Experiment 1, but girls' friendship ratings were not. However, in the forced-choice situation, the boys significantly preferred the exclusively masculine boy whereas the girls significantly preferred the exclusively feminine boy. The results were discussed in relation to the influence sex-typed behavior has on modifying the effects of a peer's sex on affiliative preference and sex differences in appraisals of cross-gender behavior, including the concept of threshold effects.     

Distinguishing age differences in knowledge, strategy use, and confidence during strategic skill acquisition

The authors examined how age differences in strategy selection are related to associative learning deficits and metacognitive variables, including memory ability confidence. In Experiment 1, increases in memory reliance for performance of the noun-pair lookup task were compared with increases in noun-pair memory ability. In Experiment 2, memory reliance was assessed for noun pairs memorized prior to the task. In each experiment, older adults manifested a substantial delay in transition to a retrieval-based strategy despite comparable noun-pair knowledge. In Experiment 3, young and older adults reported comparable confidence ratings for the accuracy of each memory probe response. However, older adults reported lower confidence in their general ability to use the memory retrieval strategy, which correlated with avoidance of the retrieval strategy.     

Automatic priming of attentional control by relevant colors

We tested whether color word cues automatically primed attentional control settings during visual search, or whether color words were used in a strategic manner for the control of attention. In Experiment 1, we used color words as cues that were informative or uninformative with respect to the target color. Regardless of the cue's informativeness, distractors similar to the color cue captured more attention. In Experiment 2, the participants either indicated their expectation about the target color or recalled the last target color, which was uncorrelated with the present target color. We observed more attentional capture by distractors that were similar to the participants' predictions and recollections, but no difference between effects of the recollected and predicted colors. In Experiment 3, we used 100%-informative word cues that were congruent with the predicted target color (e.g., the word "red" informed that the target would be red) or incongruent with the predicted target color (e.g., the word "green" informed that the target would be red) and found that informative incongruent word cues primed attention capture by a word-similar distractor. Together, the results suggest that word cues (Exps. 1 and 3) and color representations (Exp. 2) primed attention capture in an automatic manner. This indicates that color cues automatically primed temporary adjustments in attention control settings.     

Age-related differences in metacognition for memory capacity and selectivity

ABSTRACT

Background: We compared two types of metacognitive monitoring in younger and older adults: metacognitive accuracy for their overall memory performance and their ability to selectively remember high-value information. Method: Participants studied words paired with point values and were asked to maximise their point score. In Experiment 1, they predicted how many words they would remember while in Experiment 2, they predicted how many points they would earn. Results: In Experiment 1, while younger adults were accurate in their predictions, older adults were overconfident in the number of words they would recall throughout the task. In Experiment 2, however, both younger and older adults were equally accurate when predicting the amount of points they would earn after some task experience. Conclusions: While younger adults may have higher metacognitive accuracy for their capacity, older adults can accurately assess their ability to selectively remember information, suggesting potentially separate metacognitive mechanisms that are differentially affected by aging.     

Prospective Relations Between Dysfunctional Metacognitive Beliefs,Metacognitive Strategies,and Anxiety: Results From a Four-Wave Longitudinal Mediation Model

The metacognitive model of psychological disorders suggests that emotional disorders are related to maladaptive metacognitive strategies corresponding to underlying dysfunctional metacognitive beliefs. There is substantial empirical evidence supporting a role of metacognition in psychopathology, but fewer studies have evaluated the metacognitive model using longitudinal data and taken into consideration its differentiation between components and how they are hypothesized to be related to each other. Thus, more specific model evaluation is important as it relates to identifying mechanisms of disorder with a potential to provide clinical advances. In the present study, 868 participants took part in a 4-wave survey and reported on metacognitive beliefs and strategies and anxiety symptoms. Two longitudinal mediation models (forward and reversed causation) were run to test temporal precedence and bidirectional relations. The results indicated that metacognitive beliefs significantly predicted metacognitive strategies, which further predicted anxiety symptoms and mediated the indirect effect in the relationship between metacognitive beliefs and anxiety over time. The relationship between metacognitive beliefs and anxiety symptoms over time were bidirectional, but this relationship was not accounted for by metacognitive strategies. These findings largely support central predictions set forward by the metacognitive model and indicate that metacognitions play a preceding and maintaining role in anxiety.     

Effects of study list composition on the word frequency effect and metacognitive attributions in recognition memory

In two experiments, study-list composition was manipulated and its impact was observed on metacognitive judgements associated with recognition hits (Hs) and false alarms (FAs). Both studies involved recognition of high-frequency (HF) and low-frequency (LF) words, and focused on the FA portion of the word frequency effect. Our hypothesis was that participants can actively reject items that are distinctive from the study list, and that this effect may be strong enough to overcome the FA word frequency effect. Experiment 1 manipulated list composition with a conjunctive rule and Experiment 2 varied it by having participants study either HF or LF items prior to a test consisting of words of both frequencies. In each study H rate, FA rate, and metacognitive attributions underlying recognition decisions were investigated. In both studies, participants reported rejecting test items predominantly through a process of active rejection, which was more often reported for LF items. This effect was strong enough to reverse the FA portion of the word frequency effect in Experiment 2, but not Experiment 1. The results are discussed in terms of metacognitive rejection mechanisms in recognition memory.     

Effects of study list composition on the word frequency effect and metacognitive attributions in recognition memory

In two experiments, study-list composition was manipulated and its impact was observed on metacognitive judgements associated with recognition hits (Hs) and false alarms (FAs). Both studies involved recognition of high-frequency (HF) and low-frequency (LF) words, and focused on the FA portion of the word frequency effect. Our hypothesis was that participants can actively reject items that are distinctive from the study list, and that this effect may be strong enough to overcome the FA word frequency effect. Experiment 1 manipulated list composition with a conjunctive rule and Experiment 2 varied it by having participants study either HF or LF items prior to a test consisting of words of both frequencies. In each study H rate, FA rate, and metacognitive attributions underlying recognition decisions were investigated. In both studies, participants reported rejecting test items predominantly through a process of active rejection, which was more often reported for LF items. This effect was strong enough to reverse the FA portion of the word frequency effect in Experiment 2, but not Experiment 1. The results are discussed in terms of metacognitive rejection mechanisms in recognition memory.