The perception of identity by 6 1/2-month-old infants.

In Study 1, sixteen 6 1/2-month-olds were habituated to a Reversible stimulus (an upright face that could be perceived as an entirely different upright face when it was rotated 180 degrees) and to a Nonreversible stimulus (a face that could be perceived as upright in only one orientation). Following habituation for each type of stimulus, test trials paired the habituated face with a novel stimulus (an inversion of the same face). For both Reversible and Nonreversible stimuli, the physical difference between the old and new test stimuli was the same (a 180 degrees rotation); however, infants devoted more visual attention to the 180 degrees rotation only when it was a Reversible face, suggesting that the identity change was detected. Experiment 2 ruled out the explanation that infants might have failed to dishabituate to the inversion of the Nonreversible stimulus because they could not remember it. Results are interpreted as evidence that 6 1/2-month-old infants are not limited to face recognition based on similarity in pattern arrangement alone, but are capable of processing faces at a representational level.     

Infants' reasoning about opaque and transparent occluders in an individuation task

There has been some debate about whether infants 10 months and younger can use featural information to individuate objects. The present research tested the hypothesis that negative results obtained with younger infants reflect limitations in information processing capacities rather than the inability to individuate objects based on featural differences. Infants aged 9.5 months saw one object (i.e. a ball) or two objects (i.e. a box and a ball) emerge successively to opposite sides of an opaque occluder. Infants then saw a single ball either behind a transparent occluder or without an occluder. Only the infants who saw the ball behind the transparent occluder correctly judged that the one-ball display was inconsistent with the box-ball sequence. These results suggest that: (a) infants categorize events involving opaque and transparent occluders as the same kind of physical situation (i.e. occlusion) and (b) support the notion that infants are more likely to give evidence of object individuation when they need to reason about one kind of event (i.e. occlusion) than when they must retrieve and compare categorically distinct events (i.e. occlusion and no-occlusion).     

The human first hypothesis: identification of conspecifics and individuation of objects in the young infant

How do infants individuate and track objects, and among them objects belonging to their species, when they can only rely on information about the properties of those objects? We propose the Human First Hypothesis (HFH), which posits that infants possess information about their conspecifics and use it to identify and count objects. F. Xu and S. Carey [Cognitive Psychology, 30(2), 111-153, 1996] argued that before the age of 1 year, infants fail to use property information. To explain their results, Xu and Carey proposed the Object First Hypothesis (OFH), according to which infants under 1 year of age have only the general concept of physical object to identify and count objects. We show that infants have a more extensive knowledge of sortals than that claimed by the OFH. When 10-month-olds see one humanlike and one non-humanlike object, they successfully identify and count them by using the contrast in their properties, as predicted by the HFH. We also show that infants succeed even when they make a decision based on differences between two close basic-level categories such as humanlike objects and doglike objects, but fail when they have to use differences within the human category. Thus, infants treat "human" as a basic sortal, as predicted by the HFH. We argue that our results cannot be accounted for by general purpose mechanisms. Neither the strong version of the OFH and its explanation in terms of object indexing mechanisms [A. M. Leslie, F. Xu, P. Tremoulet, & B. J. Scholl, Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 2(1), 10-18, 1998] nor explanations in terms of task demands [T. Wilcox & R. Baillargeon, Cognitive Psychology, 37(2), 97-155, 1998] are sufficient to explain our results.     

A new "fat face" illusion

We report a novel fat face illusion that when two identical images of the same face are aligned vertically, the face at the bottom appears 'fatter'. This illusion emerged when the faces were shown upright, but not inverted, with the size of the illusion being 4%. When the faces were presented upside down, the illusion did not emerge. Also, when upright clocks were shown in the same vertically aligned fashion, we did not observe the illusion, indicating that the fat illusion does not generalize to every category of canonically upright objects with similar geometric shape as a face.     

Neural developmental changes in processing inverted faces

We explored developmental changes in neural substrates for face processing, using fMRI. Children and adults performed a perceptual-matching task with upright and inverted face and animal stimuli. Behaviorally, inversion disrupted face processing more than animal processing for adults and older children. In line with this behavioral pattern, the left middle occipital gyrus showed a stronger face than animal inversion effect in adults. Moreover, a superior aspect of this region showed a greater face inversion effect in older than in younger children, indicating a developmental change in the processing of inverted faces. The visual regions recruited for inverted face processing in adults also overlapped more with brain regions involved in the viewing of upright objects than with regions involved in the viewing of upright faces in an independent localizer task. Hence, when faces are inverted, adults recruit regions normally engaged for recognizing objects, possibly pointing to a role for the featural processing of inverted faces.     

Infants' recognition of a face revealed through motion: contribution of internal facial movement and head movement

The experiment reported here explores 3-month-old infants' ability to recognize a human face from a specific motion pattern lacking static facial features. A woman's face was covered with black makeup and numerous white triangles. It was videotaped while the woman was pretending to interact with a baby. A soft rubber mask was prepared likewise and was videotaped while being moved and deformed by hand. In one condition, the face or mask showed facial movement only, while in a second condition there was internal movement plus head movement. The two stimuli were presented either in upright or in upside-down orientation. Results of 48 subjects indicate that the discrimination of face and mask was easier when the stimuli were presented upright. The absence of head movements did not influence the discriminability. These results suggest that 3-month-old infants organize the moving triangles on the face in the upright orientation into a coherent facelike structure.     

Object individuation: infants' use of shape, size, pattern, and color.

Recent research indicates that when an event-monitoring paradigm is used, infants as young as 4.5 months of age demonstrate the ability to use featural information to individuate objects involved in occlusion events (Wilcox & Baillargeon, 1998a, Object individuation in infancy: The use of featural information in reasoning about occlusion events. Cognitive Psychology 37, 97-155; Wilcox & Baillargeon, 1998b, Object individuation in young infants: Further evidence with an event monitoring task. Developmental Science 1, 127-142). For example, in one experiment (Wilcox & Baillargeon, 1998b, Object individuation in young infants: Further evidence with an event monitoring task. Developmental Science 1, 127-142) 4.5-month-old infants saw a test event in which a green ball with colored dots disappeared behind one edge of a narrow or wide screen, and a red box with silver thumbtacks appeared at the other edge; the narrow screen was too narrow to hide both objects simultaneously, whereas the wide screen was sufficiently wide to hide both objects at the same time. The infants looked reliably longer at the narrow- than at the wide-screen test event. These and control results suggested that the infants had: (a) used the featural differences between the ball and box to conclude that two objects were involved in the event; (b) judged that both objects could fit simultaneously behind the wide but not the narrow screen; and hence (c) were surprised by the narrow-screen event. The present experiments build on these initial findings by investigating the features to which infants are most sensitive. Four experiments were conducted with infants 4.5-11.5 months of age using the same procedure, except that only one feature was manipulated at a time: shape, size, pattern, or color. The results indicated that 4.5-month-olds use both shape and size features to individuate objects involved in occlusion events. However, it is not until 7.5 months that infants use pattern, and 11.5 months that infants use color, to reason about object identity. It is suggested that these results reflect biases in the kind of information that infants attend to when reasoning about occlusion events. Possible sources of bias are discussed.     

Gaze detection and the cortical processing of faces: Evidence from infants and adults

Abstract

Faces, as a class of objects, have been studied extensively in order to understand how the human visual system recognizes and represents objects. In this paper we studied the ontogeny of the ability to perceive gaze direction. We bring together both developmental research and neurophysiological and neuropsychological research in order to address this issue. In two experiments we explored the developmental time course of the ability to discriminate between direct and averted gaze, a task thought to involve cortical information processing of faces. We found that (a) infants as young as four months could discriminate between direct and averted gaze, (b) this ability was not due to the development of low-level visual processes, and (c) younger infants did not show reliable evidence of gaze discrimination. In an additional experiment we tested adults to study the effect of face context on the ability to discriminate gaze direction. Adult subjects were more sensitive in this discrimination when the eyes were in the context of an upright face than when the eyes were in either an inverted face or in a scrambled face. Taken together, these results suggest that the mechanisms underlying gaze detection may be mediated by cortical circuits also involved in other aspects of face recognition.     

Normal perception of Mooney faces in developmental prosopagnosia: Evidence from the N170 component and rapid neural adaptation

Individuals with developmental prosopagnosia (DP) have a severe difficulty recognizing the faces of known individuals in the absence of any history of neurological damage. These recognition problems may be linked to selective deficits in the holistic/configural processing of faces. We used two‐tone Mooney images to study the processing of faces versus non‐face objects in DP when it is based on holistic information (or the facial gestalt) in the absence of obvious local cues about facial features. A rapid adaptation procedure was employed for a group of 16 DPs. Naturalistic photographs of upright faces were preceded by upright or inverted Mooney faces or by Mooney houses. DPs showed face‐sensitive N170 components in response to Mooney faces versus houses, and N170 amplitude reductions for inverted as compared to upright Mooney faces. They also showed the typical pattern of N170 adaptation effects, with reduced N170 components when upright naturalistic test faces were preceded by upright Mooney faces, demonstrating that the perception of Mooney and naturalistic faces recruits shared neural populations. Our findings demonstrate that individuals with DP can utilize global information about face configurations for categorical discriminations between faces and non‐face objects, and suggest that face processing deficits emerge primarily at more fine‐grained higher level stages of face perception.     

Toddlers’ cognition of adding and subtracting objects in action and in perception

A first experiment tested infants’ perceptual discrimination between correct and incorrect adding and subtracting objects with a standardized violation-of-expectation procedure. Eleven-, 16- and 21-month-olds did not look longer at incorrect (one object) than at correct (two objects) results of adding one object to another, nor at incorrect (two objects) than at correct (one object) results of subtracting one object from two. A second experiment tested 21-month-olds’ sensorimotor production of addition and subtraction results using a search-for-objects procedure. They already searched correctly for two objects when one object is added to another and for one object when one is subtracted from two objects. These findings support the constructivist hypothesis that infants’ active sensorimotor production may develop before their reactive perceptual discrimination of adding and subtracting objects.     

Effects of motion and audio-visual redundancy on upright and inverted face and feature preferences in 4-13-month old pre- and full-term NICU graduates

NICU infants are reported to have diminished social orientation and increased risk of socio-communicative disorders. In this eye tracking study, we used a preference for upright compared to inverted faces as a gauge of social interest in high medical risk full- and pre-term NICU infants. We examined the effects of facial motion and audio-visual redundancy on face and eye/mouth preferences across the first year. Upright and inverted baby faces were simultaneously presented in a paired-preference paradigm with motion and synchronized vocalization varied. NICU risk factors including birth weight, sex, and degree of CNS injury were examined. Overall, infants preferred the more socially salient upright faces, making this the first report, to our knowledge, of an upright compared to inverted face preference among high medical risk NICU infants. Infants with abnormalities on cranial ultrasound displayed lower social interest, i.e. less of a preferential interest in upright faces, when viewing static faces. However, motion selectively increased their upright face looking time to a level equal that of infants in other CNS injury groups. We also observed an age-related sex effect suggesting higher risk in NICU males. Females increased their attention to the mouth in upright faces across the first year, especially between 7–10 months, but males did not. Although vocalization increased diffuse attention toward the screen, contrary to our predictions, there was no evidence that the audio-visual redundancy embodied in a vocalizing face focused additional attention on upright faces or mouths. This unexpected result may suggest a vulnerability in response to talking faces among NICU infants that could potentially affect later verbal and socio-communicative development.     

The representations of spacing and part-based information are associated for upright faces but dissociated for objects: Evidence from individual differences

Considerable evidence suggests that qualitatively different processes are involved in the perception of faces and objects. According to a central hypothesis, the extraction of information about the spacing among face parts (e.g., eyes and mouth) is a primary function of face processing mechanisms that is dissociated from the extraction of information about the shape of these parts. Here, we used an individual-differences approach to test whether the shape of face parts and the spacing among them are indeed processed by dissociated mechanisms. To determine whether the pattern of findings that we reveal is unique for upright faces, we also presented similarly manipulated nonface stimuli. Subjects discriminated upright or inverted faces or houses that differed in parts or spacing. Only upright faces yielded a large positive correlation across subjects between performance on the spacing and part discrimination tasks. We found no such correlation for inverted faces or houses. Our findings suggest that face parts and spacing are processed by associated mechanisms, whereas the parts and spacing of nonface objects are processed by distinct mechanisms. These results may be consistent with the idea that faces are special, in that they are processed as nondecomposable wholes.     

Asymmetric response time functions during left-/right-facing discriminations of rotated objects: The short and the long of it

When deciding if a rotated object would face to the left or to the right, if imagined at the upright, mental rotation is typically assumed to be carried out through the shortest angular distance to the upright prior to determining the direction of facing. However, the response time functions for left- and right-facing objects are oppositely asymmetric, which is not consistent with the standard explanation. Using Searle and Hamm’s individual differences adaption of Kung and Hamm’s Mixture Model, the current study compares the predicted response time functions derived when assuming that objects are rotated through the shortest route to the upright with the predicted response time functions derived when assuming that objects are rotated in the direction they face. The latter model provides a better fit to the majority of the individual data. This allows us to conclude that, when deciding if rotated objects would face to the left or to the right if imagined at the upright, mental rotation is carried out in the direction that the objects face and not necessarily in the shortest direction to the upright. By comparing results for mobile and immobile object sets we can also conclude that semantic information regarding the mobility of an object does not appear to influence the speed of mental rotation, but it does appear to influence pre-rotation processes and the likelihood of employing a mental rotation strategy.     

Identification of disoriented objects: effects of context of prior presentation

Half of the subjects in the training phase of Experiment 1 named objects shown in a number of orientations, whereas the other half named objects shown upright only. All subjects named objects seen in a number of different orientations in the transfer phase. Half of the objects in the transfer phase were the ones they had seen in the training phase (old objects), whereas the other half were objects they had not seen before (new objects). Mean naming time in the transfer phase increased more as the objects were rotated further from the upright for new objects than for old objects when the old objects had been seen in a variety of orientations. In contrast, a substantial and equivalent orientation effect on identification time was obtained for old and new objects when the old objects had been seen upright only. These results suggest that the extraction and use of orientation-invariant attributes to identify objects is not a "default" identification strategy employed by the human visual system. In Experiment 2, half of the objects named in the training phase were shown upright only, whereas the other half were shown in a number of orientations. Both types of objects (upright vs. rotated) were presented in a mixed fashion from trial to trial. The results revealed that prior naming of the objects in this context resulted in equivalent reductions in the magnitude of the orientation effect on identification time for both sets of objects (upright and rotated). Together, the results of these two experiments suggest that markedly different representations of objects are encoded, depending on the context in which objects are seen. Implications for models of pattern recognition are discussed.     

The role of surface discontinuity and shape in 4-month-old infants' object segregation

This research examined whether 4-month-old infants use a discontinuity in an object's front surface to visually segregate a display into two separate objects, and whether object shape enables its use. In Experiment 1, infants saw a three-dimensional display composed of two parts with distinctly different shapes. Two groups of infants saw a display in which these two shapes were divided by a visible discontinuity in the front surface (i.e., a boundary between the two objects). One of these groups saw the display move apart at the discontinuity when a gloved hand pulled one object; the second group saw the two objects move together as a single unit. A third group saw a modified version of this display that had no discontinuity present. The results suggested that infants regarded the discontinuity as an indication that the display could be composed of more than one object. In Experiment 2, infants saw the same display, but with a shape that did not highlight the discontinuity. The infants in this study showed no evidence of using the discontinuity. Together, the findings suggest that 4-month-old infants use the surface discontinuity between two objects as an indication that multiple objects could be present in a display, but only when scanning the outer edges of the display leads them to attend to it.     

Object individuation and labelling in 6-month-old infants

The ability to determine how many objects are involved in physical events is fundamental for reasoning about the world that surrounds us. Previous studies suggest that infants can fail to individuate objects in ambiguous occlusion events until their first birthday and that learning words for the objects may play a crucial role in the development of this ability. The present eye-tracking study tested whether the classical object individuation experiments underestimate young infants’ ability to individuate objects and the role word learning plays in this process. Three groups of 6-month-old infants (N = 72) saw two opaque boxes side by side on the eye-tracker screen so that the content of the boxes was not visible. During a familiarization phase, two visually identical objects emerged sequentially from one box and two visually different objects from the other box. For one group of infants the familiarization was silent (Visual Only condition). For a second group of infants the objects were accompanied with nonsense words so that objects’ shape and linguistic labels indicated the same number of objects in the two boxes (Visual & Language condition). For the third group of infants, objects’ shape and linguistic labels were in conflict (Visual vs. Language condition). Following the familiarization, it was revealed that both boxes contained the same number of objects (e.g. one or two). In the Visual Only condition, infants looked longer to the box with incorrect number of objects at test, showing that they could individuate objects using visual cues alone. In the Visual & Language condition infants showed the same looking pattern. However, in the Visual vs Language condition infants looked longer to the box with incorrect number of objects according to linguistic labels. The results show that infants can individuate objects in a complex object individuation paradigm considerably earlier than previously thought and that linguistic cues enforce their own preference in object individuation. The results are consistent with the idea that when language and visual information are in conflict, language can exert an influence on how young infants reason about the visual world.     

Perceptual specialization and configural face processing in infancy

Adults’ face processing expertise includes sensitivity to second-order configural information (spatial relations among features such as distance between eyes). Prior research indicates that infants process this information in female faces. In the current experiments, 9-month-olds discriminated spacing changes in upright human male and monkey faces but not in inverted faces. However, they failed to process matching changes in upright house stimuli. A similar pattern of performance was exhibited by 5-month-olds. Thus, 5- and 9-month-olds exhibited specialization by processing configural information in upright primate faces but not in houses or inverted faces. This finding suggests that, even early in life, infants treat faces in a special manner by responding to changes in configural information more readily in faces than in non-face stimuli. However, previously reported differences in infants’ processing of human versus monkey faces at 9 months of age (but not at younger ages), which have been associated with perceptual narrowing, were not evident in the current study. Thus, perceptual narrowing is not absolute in the sense of loss of the ability to process information from other species’ faces at older ages.     

Infants' understanding of false labeling events: the referential roles of words and the speakers who use them

The four studies reported here examine whether 16-month-old infants' responses to true and false utterances interact with their knowledge of human agents. In Study 1, infants heard repeated instances either of true or false labeling of common objects; labels came from an active human speaker seated next to the infant. In Study 2, infants experienced the same stimuli and procedure; however, we replaced the human speaker of Study 1 with an audio speaker in the same location. In Study 3, labels came from a hidden audio speaker. In Study 4, a human speaker labeled the objects while facing away from them. In Study 1, infants looked significantly longer to the human agent when she falsely labeled than when she truthfully labeled the objects. Infants did not show a similar pattern of attention for the audio speaker of Study 2, the silent human of Study 3 or the facing-backward speaker of Study 4. In fact, infants who experienced truthful labeling looked significantly longer to the facing-backward labeler of Study 4 than to true labelers of the other three contexts. Additionally, infants were more likely to correct false labels when produced by the human labeler of Study 1 than in any of the other contexts. These findings suggest, first, that infants are developing a critical conception of other human speakers as truthful communicators, and second, that infants understand that human speakers may provide uniquely useful information when a word fails to match its referent. These findings are consistent with the view that infants can recognize differences in knowledge and that such differences can be based on differences in the availability of perceptual experience.     

The emergence of kind-based object individuation in infancy

Four experiments investigated whether 12-month-old infants use perceptual property information in a complex object individuation task, using the violation-of-expectancy looking time method (Xu, 2002; Xu & Carey, 1996). Infants were shown two objects with different properties emerge and return behind an occluder, one at a time. The occluder was then removed, revealing either two objects (expected outcome, if property differences support individuation) or one object (unexpected outcome). In Experiments 1-3, infants failed to use color, size, or a combination of color, size, and pattern differences to establish a representation of two distinct objects behind an occluder. In Experiment 4, infants succeeded in using cross-basic-level-kind shape differences to establish a representation of two objects but failed to do so using within-basic-level-kind shape differences. Control conditions found that the methods were sensitive. Infants succeeded when provided unambiguous spatiotemporal information for two objects, and they encoded the property differences during these experiments. These findings suggest that by 12 months, different properties play different roles in a complex object individuation task. Certain salient shape differences enter into the computation of numerical distinctness of objects before other property differences such as color or size. Since shape differences are often correlated with object kind differences, these results converge with others in the literature that suggest that by the end of the first year of life, infants' representational systems begin to distinguish kinds and properties.     

Beyond U-Shaped Development in Infants' Processing of Faces: An Information-Processing Account

The development of the "inversion" effect in face processing was examined in infants 3 to 6 months of age by testing their integration of the internal and external features of upright and inverted faces using a variation of the "switch" visual habituation paradigm. When combined with previous findings showing that 7-month-olds use integrative processing of an upright face, but featural processing of an inverted face (Cohen & Cashon, 2001a), the present findings suggest that from 3 to 7 months, infants' ability to integrate facial features follows an N-shaped developmental pattern for upright faces and an inverted U-shaped pattern for inverted faces. We discuss these results in terms of a set of domain-general information-processing principles.