Moore's paradox

G. E. Moore famously noted that saying ‘I went to the movies, but I don't believe it’ is absurd, while saying ‘I went to the movies, but he doesn't believe it’ is not in the least absurd. The problem is to explain this fact without supposing that the semantic contribution of ‘believes’ changes across first-person and third-person uses, and without making the absurdity out to be merely pragmatic. We offer a new solution to the paradox. Our solution is that the truth conditions of any moorean utterance contradict its accuracy conditions. Thus we diagnose a contradiction in how the moorean utterance represents things as being; so we can do justice to the intuition that a Moore-paradoxical utterance is in some way senseless, even if we know what proposition it expresses.     

The corroboration paradox

Evidentiary propositions E ₁ and E ₂, each p-positively relevant to some hypothesis H, are mutually corroborating if p(H|E ₁ ∩ E ₂) > p(H|E _i ), i = 1, 2. Failures of such mutual corroboration are instances of what may be called the corroboration paradox. This paper assesses two rather different analyses of the corroboration paradox due, respectively, to John Pollock and Jonathan Cohen. Pollock invokes a particular embodiment of the principle of insufficient reason to argue that instances of the corroboration paradox are of negligible probability, and that it is therefore defeasibly reasonable to assume that items of evidence positively relevant to some hypothesis are mutually corroborating. Taking a different approach, Cohen seeks to identify supplementary conditions that are sufficient to ensure that such items of evidence will be mutually corroborating, and claims to have identified conditions which account for most cases of mutual corroboration. Combining a proposed common framework for the general study of paradoxes of positive relevance with a simulation experiment, we conclude that neither Pollock’s nor Cohen’s claims stand up to detailed scrutiny. I am quite prepared to be told…”oh, that is an extreme case: it could never really happen!” Now I have observed that this answer is always given instantly, with perfect confidence, and without any examination of the proposed case. It must therefore rest on some general principle: the mental process being something like this—“I have formed a theory. This case contradicts my theory. Therefore, this is an extreme case, and would never occur in practice.” Rev. Charles L. Dodgson      

Logic of paradox revisited

Conclusion If, to return to the image with which I started this paper we consider the path of papers written on the logical paradoxes, then there is much to be learnt from the more recent additions, those by Chihara, Dowden and Woodruff included. However, the case for the paraconsistent approach to the paradoxes has not been weakened. In fact, it seems to me to have been strengthened. If we consider the path of papers, not as a signle line, but branching according to the approach to the paradoxes advocated, then the Logic of Paradox would, I still submit, be on the right track.     

An eyewitness paradox

Two methods of analysing data from an identification parade give rise to seemingly contradictory outcomes, both of which reach statistical significance. The traditional method is based on the first choices of eyewitnesses, whereas the paired-comparison method takes account of each eyewitness's full rank ordering of the lineup participants. The person that most eyewitnesses pick out as the perpetrator of an offence (according to the first-choice method) may in fact be the person that those same eyewitnesses as a group regard as least likely to have committed the act (according to the paired-comparison method). Implications of the paradox for the analysis of lineup data are considered.