Human Enhancement,Social Solidarity and the Distribution of Responsibility

This paper tries to clarify, strengthen and respond to two prominent objections to the development and use of human enhancement technologies. Both objections express concerns about the link between enhancement and the drive for hyperagency (i.e. the ability to control and manipulate all aspects of one’s agency). The first derives from the work of Sandel and Hauskeller—and is concerned with the negative impact of hyperagency on social solidarity. In responding to their objection, I argue that although social solidarity is valuable, there is a danger in overestimating its value and in neglecting some obvious ways in which the enhancement project can be planned so as to avoid its degradation. The second objection, though common to several writers, has been most directly asserted by Saskia Nagel, and is concerned with the impact of hyperagency on the burden and distribution of responsibility. Though this is an intriguing objection, I argue that not enough has been done to explain why this is morally problematic. I try to correct for this flaw before offering a variety of strategies for dealing with the problems raised.     

Responsibility Allocation and Human Rights

How does morality allocate responsibility for what it requires? I am concerned here with one fundamental part of this question, namely, how morality determines responsibility when multiple agents are capable of contributing to or completing a moral task, and special relationships capable of generating duties with respect to the task are non-existent, insufficient as a moral response, or partly indeterminate. On one view, responsibility falls to the agents who can bear it with the least burden. I show why this is initially attractive and mistaken. Instead, I defend an equity-based approach that accommodates the intuitions that both support and trouble the least-cost principle. One upshot is that sometimes we ought prefer a distribution of responsibility that is more expensive and less local than needed to complete the task. I illustrate the practical significance of the argument in terms of the human rights of refugees.     

Theosis and Human Enhancement

Recent theological work on the meaning of theosis or deification has largely ignored today’s cultural context in which ordinary Christians are expected to put theosis into practice. The widespread use of various technologies of human enhancement creates expectations that might distort the interpretation of theosis. Human enhancement technologies tend to feed off the desire to expand the self, while theosis is grounded in the idea that true divinization means becoming like God in God’s own kenosis of self-giving love. The theology of theosis is a call to empty the self, not to expand it. If theosis defines the Christian life, the use of human enhancement technology is largely a matter of indifference.     

Retooling Techno-Moral Scenarios. A Revisited Technique for Exploring Alternative Regimes of Responsibility for Human Enhancement

The techno-moral scenarios (TMS) approach has been developed to explore the interplay between technology, society and morality. Focused on new and emerging sciences and technologies, techno-moral scenarios can be used to inform and enhance public deliberation on the desirability of socio-technical trajectories. The article presents an attempt to hybridise this scenario tool, complementing the focus on ethics with an explicit acknowledgement of the multiple meanings of responsibility and of the plurality of its regimes, i.e. the institutional arrangements presiding over the assumption and assignment of responsibilities. We call this integrated technique ‘rTMS’ to stress the continuity with the original technique and, at the same time, to highlight the additional element we aim to develop: responsibility. The article describes this approach and illustrates a loosely standardised procedure that can be used to organise and conduct public engagement workshops based on rTMS.     

改造自然界与人的道德责任——论对世界存在和人存在的重新开启

长期以来,人们总是将改造自然界的实践活动理解为满足人的生存需要的手段,在马克思以前从来没有人将改造自然界的实践活动视为一种先行开启世界存在和人存在的本体论的目的性活动。正是对改造自然界实践活动的这一重大误读,导致了现代性的实践活动给自然界带来巨大破坏和对人的存在的严重扭曲。因此,正本清源,还改造自然界实践活动的本来面目,成为摆在理论工作者面前一项迫在眉睫的任务。改造自然界的实践活动是创造世界和创造人的本体,它的先行存在地位决定了它才真正是人们对自然环境负道德责任的形而上学根据,正是通过它才开启出世界的存在和人的存在,因而它才有资格成为道德责任的关怀对象。改造自然界实践活动的先在性,决定了人们怎样进行改造自然界的实践活动,就有怎样的世界存在和怎样的人性。道德上负责任地进行改造自然界的实践活动,意味着人要负责任地创造世界、负责任地创造人的存在。对改造自然界的实践活动负道德责任,就是对自然世界负道德责任、对人本身负道德责任。     

Nanotechnology, Enhancement, and Human Nature

Is nanotechnology-based human enhancement morally permissible? One reason to question such enhancement stems from a concern for preserving our species. It is harder than one might think, however, to explain what could be wrong with altering our own species. One possibility is to turn to the environmental ethics literature. Perhaps some of the arguments for preserving other species can be applied against nanotechnology-based human enhancements that alter human nature. This paper critically examines the case for using two of the strongest arguments in the environmental ethics literature to show that nanotechnology-based human enhancements are impermissible: 1) Our species, like many other naturally occurring species, has aesthetic value. So, nanotechnology-based human enhancements that alter our species should be prohibited. 2) Our species plays valuable ecological roles. Nanotechnology-based human enhancements that alter our species are likely to interfere with our species playing our ecologically valuable roles. So, such enhancements should be prohibited. Neither argument, ultimately, proves conclusive. The paper concludes, however, that considerations underlying both arguments may show us that some nanotechnology-based human enhancements are impermissible.     

人类增强技术的发展与人性的论争

对于科技的发展,不能非此即彼,采取极端的态度,而是应该采用审视和适应的态度来面对,应理性地分析科技所带来的危险与拯救的共存现象。因而对于人类增强技术的争议不是“会不会”的事实判断,而是“应不应该”的伦理价值表述。现代技术危机的实质并不是技术本身的危机,而是价值危机和伦理危机。因而需要建立具有建设性的讨论机制,其决策必须由有责任感的、谨慎对待利益和风险的、尊重自主权和个人权利的、关注所有人利益和尊严的道德眼光来引导,必须关注子孙后代的利益,且需要承担相应的道德责任。

     

人类增强技术的伦理考量

人类增强技术作为利用高新技术提高人类机体功能或能力的一种技术干预手段,是对人类身体进行的一种技术上的改变,这必然在“人是什么”、社会公平、安全与自主权等方面引发一定的社会伦理问题。而这正是对“人是目的,而不仅仅是手段”这一绝对律令的违背。由此需要对人类增强技术进行全面的评估,从坚守“增强底线原则”、相关法规的制定和加强伦理审查等方面采取有效对策,预防或减少不良后果的产生。这样才能保证人类增强技术的发展做到有效性与合理性、真理性与价值性、安全性与效益性的完美统一。     

人类增强技术的伦理审视

人类增强技术在有望治疗人类所面临的一系列严重疾病、增强人类能力的同时,也产生了一系列亟待思考的社会、伦理和法律问题。从伦理反思的角度来看,人类增强技术的应用主要面临三方面的异议:首先,这种应用破坏了我们对医疗的传统目的的理解;第二,它在某种意义上挑战了人类生活中的一系列重要价值;第三,使用这种技术来干预人性是在"扮演上帝"。尽管这些批评提出了生物技术的应用中值得认真考虑的一些问题,但它们在某种程度上也是来自对一些相关问题的误解。一旦这些误解得到澄清,在确保能够用明确的伦理准则来制约基因技术的应用的情况下,我们无需对基因技术的应用采取全盘否定的态度。但是,在尝试应用这种技术时,我们必须充分重视人类生命的复杂性及其独特的重要性,确保这种应用不会破坏人类生活的基本形式以及相关的人类价值。     

Visions and Ethics in Current Discourse on Human Enhancement

Since it is now broadly acknowledged that ethics should receive early consideration in discourse on emerging technologies, ethical debates tend to flourish even while new fields of technology are still in their infancy. Such debates often liberally mix existing applications with technologies in the pipeline and far-reaching visions. This paper analyses the problems associated with this use of ethics as “preparatory” research, taking discourse on human enhancement in general and on pharmaceutical cognitive enhancement in particular as an example. The paper will outline and discuss the gap between the scientific and technological state of the art and the ethical debates, pointing out epistemic problems in this context. Furthermore, it will discuss the future role of genuine ethical reflection in discourse on human enhancement, arguing also that such discourse needs to include a technology assessment—in the broad sense of the term—which encompasses, inter alia, anthropological perspectives and aspects of social theory.     

Human Enhancement and Communication: On Meaning and Shared Understanding

Our technologies have enabled us to change both the world and our perceptions of the world, as well as to change ourselves and to find new ways to fulfil the human desire for improvement and for having new capacities. The debate around using technology for human enhancement has already raised many ethical concerns, however little research has been done in how human enhancement can affect human communication. The purpose of this paper is to explore whether some human enhancements could change our shared lifeworld so radically that human communication as we know it would not be possible any longer. After exploring the kinds of communication problems we are concerned with as well as mentioning some possible enhancement interventions that could bring about such problems, we will address some of the ethical implications that follow from these potential communication problems. We argue that because of the role that communication plays in human society, this issue deserves attention.     

Responsibility,Reactive Attitudes and Very General Facts of Human Nature

This paper defends P.F. Strawson's controversial ‘reversal move’, the view that the reactive attitudes determine what it means to be responsible. Many are critical of this account, arguing that it leads to the result that if we were to start to hold very young children responsible, they would be responsible. I argue that it is possible to read Strawson as providing a grammatical analysis of our moral responsibility language‐game by drawing two parallels between Strawson and Wittgenstein. This interpretation shows that the formulation of the problem associated with the ‘reversal move’ rests on a grammatical mistake.     

Beyond Therapy and Enhancement: The Alteration of Human Nature

With the rapid progress and considerable promise of nanobiotechnology/neurosciences there is the potential of transforming the very nature of human beings and of how humans can conceive of themselves as rational animals through technological innovations. The interface between humans and machines (neuro-digital interface), can potentially alter what it means to be human, i.e., the very idea of human nature and of normal functioning will be changed. In this paper, I argue that we are potentially on the verge of a paradigm shift in terms of the ends and goals of techno-science and its applications in the biomedical sciences. In particular, the development of brain-computer interfaces could reconceptualize the very notion of what it means to be human. Hence, we should not limit our reflections of applications in terms of therapy and enhancement but also include an examination of applications aiming at the alteration of human nature. To this end I will first delineate the potential paradigm shift and then map out four distinct clusters of concerns in relation to the brain-computer interface. Finally, I argue that our moral and philosophical reflections should follow a procedural model based on managed consensus due to our pluralistic context.