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1.
Matthew S. Bedke 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2008,11(1):85-111
There are a number of proposals as to exactly how reasons, ends and rationality are related. It is often thought that practical
reasons can be analyzed in terms of practical rationality, which, in turn, has something to do with the pursuit of ends. I
want to argue against the conceptual priority of rationality and the pursuit of ends, and in favor of the conceptual priority
of reasons. This case comes in two parts. I first argue for a new conception of ends by which all ends are had under the guise
of reasons. I then articulate a sense of rationality, procedural rationality, that is connected with the pursuit of ends so
conceived, where one is rational to the extent that one is motivated to act in accordance with reasons as they appear to be.
Unfortunately, these conceptions of ends and procedural rationality are inadequate for building an account of practical reasons,
though I try to explain why it is that the rational pursuit of ends generates intuitive but misleading accounts of genuine
normative reasons. The crux of the problem is an insensitivity to an is-seems distinction, where procedural rationality concerns
reasons as they appear, and what we are after is a substantive sense of rationality that concerns reasons as they are. Based
on these distinct senses of rationality, and some disambiguation of what it is to have a reason, I offer a critique of internalist
analyses of one’s reasons in terms of the motivational states of one’s ideal, procedurally rational self, and I offer an alternative
analysis of one’s practical reasons in terms of practical wisdom that overcomes objections to related reasons externalist
views. The resulting theory is roughly Humean about procedural rationality and roughly Aristotelian about reasons, capturing
the core truths of both camps.
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Matthew S. BedkeEmail: |
2.
Matt Stichter 《Australasian journal of philosophy》2016,94(3):435-448
This paper challenges a frequent objection to conceptualizing virtues as skills, which is that skills are merely capacities to act well, while virtues additionally require being properly motivated to act well. I discuss several cases that purport to show the supposed motivational difference by drawing our attention to the differing intuitions we have about virtues and skills. However, this putative difference between virtue and skill disappears when we switch our focus in the skill examples from the performance to the performer. The ends of a practice can be used to judge not only the skilfulness of a performance, but also the motivational commitment of the performer. Being virtuous requires both acting well and being properly motivated to do so, which can be captured by viewing virtues as the moral subset of skills. In claiming this, though, I resist the idea that there is no element in virtue that is not found in other skills. Virtue requires being practically wise about how practices fit into a conception of the good life, but other skills do not. I further argue that this difference doesn't undermine the ‘virtue as skill’ thesis, as it's the connection between virtues and morality that requires practical wisdom. 相似文献
3.
Ernest W. Adams 《Pacific Philosophical Quarterly》1997,78(2):113-127
Abstract: That inferences of the form "If M then S and possibly M, therefore possibly S" are invalid in possible worlds modal logics can be viewed as another fallacy of material implication. However, this paper argues that properly analyzing this and related inferences requires treating the possibility involved as a practical modality. Specifically, ordinary language propositions of the form "It is possible that M" must be understood to mean that there is a non-negligible probability of M being the case. But this entails reexamining the very idea of logical validity. 相似文献
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Lilian O'Brien 《Philosophical Issues》2023,33(1):183-197
Well-functioning agents ordinarily have an excellent epistemic relationship to their intentional actions. This phenomenon is often characterized as knowledge of what one is doing and labeled “practical knowledge”. But when we examine it carefully, it seems to require a particular kind of understanding - understanding of the normative structure of one's action. Three lines of argument are offered to support this Necessity of Understanding thesis. The first appeals to the nature of intentional action and the second to our everyday reasons explanation of action. The final line of argument draws on a practical amnesia case in which an agent forgets her overall goal while acting. Implications of the Necessity of Understanding thesis for the widely endorsed non-observational view of practical knowledge are briefly discussed. It is argued that support for the non-observational view is weaker than has been appreciated. 相似文献
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Dustin Locke 《Philosophy and phenomenological research》2015,90(1):72-95
When we engage in practical deliberation, we sometimes engage in careful probabilistic reasoning. At other times, we simply make flat out assumptions about how the world is or will be. A question thus arises: when, if ever, is it rationally permissible to engage in the latter, less sophisticated kind of practical deliberation? Recently, a number of authors have argued that the answer concerns whether one knows that p. Others have argued that the answer concerns whether one is justified in believing that one knows that p. Against both of these, this paper argues that the answer concerns whether p is ‘practically certain’—that is, whether the actual epistemic probability that p differs from epistemic certainty that p only in ways that are irrelevant to the decision one currently faces. 相似文献
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Karsten Schoellner 《Philosophical Investigations》2017,40(2):121-138
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Nam-In Lee 《Husserl Studies》2000,17(1):49-63
This paper will deal with the problem of practical intentionality in the transcendental phenomenology of Husserl. First, through an analysis of a passage found in Logical Investigations, I will show Husserl's earlier position with respect to the problem of practical intentionality. I will then go on to critically assess this position and, with reference to some of Husserl's works written after the 1920's, prove that every intentionality should be regarded as a practical intentionality. Correspondingly, transcendental phenomenology should also be characterized as a practical philosophy. I make this statement with the following two senses in mind; transcendental phenomenology is a practical philosophy, first, in the sense that it investigates the various forms of practical intentionality and, second, in the sense that transcendental intentionality as the grounding source of transcendental phenomenology is also a kind of practical intentionality. 相似文献
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《哲学分析》2014,(2)
杨国荣教授在新作《人类行动与实践智慧》中提出一种形而上的实践智慧理论,将事实与价值、理论与实践、实然与应然等概念统一起来。尽管实践智慧的实际运作会综合地涉及诸多方面,但要清晰呈现其内在结构,须首先详尽分析每个方面在实践中的意义和作用。实践活动针对的是复杂异质的经验对象,根据对象的不同可将其大致分为三个最高范畴和六个次级范畴或类型。实践智慧的洞察与判断力就在于分析和判断实践对象应属哪个或哪些范畴,进而以适合该类型的方式筹划实践活动。范畴归属不当便是实践思维中的范畴错误,也就是实践判断的错误。只有以确切的经验分析和判断为前提,杨国荣教授所倡导的形而上的综合性实践智慧才有可能。 相似文献
13.
Tristram McPherson 《Topoi》2018,37(4):621-630
Ethical non-naturalists often charge that their naturalist competitors cannot adequately explain the distinctive normativity of moral or more broadly practical concepts. I argue that the force of the charge is mitigated, because non-naturalism is ultimately committed to a kind of mysterianism about the metaphysics of practical norms that possesses limited explanatory power. I then show that focusing on comparative judgments about the explanatory power of various metaethical theories raises additional problems for the non-naturalist, and suggest grounds for optimism that a naturalistic realist about practical normativity will ultimately be able to explain the distinctive normativity of practical norms. I then show that radical pluralism or particularism about the structure of normative ethics would complicate the naturalistic strategy that I defend. This suggests a perhaps surprising way in which the resolution of the debate between ethical naturalists and non-naturalists may rest in part on the answers to substantive normative questions. 相似文献
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Philosophical Studies - 相似文献
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Douglas Walton 《Synthese》2007,157(2):197-240
In this paper, the defeasible argumentation scheme for practical reasoning (Walton 1990) is revised. To replace the old scheme,
two new schemes are presented, each with a matching set of critical questions. One is a purely instrumental scheme, while
the other is a more complex scheme that takes values into account. It is argued that a given instance of practical reasoning
can be evaluated, using schemes and sets of critical questions, in three ways: by attacking one or more premises of the argument,
by attacking the inferential link between the premises and conclusion, or by mounting a counter-argument. It is argued that
such an evaluation can be carried out in many cases using an argument diagram structure in which all components of the practical
reasoning in the case are represented as premises, conclusions, and inferential links between them that can be labeled as
argumentation schemes. This system works if every critical question can be classified as a assumption of or an exception to
the original argument. However, it is also argued that this system does not work in all cases, namely those where epistemic
closure is problematic because of intractable disputes about burden of proof. 相似文献
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Howard J. Curzer 《The Philosophical forum》2015,46(2):129-153
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David Phillips 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2007,10(5):457-468
I argue that John Mackie’s treatment of practical reason is both attractive and unjustly neglected. In particular, I argue
that it is importantly different from, and much more plausible than, the kind of instrumentalist approach famously articulated
by Bernard Williams. This matters for the interpretation of the arguments for Mackie’s most famous thesis: moral scepticism,
the claim that there are no objective values. Richard Joyce has recently defended a version or variant of moral scepticism
by invoking an instrumentalist theory like Williams’. I argue that this is a serious strategic mistake.
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David PhillipsEmail: |
19.
Heath White 《Philosophical Studies》2006,129(2):197-221
Inferences from desired ends to intended necessary means seem to be among the most unproblematic elements of practical reasoning.
A closer look dissolves this appearance, however, when we see that such inferences are defeasible. We can nevertheless understand
such inferences as leading to the adoption of plans, by analogy with inferences leading to explanations. Plans should satisfy
at least some important ends desired by the agent, be consistent with the satisfaction of other desired ends, and be inconsistent
with as few desired ends as possible. A rational plan may rule out the satisfaction of some desires, however, and this feature
explains the defeasibility of such inferences. 相似文献
20.
Heath White 《The Philosophical quarterly》2003,53(213):566-572
Robert Brandom claims that language expressing pro-attitudes makes explicit proprieties of practical inference. This thesis is untenable, especially given certain premises which Brandom himself endorses. Pro-attitude vocabulary has the wrong grammatical structure; other parts of vocabulary do the job he ascribes to pro-attitude vocabulary; the thesis introduces implausible differences between the inferential consequences of desires and intentions, and distorts the interpretation of conditional statements. Rather, I suggest, logical vocabulary can make proprieties of practical inference explicit, just as the inferentialist says it can for theoretical inference. 相似文献