Listening to the Language,Listening to the Words and Listening to the Spaces between the Words: Rhetoric and Pragmatics in the Performance of Christian–Muslim Relations

The article argues for the need to look beyond the texts used within the context of interreligious dialogue, and to focus just as much on the context and the way in which the texts are expected to be heard. It focuses specifically on Christian–Muslim dialogue at an event in Iran where the author was present. By looking at the use of rhetoric and pragmatics within his own contribution to this event, he raises questions about the way in which those contributing to dialogue communicate with the many different audiences involved, and the way in which their messages are received by those audiences. By focussing on this one event, the aim is to show what might be achieved through this kind of analysis and to call for more work to be done in this kind of way.     

Are the windows to the soul the same in the East and West? Cultural differences in using the eyes and mouth as cues to recognize emotions in Japan and the United States

The current research investigated the hypothesis that, depending on an individual’s cultural background, facial cues in different parts of the face are weighted differently when interpreting emotions. Given that the eyes are more difficult to control than the mouth when people express emotions, we predicted that individuals in cultures where emotional subduction is the norm (such as Japan) would focus more strongly on the eyes than the mouth when interpreting others’ emotions. By contrast, we predicted that people in cultures where overt emotional expression is the norm (such as the US) would tend to interpret emotions based on the position of the mouth, because it is the most expressive part of the face. This hypothesis was confirmed in two studies, one using illustrated faces, and one using edited facial expressions from real people, in which emotional expressions in the eyes and mouth were independently manipulated. Implications for our understanding of cross-cultural psychology, as well of the psychology of emotional interpretation, are discussed.     

Age-related susceptibility to the Müller-Lyer and the horizontal-vertical illusions

Participants between the ages of 3 and 20 years adjusted the Müller-Lyer illusion and the inverted-T form of the Horizontal-Vertical illusion. Perceptual error was quantified using signal detection and nonparametric measures of sensitivity and responsivity. Significant changes in sensitivity and responsivity were found for each illusion across participants' ages. No effect of sex of participant was found. Sensitivity and responsivity were largely asymptotic between the ages of 13 to 15 years for the Müller-Lyer illusion and between the ages of 11 to 15 years for the Horizontal-Vertical illusion.     

Psychology and Culture: Back to the Future?

Psychology has a poor record in addressing cultural phenomena. One response is to turn to ancient concepts from local traditions and to use these as alternative analytic categories to explain behavior. However, there are problems with such an approach. These concepts will be read from the vantage point of the present and interpreted differently so as to propose different diagnoses (and solutions) for contemporary social problems. As an alternative, rather than using ancient resources as analytic categories in the explanation of behavior, we could instead examine how they are used as categories of practice as people actively make sense of their social context and themselves. Attending to such contemporary ‘lay’ usage (and the contestation it entails) allows for a more dynamic conception of cultural processes than is typical in psychology. More generally, I believe that it is possible to use our psychological constructs so that we can see the distinctive particularities of the phenomena before us in new and interesting ways, and in ways that respect their cultural specificity. This claim is illustrated through reference to recent work using the concept of social identity to illuminate aspects of Hindu pilgrimage.     

Reply to “Expanding the Frame” by Anthony Bass and to Commentaries

In this reply I offer a short answer to the question about the theme “What do we learn from experience?” I can say that certainly the power of that particular experience with that patient made me more sensitive and careful toward similar moments with other patients. I then offer some comment on the contributions in this issue of the journal. I emphasize the interweaving of structure and process and the process of building meaning as an intersubjective achievement. I also intervene on the theme “how to transmit psychoanalytic wisdom.”     

Michel Foucault and the “care of the self” approach to the Buddhist dharma

In line with a particular form of analysis as developed by Michel Foucault, this article proposes to elucidate a particular way of understanding Buddhist monastic culture as detailed in the rules concerning behaviour (the Vinaya), which may be called the “care of the self approach”. To develop this argument, the article first describes the nature of the Vinaya as a “training scheme” rather than a system of prohibitions or rules. Second, it examines the nature of confession or what is called “truth telling”. Third, it examines the nature of transgression of the Vinaya rules. Fourth, I examine the Vinaya and the role of ethics. Lastly, it is shown how these approaches to monastic Buddhism deal with the nature of the transformation of desire to construct what may be seen as a form of “ethical technology” or alternatively as a “transgressive technology”.     

Depression in the Context of Disability and the “Right to Die”

Arguments in favor of legalized assisted suicide often center on issues of personal privacy and freedom of choice over one's body. Many disability advocates assert, however, that autonomy arguments neglect the complex sociopolitical determinants of despair for people with disabilities. Specifically, they argue that social approval of suicide for individuals with irreversible conditions is discriminatory and that relaxing restrictions on assisted suicide would jeopardize, not advance, the freedom of persons with disabilities to direct the lives they choose. This paper examines the idea promoted by some proponents of assisted suicide that it is reasonable to be depressed about one's diminished quality of life in cases of irreversible illness or disability and, therefore, such depression should not call into question the individual's competence to request assistance in dying. The concept of rational depression is defined and examined in the context of: four real-life cases involving individuals with disabilities who requested assistance in dying; a set of criteria commonly applied to decision-making to determine rationality; and research bearing on the emotional status of people with disabilities. It is concluded that although disability is associated with particular socially mediated stressors, there is no theoretical or empirical evidence to indicate that depression and its role in the right to die is dynamically different, more natural, or more reasonable for disabled people than for non-disabled people.     

Returning to the Fire: Surviving the Holocaust and “Going Back”

This paper examines the multiply determined factors in Holocaust survivors who return to their native countries and sites of persecution. Citing material from archived interviews and consultations with a gravely ill survivor, as well as published accounts from others, the author explores historical, cultural, and psychodynamic dimensions. Intrapsychic, developmental, and traumatic aspects are considered, such as the fantasy of reunion with the lost maternal object, unresolved grief, the repetition compulsion, attempts at mastery, and the use of counterphobic or hypomanic defenses. This constellation of factors is seen in the context of the Jewish premium on remembering and the political realities of post war Europe. The role of the Second Generation in assisting the survivor parents in the working through process is also emphasized.     

Languages on the screen: Is film comprehension related to the viewers’ fluency level and to the language in the subtitles?

This research aimed at studying the role of subtitling in film comprehension. It focused on the languages in which the subtitles are written and on the participants' fluency levels in the languages presented in the film. In a preliminary part of the study, the most salient visual and dialogue elements of a short sequence of an English film were extracted by the means of a free recall task after showing two versions of the film (first a silent, then a dubbed-into-French version) to native French speakers. This visual and dialogue information was used in the setting of a questionnaire concerning the understanding of the film presented in the main part of the study, in which other French native speakers with beginner, intermediate, or advanced fluency levels in English were shown one of three versions of the film used in the preliminary part. Respectively, these versions had no subtitles or they included either English or French subtitles. The results indicate a global interaction between all three factors in this study: For the beginners, visual processing dropped from the version without subtitles to that with English subtitles, and even more so if French subtitles were provided, whereas the effect of film version on dialogue comprehension was the reverse. The advanced participants achieved higher comprehension for both types of information with the version without subtitles, and dialogue information processing was always better than visual information processing. The intermediate group similarly processed dialogues in a better way than visual information, but was not affected by film version. These results imply that, depending on the viewers' fluency levels, the language of subtitles can have different effects on movie information processing.     

Placebo and the helsinki declaration — What to do?

The Helsinki Declaration is the ‘gold standard’ — a directive, not a law, on how to conduct controlled studies in humans in conformity with ethical principles. In spite of many discussions about their unsuitability some articles have remained unchanged in the most recent (sixth) revision of the Declaration. The demand to use “the best treatment” excludes use of placebo in the control group and presents an obstacle to the scientific evaluation of a number of drugs and treatments in general. The use of placebo is justified whenever its use does not cause irreversible damage or considerable suffering to the well informed patient. It must be, is, and will be used in the controlled clinical trials of treatments of a great number of diseases especially those which have a tendency to spontaneous improvement, even healing, or have a pronounced psychological component An earlier version of this paper was presented at an international conference, “Placebo: Its Action and Place in Health Research Today,” held in Warsaw, Poland on 12–13 April, 2003.     

Transcendental Phenomenology and the Way to Happiness: Husserl’s Reply to Csikszentmihalyi

It is an unprecedented task to interpret Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology as a fundamental philosophy of happiness. Although happiness has been discussed in many psychologies, Csikszentmihalyi’s positive psychology defines happiness as “flow”, a psychic state of ongoing immersion guided by intrinsic motivations and rewards. In this paper, I interpret our transcendental consciousness as a radical “flow” maker and claim that in our transcendental life, happiness is what we ourselves are. Then, I propose this not only as an appeal to a change of attitude (i.e. reduction) for happiness, but also as a deep hermeneutics of the mental skills and activity designs suggested by positive psychology. In this way, worldly happiness dictums can be profoundly re-examined. Understood as such, Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology leaves us the task of how to make a concrete form of qualitative or hermeneutical research on happiness out of it.     

The wish to die and the wish to commit suicide in the adolescent: two different matters?

We shall try to demonstrate the difference between two wishes--the wish to die and the wish to commit suicide--as they express themselves during adolescence. First, death is seen as irreversible, while the suicidal act, at least during adolescence, is seen as reversible. While thoughts of suicide may be a part of normal adolescence, and the suicidal act a manifestation of pathological development specific to this stage in life, the wish to die has no age restrictions and may accompany life as a shadow, devoid of any suicidal act, for many years. It should be noted that both of these wishes may be balanced with the wish to live. Pathology appears when there is an imbalance of wishes and abnormal developmental processes. This imbalance can result in two distinct activities: suicidal acts and death behaviors. We suggest that the two stem from different mechanisms and personality pathologies. Therefore, they should be evaluated separately in order to better understand differences between suicidal and other aggressive acts and manifestations of the death wish during adolescence.     

Miracles in Sport: Finding the ‘Ears to Hear’ and the ‘Eyes to See’

Paralympic Games (PG), involving people with disabilities (PWD), are a manifestation of excellence in sport. They show that athletics performed by PWD counts as genuine sport. They also support a wider meaning of the term ‘health,’ understood not just like a utopian state of perfection, but like the ability to realize oneself in the projects and activities of one’s own choosing. Notwithstanding these virtues, PG—in their current form—may paradoxycally reinforce social prejudice against PWD. This is due to the fact that PG and Olympic Games (OG) are now two distinct events. In this article, I argue that PG should be integrated in the OG, just like women’s and ‘minor’ sports, because the separation of PG and OG indicates a morally arbitrary separation between people with and without disabilities. I also propose to remove the word ‘Para-lympic’ because it stigmatizes the sport performed by PWD as an appendix of ‘normal’ sport. Athletes with disabilities deserve special attention because they have special needs; but they also deserve an arena where their excellence is offered to the public, and this arena should not be different from that of normal-bodied athletes.     

The present and absent object—on thinking and the capacity to symbolize

In this paper, Bion's different theories on the development of thinking will be introduced: on the one hand, his theory of thoughts as resulting from tolerance for the absence of the object, and on the other hand, dream thoughts and thoughts as resulting from the presence of the object, originally through the mother's containing function. The effects of failures in this development will be discussed; among other things, a hypertrophy of the apparatus of projective identification at the expense of thinking capacities. Briefly, a comparison will be made between a facilitating relation between container and contained and the oscillation between the paranoid-schizoid and depressive position, which Bion describes as a prerequisite for open symbolizing processes. Bion's theories and concepts will be supplemented by Winnicott's theories on the “creative illusion” and the breast/the mother as a “subjective object” as a precondition for the symbolizing capacity that later develops in the “potential space”. Very briefly, a comparison is made between Winnicott's term “the subjective object” and Segal's term “symbolic equation”. Clinical vignettes are interpolated.     

What is the speed to transparent and kinetic-boundary displays?

To compare transparent motion and kinetic boundaries with unidirectional motion, in many studies the relative motion is generated by superimposing or adjoining unidirectional motions oriented in opposite directions. The presumption, tacitly underlying this comparison, is that the two oppositely directed velocities are independent of one another as far as their speed is concerned, i.e. the speed of the relative motion is presumed to be equivalent to the speed of the unidirectional components. Here we report that the relative motion between dots moving in opposite directions augments perceived speed. A constant-stimuli procedure was used to pair transparent-motion or kinetic-boundary displays with unidirectional motion, and human observers were asked to match the speed of the relative and unidirectional motions. The results show that transparency and kinetic boundaries increase the perceived visual speed by about 50%, compared with the speed of the individual components.     

Infant imitation and the self—A response to Welsh

Talia Welsh (2006 Welsh, T. 2006. Do neonates display innate self-awareness? Why neonatal imitation fails to provide sufficient grounds for innate self and other awareness. Philosophical Psychology, 19: 221–238. [Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) argues that Shaun Gallagher and Andrew Meltzoff's (1996) application of neonatal imitation research is insufficient grounds for their claim that neonates are born with a primitive body image and thus an innate self-awareness. Drawing upon an understanding of the self that is founded upon a “theory of mind,” Welsh challenges the notion that neonates have the capacity for self-awareness and charges the supposition with an essentialism which threatens to disrupt more social constructionist understandings of the self. In this paper, I initially defend Gallagher and Meltzoff's (1996) application of infant imitation to understandings of neonatal self-awareness by explaining how body image schemas can be understood as non-representational embodied cognitive phenomena that challenge “theory of mind” theory. I then further develop the claim that neonates are born self-aware with reference to my own work in fetal development. I conclude that Welsh's political concerns are unfounded by showing how the conclusion that a neonate is self-aware does not signal a return to an essentialist understanding of self-awareness, but rather introduces into philosophical and psychological discourse possible alternate understandings of an embodied sense of self that are embedded within intersubjective contexts.