Transition semantics: the dynamics of dependence logic

We examine the relationship between dependence logic and game logics. A variant of dynamic game logic, called Transition Logic, is developed, and we show that its relationship with dependence logic is comparable to the one between first-order logic and dynamic game logic discussed by van Benthem. This suggests a new perspective on the interpretation of dependence logic formulas, in terms of assertions about reachability in games of imperfect information against Nature. We then capitalize on this intuition by developing expressively equivalent variants of dependence logic in which this interpretation is taken to the foreground.     

A New Game Equivalence,its Logic and Algebra

We present a new notion of game equivalence that captures basic powers of interacting players. We provide a representation theorem, a complete logic, and a new game algebra for basic powers. In doing so, we establish connections with imperfect information games and epistemic logic. We also identify some new open problems concerning logic and games.

     

A Logical Analysis of Monty Hall and Sleeping Beauty

Hintikka and Sandu’s independence-friendly (IF) logic is a conservative extension of first-order logic that allows one to consider semantic games with imperfect information. In the present article, we first show how several variants of the Monty Hall problem can be modeled as semantic games for IF sentences. In the process, we extend IF logic to include semantic games with chance moves and dub this extension stochastic IF logic. Finally, we use stochastic IF logic to analyze the Sleeping Beauty problem, leading to the conclusion that the thirders are correct while identifying the main error in the halfers’ argument.     

If-Logic and Truth-definition

In this paper we show that first-order languages extended with partially ordered connectives and partially ordered quantifiers define, under a certain interpretation, their own truth-predicate. The interpretation in question is in terms of games of imperfect information. This result is compared with those of Kripke and Feferman.     

Signalling In Languages With Imperfect Information

This paper is a short survey of different languageswith imperfect information introduced in (Hintikka and Sandu 1989).The imperfect information concerns both quantifiers and connectives.At the end, I will sketch a connection between these languages and linearlogic.     

Some aspects of negation in English

I introduce a formal language called the language of informational independence (IL-language, for short) that extends an ordinary first-order language in a natural way. This language is interpreted in terms of semantical games of imperfect information. In this language, one can define two negations: (i) strong or dual negation, and (ii) weak or contradictory negation. The latter negation, unlike the former, can occur only sentence-initially. Then I argue that, to a certain extent, the two negations match the distinction existing in natural languages between sentential and constituent negation. As a corollary, I derive the fact that there are no mechanical rules for forming the contradictory negation of an English sentence.     

Information functions with applications

In the first place, we present the definition and fundamental properties of information functions — functions which establish a correspondence between sets of formulas and the information contained in them. The intuitions for the notion of information stem from the conception of Bar-Hillel and Carnap in [3]. In § 2 we will briefly show how those notions can be applied to the logic of theory change. In § 3 we will use them for proving two theorems about the lattices of classical subtheories and their content.     

Evolutionary Explanations of Indicatives and Imperatives

Recently there has been some interest in studying the explanation of meaning by using signaling games. I shall argue that the meaning of signals in signaling games remains sufficiently unclear to motivate further investigation. In particular, the possibility of distinguishing imperatives and indicatives at a fundamental level will be explored. Thereby I am trying to preserve the generality of the signaling games framework while bringing it closer to human languages. A number of convergence results for the evolutionary dynamics of our models will be proved.     

A Modal Logic for Mixed Strategies

Modal logics have proven to be a very successful tool for reasoning about games. However, until now, although logics have been put forward for games in both normal form and games in extensive form, and for games with complete and incomplete information, the focus in the logic community has hitherto been on games with pure strategies. This paper is a first to widen the scope to logics for games that allow mixed strategies. We present a modal logic for games in normal form with mixed strategies, and demonstrate its soundness and strong completeness. Characteristic for our logic is a number of infinite rules.     

Cybersemiotics and the Question of Semiotic and Informational Thresholds

The present article discusses various suggestions for a philosophical framework for a transdisciplinary information science or a semiotic doctrine. These are: the mechanical materialistic, the pan-informational, the Luhmanian second order cybernetic approach, Peircian biosemiotics and finally the pan-semiotic approach. The limitations of each are analyzed. The conclusion is that we will not have to choose between either a cybernetic-informational or a semiotic approach. A combination of a Peircian-based biosemiotics with autopoiesis theory, second order cybernetics and information science is suggested in a five-leveled cybersemiotic framework. The five levels are 1) a level of Firstness, 2) a level of mechanical matter, energy and force as Secondness, 3) a cybernetic and thermodynamic level of information and signal, 4) a level of sign games in living systems, and 5) a level of conscious language games in self-conscious social humans.     

Effective choice in all the symmetric 2 × 2 games

Solution concepts for game play implicitly assume what information is relevant for choosing moves. Maximin and Eliminating Dominated Strategies use payoff order; mixed strategies and Harsanyi??s risk dominance use payoff values. ??Cooperative?? strategies use previous choices, ignoring payoffs altogether. We first define the 12 symmetric 2 × 2 games as a continuous payoff space then use this space to evaluate strategies based on different types of information. Strategic success is shown to be sensitive to actual payoffs and seldom consistent for all games of an ordinally defined category such as Chicken. A new hybrid strategy using both payoff and choice information is introduced and shown to produce efficient outcomes in all symmetric 2 × 2 games when employed by both players. It does well in evolutionary tournaments against strategies of other types, especially in the difficult distribution games including Battle-of-the-Sexes.     

Equilibrium Selection,Similarity Judgments,and the “Nothing to Gain/Nothing to Lose” Effect

Rubinstein and Leland have both demonstrated that many observed violations of expected and discounted utility can be explained if people employ similarity judgments to make choices. In this paper, I show that this decision process also explains which equilibria will be selected in single‐shot games with multiple equilibria and implies that play in games will be associated with anomalies in risky choice. Data supporting these predictions are presented. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A game-theoretic comparison of the utilitarian and maximin rules of social choice

I will characterize the utilitarian and maximin rules of social choice game-theoretically. That is, I will introduce games whose solutions are the utilitarian and maximin distributions respectively. Then I will compare the rules by exploring similarities and differences between these games. This method of comparison has been carried out by others. But I characterize the two rules using games that involve bargaining within power structures. This new characterization better highlights the ethical differences between the rules.     

How perceiving additional targets modifies teams’ tactical behavior during football small-sided games

This study aimed to measure how the change on targets information modifies teams’ tactical behavior during football small-sided games. 20 male senior professional players divided in 4 teams of 5 players participated in the study. Each team played two small-sided games, one with 2 official targets with goalkeeper and one with 6 small targets. Positional data of each player were recorded using a 15 Hz portable GPS. The distance between the centers of gravity (CG) of both team, the stretch index and the relative stretch index were measured and differences accessed via standardized differences, coefficient intervals and meta-analysis procedures. A moderate increase on the distance between the CG of each team and a small decrease on the stretch index and on the relative stretch index from 2 targets to the 6 targets games was observed. It was also identified that pitch location affected the interaction between teams. When the game was played in lateral corridors or defensive sectors, the differences between game conditions increased. Emphasizing the information for attacking team to shoot at goal, by manipulating the number of targets constrained tactical behavior of teams. The amplification of specific information on small-sided games can help coaches to promote players and teams’ emergent adapted behaviors.     

Hard and Soft Preparation Sets in Boolean Games

A fundamental problem in game theory is the possibility of reaching equilibrium outcomes with undesirable properties, e.g., inefficiency. The economics literature abounds with models that attempt to modify games in order to avoid such undesirable properties, for example through the use of subsidies and taxation, or by allowing players to undergo a bargaining phase before their decision. In this paper, we consider the effect of such transformations in Boolean games with costs, where players control propositional variables that they can set to true or false, and are primarily motivated to seek the satisfaction of some goal formula, while secondarily motivated to minimise the costs of their actions. We adopt (pure) preparation sets (prep sets) as our basic solution concept. A preparation set is a set of outcomes that contains for every player at least one best response to every outcome in the set. Prep sets are well-suited to the analysis of Boolean games, because we can naturally represent prep sets as propositional formulas, which in turn allows us to refer to prep formulas. The preference structure of Boolean games with costs makes it possible to distinguish between hard and soft prep sets. The hard prep sets of a game are sets of valuations that would be prep sets in that game no matter what the cost function of the game was. The properties defined by hard prep sets typically relate to goal-seeking behaviour, and as such these properties cannot be eliminated from games by, for example, taxation or subsidies. In contrast, soft prep sets can be eliminated by an appropriate system of incentives. Besides considering what can happen in a game by unrestricted manipulation of players’ cost function, we also investigate several mechanisms that allow groups of players to form coalitions and eliminate undesirable outcomes from the game, even when taxes or subsidies are not a possibility.     

Informational coverage and correlational analysis

The question “How much does a set of variables tell us?” is formulated in terms of information measures, and a set of formulas is established which allows appropriate information measures to be derived from correlations. Particular attention is given to the question in the context of factor analysis and to formulas involving the latent roots of correlation matrices.

     

The effects of video game play on young children's aggression, fantasy, and prosocial behavior

From the ecological perspective of human development the emergence of significant media may affect children's behavior. It has been suggested that the home computer has the potential to affect young children's behavior, but no published data currently exist to support this hypothesis. However, home computer games have features similar to television. In that vein, research on television and aggression lends itself as a paradigm for studying the effects of video games on young children's behavior. From past television research it may be hypothesized that exposure to violent video games will increase children's aggressive behavior. Twenty-eight children, age 4 to 6 years were observed in a free play setting at baseline, after watching a violent cartoon and after playing “Space Invaders”. Results indicated significant differences in aggressive behavior, relative to baseline behaviors, after watching television and after playing video games. There was no difference between the television and video game conditions. It was concluded that violent video games arouse children in much the same way as violent television cartoons.     

PC-Based Game Features That Influence Instruction and Learner Motivation

PC-based games are currently being used for military training, but the instructional and motivational features of such technology are not well understood. To identify features of training games that influence instruction and motivation, a popular first-person-perspective game with a military theme was analyzed empirically. Twenty-one participants played the “basic training” portion of the game, which included Army background information, virtual marksmanship training, an obstacle course, virtual weapons familiarization, and an urban terrain training mission. The results of this research provide useful information to individuals developing training games, desktop simulations, and interactive multimedia courseware to meet optimal training objectives and strategies.     

Effects of violent video games on aggressive behavior, aggressive cognition, aggressive affect, physiological arousal, and prosocial behavior: a meta-analytic review of the scientific literature

Research on exposure to television and movie violence suggests that playing violent video games will increase aggressive behavior. A meta-analytic review of the video-game research literature reveals that violent video games increase aggressive behavior in children and young adults. Experimental and nonexperimental studies with males and females in laboratory and field settings support this conclusion. Analyses also reveal that exposure to violent video games increases physiological arousal and aggression-related thoughts and feelings. Playing violent video games also decreases prosocial behavior.     

Game relativity: how context influences strategic decision making

Existing models of strategic decision making typically assume that only the attributes of the currently played game need be considered when reaching a decision. The results presented in this article demonstrate that the so-called "co-operativeness" of the previously played prisoner's dilemma games influence choices and predictions in the current prisoner's dilemma game, which suggests that games are not considered independently. These effects involved reinforcement-based assimilation to the previous choices and also a perceptual contrast of the present game with preceding games, depending on the range and the rank of their co-operativeness. A. Parducci's (1965) range frequency theory and H. Helson's (1964) adaptation level theory are plausible theories of relative judgment of magnitude information, which could provide an account of these context effects.